

Resurgence of Violence in the Niger Delta and Peace Building Strategies in Post-Amnesty Era

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Abstract

Conflict especially insurgency and terrorism constitute new threat to peace and security at all levels hence this study examined “resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta and peace building strategies in post-amnesty era”. The study relied on primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data was generated through questionnaires, focus group discussions and special interviews while the secondary data was generated from records and documentation from the Presidential Amnesty Committee (PAC), civil society organizations, newspapers, magazines, academic publications etc. In terms of theoretical framework, the study made use of the basic human need's theory and the frustration aggression hypothesis by John Burton and John Dollard in explaining the factors responsible for conflict and the resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta. Findings from the study revealed that the inability of the amnesty programme to address critical socio-economic needs and challenges of the Niger Delta people (real drivers of the conflict) accounts for conflict, resurgence of violence and militancy in the oil-rich region. Other factors that are likely to escalate conflict in post-amnesty Niger Delta include: lack of gainful employment, internal struggle for security contracts and uncooperative attitude of multinational oil companies etc. Despite these challenges, the study is optimistic that with massive industrialization and investment in infrastructure and welfare needs of the people via employment creation, violence, insecurity, criminal activities and other social vices will be eradicated in post-amnesty Niger Delta.

Keywords: *Conflict, Insurgency, Resurgence, Violence, Niger Delta, Post-amnesty, Peace building and Security.*

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Background to the Study

Conflict especially, insurgency and terrorism remain a major threat to peace and security at the global level hence, states have devised and developed different methods and strategies to tackle conflict in their various environments based on its dynamics and peculiarity. It is argued that conflict in Africa especially, socio-political, economic and ethno-religious conflict occur as a result of poor-governance, mal-administration and power tussle (struggle for power and economic resources) amongst the ruling class and elites. Highlighting the dangers and consequences of conflict in Africa, Alao (2007), stated thus, for Africa, the implication of natural resources conflict has been severe sometimes underlining central issues, for example, the collapse of state structures, massive human right mishandles, the weakening of civil society, the disintegration of traditional institutions (Alao, 2007, 2). Alao (2007), Achebe (1984) and Burton (1997), are therefore of the view that factors driving any conflict should be identified and addressed to avoid its escalation since the degeneration of conflict into insurgency or terrorism portends great danger for the citizens and the society as a whole. It is in the light of the above background that this study examined *“resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta and peace building strategies in post-amnesty era”* with a view to charting a new course and proffering new peace building strategies for the oil-rich region.

Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis

The study adopted the basic human needs theory by John Burton in order to evaluate and examine the reasons for the resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta. This theory advocates that the basic needs of individuals and groups/communities must be accommodated in any decision-making process because according to Burton (1997) fundamental human desires can impact our convictions and human attitudes negatively or positively. Proponents of this theory maintain that conflict does not occur in a vacuum but are triggered by several forces and factors which takes the form of violent contestations, group formation and increased hostile interactions within the state/society. This clearly describe the Niger Delta conflict which initially started as a mere civil unrest which later escalated due to the nonchalant attitude of multinational oil companies and the federal government which resorted to use of military force which in turn led to the proliferation of militant camps and groups across the Niger Delta region. The basic human needs theory as applied in this paper clearly explains the fact that understanding the real causes of any conflict helps the state and the society to resolve such conflict without much friction. Thus, the continuous neglect of the citizen's basic needs by the government accounts for the conflict and resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta. On the other hand, the frustration aggression hypothesis was also used to explain the factors responsible for the Niger Delta uprisings in Nigeria. The original formulation of the frustration aggression theory by Dollard et al (1939), focused on the limited interference with an expected attainment of a desired goal on hostile (emotional) aggression hence, indicating that when people find it hard to achieve their goals and heart desires in any society, they are compelled to react otherwise by engaging in aggressive behaviour. Recent findings and studies have also shown that the frustration–aggression theory is intended to suggest to researchers and scholars of human nature that when he sees aggression, he should turn a suspicious eye on possibilities that the organism or group is confronted with frustration and that when he views interference with individual or group habits he should also be on the look-out for, among other

things, aggression (Green, 1941, 82). Proponents of this theory maintain that aggression is caused by frustration and when people are prevented from attaining their goals or targets in life, they become frustrated. This scenario according to frustration-aggression theorists can then turn into aggression when something triggers it. Aggression in this context is usually directed towards the cause of the frustration but where this is not feasible, the aggression may be directed to others thus, youths in different parts of the country who have been deprived of education, good governance and other socio-economic amenities have decided to embrace armed struggle against the Nigerian state as a way of venting their anger and frustration. It is on record that the frustration that emanated from the insensitivity and nonchalant posture of the Nigerian state in addressing the issue has eventually turned Nigerian society into a complex environment, characterised by frequent inter group (ethnic) conflict across the country. This clearly shows that when people perceive that they are being oppressed and deprived of their survival (in this case their access to basic social needs), their frustration is likely to turn into aggression as reflected in the Niger Delta and other conflicts across Nigeria and Sub-Saharan African states.

Conceptual Analysis

The main subject-matter variable and focus of this study is the phenomenon of conflict, thus this section of the study examined the following concepts.

