

Hobbes' State of War, Insecurity and Democracy in Africa

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Abstract

Democracy has become the catchword for governance in the contemporary state and every state claims to be practicing or at least democratizing in line with the current trend. This paper examined the relationship between Hobbes' theory of the state of war and insecurity/democracy in Nigeria from 1999 to 2018. Also analyzed are some efforts by politicians to create an atmosphere of political insecurity in order to benefit from the ensuing crisis. It argued that much of the sustained insecurity in Nigeria is a deliberate creation by politicians since they perceive violence as the means by which they can win elections. The major objective of this paper was to analyze the relationship between democracy and violence in various forms as a norm rather than the exception. The central hypothesis is that where the state fails to act promptly against or even perpetrates violence and insecurity democratic practice would be seriously impaired. Thomas Hobbes' theory of state dissolution served as the theoretical framework. Data gathering was done through secondary sources such as books, journal articles, newspapers, magazines and internet sources. Data were presented in tables and data analysis was based on content analysis of extant documents on security reports on violence and insecurity. It arrived at the conclusion that democracy needs a secure environment to thrive and accordingly recommended that the state should always act promptly against or resist violence in order for democracy to thrive on a sustainable basis.

Keywords: *Democracy, Insecurity, Violence, Leadership, Politics*

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Background to the Study

This paper is predicated on Thomas Hobbes' theoretical formulation on the state of war in a degenerate contemporary society, specifically as it relates to Nigeria. Since independence in 1960 there has been a sustained effort by politicians to create an atmosphere of violence in a supposedly democratic setting in order to politically benefit from such a situation (Ekeh, 2001, Anifowose, 1982, Ademoyega, 1981, Madiebo, 1980). It was under such circumstances that the First Republic was terminated in 1966 by the military which claimed to be embarking on a cleansing mission but actually ended up destroying the country more than the civilians, thus the calls for the introduction of democratic rule (Madiebo, 1980, Ademoyega, 1981, Anifowose, 1982). Democracy was reintroduced in Nigeria after a long but broken period of military rule between 1966 and 1999. Civil rule was introduced in 1979 but again terminated by the military just after four years, in December 1983 (Agbu, 2004, Akinjide, 2001b). The politicians were arrested, tried before tribunals and sentenced to ridiculous years of imprisonment. Nigerians were denied their basic and fundamental rights during the period of military rule (Kukah, 2011).

Decrees, most of which were obnoxious and self-serving, were the instruments with which the military exercised political power. It was a form of diarchic rule in which the military shared political power with some select group of civilians. By this mechanism and political structure, the military never really faced any threat to its position all through the years of military rule except perhaps the aftermath of the death of Chief M.K.O. Abiola in military detention when, under the umbrella of NADECO a persistent call was made for the military to restore civil rule by swearing-in the President-Elect (Kukah, 2011). A TELL commentary captured the security situation in the country thus:

There is still the darkness of fear and violence in the land and no one is safe. In every neighbourhood in Lagos and other Nigerian cities, many streets are barricaded 'for security reasons' . . . Every murder unresolved is an encouragement to the next assassin. Every preventable accident that happened is an indication that another could happen . . . This is frustrating and many people are already raising up their hands in surrender. They are waiting for divine intervention and divine protection. They would rather trust the juju in their pockets than the police at the checkpoint collecting tolls from pliant drivers (Babarinsa, TELL Magazine, May 28, 2001).

Nigeria could be said to have degenerated into a state of war in the Hobbesian sense. The crisis of insecurity had assumed various forms. An inter-ethnic conflict is one in which groups that could be identified along the wider ethnic configurations such as Yoruba, Tiv, Ibo, Ijaw, or Hausa constitute the contending parties, though it may not involve the entire ethnic group. That was the case when Yoruba clashed with Hausa in Lagos, or Hausa and Ibo clashed in Kano. The emergence of ethnic militia helped to clarify this situation. There were the Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) among the Yoruba; the Bakassi Boys were found in Igboland, while the Egbesu Boys claimed to defend the Ijaw cause. The Hausa have the umbrella organization called Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) as their mouthpiece. There however exists an

organic link between the ACF and the violent youth organizations in the North called Arewa Boys or Almajiri. An inciting statement from ACF, particularly the Muslim clerics, is enough to rouse these youths into violent action against other ethnic groups resident in the North (Ndibe, Guardian News, October 25, 2001). In the same vein the OPC had a respectable composition while it maintained a militant wing which engaged in violent activities against other ethnic groups resident in the West. In the East the relationship between the Ohaneze Ndigbo and the Bakassi Boys was somewhat tenuous. The state governors exercised a stronger control over segments of this militia than the umbrella Igbo organization. In the South-South the Ijaw National Congress (INC) is the umbrella organization, while the Egbesu Boys and several other groups seem capable of independent action without being directly subject to either the INC or the governors.

