

An Analysis of Civil Military Internal Operations in Nigeria: An Interrogation of Selected Post Colonial State

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Abstract

This paper examines the state of civil-military relations so far under the Nigerian Fourth Republic. It studied the dimensions that civil-military relations have taken in order to establish a pattern similar to or in variance with the previous republics. The underlying argument here is that since the inception of the fourth republic, civil-military relations have followed a pattern in which the civilian administration has had a grip on the military. The political class has been conscious of the need to maintain its hold on the military. This is mostly carried out through the removal of military personnel with political affiliations. The intimidation received by the populace from the military was described as a major concern in civil-military relations in the fourth republic. This paper recognizes the fact that the military dehumanizes the civilians in the roadblocks on slight provocation and suggests the need to re-orient the military towards humanitarian services and better civil-military relations.

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Background to the Study

In 1977, the late Nigerian Afro-Beat legend and Nigerian Music Maestro Fela Kuti released an album on the invasion of his Kalakuta Republic House by the Nigerian Army (NA) with the lyrics, "The leave sorrows, tears, and blood... their regular trade mark..." Forty-four years later, Nigeria, with high-caliber soldiers trained in the Nigeria Defence Academy (NDA), Nigeria War College, Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), and other top institutions in Nigeria and overseas, is still competing with a ragtag Boko Haram insurgent group on who comes out on top in human rights abuses at the International Criminal Court (ICC) table. Indeed, since 1999, the NA has grossly abused the rights of Nigerian citizens in Odi in November 1999; in Zaki-Biam, Pro-Biafra advocates on May 30, 2016; hundreds of Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) members, also known as Shi'ites, were massacred in Zaria; soldiers used live ammunition between October 27 and October 29, 2018, and admitted to killing six of their members (Abalaka, 2019). On October 20, 2020, shortly before 7 p.m., while the End SARS demonstrators were singing Nigeria's national anthem, soldiers walked toward the protesters with a terrifyingly casual calm, the kind of calm you cannot have if you are under attack, and they shot, not up in the air, which anyway would still be an atrocity when dealing with peaceful protesters, but with their guns at arm's length, shot to kill. Flashes of gunfire tainted the air, but their falling in a hail of soldiers' bullets, under the shield of darkness, should shake Nigeria to its core. Leaving a number of people dead and flags stained with blood, the attack filled Nigerian social media feeds with images that prompted condemnation from around the world (Abalaka, 2019).

The frequency of using the military to settle internal disputes compounds the problem of violence in Nigeria's nascent democracy. The consequence of which is the violation of the rights of Nigerians, the bait for a culture of violence, and a continuation of the ethos of 29 years of military dictatorship and absolutism that employed violence against the civil society (Ojo, 2009). Ake (1995) observed that the military and democracy are in dialectical opposition. The military is an apparatus for war; force is its language and style. Hence, their use unduly militarizes political and civil conflicts. Ajiteru, (2018). Indeed, the need for a medium security force is a known security gap in Nigeria. General Ibrahim Babagida's military government was the first to problematize the need for a medium force outfit because of frequent border skirmishes between the NA and Cameroonian Gendarmerie (a medium force), which ordinarily would have been mere border skirmishes but were always escalated because of the involvement of the Nigerian army (Abalaka, 2019). To fill the gap, the National Guard was established in 1991; the succeeding General Abacha's regime disbanded it. Vanguard Editorial (November 9, 2010) noted the return to this idea by former President Goodluck Jonathan following acts of terrorism and communal violence in some parts of the country in 2010. These are clear indications that there is awareness that the army is trained to fight war against enemies and is not suited for internal security against citizens (Sulaiman, 2020). The NA is aware that it is not fit for internal operations with the frequent resultant human rights abuses and its consequent NA battered image; thus, its self-directed reforms, Transformation Agenda, implemented from 2010 to 2014. Events in Zaria and Abuja with Shiites; in Southeast with IPOB and the End SARS shooting at Lekki; show that the army cannot give what it does not have: sledge hammer is not an instrument to kill flies. The army is instituted to see any opposition as enemy to crush. (Abalaka, 2019).

Meanwhile, consequent upon the abuse of the rights of Nigerians by the army, in lieu of the army being an institution that sees any opposition as an enemy to crush, came into existence concepts like Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and other multilateral regimes that guide and place consequences on military operations. Nigeria is a signatory to them, and it mandates Nigeria to abide by the rules (Abalaka, 2019). Using the Feaver model of principal-agent civil military theory, especially its means of monitoring (fire alarms), which questions the behavior of the agent (army) through platforms like think tanks, media, and international organizations and enables the principal (government) to control and even reform the agent (Abalaka, 2019) This paper focuses on international military operational regimes and the consequences of their continued fissure by the Nigerian military. The litany of abuses by the NA is well documented in literature; thus, we shall briefly grasp through it and argue that the foundation of the Nigerian military predisposes it to human rights violations in internal security operations, and rather than the continued running afoul of international regimes on military operations, the paper argues for the establishment of a Nigerian Army Medium Force named Constabulary Corps, which shall emphasize proportionality as opposed to army disproportionate use of force and (shall be) based on the intermediate spectrum of force (army-maximum and police-minimum).

Defining Security

Traditionally, security has been defined in geo-political terms, encompassing aspects such as deterrence, power balancing, and military strategy in a state-centric sphere. The focus of national security was understood to be the protection of the state from foreign attack, real or imagined, but either way, the result would be a military buildup. This paradigm is increasingly being challenged today. The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards. However, in this web of international relations, the threat to security comes not only from one nation to another but also from various non-state sources of insecurity. There is a growing debate on the need to expand the traditional notions of security to address non-traditional threats and develop a more comprehensive approach to security (Abalaka, 2019).

Security has two sides that complement each other but, in analytical terms, have to be seen as discrete variables. These two dimensions are, first, the perception of changing security dynamics and, second, the management of security-relevant policy areas. Human security, and in a broader sense, non-traditional security, is a distinctive notion that goes well beyond all earlier attempts by Asian governments to redefine and broaden their own traditional understanding of security as protection of sovereignty and territory against military threats. The end of the Cold War has not only resulted in many non-traditional security issues becoming a focus in international relations, but it has also set the stage for a comprehensive re-evaluation of the whole concept of security. Although the long-held realist and neo-realist view has been that the overarching goal of security is the survival of the state, it has become clear that most victims of both traditional and non-traditional security threats are the individual people who live in a given country.

This is mainly because the traditional security paradigm does not address the rapidly growing non-traditional threats to security like "the struggle for resources embedded in the pursuit of energy, security, environmental degradation, forced migration, international terrorism, insurgency, and the ascendancy of non-state actors in drugs, arms, money laundering, and financial crime organizations. These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive political, economic, and social responses, as well as the humanitarian use of military force. As per UNDP-1994, the "concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly, as security of territory from external aggression, as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to the nation-state than to people." This report introduces a new concept of human security that equates security with people rather than territories and with development rather than arms. It examines both the national and global concerns of human security. The report seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development cooperation, and a restructured system of global institutions.

Roles of the Military in the Society

The role of the armed forces must be appreciated in a democracy. Civil-military relationships have dovetailed into rendering some humanitarian services in modern democratic society. There are cases of military personnel offering free medical services to civilians. In modern society, the military no longer sees themselves as mere instruments of state defense but as a part of the civil world. The development of which has indicated the capacity of the military to take on civilian roles, especially in the role of nation-building. According to Huntington (1957), there are three forms of national security policy that define the role of the military in any nation-state. They are:

- a. Military security policy;
- b. Internal security policy; and
- c. Situational security policy.

The term "military security policy refers to the essential role of the military in defending the territorial integrity of a country against external aggression or evasion (Sulaiman, 2020). The internal security policy implies that the military can be utilized in the suppression of insurrection or revolution within the state. While internal security implies that the military can contribute in a limited way to the maintenance of law and order through an integrated approach to conflict management in the state.

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Section 217, states that there shall be armed forces for the federation, which shall consist of an army, a navy, and an air force. Their roles are stated as follows:

1. Defending Nigeria from external aggression This role is in line with Huntington's military security policy. This is mostly considered by most scholars to be the primary duty of the military.
2. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air.

3. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.
4. Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly

The military must operate based on professional training to serve the democratic state and subject itself to civilian control. According to *Finer (1962)*, the military should display a high level of professionalism. The military should see their role from the angle of subversion of both internal and external threats in addition to international peacekeeping (*Abalaka, 2019*).

Challenges of Civil-Military Relations: Nigerian Experience

The very question on the minds of Democrats is how to ensure a strong military and at the same time keep it under democratic control. How should the military be controlled by the civilian government? The desirable condition is bringing the armed forces under more stable or democratic forms of civilian subordination. The democratic presidents tackled the civil-military relations paradox differently. Prior to the Fourth Republic, it was difficult to reform civil-military relations. This could have been one of the reasons for frequent military intervention in politics (*Ajiteru, 2018*). There are noticeable strains in the civilian-military relationship as there are cases of the military inflicting pain on the civilians over a slight provocation. The Shiite Islamic group's clash with the members of the armed forces is an example of civil-military confrontation (*Abalaka, 2019*).

The use of the military to put an end to a simple political crisis that could have been easily handled by the mobile unit of the Nigerian Police is like demanding too much from the military. Not only that, but the Nigerian democratic government has also developed an interest in militarizing states during elections. This has made people see the election as a period of emergency rule. This use of the military has been shown to be counterproductive to democratic development. This is evident in the various allegations that the ruling government might be using the military to rig election results. Such uses have reduced the military to political tools rather than a national fighting force.

Nigerian Army and Civil Military Relations

The NA is historically rooted in the colonial Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), which was disbanded in 1959 (*Abalaka, 2019*). Thus, NA emerged from a colonial army that was created to quell indigenous resistance and serve the interests of colonial powers. The post-colonial civil-military relations in Nigeria are influenced by their colonial history which is a security culture within which the tradition is one of repressive coercion and a general lack of civility towards the civilian population with reckless disregard for the rights of the people (*Ibrahim, 2017*). It was institutionalized to the detriment of democratic civil-military relations.

Military takeovers became commonplace in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, and Nigeria was no exception (*Ebo, 2005*). Indeed, the military ruled Nigeria for 29 out of the 60 years of its

existence and impacted strongly on the country's culture, institutions, and society by generalizing its authoritarian values, which are in essence anti-social and destructive of politics (Omeje, 2020). The civil-military relationship during those military rules was what El-Shimy (2016) called "praetorians," a political system where civilians serve in government at the pleasure of the army. Praetorian armies are foundational: they establish the political system and all its rules, usually following a coup d'état against civilian political actors, to accomplish goals of societal demobilization, political organization, and the writing of a new founding constitution for the country. Abalaka (2019) noted that praetorians are the opposite of civilian control; thus, military control would be more apt.

The foregoing conditions are a description of the Nigerian civil-military relations during the 29 years of military rule. They came through coup d'états; civilians served at their pleasure; the Nigerian political system changed from parliamentary to presidential; Nigerian federalism changed from four regions to thirty-six states and seven hundred and seventy-two local governments; and they wrote a new constitution. Consequently, Nigeria's civil-military relations in that realm were the opposite of civilian control: military control (Ajiteru, 2018).²The Fourth Republic (1999-date), which was supposed to be hallmarked by democratic civil-military relations, had rather been characterized by the military's poor human rights record, which had a debilitating impact on her effectiveness and reputation. From the serious abuse of civilian communities in Odi in 1999 and Zaki Biam in 2001 to the extrajudicial killings of members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) in Zaria and Abuja and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), these acts alienate citizens, whose cooperation is crucial for successful internal security operations (DFAT, 2018) and (<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-challenge-military-reform-2016>); to the killing of protesters at Lekki killing (tollgate) Lagos state Sulaiman (2020). The following graphs provide a brief insight into the human rights abuses that NA has perpetuated. As stated earlier, the human rights abuses are well documented in literature, especially by Amnesty International and other Human Rights Watch groups (Abalaka, 2019).

Theoretical Perspectives


This paper uses the Feaver's Principal Agency (PA) civil military theory.

Figure 1: Table of Analysis of extra judicial killings and wanton human rights abuses in Nigeria Ajiteru (2018).