1. Conflict
2. Conflict Analysis
3. Peace building and
4. Conflict Resolution

Conceptual analysis helps to give direction to a study or investigation hence, the concept of methodology according to Kaplan cited in Obasi (1999), is to help in understanding in the broadest possible way both the product and the process of scientific inquiry. The need for concepts and theories in any research effort was stressed by Lieber (1992). According to him, behind every concept or analysis there is a theory or view point which make it possible for the presentation and interpretation of facts. The concept of conflict can also be viewed and analysed from different perspectives hence, peace scholars and researchers examine conflict based on their ideological beliefs and persuasions. Scholars across all disciplines however agree that conflict involved disagreement between individuals, group, communities and nations. They further agreed that conflict can escalate or de-escalate based on the methodology and framework applied. Thus, Alao (2007) reiterated that most devastating conflicts in Nigeria and Africa in the past and the present are linked to struggle for power and control of natural resources. Adidu (2006) described conflict as the discord that arises when the goals, interests, or values of different individuals or groups block or thwart each other's attempt to achieve their objective. Francis (2006:20) also defines conflict as "the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different group. He reiterated that armed conflict is "the resort to the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and particular interests and goals". The use of military force as a conflict resolution mechanism remains a source of debate among scholars in international relations. Thus, Kissinger and Osgood et al (1967) argued that the use of military power when controlled can be used to check the excesses

of ruthless state actors in the international arena. In their words: the unstable and unregulated nature of the contemporary international system make the capacity to wage war an indispensable instrument of national survival and of a just international order ... Therefore, the task of modern statecraft is to restrain military power and control it for legitimate political ends (Osgood, R. and Tucker, R. 1967: p.216). However, Coser (1995), define conflict as the struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of opposing parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure or dominate their rivals. Ezirim (2010) gave the following as features or characteristics of any conflict situation or environment:

1. There must be two or more parties with distinct interests;
2. There must be struggle by each to control the object of the struggle and
3. The objective of each party is to neutralize, injure or eliminate the other party.

It is therefore important to recognize that conflict is a form of interaction and a way of achieving some kind of unity even if it involves annihilation of the conflicting parties (Ezirim, 2010, 16). It is argued that there is no single universally accepted definition of conflict but conflict scholars and practitioners agree that conflict is inherent (inevitable) in all societies. According to Rakhim (2010), conflict refers to some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the same group are either or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. He added that conflict can also arise between people of the same group, known as intra-group conflict, or it can occur between members of two or more groups, and involve violence, tension, known as inter-group conflict. In his contribution to the subject-matter, Nicholson (1992), defines conflict as an activity which takes place when conscious beings (individuals or groups) wish to carryout mutually inconsistent acts concerning their wants, needs or obligation. Rakhim (2010), however lists the following as common elements that constitute the conflict process:

1. There are recognized opposing interests between parties in zero-sum situation.
2. There must be a belief by each side that the other side is or will act against them.
3. This belief is likely to be justified by actions taken.
4. Conflict is a process, having developed from their past interactions.

He reiterated that conflict is an interaction within or between social entities. Macduff (2004) also added that conflict resolution practice involves identifying the underlying causes of conflict and seek structural, rational and inclusive issues. While x-raying the importance of conflict analysis he reiterated that conflict analysis helps to ascertain if one is dealing with the right approach and the issues involved in order to determine appropriate responses. Basse (2002), added that peace building is also enhanced by knowledge of the motives for conflict and peculiarities of conflict systems. He reiterated that conflict prevention requires the identification and containment of possible conflict drivers before they trigger conflicts. Scholars are of the view that conflict persist in Africa due to wrong evaluation and application of conflict analysis tools and framework. According to Alao (2007), 40 percent of the twenty-seven (27) violent conflicts in the world were taking place on the African continent (Alao, 2007, 2). Social conflict scholars like Karl Marx (1883) posited that the need to outsmart and prevent others from gaining advantage in the struggle and competition for scarce and available

resources accounts for most of the conflicts in the society. Proponents of social conflict theory include: Wells Margaret. (1979), Ralf Dahrendorf (2009), Max Weber (1920) etc. According to Peterside (2017), differences in interests and opinions between groups and communities are natural, but how such differences are expressed and managed determines if conflicts will manifest themselves in violent and non-violent ways. Conflict scholars are therefore of the view that poorly managed conflict will experience escalation while a well-managed conflict will experience a steady decline. Ibeanu (2008) reiterated that, it appears that each advancement system created for the Niger Delta has incomprehensively underdeveloped the area (Ibeanu, 2008, 4). While commenting on the impact of the Niger Delta conflict on the economy, Obadan and Choker (2013) added that more than 10% of oil losses are linked to crude oil theft hence, urgent attention was needed to improve the nations earnings. They reiterated that Nigeria lost about 33.8 billion dollars as a result of militant activities for the Niger Delta region from 2000-2008. Violence and insecurity continued in the Niger Delta until 6th July 2009 when former president Umaru Musa Yar'Adua proclaimed amnesty to youths and agitators in the Niger Delta region. This proclamation led to the establishment of a Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) domiciled in the presidency. This development has no doubt helped to reduce the level of violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta.

Research Methodology

The study relied on two main sources of data (primary and secondary) and both yielded quantitative and qualitative information. The primary data was generated through Questionnaire, Focus Group Discussion (FGDs) and special interviews. Each questionnaire contained a set of closed ended questions (structured) which allowed respondents to tick from a list of answers while the opened questions (unstructured) gave respondents the liberty to answer in their own words. On the other hand, in the Focus Group Discussion (FGD), participants were representative of different interest groups including gender, age, socio-political groups, community-based organizations (CBOs) traditional leaders as well as former agitators/militant leaders. In all, there were nine (9) Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) in the study area, three (3) Focus Group Discussion in Bayelsa, Delta and River state respectively. Questions raised during the Focus Group Discussions Focused on the level of understanding and awareness of the amnesty programme, role played by community/traditional institutions, non-governmental organizations, perception of the programme and their fears in the post-amnesty era. The population of study comprised the entire people in the core Niger Delta states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers State. The estimated population of the three states according to the 2006 census is presented in Table 1. Thus, the population of the study according to 2006 census information presented in the table is ten million, nine hundred and seven thousand, one hundred and sixty-nine (10, 907, 169). The population was further reduced at the end of the sample and sampling exercise to four hundred, covering respondents from the three selected states (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers state). The sample size was kept as low as possible and considerable care was taken to ensure that it is representative of all the segments of the population.