The Problem

No sooner the military stepped down in 1999 than violent attacks were launched in various parts of Nigeria. All the bottled up grievances during military rule were ventilated on their neighbours. It was estimated that within the short period between May 1999 when civilian rule began and 2001 “over 6,000 people have died in short, sudden, and horrifying outbursts of communal violence” (The Guardian, 25 October 2001). It was also estimated that between 1999 and 2004 over 15,000 people died in ethnic, communal and sectarian violence in Nigeria, a country that was not at war. Inter-communal attacks have broken out in many communities in Nigeria. Parts of the country that were hitherto considered as safe havens became the present theatres of communal warfare. Sankore (ThisDay Newspaper, 28 October, 2001) vividly captured the emerging scenario thus:

With every new case of religious and ethnic violence, it appears more likely that Nigeria is on the verge of becoming a failed state. It seems that it is no longer a question of if but when the Nigerian State will implode. The logic of continuous cycles of violence is that its scope will continue to widen in concentric circles and draw in more people until the state is set for all out conflict.

Each attack left in its wake many lives lost and property destroyed. Attacks, counter-attacks and retaliatory attacks occurred in many parts of Nigeria. So many arms also found their way into Nigerian communities. Between 1999 and 2004 Nigeria almost degenerated into a state of anomie. Communities and religious sects attacked each other. Robbery gangs and cult groups also harassed each other as well as innocent citizens. A TELL commentary captured the security situation in the country thus:

There is still the darkness of fear and violence in the land and no one is safe. In every neighbourhood in Lagos and other Nigerian cities, many streets are barricaded 'for security reasons' . . . Every murder unresolved is an encouragement to the next assassin. Every preventable accident that happened is an indication that another could happen . . . This is frustrating and many people are already raising up their hands in surrender. They are waiting for divine intervention and divine protection. They would rather

trust the juju in their pockets than the police at the checkpoint collecting tolls from pliant drivers (Babarinsa, TELL Magazine, May 28, 2001).

Among the ordinary Nigerians often times their figures would be given as “many lives were lost”. When international and independent media reported hundreds or thousands, official media would be reporting in terms of tens as though the fewer the number the less significant the incident. For instance, after the May 2001 Kano riots; “foreign journalists put the figure at more than 200. Predictably, the Kano State government gave a meagre figure of 13 casualties” (Babarinsa, TELL Magazine, May 28, 2001). Soon these militant groups became useful and lethal instruments in the hands of politicians and from then on democratic practice or democratization became severely weakened if at all it ever took off the ground. The most recent forms of politically-motivated violence are the Boko Haram in the North East and now Fulani herdsmen ravaging villages and engaging in genocidal killings in the Middle Belt, North-Central and North-West. The present government under President Buhari has not shown any commitment to address the situation. There are even allegations that the Federal Government is actually complicit in the actions of the herdsmen. For instance, Retired General T.Y. Danjuma has publicly accused President Buhari of being the direct founder and sponsor of Miyetti Allah, the umbrella organization of Fulani herdsmen that has been found culpable and sometimes even claimed responsibility for certain violent attacks in the Middle-Belt (SpyNigeria, October 27, 2018). Certainly democracy is on trial under such circumstances. Democratic politics played in according to established rules and norms has not found Nigeria a fertile ground. This is the myriad of problems that this paper is designed to address.

Aim and Objectives of Study

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that democracy cannot thrive in a society where violence in various forms has become a norm rather than the exception, especially in a situation where the state itself becomes tolerant to the perpetration of violence or refuses to act promptly against acts of violence for political reasons. The specific objectives are to:

1. Discuss the relationship between violence, insecurity and democracy in Nigeria.
2. Examine the effects of the use of cult and militant groups to manipulate elections in Nigeria.
3. Analyze how unprovoked violent attacks create an atmosphere of insecurity and threaten/weaken the democratization process in Nigeria.

Research Questions

1. What is the relationship between violence, insecurity and democracy in Nigeria?
2. What are the effects of the use of cult and militant groups to manipulate elections in Nigeria?
3. How do unprovoked violent attacks create an atmosphere of insecurity and threaten/weaken the democratization process in Nigeria?

Research Assumptions

1. The more prevalent the use of violence and insecurity to win elections the less democratic is that state.
2. