Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria: the Boko Haram Experience (2006-2017)

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A b s t r a c t

Terrorism in Nigeria is an impediment to national security and sustainable development. The attacks on security agencies, civilians, churches, mosques, foreign embassies in Nigeria and the United Nations offices in Abuja have become more worrisome as such attacks have always resulted in collateral. With the new media, improved and sophisticated weaponry, the terrorists have unleashed mayhem on national security. This study on terrorism and counter insurgency in the northeast Nigeria between 2006-2016, studied the relationship between leadership crisis and terrorism. It also took an assessment of counter-insurgency measures to curb its prevalence. Arising from this, the study discovered that apart from poverty, unemployment and despair in the northeast, that are caused by the nature of politics and cultural values of the people terrorism is triggered by Islamic fundamentalism. Terrorism is characterized with impersonal and sustained activity intended to act on people's minds, always clandestine, intimidatory, purposive and designed to serve as a warning. This social violent act seems to have defied all measures to curb its prevalence. It equally revealed that the rise and expansion of Boko-Haram terrorist group posed security threat to lives and properties in Nigeria. Thus, this paper recommended among others, a global agreement and cooperation to be reached among nations in various areas in order to bridge socio-economic inequalities which results in aggressive behavior among the less privileged and reduce insecurity.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, Boko-Haram and State*

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Background to the Study

The fundamental responsibility of the state is the security of the lives and properties of its citizens. Issue of security is germane to the country's survival as a political entity. The security challenges in Nigeria seem to derive from lack of national identity after more than fifty six (56) years of political independent. There can be no sustainable development in any country without adequate security. There is significant mistrust, suspicion and bad faith amongst the people of Nigeria, at tribal, religious, individual and communal levels. This is manifested by communal conflict across the country and the spread of terrorist activities. However, this protective function of the state has been threatened by the emergence of "violent and terrorism-related activities. Nigeria has had quite a number of security challenges from the Urhobo-Itsekiri-Ijaw, Adono-Ndoni, Ogoni-uprising, oil producing areas versus the state and oil companies across the Niger Delta, through the Aguleri-Umuleri in Anambra state, the Zango-kataf in Kaduna state to the Tiv-Jukun in the Benue and Taraba states. Interethnic crisis is till ranging in Nigeria such as the Birom versus Fulani in Plateau state, the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko-Haram insurgency in the North-east zone of Nigeria notably, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.

Consequently, the goal of safe guarding national security, territorial authority and sovereignty of nation-states by state actors has been on the ascendancy, assuming a global dimension. The reason been that terrorism both international and local have been accepted as potent threat to the security and sovereignty of nation-states and their citizens. Since 2009, the Boko-Haram acts of terrorism have doubled in geometric terms in Nigeria. It is instructive to state that anyone who involves, adopts, supports or sponsors a policy that aims at bringing nothing but an overwhelming impulse of fear, extreme fear and dread, turning the people against their government by undermining the efficiency of security agencies promoting anarchy by causing confusion and wide spread panic, breakdown of law and order which may lead to declaration of a state of emergency and curfew among others is a terrorist (Bruno, 2015) cited in Obialor (2016). To actualize this acts, the terrorists commit acts such as hostage taking, car-bombings, suicide bombings etc. Majority of these groups are sponsored by highly place individuals in society, associations or governments to achieve their aims which are normally political and at times religious.

The rise and expansion of violent non state actors has been engendered by the process of globalization. With the support of globalization, violent groups have come to be powerful threat which the nation-states in most cases are not adequately prepared to encounter (Aydinli,2006).

Statement of the Problem

The issue of the Islamist fundamentalist group known as Boko-Haram since 2006 has continued to pose serious challenge to Nigeria's national life. To Boko-Haram group, it has been argued that poverty and the struggle for the control of economic and political power among the political class in the north are reasons for the emergence. Others have argued that it is a fallout of the on-going global attempt to radicalize Islam and instigate global jihadism with the ultimate aim of challenging the westernization of the international system by the United states and its European allies.

Book-Haram have caused serious security problems to Nigeria and its people. Their activities have affected economic and social activities. National resources that should have been channeled to more useful ventures have been sued for counter-insurgency acts. The joint security challenge against Boko-Haram appear to be at their wits and are unable to stop them. These acts of terrorism break national security, engender chaos and hamper sustainable development. The pertinent question is; how has the activities of the Boko-Haram terrorist group affected sustainable development of the north-east zone of Nigeria?

Objective of the Study

This study examined the security challenges posed by the Boko-Haram terrorist in the north east zone of Nigeria. It also looked at counter-insurgency methods.

Conceptual Explanation

Terrorism is a phenomenon that is becoming pervasive, often dominant influence in our lives. Combs (2003), sees terrorism as a synthesis of war and theater, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence that which is perpetrated on innocent victims-played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes. This description of terrorism, by this definition, involves an act of violence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims, and political motives or goals.

Terrorism is an acceptable alternative to the exercise of legitimate power, while to others, it is a negative and criminal act outside the realms of what is permissible and tolerable, and necessarily must be punished according to relevant laws.

Cline and Alexander (1987), stated that "Terrorism is a deliberate employment of violence or a threat of the use of violence by sovereign states as well as some national groups assisted by sovereign states in order to attain strategic and political objectives by a violation of law. A working definition that is relatively neutral recognizes the basic fact that terrorism is a tactic used by many different kinds of groups. It includes six major elements. Terrorism involves:

1. The use of violence or threat of violence
2. By an organized group
3. To achieve Political objectives.
4. The violence is directed against a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims, who are often innocent civilians.
5. While a government can either be the perpetrator of violence or the target, it is only considered an act of terrorism if the other actor is not a government.
6. Finally, terrorism is a weapon of the weak (Lutz and Lutz, 2005). This definition excludes kidnappings for financial gain and excludes acts by individuals, even those with political objectives.

While terrorism can involve governments as targets or perpetrators, it does not include cases during cold and hot wars where governments use terror tactics against each other. These government to government attacks are a different security issues and are not included in definitions of terrorism even if they involve massacres, atrocities, or war crimes.

Counter – Insurgency

Counter-insurgency frequently referred to by the acronym COIN – is just the opposite of insurgency. To put it differently, it involves a combination of measures undertaken by the legitimate government of a country to curb or suppress an insurgency taken up against it. So while terrorist for instance try to overthrow the existing political authority in order to establish theirs, the counter-insurgency forces try to reinstate the existing political structures as well as reduce or annihilate the usurping authority of the terrorists. In the main, counter-insurgents hold monopoly of violence, legitimacy as well as other material resources often exclusively reserved for states. These factors also emphasize the need for counter-insurgents to uphold law and order, something that technically limits their potential action in the fight against insurgencies. On the other hand, insurgents are characterized by lack of responsibility in destroying state properties while launching their grievances. They are consequently freer to violate state laws or the social norms, target civilians as well as decide where and when the conflict begins.

The US Army-Marine corps counter-insurgency field manual (FM-3-24) defined counter-insurgency as a "military, paramilitary, political economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat terrorism" (Petraeus and Amos, 2006). The 2009 joint publication 3-24 counter-insurgency operations thus defines counter-insurgency as a "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat terrorism and to address any core grievances. Furthermore, it noted that "counter-insurgency is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one" while this new definition includes a key point of addressing core terrorists "grievances, it fails to reflect the different facets of counter insurgency operations. In all effective counter-insurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the terrorist while bolstering the government legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

Boko-Haram

The Boko-Haram known as Jamaatul Alissuma lid dawa wal Jihad, started its operation in Bauchi state on July 26, 2009 and since spread to other states in the northern parts of Nigeria. Since then, the group has existed with known preferences in religious belief and social practices (Adams and Ogbonnaya, 2014). Eso (2011) has observed," the root causes of resort to violence and criminality in order to influence public policy is rather deep-seated and beyond the sectarian". This is because the attacks of the group have been targeted or directed at the state, its institutions, and the civilian populations. Several police stations including force Headquarters, Abuja, army barracks, schools, government establishments and places of worship have been attacked in several states of the federation.

The attack on the UN office in Abuja 2011 was, according Eso (2011), "a game-changer with new dynamics, far reaching and imponderable reverberations that dramatically altered the scope, intensity, and focus of Boko-Haram's violence and mission, as well as any consideration of the sect". Adams and ogbonnaya (2014) have argued that Boko-Haram induced security crisis in the north-east is more religious than political. It is said that beginning from 1987 to the controversial introduction of Sharia Penal system by some states in the north in 2000, some political leaders have laid the foundation for extremist sects to

emerge through religious manipulation which coupled with widespread illiteracy, poverty and a weak leadership, has since allowed a violent group like Boko Haram to emerge (Harrington, 2012).

According to Awoyemi (2012), "Boko-Haram phenomenon has a deep economic root more than any other perspectives from which the investigating intelligence can suggest". These realities are much more obvious in rural areas. A factual indicator is the result of the harmonized Nigeria living standard survey published by the National Bureau of statistics in 2012, which showed that the north scored badly and accounted for the large proportion of Nigerians living in poverty. Accordingly, the betrayal of the government and the low level of government presence provided criminals platform to launch insurrection being witnessed across the country mostly north-east. Indeed, terrorism has a major impact on the socio-economic and sustainable development of the north-east Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework
Frustration Aggression Theory
The study adopted the frustration Aggression theory to address the incidence of terrorism in Nigeria with a view to broadening our understanding of the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria so as to have a holistic knowledge of the underpinning issues that led to this phenomenon and the best counter-insurgency approach. The frustration aggression theory explains why people become frustrated and aggressive when their goals and aspirations are not achieved. The Frustration Aggression theory which John Dollard and his research associates initially developed in 1939 and has been expanded and modified by scholars like Leonard Berkowitz (1962) and Yates (1962) appears to be the most common explanation for violent behavior stemming from the inability to fulfill needs. Theorists who rely on this explanation use the psychological theories of motivation and behavior, as well as frustration and aggression (Anifowose, 1982). In an attempt to explain aggression, scholars point to the difference between what people feel they want or deserve to what they actually get – the "want-get-ration", and the difference between "expected need satisfaction" and "actual need satisfaction". Where expectation does not meet attainment, the tendency is for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions. This is the central argument that Ted Robert Gurr's relative deprivation thesis addressed in saying that "the greater the discrepancy, however marginal, between what is sought and what seem attainable, the greater will be the chances that anger and violence will result (Gurr, 1970).

The main explanation that the frustration aggression theory provides is that aggression is not just undertaken as a natural reaction or instinct as realists and biological theorists assume, but that it is the outcome of frustration and that in a situation where the legitimate desires of an individual is denied either directly or by the indirect consequence of the way of the society is structured, the feeling of disappointment may lead such a person to express his anger through violence that will be directed at those he holds responsible or people who are directly or indirectly related to them.

This theory applies to this study in the sense that frustration leads to aggression can be seen in the Boko-Haram terrorist group actions against the state and people in the north east of Nigeria. After waiting and seeing that politics in north east has been seized by a group of

corrupt, false muslims, poverty and western education has taken over its people, youths now take the law into their own hands by planting bombs, killing and other violent acts of terror and generally creating problems for those they believe are responsible for their predicaments.

Causes of Terrorism
The causes of terrorism in many ways are similar to the causes of most other forms of political violence (such as riots, rebellions, coups and civil wars). Individuals in a society become so disconnected or frustrated with their inability to bring about what they see as necessary changes that they resort to violence. Lutz and Lutz (2007) assert that the dissidents have a perception that society and the political system discriminate or are unfair. What is ultimately important are the perceptions of the dissidents, although greater levels of exploitation may drive larger numbers to attempt violent change.

There are some specific factors, however, that can contribute to outbreaks of terrorism Democracies with their limitations on security forces provide opportunities for terrorists. Limited political participation and repression by government forces can also breed the necessary popular discontent for violence, but states with strong security forces and firm control of their societies usually can prevent terrorist from operating (Lutz and Lutz, 2007).

States that are weak are easily taken over by terrorists groups. It is the inability of the Colombia government to function effectively in many parts of the country that has provided significant opportunities for guerrillas and terrorists, to survive and prosper. Similarly, the weak state structure present in Lebanon for the last part of the twentieth century permitted terrorist groups to form and operate. Lebanon not only saw terrorism used in the struggles to control the country; but became a base for terrorist groups operating elsewhere.

The processes involved with globalization have also contributed to outbreaks of terrorism. With faster communications and transportation outside forces- usually Western-intrusion into local societies, economies are disrupted. Further, local cultures including religious components are threatened by globalization, especially when it has been accompanied by secularization. "Terrorism in many cases can be seen as a reaction to globalization".

> *Leftist groups around the world have opposed the spread of capitalism and all its evils. Secular globalization also leads to religious and ethnic fragmentation (Ramakrishna and Tan, 2003). Many religious groups (Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu) are opposed to the secularism that comes with modernity (Pillar, 2001). Right wing, ethnocentric groups have opposed the dilution of their cultures by the outside ideas that accompany migrants, guest workers, and refugees. It is perhaps ironic that Muslims in the Middle East feel threatened by the intrusion of European or Western values at the same time that group in Europe feel threatened by individuals from Middle Eastern cultures and with Islamic ideas.*

Terrorism rooted in ethnic differences can also reflect the intrusion of outside forces as groups like the Irish and the Basques fear the submergence of their language and culture into a larger ethnic identity (Dingley and Kirk-Smith, 2002). There is another potential connection

between democracy and nationalism that has come with globalization or has been a response to it. Laqueur (2001) has suggested that the overlap between democracy and nationalism provides more opportunities for terrorism.

Nationalism provides a spark that can exacerbate ethnic differences, and democracy allows for the expression of opposing nationalist views. If Laqueur's analysis is correct, the wave of democratization that occurred at the end of the twentieth century may have increased the chances of new outbreaks of terrorism, although increasing democratization in stable countries may eventually remove many of the conditions that contribute to terrorism.

Nature, Techniques and Targets of Terrorist
Terrorism has been described as a highly impersonal and sustained activity intended to act on people's mind, always clandestine, intimidatory, purposive and designed to serve as a warning. Terrorists are known to resort to a variety of tactics, including assassination, fire-bombing, car-bombing, suicide-bombing, kidnapping, hijacking, skyjacking, hostage-taking, armed assault, sabotage, contamination with noxious or bacteriological substances, and use of innocent victims to injure affected third parties (Eminue, 2008).

The overtly political connotation of terrorism would be underscored when, as the middle East experience shows, terrorism occurs in the form of resistance against obvious social evils such as exploitation, domination and discrimination; as when Islamic fundamentalism remains secularization-resistant, rejecting the establishment in any Muslim nation of a republic that preaches religious pluralism, mutual tolerance, freedom of conscience, a scientifically-based culture and European models as a whole. (Al-Azm, 1997) cited in Eminue (2008).

In a number of ways, contemporary terrorism is radically and fundamentally different from the terrorism of yesteryears-quality of those who are terrorist, their methods targets weapons and impact. In terms of quality of individual terrorist, whereas terrorists in the past were usually "very raw, wicked, trigger happy, illiterate (school dropouts), haggard, hungry, disorganized, disoriented, unskilled and sadistic persons" (Ekwo, 2005), cited in Obialor (2016) today, terrorists are those described by Nwolise (2005) cited in Obialor (2016) as intellectuals "who do more hard thinking, hard-headed and hard-boiled analysis and calculations and highly-skilled or acquire skills in hi-tech areas such as aeronautics, nuclear technology, etc, they are well trained, established and highly motivated, adapts in the use of weapons and facilities for inter-connectivity.

The methods adopted by conventional terrorists are fundamentally different from those employed by their forebears. Whereas, in time past, terrorists were content to carryout hijacking, kidnapping, hostage-taking (from which they could extract ransomed money or negotiate freedom for their imprisoned colleagues), bomb explosions, assassinations etc, present day terrorists convert planes they hijack into missiles for eliminating historical monuments such as the world trade center (WTC) and the pentagon as well as causing mass destruction for dramatic effect.

Targets of terrorist attacks have also changed radically. No longer content to target government offices, diplomatic establishments, infrastructure such as communication facilities; Today's terrorists target commercial buses during prime rush hours on working days, commercial planes, supermarkets, sub-way train stations, cinema-centers, five-star hotels, etc. Although weapons such as knives, guns, grenades, and such-like cudgels are still being used in hijacking buses and planes, kidnapping and assassinations, today's terrorists mainly use biochemical devices such as anthrax, mustard gas, explosives, incendiary materials etc. Kapur (1996) cited in Obialor (2016) predicts that the world should be expecting surrogate warfare, nuclear terrorism, chemical-biological terrorism, high-technology terrorism, and macro-terrorism and oil resources terrorism.