Table 1: Selected Niger Delta states and their estimated population based on the 2006 census figures

S/N	State	Estimated Population
1	Bayelsa	1,703,358
2	Delta	4,098,391
3	Rivers	5,185,420
4	Total	10,907,169

Source: Adapted from National Population Commission (2006)

The sample techniques were both random and purposive hence, stakeholder's categories such as ex-militants/leaders were selected purposively while respondents from community-based organizations (CBOs) women groups, community development committees (CDCs) and youth associations were selected through simple random sampling technique. For secondary data, the study relied on records and documentation from the presidential amnesty committee (PAC), civil society organizations (CSOs), newspapers and magazines, academic publications etc. The focus was basically to re-appraise and evaluate the amnesty programme with a view to providing new peace building strategies in the post-amnesty era in the Niger Delta.

Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents

Majority of the respondents in the study are males within the age brackets of 20-30 years while some of them had some form of primary education, most of them had no formal education. Thus, while some completed secondary education a negligible number of the respondents have qualifications above secondary school level (graduates). Records however shows that vast majority of the people in the Niger Delta still depend on their immediate environment for survival through fishing, farming and petty trading. However, oil and gas activities such as dredging and laying of pipe lines across the Niger Delta has adversely affected economic activities and lively hood of the people. The activities of oil multinational companies such as oil spillage and excessive heat have led to the destruction of fish ponds, farm lands and the entire ecosystem. This development no doubt strained the relationship between community leaders, youths and the oil companies. Suspicion and distrust became the order of the day. The destruction of the ecosystem and the search for employment led to constant clashes between the youths, the Nigeria military and the oil companies. This no doubt marked the beginning of violence and conflict in the Niger Delta region.

Legal Status of the Amnesty Programme/Policy

The militarization of the Niger Delta due to the non-implementation of the Kaiama declaration and other agreements by the federal government and multinational oil companies led to the proliferation of militant camps and weapons across the oil-rich region between 1998-2009, This development no doubt prompted the Umaru Musa Ya'Adua-led administration to proclaim amnesty for aggrieved youths of Niger Delta on the 25th June 2009. The amnesty programme/policy further established the Presidential Amnesty Committee (PAC) which was mandated to coordinate the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militants/agitators in the Niger Delta. Initially, only few political stake holders were consulted prior to the announcement of the amnesty offer hence, there was resistance at the beginning.

Respondents in the study stated that wider consultation was done and that the following category of persons were consulted: militant leaders, state and local government, regional and community leaders, security agencies and other stake holders. Some respondents added that prior to the declaration of amnesty for the militants in the region, political leaders and elders from the Niger Delta were mobilized to the creeks to pacify aggrieved Niger Delta youths and militants teaching and educating them on the need and methodology of surrendering their arms and ammunition without necessarily deviating from the goals of the Niger Delta struggle/agitation. According to the respondents, the action of political leaders and elders was to assist the Federal Government to use the amnesty programme as a platform and to address the socio-economic problems and challenges in the Niger Delta in order to avoid a resurgence of violence and insecurity in the oil-rich-region. Regarding the legality of the amnesty programme, some stakeholders argued that the National Assembly was not consulted hence, the programme has no legal/constitutional backing. On the other hand, some scholars and respondents maintained that section 175 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended empowers the president to grant amnesty where necessary thus, they contended that the proclamation of amnesty by the Umaru Musa Yar'Adua-led administration in June, 2009 has constitutional backing.

Actual implementation of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta

While most respondents believed that the federal government of Nigeria did not set up any agency to drive and implement the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta, very few respondents re-iterated that the federal government set up a technical committee on the Niger Delta and the presidential Amnesty committee on Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militants in the Niger Delta. It is important to note that the first committee was chaired by the then Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Godwin Abbe (rtd). Issues relating to poor leadership and the mismanagement of the N60 billion released to the committee prompted the Federal Government to dissolve the presidential committee in November 2009. By the 16th of December 2009, the federal government to drive the amnesty programme. This time several stake holders including militant leaders and their nominees were co-opted as members of some of the committees. At the end of the disarmament and demobilization phase, ex-militants were profiled and documented and deployed to a camp at Obubra in Cross River State for further trainings on peace building and nonviolence. In the words of Sofiri Joab (2017), an estimated total of twenty thousand, one hundred and ninety-two (20,192) ex-militants were to be admitted into the camp for intensive nonviolence transformational training and re-orientation programme that runs for a period of fourteen (14) days per batch of between one thousand (1000) and one thousand five hundred (1,500) ex-militants (Sofiri, Joab, 2017, 131). Abazie (2014) noted that the federal government amnesty programme objectives and deliverables were expected to run in three phases as listed below:

1. A disarmament phase which was to last from 6th August 2009 and 4th October 2009 and to include the collection of biometric data and oath taking.
2. A demobilization and rehabilitation phase expected to last from 6 to 12 months and to include the provision of, among other things counselling and career guidance for the ex-combatants and participants.

3. A re-integration phase expected to last up to five years and to include the provision of, among other things, training and micro credit for the participants.

The amnesty programme objectives and expected deliverables is listed in the table below.

Table 2: Components of the federal governments amnesty programme

Disarmament	Demobilization	Reintegration
Duration: August 6- October 4, 2009	Rehabilitation duration:6-12 months	Duration: up to 5 years
Key activities ❖ Collection of arms and ammunitions, explosives etc.	Key activities ❖ Ex-militants report to camp ❖ Verification and documentation ❖ Transformational training. ❖ Peace building and conflict resolution ❖ Counselling ❖ Career guidance ❖ Wellness assessment ❖ Reintegration classification ❖ Education and vocational placement ❖ Graduation and demobilization	Key activities ❖ Knowledge and skills acquisition ❖ Financial empowerment ❖ Placement programmes ❖ Micro credit ❖ Education ❖ Reconciliation with local community ❖ Conflict resolution framework/mechanism ❖ Monitoring and evaluation ❖ Exit of amnesty
Key Enabler Disarmament camp Massive campaign.	Key Enabler Transformational training centres Rehabilitation camps.	Key Enabler Partnering government agencies, NGOs and private organizations, OGIS training and support framework.

