

External Funding and Insecurity in North-East Nigeria: Sustaining Factors

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Abstract

Terrorism financing is one of the most multifaceted problems the democratic world is facing today. The transfer of funds to support terrorist activities has created colossal challenges across the globe. This has fuelled several inter-religious and nationalist disgust, and as such has put many nations into war with terrorist organisations. This paper examined the effect of external funding on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria. Cross sectional survey research design was employed for this study. Set of structured questionnaire were administered for the collection of the primary data. In order to get a valid sample, a group of 510 respondents made up of key security agents and experts, political officers, internally displaced persons, market leaders, religious leaders, civil right organisations, traditional rulers, repentant Boko Haram fighters and vigilante officers were analyzed. Pilot study was carried out to test the validity and reliability of the research instrument using Cronbach Alpha reliability test. Data collected were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. The findings of this study revealed that external funding significantly contributes to insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria ($R^2 = 0.502$, $p < 0.05$). It was concluded that external funding had a significant influence on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist activities. However, the study recommends that counter terrorism financing tools should be used to continue to keep Boko Haram sect isolated from external patrons and state sponsors of terrorism.

Keywords: *External funding, Insecurity, Sponsors, Sustaining factors, Terrorism.*

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Background to the Study

Terrorism has a global spread; in terms of its activities and funding sources. Money is the engine that propels terrorism. A vital aspect of the global “war on terror” over the past decade has been the fight against financing terrorism (Blanchard & Cavigelli; 2018). Funding is one of the major sources of strength of terrorist organization and funding can be sourced legally and illegally. Some of the sources include charities; well-funded organizations; and non-violent associations with similar ideologies; state funds and organized crimes such as kidnapping; drug trafficking; robbery; identity theft; cybercrimes and fraud (Okemi;2013). For many terrorist organisations money transfers; such as Western Union; provide a secure avenue for discreetly transferring funds. In recognition of the various sources of fund; several countries have introduced regulation to place restrictions on short term financial flows; this has occurred largely through compliance with transnational banking laws that aim to stem the flow of terrorist finances; unfortunately, this effort has become counterproductive in some countries (Sinai;2018). Several terrorist groups have gained territorial control which provides other forms of revenue such as taxes and the operations of businesses. Some of the largest groups have annual revenue akin to small national budgets or large companies. Estimates from 2016 indicate that annual revenues for the biggest terrorist's groups range from US\$2 billion for ISIL; US\$400 million for the Taliban to US\$250 million for al-Qaida and US\$25 million for Boko Haram (Sinai;2018).

Boko Haram; unlike ISIL; al-Qaida and the Taliban; does not have sophisticated financing structures. Instead; the group has historically relied on one time operations to fund its activities (Sinai;2018). This reflects the decentralized nature of the group with local commanders required to generate revenue to fund their own activities. Some of the most common fundraising techniques include abductions for ransoms; kidnapping; extortion of various businesses and bank robberies. Boko Haram has also been known to raise funds by utilising a network of alliances with other terror organisations including receiving funding from Al-Qa'ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Sinai;2018). Mass kidnapping of foreigners and civilians for ransom has proven to be a lucrative method for raising funds. Boko Haram has a specialized kidnapping task force that sets out to abduct politicians; business people; foreigners; rulers and civil servants with the intention of later trading them back for large sums of money or for the return of other Boko Haram militants. In 2013 Boko Haram was paid US\$3 million in ransom to release a French family of seven and in early 2017 negotiations with the Nigerian government resulted in the release of kidnapped school girls in return for the release of some imprisoned Boko Haram members. Boko Haram has also been financed by donations from group members; corrupt politicians and government officials as well as supporters or organisations based in other countries. There is also evidence that Boko Haram helps facilitate trade in illicit drugs by ensuring their transit through Nigeria (Sinai, 2018).

Terrorist organizations have adapted and become innovative to ensure their monetary funds are secure and undetectable. Boko Haram is one organization that has found ways to ensure its finances are almost undetectable. Over the past 12 years; Boko Haram has become a powerful and destructive violent extremist organization while obtaining millions of dollars in

funding. The ease of transferring money to and within terrorist groups has increased with increased access to the internet; online banking; phone money transfers and cryptocurrency. Outside of conflict-areas; the cost of executing attacks is generally low enough that most incidents are self-funded (Sinai; 2018). The Nigerian armed forces; the Nigerian police and security stakeholders and other officials have been criticized for being unable to trace much of the funding that Boko Haram has received. However; in February 2012; arrested Boko Haram officials revealed that while the organisation initially relied on donations from members; its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) opened it up to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the UK (Agbiboa; 2013). Furthermore; the arrested officials divulged that other sources of funding included the Al Muntada Trust Fund and the Islamic World Society. Also; a spokesman of Boko Haram revealed that Kano State Governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi State Governor Isa Yuguda had been paying them monthly (Aziken; Muhammad; Ojeme; & Marama; 2012). The need for a detailed study on external funding of Boko Haram has become all the more important because of the recent alleged link between Boko Haram Sect and the developments in some parts of West Africa and the entire Northeastern region of Nigeria.

Literature Review

This conceptual review thus outlined external funding as one potential transnational aspect of conflict. From literature on al-Qaeda and other extremist religious groups; we know that such groups often receive financial support from persons and organizations in other countries; in addition to collecting own funds through drug trafficking; kidnappings and other activity (Gomez 2014; Wittig, 2017). Funds are often raised through imams or other religious leaders who divert parts of compulsory charitable donations known as zakat to extremist groups; or through Islamic charities operating in one or more foreign countries (Gomez, 2014). According to the newspaper; members of Boko Haram confirmed that a charity organization based in the United Kingdom; the Al-Muntada Trust Fund; has given financial support to the group (Nigerian Tribune February 13; 2012). The allegation against Al-Muntada was taken up in British press; but the organization itself has denied having any connection to Boko Haram (Al-Muntada Trust Fund September; 2012). Another foreign source of Boko Haram funding reportedly uncovered in the police investigations was the Islamic World Society; with headquarters in Saudi Arabia (Nigerian Tribune; February 13, 2012). An intelligence report based on police investigations and military operations against Boko Haram hideouts in December 2011; also asserted that Boko Haram has received 40 million naira (which equals about 250;000 USD) from an unnamed Algerian organization (Premium Times May 13; 2012). As previously noted; Boko Haram's spokesman Abu Qaqa has also said that the group receives funding from al-Qaeda; but there is little concrete evidence to support this claim (The Guardian January 27, 2012).

Boko Haram; as with any "violent extremist organizations" (VEO); has depended on financial donations from sympathizers and external funding from other VEOs. In 2002; Osama Bin Laden sent an aide to Nigeria with \$3 million. Bin Laden's aide was instructed to disperse the money among groups that believed in Al-Qaeda's cause. The International Crisis Group reported that Boko Haram received some of that money; but the exact amount is

undetermined. The U.S. Treasury Department has publicly stated that they have evidence that Boko Haram has received funding from both Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). In 2012; Nigerian media reported that the president received intelligence that Boko Haram had received a \$40 million payment from AQIM (which also operates in West Africa); this was reported to be the first of many payments that were to take place between the two groups. U.S. officials believe if AQIM is still funding Boko Haram; it is in very small amounts; not ranging into the millions of dollars.

In March of 2015; the current leader of Boko Haram; Abubakar Shekau; pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi; the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Later that month ISIS's English-language magazine approved of the alliance with Boko Haram. When ISIS accepted Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance; an ISIS spokesman informed fellow Muslims looking to join its ranks that "a new door for you to migrate to the land of Islam and fight" had opened within Africa. In April of 2016; the commanding general of the U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF); Brigadier General Donald Bolduc; said that ISIS and Boko Haram are increasingly sharing "tactics; techniques and procedures." General Bolduc highlighted that an ISIS weapons convoy was detected departing Libya and believed to be headed to the Lake Chad region to provide support to Boko Haram. However; other than verbal and material support; there is no indication that ISIS is providing Boko Haram financial support (Wittig, 2017).

Boko Haram has not only depended on external funding from other VEOs; throughout its movement it has received financial support from local sympathizers and politicians. One of Boko Haram's main financial backers was Alhaji Buji Foyi. Foyi was a powerful political figure in Borno State; and at one point in his career he was the commissioner for religious affairs in Borno. Foyi provided Boko Haram with a substantial amount of financial support to run its operations and was a known and open sympathizer (Wittig, 2017). Some Northern Nigerian politicians have also been accused of giving Boko Haram financial support over the years. U.S. government officials confirmed that a high-ranking Borno State politician supported Boko Haram financially until 2009. The actual amount of money politicians gave to Boko Haram is unclear; but it is clear through arrest and interrogations that political figures throughout Nigeria have supported Boko Haram financially (Sinai, 2018).

External Funding

There are different views expressed by researchers on how terrorists raise funds. All terrorist groups are formed by idealists with particular ideologies (Karaman and Noebe; 2012). As they progress; all groups primarily have to acquire an income to finance their activities. Terrorists need to spend money to exist. In fact; some authorities have defined money as "the lifeblood" of terrorist (Aykin and Sozmen, 2009). Without financial sources and ammunition; these groups could not sustain their operations. To sustain the terrorism activities and propaganda; several requirements such as establishment of several support networks; creation of facilities and finance to support training activities have to be met; all of which require a vast amount of money. First of all; the organisations have to allocate resources to recruit new members. If they are operating abroad; they need finances to create new training camps and they need to supply

food and shelter for the militants. Various reports listed kidnapping; robbery; drugs; and support from other terrorists group among others as sources of financing Boko Haram terrorists group (Karaman and Noebe; 2012).

Foreign Donors

Boko Haram; like most other terror groups; been pointed out as a group that receives funds from foreign and particularly Gulf donors. One case that would support such claims is the connections Boko Haram has with Cameroonian businessman Alhaji Abdalla; who runs a vehicle import business with dealings in Qatar (Blanchard and Cavigelli, 2018). Boko Haram has previously stolen cars and sold them through Abdalla's firm to individuals in Qatar. The intimacy of the two parties' relationship is demonstrated by the fact that Abdalla was one of Boko Haram's negotiators during the French family hostage situation in 2013. Moreover; the Cameroonian military found receipts from Qatar as well as travel documents from Libya and Qatar in a Boko Haram camp in June 2014.

Something which has not received widespread attention in Western media is the confession of Sheikh Sani Haliru; a Boko Haram defector. Haliru claims that throughout his many years as a Boko Haram fighter; he visited countries like Saudi Arabia; Pakistan; Yemen; Egypt; Sudan; Somalia; Libya and Niger; and received his training in Pakistan and Libya. Although there are several caveats to such a confession; it does shed light on links that Boko Haram has to several of these countries (Blanchard and Cavigelli, 2018). Boko Haram has; for example; maintained a diplomatic presence in Saudi Arabia which was the country to which Mohammad Yusuf fled in 2004 during a crackdown by the Nigerian military in northern Nigeria. Salafi sympathizers from the Gulf region have also been pointed out as early donors to Boko Haram's cause; mainly through connections Yusuf made during two hajj trips to the country. There have also been several reports of Boko Haram dispatching fighters to Sudan; Pakistan; Afghanistan and the Sahel in order to raise funds. The countries mentioned by Haliru would also give credence to reports that Boko Haram has cooperated with AQIM and al-Shabaab (Sinai, 2018).

Former head of French intelligence service DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure) Alain Chouet has also stated that Qatar and Saudi Arabia have directly participated in funding Boko Haram; and that much funding occurs through shell companies based in the countries neighboring Nigeria (Sinai;2018). During the trial of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar it was made clear that there had been extensive internal disagreements within Boko Haram regarding the sharing of funds donated by a small Algeria-based group called Musilimi Yamaa; although little proof was added to this testimony (Sinai;2018). Indeed; very little evidence of either Gulf or other foreign funding exists. However; there has been an active presence of Gulf-based charities in the Sahel region for years; which may certainly have played a role in exposing several people to a radical ideology. It should also be mentioned that it is likely that individuals who have supported IS have also funded Boko Haram as a result of their pledge of allegiance (Sinai; 2018).

Local and Domestic Donors

Whilst Boko Haram's foreign sponsorship remains opaque; more is known about support from external actors within Nigeria. This support involves both the political and military establishment; and is often motivated by power moves or self-serving interests rather than ideological alignment (Sinai, 2018). Before 2009; several local politicians in Borno state either funded or aided Boko Haram in order to advance their own interests. In the build-up to the 2003 Nigerian general elections; several northern state politicians employed local youth gangs in order to gauge support. In Borno state; Ali Modu Sheriff employed members of Mohammad Yusuf's group and promised them both money (50 million naira) and political influence in exchange for their support for his campaign as state governor. After winning; Yusuf was even allowed to pick a candidate for the position of Borno's Minister for Religious Affairs as a result of Sheriff's victory. After having failed on his promise to implement full sharia laws in Borno state; Sheriff and Boko Haram clashed; and Yusuf's group eventually turned on their former ally and started attacking local institutions (Aziken; Muhammad; Ojeme and Marama; 2012).