The Relationship between Leadership Crisis and Terrorism

The level of public sector corruption in the country is alarming, as Nigeria has continued to be classified as one of the most corrupt countries of the world by transparency international, since the return of democracy in 1999. There is evidence from across the country that a large majority of public officials indulge in corrupt practices, instead of providing for the common good. Elected public officials engage in flagrant display of their ill gotten wealth to the chagrin and dismay of the populace who voted them into power (for those who we really voted into power).

A situation where Nigerian politicians only associated with barbaric acquisition of wealth and property through public corruption and to the chagrin of the impoverished Nigerians is now part of the violent reaction by the people (Obialor, 2016). Undoubtedly, this flagrant and wanton display of this ill gotten wealth relatively induces some weak-minded citizens to take to criminality and violence as means of survival in a society that does not have any plan for them as a result, at any slightest provocation people resort to violent crimes as an alternative means of complaint (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012). Poverty in Nigeria is a direct output of bad governance, including bloated and inefficient administrations at federal and state levels. A larger proportion of the annual budgets of the federal and state governments in Nigeria go to recurrent expenditure, instead of capital expenditure which is supposed to engender development. Over the last few years the Nigerian government has been borrowing to finance recurrent expenditure, which is an ill wind that portends continual underdevelopment for the country. Poverty and malnutrition rates are to be worse in the Boko Haram dominated states of Northwest and over 75 percent of the population surviving on less than one US dollar per day (Copeland, 2013).

Book Haram group alleges that Northern political leaders, past and present do not live in line with the tenets of Islam contrary to Islamic injunctions, the political leaders, have resorted to barbaric accumulation of wealth, indecent personal life styles which are offensive to Islamic culture, without regard to the needs and sensibilities of the masses. They have come to see terrorist activities as their way of getting backs to the system, which has refused to care for the needs of the less privileged, rather choosing to administer over unlimited corruption, without fear.

Counter-insurgency Measures

Leaders and governments facing terrorist attacks have to defend against the danger of these attacks. Since there is no one overwhelming cause or source of terrorism, partially because it is a technique that can be used by different groups for different causes. Counter measures become more difficult. It is dangerous to be prescriptive, since the latest cycle of counterinsurgencies is just beginning, and there is undoubtedly more adaptation ahead.

In modern counterinsurgency, the side may win which best mobilizes and energizes its global, regional and local support base and prevents its adversaries doing likewise. Most fundamentally, we might reconsider the classical conception of counterinsurgency as a competition for legitimate government. Seeing it instead as a competition to mobilize, interpreted in the broadest sense. Modern insurgency/terrorism may not seek to seize government, relying instead on their ability to mobilize sympathizers within a global audience and generate local support. Thus local government legitimacy may be a secondary factor (Kilcullen, 2006). Likewise, the counterinsurgent must mobilize the home population, the host country, the global audience, the populations of allied and neutral countries, and the military and government agencies involved. Success may be less about local legitimacy and more about the ability to energize and mobilize support, and deny energy and mobility to the enemy's support base.

In modern counterinsurgency, the security force "area of influence" may need to include all neighboring countries, and its "area of interest" may need to be global. The classical single-state paradigm for counterinsurgency may no longer apply, since insurgents operate across boundaries and exploit a global "virtual sanctuary". Legal and practical considerations will probably prevent military activity outside a single-country "area of operations". But border security, money transfers, ungoverned areas, ethnic minorities, refugees and media in neighboring states may all play key operational roles for the insurgents/terrorist. Similarly, the terrorists' propaganda audience, funds, recruits and support may be global. So the counterinsurgent's parent government must work globally to counter propaganda and disrupt funding and recruiting. This implies a vastly increased role for diplomacy, global intelligence liaison and information operations.

In modern counterinsurgency, the security force must control a complex "conflict ecosystem" rather than defeating a single specific insurgent adversary. Classical counterinsurgency focuses on securing the population rather than destroying the enemy. Modern terrorism believes in multiple competing terrorist forces fighting each other as well as the government, and the "supported" government's interests may differ in key respects from those of its allies. Hence, we might conceive of the environment as a "conflict ecosystem" with multiple competing entities seeking to maximize their survivability and influence. The counterinsurgent's task may no longer be to defeat the terrorist, but rather to impose order (to the degree possible) on an unstable and chaotic environment.