Source: Adapted from Arugu and Okoye 2014, 80

Public Awareness of the Amnesty Programme

75 percent of the respondents confirmed the federal government as the financial and coordination of the amnesty programme while 20 percent of the respondents attributed the programme to the efforts of state government in the Niger Delta. In the same vein 5 percent of respondents named local governments in the Niger Delta as the implementing and coordinating body in charge of the amnesty programme. Thus, indicating that the amnesty programme did not receive adequate publicity and enlightenment at the grass roots. The study however observed that the federal government is the main financier and coordinator of amnesty programme. Majority of the respondents did not also know that international organizations, non-governmental organizations and multinational oil companies provided support for the amnesty programme especially during the demobilization and reintegration phases. The institutional framework and structure used during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration phases of the programme include: The amnesty committee, the military and other security agencies (police, civil defence, navy etc.).

The study observed that the role of non-governmental organizations was more visible during the reintegration phase. During this period, the NGOs provide technical services such as training to ex-combatants on non-violence, peace building, methodology and other psycho-

social services which helped the ex-combats to adjust to civil/democratic life. Majority of respondents added that financial dealings and contracts were never made public by the presidential amnesty committee and members of the reconstituted committees hence there was internal struggle over the initial N50 billion take off grant released on the 30th July, 2009. The study observed that the major NGO involved in the re-orientation phase of the amnesty programme is a Lagos based firm known as “Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN) led by one Mr. Allen Onyema. Smaller firms were also involved in the reintegration phase but Mr. Allen Onyema's foundation coordinated the whole process and also engaged other international partners such as the team of transformational trainers from the University of Rhode Island Centre for Nonviolence and Peace Studies United States led by Dr Bernard Lafayette. It is on record that the foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN) in conjunction with other NGOs handled the transformation training of ex-militants on nonviolence and peace building. Thus, ex-combatants who have willingly renounced violence (armed struggle) and have also pledged to live a normal civil life free from violence and terror are graduated in batches on a weekly basis from the Obubra camp in Cross River State. Data generated from the study shows that most of the firms and vendors engaged during the reintegration phase of the amnesty programme were hurriedly established to manage the programme hence they had no established base/location, future goals or background in civil society operations. This explained why some of the respondents and ex-militants interviewed complained of misappropriation of funds, under-payment and inadequate training and welfare while in the training camp at Obubra.

Assessment of the Disarmament (Arms and Ammunition Surrendering) Process

Data generated from the study revealed that the disarmament (arms surrendering) process was a huge success across the Niger Delta states especially in the core Delta states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers state. Details of the quantity of arms surrendered and the camp/militant leader is listed in the tables below:

Table 3a: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Ngologolo Toroma

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	MG Rifle	3	22/08/2009
2.	AK 47 Rifle	4	22/08/2009
3.	LAR Rifle	1	22/08/2009
4.	G3 Rifle	6	22/08/2009
5.	Sterling SMG Rifle	1	22/08/2009
6.	G3 Empty Magazine	6	22/08/2009
7.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	4	22/08/2009
8.	SME Empty Magazine	1	22/08/2009
9.	9MN Live Ammunition	16 RDS	22/08/2009
10.	7.62 Short Live Ammunition	121 RDS	22/08/2009
11.	7.62 Ball live Ammunition	291 RDS	22/08/2009
12.	Dynamites Nitrocellulose	11/23KG	22/08/2009
13.	Improvised Explosive Device	1	22/08/2009

Table 3b: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Pius Wariya

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	AK 47 Rifle	2	22/08/2009
2.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009

Table 3c: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by General Ogun Boss

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	AK 47 Rifle	31	22/08/2009
2.	AR Rifle	1	22/08/2009
3.	Rocket Launcher (22)	1	22/08/2009
4.	MG Rifle	1	22/08/2009
5.	G3 Rifle	3	22/08/2009
6.	LAR Rifle	1	22/08/2009
7.	FCN Rifle	1	22/08/2009
8.	MARK 4 Rifle	2	22/08/2009
9.	Dynamite Stike	1 X 2KG	22/08/2009
10.	Anti-Personnel Rocket Accessory	1	22/08/2009
11.	Electric Detector	4 Pieces	22/08/2009
12.	Non-electric Detector	17 pieces	22/08/2009
13.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	105	22/08/2009
14.	AR Empty Magazine	5	22/08/2009
15.	G3 Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009
16.	LAR Empty Magazine	7	22/08/2009
17.	Walkie Talkie	2	22/08/2009
18.	Icon Walkie Talkie	2	22/08/2009
19.	BASE Set	2	22/08/2009
20.	Walkie Talkie Chargers	3	22/08/2009
21.	Binocular	1	22/08/2009
22.	Camouflage Uniforms with Trousers	6	22/08/2009
23.	HATS	2	22/08/2009
24.	T-shirts	1	22/08/2009
25.	2 YDS of Camouflage		22/08/2009
26.	7.62 MM Short Live Ammunition	2.228 RDS	22/08/2009
27.	7.62 MM Ball Live Ammunition	199 RDS	22/08/2009

Table 3d: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by General Theme Ebite

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	MG Rifle	1	22/08/2009
2.	AK 47 Rifle	3	22/08/2009
3.	G3 Rifle	3	22/08/2009
4.	MG Empty Magazine	1	22/08/2009
5.	G3 Empty Magazine	3	22/08/2009
6.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	20	22/08/2009
7.	7.62 MM Ball Live Ammunition	45 RDS	22/08/2009
8.	7.62 MM Short Live Ammunition	27 RDS	22/08/2009
9.	Short Nickers Camouflage Uniform	4	22/08/2009
10.	Bullet Proof Jacket	1	22/08/2009
11.	Homemade bomb	8 pieces	22/08/2009
12.	Canister (Tear Gas)	1	22/08/2009
13.	Charms		22/08/2009

Table 3e: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Inatimi Eleberi

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	AK 47 Rifle	1	22/08/2009
2.	Locally made pistol	1	22/08/2009
3.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009
4.	7.62 MM Short Live Ammunition	5 RDS	22/08/2009