The enmity between Sheriff and Boko Haram has later been used as a tool by Sheriff's political opponents; which has meant that more funds have been diverted towards Boko Haram. For example; Senator Ali Ndume was arrested in 2011 after a Boko Haram spokesperson upon interrogation confessed that Ndume had paid Boko Haram to send threatening text messages to rival politicians. Local business tycoons; such as Alhaji Bunu Wakil; have also been pointed out as major Boko Haram financiers. In Cameroon; the mayor of border town Fotokol; Ramat Moussa; was arrested after having been pointed out by Boko Haram commander Abakar Ali as having coordinated Boko Haram arms trafficking. Large stocks of weapons were found in his residency. The latter case supports a trend in which Boko Haram has found funding from northern Cameroon; especially among wealthy Kanuris (Blanchard and Cavigelli, 2018). Nigeria's military has also been accused of either funding or diverting arms to Boko Haram (Aziken, Muhammad, Ojeme and Marama; 2012). Brigadier-General Aliyu Hussaini has also been arrested for allegedly being a member of Boko Haram and providing funds for the group. However; most observers would say that there is much less direct support for Boko Haram from Nigeria's military than around 2009 and 2010. Many of the allegations raised against certain high-ranking officers remain unconfirmed and uncorroborated. Although there have been several cases of 'inside jobs' concerning military personnel providing intelligence to Boko Haram; there is little evidence suggesting that the military has directly funded Boko Haram in recent years (Aziken, Muhammad; Ojeme, and Marama, 2012).

Australian Stephen Davis; who negotiated with Boko Haram over the Chibok Girls case; stated that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) played an instrumental part in making Boko Haram money untraceable and practically acts as a gatekeeper. Reportedly; Boko Haram fighters had told him that transactions to their main arms supplier; who is based in Cairo; are sent through the CBN without any interference. Davis also pointed to the fact that a senior official at CBN was very close to Sodiq Ominu Ogwuche; the mastermind of the April 2014 Nyanya bombing which killed 88 people. Davis also stated that Ali Modu Sheriff continues to fund Boko Haram; which has been widely refuted by several observers and described as an

attempt to divert attention away from the Nigerian government's own failure to fully deal with Boko Haram (Aziken, Muhammad, Ojeme, and Marama, 2012).

Size; Financing; and Capabilities of Boko Haram Sect

Estimates of Boko Haram's size vary. U.S. military officials suggest that it has roughly 1;500 fighters; while ISWA may have up to 3;500. Boko Haram's membership appears to draw predominately from the minority ethnic Kanuri community in northeast Nigeria; where it has been most active; but both factions are reported to have fighters from the other Lake Chad Basin countries as well (Blanchard and Cavigelli, 2018). Experts suggest Boko Haram funds its operations largely through criminal activity; including bank robberies; kidnappings; assassinations for hire; trafficking; cattle rustling; and extortion. The group reportedly collected several million dollars in ransoms in exchange for the release of Chibok schoolgirls. Both factions have seized vehicles; weapons; and ammunition from the Nigerian and Nigerien armies(Blanchard and Cavigelli, 2018).

In March 2015, Shekau released a statement pledging loyalty to the leader of the Syria/Iraq-based Islamic State. An IS spokesman welcomed the pledge; urging followers to travel to West Africa to support Boko Haram. The Islamic State's English-language magazine; Dabiq; heralded the alliance; declaring that “the mujahidin of West Africa now guard yet another frontier of the Khilāfah (caliphate).” Branding itself part of the Islamic State may have provided recruitment and fundraising opportunities by raising Boko Haram's profile; but the extent to which affiliation has facilitated operational ties is unclear. Such ties may also hold less promise today given territorial losses by “core” IS. Potential links between Boko Haram/IS-WA and IS affiliates in Libya may be of more immediate concern (Blanchard & Cavigelli, 2018).

Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored on rational choice theory. The rational choice theory offers useful explanations of Boko Haram sect terrorist activities from an economic point of view. The rational choice theory takes individuals who engage in terrorism as rational beings; and their behaviour is motivated by the costs; benefits; and the opportunity costs of violent activities. It believes terrorists are homo economicus who weigh the cost and benefit before engaging in terrorist activities. They however; do not act in a vacuum. If the cost of terrorist activity is great; or if peaceful means are available which can be as effective as a terrorist activity they will not choose terrorist activity being rational actors (Muller and Weede; 1990). The rational choice theory of terrorism is based on three foundations. Firstly; is the opportunity cost of terrorism in which poor economic condition lowers the opportunity cost of terrorism. Secondly; the material cost of terrorism which is premised on the operating cost of terrorism. If a terrorist group has public support and sympathy they will find a sanctuary from the population. From an economic point of view if economic conditions are poor and unfavorable; the opportunity cost of terrorism will be lower and terrorist will have more popular public support. Thirdly; the benefits of terrorism which are closely linked to the tactical and strategic goals of terrorism suggest if economic conditions are poor the likely pay-off from terrorism is attractive. (Meierrieks, 2015). When economic conditions are poor; the

opportunity cost for engaging in terrorism is low; invariably making it more attractive in order to drive mental rewards. (Freytag; 2011) Terrorist being rational actors seek to use terrorism to effect a sociopolitical change because they are subjected to constraints of manpower and financial resources. The rational choice further believes terrorists consider the benefits of either gaining government concessions and or the costs of punishment for their actions.

Methodology

Cross sectional survey research design was used for the study; this research design was appropriate because it enabled the researcher to collect data that represented the perception and view of people across a large geographical area; which in this case was three selected Northeast state in Nigeria. The adoption of this design was consistent with the studies of (Awino, 2013; Olajide, 2015; Shabbir, 2018; Walala, Waiganjo and Njeru, 2015). The unit of analysis of the sample for the study was key security agents and experts; political officers; internally displaced persons; market leaders; religious leaders; civil right organisations; traditional rulers; repentant Boko Haram fighters and vigilante officers which were analyzed. The justification for this unit of analysis was based on the fact that it aided the quantitative description of study variables in relations to a given population.

A total population of five hundred and ten (510) respondents were sampled for this study. The total enumeration or census method was used for this study as the total population is not large. A structured questionnaire was adapted from previous studies Titus, Aminu and James (2017); Adeoye (2015); and Salisu, Mohd and Abdullahi (2015) along the constructs with sections capturing demographic information; political instability and insecurity using a six point likert scale ranging from strongly agree (6) to strongly disagree (1). Afterwards; primary data for the study which was retrieved by well-trained research assistants from the field was treated to conform to the assumptions of regression as well minimize errors in data collected and provide for better results. The researchers developed a structured model for the study using the main constructs; and the data was analysed using linear regression.

Findings and Discussion

The results of the analysis are presented in table 1 showing the effect of external funding on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria.

Restatement of Hypothesis Three

H₀₁: External funding does not influence insecurity and sustain terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria.

To test the hypothesis; simple linear regression analysis was used. The results of the regression are presented in Tables 1: To test the hypothesis; model $y_1 = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \mu$ was fitted.

Table 1a: Regression Results for External Funding on Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities

(a) Model Summary ^b					
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.708 ^a	.502	.501	5.46134	1.362
a. Predictors: (Constant); External Funding					
b. Dependent Variable: Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities					

Source: Field Survey; 2020

Table 1a presents regression results on influence of external funding on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria. The R represents the relationship of correlation coefficients between the predictors used in the model of external funding and insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities. The R² represented the measure of variability in insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities that is accounted for by external funding. From the model; (R = 0.708) shows that external funding account for 70.8 percent variation of insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities. The value of R² was 0.502; showing that the prediction of external funding on insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities account for 50.2 percent less variance.

The R-squared of 50.2 percent means that the external funding explains approximately 50 percent of variations in the insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities; the model failed to explain 49.8 percent of the variation; meaning that there are other factors associated with insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities which were not fitted in the model. The change statistics were used to test whether the change in adjusted R² is significant using the F ratio as summarized in table 1b.

Table 1b.