		No of death		No of missing people		Houses destroyed		No of displaced people		No of Dead Soldiers		Spared properties	No of affected villages		Compensation request		Arrest/military abduction		Injuries		
		Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%	Score	%
1999	Odi	100	9.9	59,987	100	3000	75	2000	100	25	43.9	5									
2001	Zaki-biam	a whole village				1000	25			31			20	100	N100b	100					
2014	Borno	228	22.8								54.4										
2015	Zaria (Shittes)	347	34.7																		
2016	Abia (IPOB)	64	6.4																		
2016	Anambra (IPOB)	153	15.3																		
2020	Lagos (Lekki)	38	3.8																		
2020	Rivers (Obigbo)	61	6.2			dozens											365	100	100	100	
2021	Imo (Orlu)	10	0.9							1	1.8										
	Total	1001+	100	59,987	100	4000	100	2000	100	57			20	100	N100b	100	365	100	100	100	


Source: the researcher, 2021.

Figure 2. Events Diagram Sulaiman (2020)



Source: The researcher, 2021.

Figure 3: Summary Diagram.



Source: The researcher, 2021

From this paper, the temptation would have been to use Janowitz's model of constabulary force of shared value with society. However, Feaver builds a model that addresses problems between actors (principals/government) and their subordinates (agents/army), which can be likened to the employer-employee relationship (Baker, 2007). The goal is to address the problem of how the employer (the government elected by the people) ensures that the employee (the army, an agent of the government) does what is required of her—working (submission) rather than shirking (refusal to obey or obeying in breach). It is a strategic interaction between principals and their military servants; the military is working when it diligently seeks to fulfill the wishes of its civilian overseers; it will be shirking if its works do not correspond with the desires of the civilian principal, like human rights abuses during operations, which breach international regimes on military operations (Sulaiman, 2020).

Feaver (2015), described the problem of getting the agent to work in the desired manner, like working according to tendon IRs rules, as a moral hazard problem. He noted that in literature, there are two distinct ways to solve this problem: 1) to ensure that the agent is working by applying the best available monitoring system--intrusive or non-intrusive instruments, or both; 2) that the superior approach is to implement measures aimed at adjusting the agent's preferences to increasingly coincide with those of the principal, which can be measured and assessed, especially in terms of the attempt to seek convergence between the preferences of the civilian principal and the military agents and mechanisms for addressing the constantly-

threatened imbalance in the civil-military relationship (Baker, 2007), which is akin to the government which is elected by the people seeking a convergence where the military will no longer abuse the rights of her citizens and attract the wrath of other states by breaching IRs rules.

Though the Feaver model has been criticized for imposing an economic model on a relationship between a state and one of its strongest institutions, the army, Also, it is criticized that the more reassurance the principal provides, the less credible their threat of sanctions becomes, and vice versa: a principal whose commitment to support the agent is unshakable encourages the agent to take advantage and shirk with less fear of penalty. And problems of interest asymmetry, information asymmetry, and moral hazard thus impose an inherent agency loss, or divergence, between the outcome the principal seeks and what it actually gets (Biddle, 2017), which means in a state like Nigeria, the government's support for the military despite its human rights abuses encourages the military, even though the military and the state have divergent interests, like: the military wants a higher budget, while the state wants efficiency to enable her to solve other problems, and the military does not want to take risks, thus it wants to always use maximum force to achieve its goal with minimum risk. Another criticism is that it concluded that it can only be applied in mature democracies (Sulaiman, 2020). However, Baker (2017) also noted that where civilian governments have few resources with which to apply coercive power over military agents, these civilian governments can still put into place both monitoring and punishment mechanisms by means of their involvement in regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Abalaka, 2019).

Consequently, in a democracy like Nigeria, with the principle of democratic governance, the rights of citizens to protest, assemble, etc. are guaranteed, cemented even more by the rise of concepts such as the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (DHI), the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the International Human Rights Law (IHRL), the African Union (AU), Constitutive Acts, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on uses of force. These are regimes that guide military operations. And when the army goes contrary to these regimes, it goes against the interest and will of the polity and alienates citizens, whose cooperation is crucial for successful internal security operations, as events in Zaria and Abuja with Shiites, the Southeast with IPOB, and the End SARS shooting at Lekki portray. Feaver proffered a wide range of corrective options available to democratic governments, among which are devising strategy, drawing up operational plans, directing the equipping and provisioning of the military, and setting rules of engagement as means of correction (Feaver, 2005). This means that the Nigerian government must devise a strategy and a proviso on how the military can engage in internal operations without much human rights abuse. Therefore, the Feaver model of analysis is fitting for interrogating the Nigerian military's internal operations and its insistent military human rights abuses.

This paper relied on documentary method of data collection. It is most suitable for the paper because the data required for the study are already in the public domain. What is needed is to refine, interpret, evaluate, and analyze them. The paper also used content analysis, rooted in

systematic logical deductions; a method for analyzing and/or retrieving meaningful information from documents and other contents. The next section discusses international military operational regimes Abalaka, (2019).

Civil-Military Relations: Theoretical Perspectives

The access to the instrument of violence by the members of the armed forces suggests that the military is always a crucial and important factor in the democratic system (Ajiteru, 2018). This does not indicate that the military is expected to directly intervene in politics, but that they have a key role to play in the sustainability of democratic governance. Since the 15th of January 1966, when the army seized power from the democratically elected government in Nigeria, the country has witnessed more military rule than the democratic government (Sulaiman, 2020). Civil-military relations can take any form in a state. Finer (1962) describes four types of civil-military relations. The first is that the military officers can exercise their legitimate power over the civilian government like every other pressure group to achieve certain ends, such as an increase in the budget. Although the military may be able to exert considerable policy influence as an interest group, it is restricted by the fact that it cannot challenge the decisions of the civilian government. Secondly, the members of the armed forces can use the threat of some sanction or blackmail to achieve some goals (Abalaka, 2020). This is mostly in theory because any use of threats by the Nigerian military against the civilian government is considered treason and attracts the death penalty. Thirdly, according to Finer, the military may displace a civilian government and replace it with another civilian government (Abalaka, 2019). This may happen if the former civilian regime fails in its national duty. The last civil-military relationship identified by Finer is that the military officers may decide to overthrow a civilian government and take charge of state affairs (Sulaiman, 2020).

As an organization that can use coercion and force to achieve a goal of the state in terms of defense, it has created a major concern. The concern is how civilian control over the military can be sustained given the violent training of the military (Abalaka, 2019). The mechanisms and methods by which the civilian can control the military have been categorized by Huntington (1957) into 'objective' and 'subjective' mechanisms. The objective mechanism describes a form of relationship in which there is a clear division between political and military roles and responsibilities. The essence of this approach is to keep the military out of politics to the greatest extent possible. The subjective mechanism, on the other hand, dictates that the military is formally subordinate to civilian leaders and therefore stands in no way to challenge civil authority. The subjective and objective civilian control places emphasis on the ideological control, which will eventually maximize civilian power. In a nutshell, the subjective and objective framework suggests that an ideological military will see themselves as a professional military rather than a political military.

In examining the exertion of civilian control over the military, Desch (1999), delved into the structural theory of civil-military relations, which predicts that the strength or weakness of civilian control is based on the degree of internal and external threat faced by the state. In this case, a country that faces a strong external enemy will want to ensure a very strong military and

involve it in the decision-making process, while a country with little or no threat will want to reduce the capacity of the military and give it a limited role. Either way, the civil-military relationship is affected. However, it should be noted that civilian control of the military, irrespective of its capacity, does not render the military politically inactive (Abalaka, 2019). Feaver (2003) utilized the principal-agent theory to describe civil-military relations. In his analysis, he stated that the civilian hired the military's. Therefore, it is expected that the civilian, being the principal, should be able to exert maximum control over the military, which is the agent. The relationship is therefore that of an employer and employee. The employee is expected to carry out his assigned responsibility based on the terms agreed upon. In this regard, a state's civil-military relations will depend on a number of factors regarding the constitutional roles of the military that posit the military as professional in nature and not political (Abalaka, 2020).