In modern counterinsurgency, "victory" may not be final-"Permanent containment" may be needed to prevent defeated terrorists transforming into terrorists groups. Classical counterinsurgency defines victory as military defeat of the insurgents, destruction of their political organization, and their marginalization from the population. Typically, destruction

of insurgent remnants takes decades, but once permanently marginalized, they are no longer considered a threat. Yet this may no longer apply to modern counterinsurgency, in which cell-based organizations, bombing based tactics, global communications and improved lethality make it easy for marginalized insurgent movements, to transform themselves into terrorist groups. Pursuing classically defined victory over insurgents, particularly those linked to Qaeda, may simply create a series of virtually-linked, near-invisible "rump" terrorist movements in previous insurgent theaters. Since terrorists do not require a mass base, this may perpetuate rather than end the broader conflict. In modern counterinsurgency, victory may need to be re-defined as the disarming and reintegration of insurgents into society, combined with popular support for permanent, institutionalized anti-terrorist cells-emerging from the former insurgent movement.

Discussions of Findings
The findings of the study are;
1. The study established that, endemic poverty, unemployment and despair in the northeast that are orchestrated by the nature of politics and cultural values of the people (especially, among the political elite who want to be venerated by the downtrodden among them). The major motivational factor that triggered the insurgency is Islamic fundamentalism. This can be seen by the linkage between Boko Haram and other international Islamic sects.
2. The study showed that the rise and expansion of the Boko Haram group poses security threats to lives and properties in Nigeria thereby creating an investors unfriendly environment in the northeast area of Nigeria.
3. The operations of the violent non-state actors (Boko Haram) are having negative effect on sustainable development efforts of the Nigerian state.
4. Lastly, Boko Haram poses great threat to national security and sovereignty and territoriality of the state.

Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis, it is certain that insecurity beclouds the Nigerian state. This is more worrisome as the Boko-Haram terrorist group has a far reaching terrorist network with al qaeda in the Maghreb, al shabab in Somalia and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Book-Haram constitutes great threat to national security in Nigeria. A multi dimensional approach that will address the symptom of terrorism and root causes must include looking into such problems that create the enabling environment. Poorly and lack of employment, particularly with regard to the Boko-Haram remain a monumental challenge.

Understanding them may seem a wise thing to do. Such motivations that are applicable to Boko-Haram include perceptions of social exclusion, real or perceived discrimination, frustrated expectations and government repression that may push already frustrated individuals into collective violence. Lack of good governance has also affected the operations of security and intelligent agencies as they are seen as lacking adequate training, in addition to being ill-equipped, ill motivated and without modern and state of the art intelligence disciplines. Hence they lack the capacity to effectively combat breaches of security, especially in terms of combating terrorism by groups that are believed to be well armed, more motivated

and which have an unlimited capacity to recruit willing hands from among the large number of unemployed, frustrated and poverty ridden youths. No less a problem is the culture of impurity and flagrant display of ill gotten wealth by political functionaries especially in the northern parts of Nigeria which tend to exacerbate the rate at which the Boko-Haram sect is able to recruit youths who see in their political leaders the proof of the claim of Boko-Haram that they have no fear of Allah, and are looting the public treasury for their selfish ends. Military actions alone cannot end terrorism. As noted earlier a multifaceted counter-insurgency measures which would address the various agitations, along with the military actions may be what the situation requires to curb terrorism in Nigeria.

Recommendations

Arising from the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made;

i.   Global efforts must be made among state actors and non state actors for cooperation in various areas in order to curtail international crime and terrorism and reduce poverty and equally reduce socio-economic inequalities which in most cases result in aggressive behaviors among the less privileged as was with Boko Haram.

ii.   There is the urgent need for a complete and total overhauling of the security apparatus of the state to meet the modern techniques of the insurgents challenging the state. This will include adequate training, funding and equipping of the security agencies.

iii.   There should be re-defined approach of disarming and reintegration of insurgents into society, combined with popular support for permanent, institutionalized anti-terrorist cells-emerging from the former insurgent movement.

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