(a) ANOVA ^a						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	13857.863	1	13857.863	464.620	.000 ^b
	Residual	13749.882	461	29.826		
	Total	27607.745	462			
a. Dependent Variable: Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities						
b. Predictors: (Constant); External Funding						

Source: Field Survey; 2020

The analysis of variance was used to test whether the model could significantly fit in predicting the outcome than using the means. The F- ratio represents the ratio of improvement in prediction that results from fitting the model; relative to the inaccuracy that exists in the model. The F- ratio was 464.620 and was significant (P<0.05) which implies that external funding are significant in explaining variations in the insecurity and sustenance of

terrorist activities in North-East Nigeria. The model significantly improved the ability to predict the effects of external funding on insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities. Therefore; the model can reliably be used to test the effect of external funding on insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities.

Table 1c.

Model		(a) Coefficients ^a				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	11.437	1.555		7.357	.000
	External Funding	1.030	.048	.708	21.555	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities

Source: Field Survey; 2020

Table 1c show the results of regression coefficients which reveal that a positive effect was reported for insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities ($\beta = 11.437$; $p < 0.05$). Further; the results showed that at 95 percent confidence level; external funding ($\beta = 1.030$; $p < 0.05$) was statistically significant as the p-value was less than 0.05 and the t values greater than 1.96. This implies that external funding had significant positive effect on insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities North-East Nigeria especially when external funding is implemented. From the results; the equation for the regression model is expressed as:

$$ISTA = 11.437 + 1.030x_1 \dots \dots \dots \text{Eq. (i)}$$

Where: ISTA = Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities and x_1 is External funding

The results also show that β was significant ($\beta = 1.030$; $t = 21.555$; $p = 0.00$) indicating that for one unit increase in external funding; insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities increases by 1.030 units. Since $p\text{-value} < 0.05$; the null hypothesis (H_{01}) which states that external funding does not influence insecurity and sustain terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria is hereby rejected. The interview response corroborates with the descriptive and inferential statics result of this study.

Discussion of Findings

The finding of this study corroborates with the findings of Olugbenga (2017), who found a positive relationship between external funding and insecurity and that external funding is a sustaining factor of terrorism. Also, Onuoha (2014); Wittig (2017); Aykin and Sozmen (2009); Titus, Aminu and James (2017); Sinai (2018); Agbiboa (2013); Aziken, Muhammad, Ojeme and Marama (2012); Okemi (2013); Blanchard and Cavigelli (2018); Karaman and Noebe (2012) and Gomez (2014), found a significant association between external funding on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist activities. However; some studies found opposite. Such studies include; other authors in their research whom failed to find any significant

positive relationship between external funding on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist activities. Levine (2017) found a negative relationship between external funding on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities. The findings from Karaman and Noebe (2012) and Gomez (2014) gave mixed results. Ochonu (2014) results indicated that external funding has a negative effect on insurgency. The latter study concludes that external funding influences insecurity and that external funding is a sustaining factor of terrorism. The study identified with the position of scholars that with specific reference to Boko Haram; external funding has positive and significant effect on insecurity and act as a sustaining factor of terrorism. Therefore this study rejected null hypothesis (H_0) which states that external funding have no significant influence on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria.

Conclusions and Recommendation

This paper examined terrorist financing in Nigeria and analyzed the case of Boko Haram sect activities. The paper further discussed; among others; the methods; and techniques employed by terrorists in collecting; transferring; and utilizing funds with reference to specific cases. The rise of the Islamic State and its almost complete reliance on funding derived locally has highlighted the need to not just disrupt terrorist access to the financial system; but also find ways to cut them off from their means of raising funds. Together with the trend towards criminal sources of funds; there should also be special focus on the role of law enforcement in disrupting terrorist financing and even the role of military in blocking terrorists' access to revenue. The fight against terror financing is a continuous battle and remains a challenge for many states and international institutions. Terrorists have greatly evolved their means of functioning and many times are ahead of law enforcement mechanisms. This study further recommends that counterterrorism financing tools should be used to continue to keep Boko Haram sect isolated from external patrons and state sponsors of terrorism. Government should continue to apply force so as to keep Boko Haram Sect under pressure; on the run and on the defensive. This should be followed with 'war on sources of finance' so as to deny or limit their sources of funding. Though military and police pressure can drive terrorism into extinction; political problems could also require political solutions. Further study should investigate measures of cubing terrorist financing and other sources of funds.

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