Table 3f: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Peace Advocates

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	Brownie Pistol	1	22/08/2009
2.	Brownie Pistol & Empty Magazine	1	22/08/2009
3.	7.6 MM Live Ammunition	6 RDS	22/08/2009
4.	LAR Rifle	1	22/08/2009

Table 3g: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by General Africa

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	AK 47 Riffle	70	22/08/2009
2.	Assault Riffle	7	22/08/2009
3.	LAR Riffle	8	22/08/2009
4.	FNC Riffle	1	22/08/2009
5.	Sterling SMG Riffle	2	22/08/2009
6.	SMG Model 12 Riffle	1	22/08/2009
7.	G3 Riffle	9	22/08/2009
8.	Smoke Pistol	1	22/08/2009
9.	Rocket Launcher	5	22/08/2009
10.	MG Riffle	10	22/08/2009
11.	GP MG Riffle	6	22/08/2009
12.	Special Single Barrel Gun	1	22/08/2009
13.	Gun Boat	4	22/08/2009
14.	Pirotechnic (Smoke Signal)	10 pieces	22/08/2009
15.	Anti-Personnel Rocket Accessory	5 units	22/08/2009
16.	Tear Gas Canisters	2	22/08/2009
17.	Brandy Riffle	2	22/08/2009
18.	7.62 MM Short Live Ammunition	11705 RDS	22/08/2009
19.	7.62 MM Ball Live Ammunition	2851 RDS	22/08/2009
20.	GP MG Live Ammunition	266 RDS	22/08/2009
21.	5.56 MM Live Ammunition	2350 RDS	22/08/2009
22.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	289	22/08/2009
23.	Assault Type 60 Empty Magazine	23	22/08/2009
24.	FNC Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009
25.	G3 Empty Magazine	12	22/08/2009
26.	LAR Empty Magazine	7	22/08/2009
27.	Camouflage Bullet Proof Jacket	20	22/08/2009
28.	Camouflage Uniforms	26 Pairs	22/08/2009
29.	Army Helmet	2	22/08/2009

Table 3h: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Sunder Olomu

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	G3 Riffle	1	22/08/2009
2.	AK 47 Riffle	1	22/08/2009
3.	Double Barrel	2	22/08/2009
4.	Single Barrel	2	22/08/2009
5.	G3 Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009
6.	AK47 Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009
7.	5.56 Live Ammunition	5 RDS	22/08/2009
8.	7.62 Live Ammunition	9 RDS	22/08/2009
9.	Live Carteredge	2	22/08/2022
10.	Dynamites (Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)	10	22/08/2009
11.	Strades of Safety fuse	5	22/08/2009

Table 3i: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Lagos

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	G3 Rifle	1	22/08/2009
2.	AK 47 Rifle	9	22/08/2009
3.	K.2 Rifle	1	22/08/2009
4.	LAR Rifle	8	22/08/2009
5.	LG Rifle	2	22/08/2009
6.	Pump Action Gun	2	22/08/2009
7.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	289	22/08/2009
8.	G3 Empty Magazine	1	22/08/2009
9.	K.2 Empty Magazine	1	22/08/2022
10.	LAR Empty Magazine	2	22/08/2009
11.	95 RDS of Chain Bullet of MG 7.62MM short		22/08/2009
12.	5.56 MM Live Ammunition	166 RDS	22/08/2009
13.	7.62 MM Ball Live Ammunition	18 RDS	22/08/2009
14.	7.62 MM Short Live Ammunition	1314 RDS	22/08/2009

Table 3j: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Osei Clever

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	MG Rifle	1	21/08/2009
2.	AK 47 Rifle	5	21/08/2009
3.	LAR Rifle	6	21/08/2009
4.	G3 Rifle	9	21/08/2009
5.	Berrera Pistol	1	21/08/2009
6.	K2 Rifle	1	21/08/2009
7.	Pump Action Gun (28)	2	21/08/2009
8.	MG Empty Magazine	4	21/08/2009
9.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	6	21/08/2009
10.	K2 Empty Magazine	1	21/08/2009
11.	LAR Empty Magazine	3	21/08/2009
12.	7.62 MM Live Ammunition	29	21/08/2009

Table 3k: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Lammy

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	G3 Riffle	3	21/08/2009
2.	MG Riffle	6	21/08/2009
3.	LAR Riffle	1	21/08/2009
4.	Bettet Riffle	3	21/08/2009
5.	FNC Riffle	1	21/08/2009
6.	AK 47 Riffle	2	21/08/2009
7.	Sub Machine Gun Riffle	1	21/08/2009
8.	Pump Action	5	21/08/2009
9.	Locally Made Single Barrel	5	21/08/2009
10.	Double Barrel	1	21/08/2009
11.	Locally Made single Barrel Pistol	1	21/08/2009
12.	Gun boats without board Engine	2	21/08/2009
13.	SMG Empty Magazine	1	21/08/2009
14.	MG Empty Magazine	5	21/08/2009
15.	Anti-Riot Grenades	2	21/08/2009
16.	Roll of Dynamites with 2 Fuses	6	21/08/2009
17.	A.A. Cartridges	50	21/08/2009

Table 3l: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Area

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	G3 Riffle	5	27/08/2009
2.	K2 Riffle	1	27/08/2009
3.	FNC Riffle	1	27/08/2009
4.	MARK 4 Riffle	2	27/08/2009
5.	Dane Gun D. Barrel	1	27/08/2009
6.	Dane Gun Single Barrel	1	27/08/2009
7.	Dynamite Launcher	2	27/08/2009
8.	G3 Empty Magazine	2	27/08/2009
9.	Mark 4 Empty Magazine	1	27/08/2009
10.	FNC Empty Magazine	1	27/08/2009
11.	Live Cartridges	27 RDS	27/08/2009
12.	7.63mm Special live Ammunition	36 RDS	27/08/2009
13.	7.62mm Live Ammunition	16 RDS	27/08/2009
14.	9mm Live Ammunition	5 RDS	27/08/2009
15.	Unclassified live Pistol Ammunition	3RDS	27/08/2009

Table 3m: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Ayaye Agelli

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	Rocket Launcher	1	29/08/2009
2.	Pump Action Gun	4	29/08/2009
3.	FNC Riffle	1	29/08/2009
4.	Locally Made Pistol	1	29/08/2009
5.	Double Barrel Gun	1	29/08/2009

Table 3m: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Ayaye Agelli

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	Rocket Launcher	1	29/08/2009
2.	Pump Action Gun	4	29/08/2009
3.	FNC Rifle	1	29/08/2009
4.	Locally Made Pistol	1	29/08/2009
5.	Double Barrel Gun	1	29/08/2009

Table 3n: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Edward Youdiowei

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	FNC Rifle	2	28/08/2009
2.	Pump Action Gun	4	28/08/2009
3.	RPG	1	28/08/2009
4.	Double Barrel	1	28/08/2009
5.	7.62 MM Short Live Ammunition 7.62 MM Auto Live Ammunition; 9MM live Ammunition	700 RDS	28/08/2009
6.	RPG Launcher	1	28/08/2009
7.	RPG Launcher	1	28/08/2009
8.	Dynamites	6 sticks	28/08/2009
9.	Dynamite Cup	21	28/08/2009
10.	FNC Empty Magazine	3	28/08/2009
11.	Live Cartridges	1	28/08/2009

Table 3o: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Commander Ngologolo Toroma

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	MG Rifle	3	27/08/2009
2.	AK Rifle	4	27/08/2009
3.	LAR Rifle	1	27/08/2009
4.	G3 Rifle	6	27/08/2009
5.	Sterling SMG Rifle	1	27/08/2009
6.	G3 Empty Magazine	6	27/08/2009
7.	AK 47 Empty Magazine	4	27/08/2009
8.	SMG Empty Magazine	1	27/08/2009
9.	9MM Live Ammunition	16 RDS	27/08/2009
10.	7.62MM Short Live Ammunition	121 RDS	27/08/2009
11.	7.62MM Ball Live Ammunition	291 RDS	27/08/2009
12.	Dynamites Nitrocellulose	11/23 Kg	27/08/2009
13.	Improvised Explosive Device	1	27/08/2009
14.	G3 Rifle	1	08/09/2009
15.	FNC Rifle	1	08/09/2009
16.	7.62mm short live Ammunition	29 RDS	08/09/2009
17.	G3 Empty Magazine	1	08/09/2009

Table 3p: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by The Young Shall Grow

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	AK 47 Riffle	1	5/09/2022
2.	AK Machine Gun	4	5/09/2022
3.	FN machine Gun	1	5/09/2022
4.	DPL MG	4	5/09/2022
5.	Mark 4 Riffle	1	5/09/2022
6.	SMG	5	5/09/2022
7.	K 2 Riffle	1	5/09/2022
8.	RPG 7	2	5/09/2022
9.	Pump Action	3	5/09/2022
10.	Signal Pistol	9	5/09/2022
11.	Locally made short pistol single barrel	3	5/09/2022
12.	G 3 Riffle	21	5/09/2022
13.	English Made Single Barrel	4	5/09/2022
14.	HMG (High Machine Gun)	4	5/09/2022
15.	AGL (Automatic Grenade Launcher)	2	5/09/2022
16.	7.62 MM (SP) Ball	2,350 RDS	5/09/2022
17.	7.62 MM (SP) Link	71 RDS	5/09/2022
18.	7.62 MM Rim Ball	1967 RDS	5/09/2022
19.	7.62 MM Rim Ball	2500 RDS	5/09/2022
20.	7.62 MM Rim Link	340 RDS	5/09/2022
21.	7.62 MM NATO Metal Ball	11616 RDS	5/09/2022
22.	7.62 MM NATO Metal Link	329 RDS	5/09/2022
23.	K2 Riffle Ammo (223 Remington)	1530	5/09/2022
24.	50mm Link	2,440 RDS	5/09/2022
25.	40mm H.E. (For A.G.L)	54 RDS	5/09/2022
26.	RPG 7 Bomb (Big Size)	2 RDS	5/09/2022
27.	RPG 7 Bomb (Small Size)	3 RDS	5/09/2022
28.	Anti-riot Bomb	88 RDS	5/09/2022
29.	AK 47 Magazine	155	5/09/2022
30.	FN Magazine	9	5/09/2022
31.	G3 Magazine	17	5/09/2022
32.	RPG 7 Charger	5	5/09/2022
33.	SMG Magazine	3	5/09/2022
34.	Mark 4 Magazine	1	5/09/2022
35.	AGI HMG Accessories	9	5/09/2022

Table 3q: Arms and Ammunition Surrendered by Monday Toroma

S/NO	Types of Weapon/Ammunition	Quantity	Date Submitted
1.	G3 Riffle	1	08/09/2009
2.	FNC Riffle	1	08/09/2009
3.	7.62MM short live Ammunition	29 RDS	08/09/2009
4.	G3 Empty Magazine	1	08/09/2009

Source: Adapted from Sofiri Joab, 2017, 135-144 in Chukwuma, C.O & Mohammed, T.I. (eds) Studies in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 2017.

The data above clearly shows that militancy was more pronounced in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers state as reflected in tables above. Thus, the largest number of weapons, ammunitions and militant camps was also recorded in Bayelsa state indicating why violence and insecurity was more in these states. Most respondents claimed that the relative peace in these states especially Bayelsa state is a clear sign of the successes recorded by the Federal Governments Amnesty programme. However, some respondents argued that some of the arms and ammunitions surrendered have found its way back to the Niger Delta. According to them, the arms and ammunitions collected by the federal government through the disarmament process were not openly destroyed for all to see. Records from security agencies also revealed that violence and insecurity is gradually returning to Niger Delta region through the activities of new groups and aggrieved young militants who were not captured in the first, second and third phases of the amnesty programme. It will be recalled that the Joint Task Force (JTF) on Saturday, 20 November 2010 arrested one Mr. Obeseskuna who had earlier accepted the amnesty programme. The JTF report shows that Obeses and his armed gang were responsible for the abduction of several oil workers and expatriates in the Rivers and Bayelsa water ways. His arrest led to the recovery of large sums of money and arms. The Niger Delta Avengers and several other armed groups are springing up daily in different parts of Niger Delta for different reasons. Tubodenye and Felix (2013) noted that the structural and institutional defects in the federal governments amnesty programme may give rise to more violence and insecurity in the future. They noted that all the social and economic factors that fuelled and drive the conflict in the Niger Delta have been largely ignored and still very much present. According to them, a Pandora's box of violence may yet be opened. In their words:

The structural and institutional contradictions serving as drivers for the conflict persist despite the seeming hibernation of previously hostile elements and this makes the development of a social and political environment of conflict only too probable, and as such making the possibilities for mobilization and insurgency remain, given that the existing window of political opportunity is at best tenuous and volatile (Tubodenyefa and Felix, 2013, 22)

They reiterated that the inherent contradictions in the method of implementation of the amnesty programme to the very nature of the reward system as basis for pacification in the face of the continued perpetuation of the structural, institutional and individual level drivers of the conflict thus throws up a tenuous situation for recurrence of violence and hostilities. In a paper titled "Preventing the next insurgency: Highlighting the risks to violence in post-amnesty Niger Delta, Ibaba and Arugu, contended that the post-amnesty environment in the Niger Delta is still characterized by kidnappings and criminal activities due to the structural defects in the amnesty programme. According to them, the post-amnesty environment is characterised by several issues that points to the possible recurrence of violence, if the Nigerian government (at all levels) fails to address them. First are the fading expectations of the amnesty programme and developmental benefits of the Goodluck Jonathan presidency. There fear was confirmed by Ebikabowei Victor Ben popularly called Boyloaf, a former high-ranking Commander of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) who stated thus:

What we are experiencing now in the Niger Delta is peace without justice. The government has not properly addressed the fact of the Niger Delta agitations as it concerns critical infrastructure... the East-West Road has been there before amnesty. Till date, it is still under construction, under 40 percent completion... people seem to be overwhelmed and carried away by the fact recorded by some Niger Delta indigenes in the realm of politics... the government is failing in meeting up the promises made prior to our surrendering of arms... I fear for the future as the people inwardly are not happy with the style of this government (Vanguard, 2012, 46-47).

The table below further explains why militancy and armed struggle is regarded as a lucrative venture in the Niger Delta.

Table 4: Security/surveillance contracts awarded to top ex-militant commanders/leaders in the Niger Delta Region.

S/NO	Name/Beneficiary	Contract Value	Purpose
1	Gen. Ebikabowei Victor Ben (Boyloaf)	US\$3.8 Million (₦ 559.64 Million)	Oil pipeline security/surveillance in Bayelsa State.
2	Gen. Ateke Tom	US\$3.8 Million (₦ 559.64 Million)	Oil pipeline security/surveillance in Rivers State.
3	Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo	US\$9 Million (₦ 1.420 Billion)	Oil pipeline security/surveillance in Rivers State.
4	Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo)	US\$22.9 Million (₦ 3.614Billion)	Oil pipeline security/surveillance in Delta State.

Source: Adapted from Tubodenyeafa and Felix, 2013, 17-18.

It is the position of this study that granting financial inducements to militant leaders and commanders have constantly pitched ex-combatants in fierce internal battles with oil facilities saboteurs and vandals (some of whom are former militant foot-soldiers who feel short-changed by their leaders/commanders). The above contracts were cancelled in 2020 and re-awarded to Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo) in July 2022 hence, the struggle for these security/surveillance contracts explains why new armed groups and militant commanders are emerging in the post-amnesty Niger Delta. It is in the light of these that this study x-rayed the post-amnesty environment and situation in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria with a view to providing new peace building strategies.

Peace Building Strategies in Post-Amnesty Era in the Niger Delta

Conflict necessitates peace building which seeks to secure peace through conflict prevention, resolution and management (World Bank, 2006; Ibeanu, 2006; Francis 2006; Best, 2007. According to Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, Peace building is aimed at preventing and managing armed conflict and sustaining peace after large-scale organized violence. They

noted that this is usually achieved in three stages:

1. Conflict prevention
2. Conflict management or peace making which seeks to end armed conflict and reach agreement and
3. Post-conflict management which involves reconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, reintegration, and enforcement of justice (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, 16).

In the words of Bassey (2002), peace building is also enhanced by knowledge of the motives for conflict and peculiarities of conflict systems. He reiterated that conflict prevention requires the identification and containment of possible conflict drivers before they trigger conflicts. Haven understood the concept of peace building, one wonders why conflict, violence and insecurity still persist in the Niger Delta despite the federal government's amnesty programme? (a peace building strategy). However, the following peace building strategies will go a long way in promoting lasting peace, stability and sustainable development in post-amnesty era in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria:

1. **Employment Generation and Skill Acquisition:** Data from the study as affirmed by majority of respondents revealed that oil exploration and gas flaring by multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta has destroyed and contaminated the land, streams and the ecosystem which has affected the livelihood and economy of the people prompting some of the youths to resort to vandalism, oil theft through the establishment of local artisanal refineries popularly called kpo fire. In the short terms, provision of skill acquisition schemes/programmes and employment of young people especially in the rural areas will help to check and stop crime and criminality in the Niger Delta region.
2. Findings from the study shows that the disbursement of funds for the DDR programme was characterised by corruption and neglect of the welfare of the amnesty trainees hence, the entire amnesty programme should be investigated and re-evaluated to ensure justice for all the parties including community stakeholders who were ignored and side lined throughout the commencement of the programme. This is important because according to peace scholars, effective peace building programme entails:
 - a) Conflict prevention
 - b) Conflict management or peace making and
 - c) Post-conflict management which involves reconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, re-integration and enforcement of Justice (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, 16).
3. **Massive Investment and Development of the Niger Delta:** Ibaba (2007) stated categorically that precious interventions in the Niger Delta did not yield the desired result because precious interventions by the federal government and oil companies failed to address the root caused and drivers of conflict. In his work “mopping the wet floor while overlooking the leaking roof: Rethinking peace building in the Niger

Delta” he stated that previous state responses to the conflict in Niger Delta were merely based on Military force. He advocated for massive investment and infrastructural development in the region this will in turn address other socio-economic variables.