Post-Colonial State Improving Civil-Military Relations

The 1999 constitution conferred power on the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the federation. The President possesses the power to appoint the service chiefs, while the National Assembly has the power to make laws for the regulation of the power of the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The constitution has placed the control of the military in civilian hands. This situation is different from what was obtained in the second republic, in which the Minister of Defense was ignorant about most of the decisions made by the military. The second schedule of the 1999 constitution grants the power of legislating on the military to the National Assembly. The military, in order to improve their relationship with civilians, embarked on the establishment of an office, which was borne out of the increasing interest of local and international human rights bodies in the civil-military relations in north-east Nigeria. The desk offices receive documents and investigate complaints about violations of human rights. This development has been described as a "novel and bold initiative" by human rights bodies. This move has the tendency to improve civil-military relations. Therefore, the democratic government must ensure that the powers granted to it are used to limit the excesses of the members of the armed forces, especially in their dealings with the public. This will also go a long way in preventing the military's incursion into politics.

The Case for an Army Constabulary Corps.

Indeed, it was Plato who described soldiers as guardians (people's army), which exist for those ends that all in society share and whose pursuit and protection enhance the ability of all to live according to their lives' plans. Soldiers are part of the rest of society in an ideal situation and should not have interests that are incompatible with those of the rest of the society for which they exist and are trained to defend. Their training should include indoctrinating them about the values, interests, and goals of their society since they are agents for attaining their interests. The centrality of the military was further strengthened by Thomas Hobbes, who wrote "covenants without swords are but words," and Machiavelli in *The Prince*, who affirmed that "the chief foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms... The best ordinances in the world will be despised and trampled underfoot if not supported by military power; they are like a magnificent, roofless palace that, though full of

jewels and costly furniture, must soon molder into ruin since it has nothing but its splendor and riches to defend it from the ravages of the weather (Plato, Hobbes, and Machiavelli cited in Sulaiman, 2020). Certainly, no state can exist without the military. Though the military is one of the institutions of the state, if not well subordinated to rules, it can truncate the state. The army is essentially trained to use maximum force to subdue, subjugate, and conquer enemy targets. noted that the Nigerian constitution defines the purpose of the state as the protection and security of Nigerians and the pursuit of their welfare (Abalaka, 2019).

The National Security Adviser to the President stated that there are military operations in 32 out of the 36 states of Nigeria, meaning that the normal process of the police being in charge of internal security no longer operates. The military is not traditionally trained to engage in this arena, and their rules of engagement might not be suitable for the new role thrust upon them (Ibrahim, 2013). That is why when NA is faced with protesting citizens like Shi'ites at the outskirts of Abuja, End SARS at Lekki, or when sent to quell internal crises in Odi or Zaki Biam, they resorted to serious abuse of civilian communities with live ammunition, bazookas, and other high-powered weaponry, which alienated the citizens. Also, for a country of over 200 million people facing several security challenges, a military numbering less than 120,000 personnel (all services) is clearly inadequate to face the type of daunting challenges it faces in Sulaiman (2020).

Indeed, to effectively engage in internal security and win the hearts and minds of the citizenry, the NA needs to re-calibrate its uses of force to the problem at hand rather than maximum and indiscriminate use of force that have been ineffective and counterproductive. Friesendorf (2017) noted that there are three levels of force: maximum, intermediate, and minimum, and that though internal security requires all three levels, at each level they are to show versatility and the ability to adapt their material, educational, cultural, legal, organizational, and operational characteristics, and thus levels of force, to their environment. He further stated that for the army to be versatile, soldiers would have to avoid relying on lethal weapons as a default weaponry, have to talk first, appear less martial, consider legal obligations beyond the laws of war, operate in smaller units, and work closely with the public (Abalaka, 2019). And for regular police officers to move towards versatility, they would have to be comfortable with weapons such as automatic rifles, be prepared for the use of lethal force, demonstrate a martial attitude, understand military laws and regulations, operate in larger units, and switch from crime fighting to combat if necessary. The Nigerian police has demonstrated this type of versatility in its Mobile Police Unit and Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), now Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT).