4. **True Federalism and the need for Restructuring:** Scholars and respondent in the study observed that the present federal system in Nigeria is lopsided and characterised by inter-segment imbalance which has fuelled inter-ethnic competition and suspicion. According to Ibaba and Arugu (2013), one of the essentials of stable federal system is the equality of the Federating units/states. While reiterating the need for restructuring and the practice of true federalism in Nigeria as a means of protecting the people of Niger Delta and other minorities Ibaba (2017), posited that the current federal structure which has created inter-segment imbalance equally has political representation and resource allocation consequences that have further created uneven development. In his words: In terms of political representation, the unequal size of the federating units which coincides with ethnic boundaries has given the major ethnic groups numerical advantage in the national legislature... the pattern of representation in the Federal legislature (National Assembly) is such that minority groups do not have adequate numbers in parliament to pursue their interests without the benevolence or concession of the major ethnic groups (Ibaba, 2017, 45).
5. **Apart from providing employment**, there is need to also provide social security and safety nets for the less privileged youths, children and vulnerable groups in the Niger Delta. Ibaba (2012) posited that sociopathic personality occur due to parental irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity and the associated really pregnancy leading to early and unplanned family living by uneducated and unskilled teenage mothers and fathers; and large family size etc. According to him, sociopathic personality is the outcome of Antisocial personality disorder (APD) which refers to pervasive pattern for, and violation of, the rights of others. He reiterated that this category of youths (boys and girls) are deadly and dangerous. In his words persons with sociopathic personality are usually filled with pent up anger, given their feeling of alienation, deprivation and refection by the society. They lack social responsibility and love the attitude to take from society by whatever means, what they perceive to love been denied them. The social breakdown theory explains that such person's form or join social groups or mass movements to advance their private interest/agenda (Ibaba, 2017, .90). Thus, to avert further insurgency and insecurity in the Niger Delta Children and youths with sociopathic traits should be taken care of through policy initiatives and actions by the government and other stakeholders.
6. **Enthronement of quality Leadership at all levels:** The study revealed that the conflict in the Niger Delta region has triggered and aggravated by the absence of basic social amenities which urgent to have been provided by the local, state, federal and the multinational oil companies. Thus, the enthronement of honest. Patriotic and disciplined leadership at all levels will no doubt help to build peace and stability in the region.

- 7. Political and Electoral Reforms:** Political and electoral reforms create room for people-oriented policies and programmes at all levels. This explains why Achebe (1984) and Ted Gur (1994), argued that lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the political decision-making process can lead to frustration and aggression which could degenerate into violence, conflict and insecurity especially in third world countries. In the case of the Niger Delta and other minorities in Nigeria, electoral and political reforms when carried out transparently and faithfully will lead to the repealing and eradication of obnoxious anti-development laws, policies and legislations. Such actions will give hope to the people and in the process build trust and confidence in the citizens.

Conclusion

The study examined “resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta and peace building strategies in post-amnesty era” with a view to interrogating the challenges experienced by the federal governments amnesty programme in other to proffer new peace building strategies in the post-amnesty era in the Niger Delta. In other to do justice to the subject matter, the work was arranged in the following order:

Abstract, introduction, theoretical and conceptual analysis, research methodology, legal status of the amnesty programme/policy, actual implementation of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta, public awareness of the amnesty programme, assessment of the disarmament and arms surrendering process, peace building strategies in post-amnesty era in the Niger Delta, conclusion and recommendations. Relying on secondary and primary sources of data, the study observed that the federal governments amnesty programme in the Niger Delta suffered several setbacks which affected the programme adversely hence, the disaffection and distrust which has created room for more frustration and aggression in the oil rich region. The study however proposed peace building approaches and strategies that can promote and guarantee peace, development and stability in post-amnesty Niger Delta. We are convinced that with effective implementation these new strategies lasting peace will return to the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole.

Recommendations

The following recommendations will no doubt help to promote sustainable peace, development and political stability in Nigeria's troubled Niger Delta region:

1. The government at all levels especially the federal government should develop the political will and capacity to check and regulate the activities of multinational oil companies to ensure that they comply with safety standards. This is important because issues relating to gas flaring and environmental degradation helped to aggravate the conflict in the Niger Delta.
2. Political and electoral reforms aimed at promoting equity, justice and inclusiveness in the governance structure should be encouraged. This will ensure that only honest, patriotic and disciplined persons emerge as leaders at all levels in the country.
3. In the future, the federal government should ensure that DDR programmes and other peace building frameworks should adhere to international standards as contained in

United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. (UN-IDDRS 2004/2006) Thus, the monetization of peace building processes via the payment of huge allowances and award of security contracts to amnesty trainees should be discarded henceforth.

4. Political office holders and other officials who diverted funds meant for the amnesty programme and welfare of trainees should be investigated and prosecuted without further delay. This is important because non-payment of claims, incurred by ex-combatants account for the current in-fighting and internal wrangling threatening peace and security in Niger Delta.
5. The Niger Delta should be treated as a national emergency in terms of project allocation to the area. Special funds should also be approved for the development of the oil-rich region. In the same vein, development agencies such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Nigeria Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB), the ministry of Niger Delta Affairs etc. must be alive to their responsibilities. As part of its oversight functions, the National assembly should also carryout periodic checks/visits on these agencies to ensure compliance.

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