The need for such a medium and versatile force has been glaring since the 1980s. Ergo, the then military President of Nigeria, Gen. IB Babagida, considered the escalation of conflict to a war scenario whenever there was a border clash between the Nigerian army and the Cameroonian Gendarmerie (a medium force), and to fill this gap, he established the Nigerian National Guard in 1991, which Gen. S. Abacha later disbanded. In a Vanguard editorial (November 9, 2010), President Goodluck E. Jonathan mooted the idea of re-establishing the National Guard to take care of civil unrest, kidnapping, electoral violence, illegal oil

bunkering, banalization of oil and gas facilities, and militancy in the oil-producing areas (Ajiteru, 2018). The editorial emphasized that as much as they recognized the need for Nigeria to rise up to the challenges of modern-day security management, they were worried that the resort to the establishment of a National Guard is just another badly chewed and ill-digested strategy, which will lead to another round of wasteful spending. There was no need to set up another federal security agency when we already have the Army, Air Force, Navy, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Customs, Immigration, and the National Security and Civil Defense Corps. It further asked, "What was the point in adding to the constraints security agencies face when the government is struggling to fund existing ones? What would the National Guard do that the existing agencies, if better funded, could not handle? The Vanguard editorial declared. If the issue is terrorism, for instance, a branch can be created within the police to receive specialized training in tackling terrorism. Communities are also best placed to know the criminals among them. Our current chain of command for security agencies, which places everything under Abuja, cannot enhance security. It is cumbersome, makes decisions difficult to locate, and inhibits proper policing of the country. The creation of the National Guard is not only unnecessary, but it is wasteful in the same way that a Ministry of Homeland Security is a duplication of the Ministry of Interior (November 9, 2020, 12).

There is a dichotomy between external military threats and internal crime problems, which mitigate against maximum force in the domestic realm. The constitutions and laws of democracies emphasize the rule of law and norms such as proportionality; the disproportionate use of force against citizens undermines public support. Political parties, especially those in the opposition, want to ensure that the government respects constitutional provisions regarding the deployment of the military (Abalaka, 2019). Just like the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) has stridently called on the ICC to try General Buratai and other Service Chiefs he worked with for gross breach of IHL, IHRL, AU Constitutive Acts, the African Charter of Human Rights, and other international military operational regimes. Gross violation of citizens' rights was the excuse given for the invasion of Libya in 2010, which led to the deaths of President Gaddafi and some of his children. His son and top aides were declared wanted by the ICC. Today, a once prosperous Libya is a failed state and an arena for great power rivalry. The same is true of Syria, now a theater of all manner of great power rivalries. Gannon (n.d.) gave a narration of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which was tasked with fighting the Irish insurgency but was disbanded in the spring of 1921 because of its recourse to communal retaliation for IRA attacks, which made Britain lose the propaganda war critical to its counterinsurgency's success. In April 1922, over 700 disbanded RIC members were transferred to Palestine as the British section of the Palestine Gendarmerie formed a striking force or riot squad to reinforce the locally recruited policing forces. Due to the lesson learned in her misadventure in Ireland, retaliation for attacks on her was now targeted only at the perpetrators, and even in cases where gendarmes were killed, revenge was not wreaked on the wider Arab population. Its function was to maintain public order and fight against brigandage, including highway robbery and raiding by armed bands, which cast the British Gendarmerie as a counterinsurgency force. It made a success of its goals.

In the Philippines, the Constabulary officially constituted the national police force and essentially operated as a gendarmerie; it was responsible for dealing with large-scale crime, conducting wide-area operations, and enforcing the peace and national laws, especially in remote areas where other forces were non-existent or ineffective. The constabulary also played a prominent role in combating the Moro and communist insurgencies. Meanwhile, the argument for a Constabulary Corps for NA is premised on the exploits of a similar outfit, the United States of America Constabulary Army, which became fully operational on July 1, 1946, amidst the disorder of post-war Germany. Its arsenal includes armored cars, tanks, jeeps, motorcycles, and other vehicles outfitted with full radio and signal equipment. It was a highly mobile force, ready and able to respond to general and specific needs while policing places like displaced persons (DP) camps, suppressing riots, and confiscating weapons and contraband. It has a horse cavalry platoon and a motorcycle platoon in Sulaiman (2020). The horse cavalry platoon was designated to work in riot suppression and crowd control, just as modern policing agencies use horse-mounted police officers today. They were also used in wooded areas and other locations inaccessible to motor vehicles. The police were organized along the geopolitical boundary in the occupied zone. The regiments, squadrons, and troops carried this presence down to the smaller political boundaries.

Ebo (2005), noted that at the core of civil-military relations is the control and regulation of the armed and security forces by the larger society, based on the principles of transparency and accountability, to have an armed and security force that is effective and efficient in the performance of their constitutional duties and according to the dictates of democratic governance. He defined democratic control as the civilian oversight of the military by legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state in a manner consistent with the basic tenets of transparency and accountability. Key principles of democratic control are accountability of security forces to elected civil authorities and civil society; adherence of security forces to international law and domestic constitutional law; and the capacity within civil society to monitor the security sector and provide constructive input into political debate on security policies in a conducive environment, among others. Meanwhile, Feaver pointed out that, in structural terms, the desires of the civilian principal can be viewed in two-fold distinction: functional goal, whether the military is competent (measured by some reasonableness standard) to do what civilians asked it to do; and relational goal—where the military is engaging in any behavior that undermines civilian supremacy in the long run, even if it is fulfilling civilian functional orders. He described the problem of getting the agent to work in the desired manner as a moral hazard problem. Feaver noted that in general literature, there are two distinct ways to solve this problem: 1) to ensure that the agent is working by applying the best available monitoring system, intrusive or non-intrusive instruments, or both; 2) that the superior approach is to implement measures aimed at adjusting the agent's preferences to increasingly coincide with those of the principal (cited Baker, 2007).

Indeed, situating the foresaid Feaver PA tenets to the NA, functionally they look talented to do what the democratic leadership asks them to do; relationally, the Nigerian army has shown in Odi, Zakim Biam, with Shittes, with IPOB, and at Lekki that in carrying out its functions, it has been undermining the democratic ethos and control of the army. To get this agent (army)

in line with key principles of democratic control: accountability of security forces to elected civil authorities and civil society; adherence of security forces to international law and domestic constitutional law; and the capacity within civil society to monitor the security sector and provide constructive input into political debate on security policies in a conducive environment. Feaver proffered a wide range of corrective options available to civilians, among which are devising strategy, drawing up operational plans, directing the equipping and provisioning of the military, and setting rules of engagement, as among the means civilians can employ to achieve the goal of correction (Sulaiman, 2020). Therefore, using the Feaver model of analysis, the paper argues, as a correctional remedy to the incessant human rights abuses by NA, for the establishment of a NA Constabulary Corps, which shall be a kind of medium force branch of the army, with a specialty in all manners of internal security operations and well-schooled in international security operational regimes.

The Nigerian police have a miniature of such a functional unit in their Traffic Warder Unit, which specializes in traffic control, with its men coming from the area they operate. The fact that the Nigerian Army is now in thirty-two out of the thirty-six states of Nigeria has made this branch of the army apparent and obvious (Ajiteru, 2018). Their officer corps shall be composed of military officers well trained in democratic and international security operational regimes. Its men shall be recruited from their area of deployment: army divisions and army units in the 36 states of Nigeria. Apart from medium force weaponry, it shall have all equipment for the control of protests, crowds, and riots: batons, hot water spray vehicles, pepper spray, tear gas, mobile perimeter fencing, and others. The Nigerian army has the intellectual reservoir to give it all its finesse and make it suitable to Nigeria's security problems and environment, and NA, unlike the police, is far ahead in maintenance culture, logistics storage, deployment, and communications (Sulaiman, 2020).

Conclusion

To build very good and solid civil-military relations, the military should be left with operational control of the military, while the civilian should focus on policy control of the defense. The military should return to being ideological, as this will guide their conduct and relations with the political class. The professionalism of the military should be the priority of every member of the armed forces. The military should see their role as protecting civilians and not using their might to intimidate them. This will showcase the Nigerian military as professionals. The civilian government should make the military accountable and subject it to civil control. The above will promote cordial relationships between civilians and the military. This will enable civilians to exert a high level of control over the military.

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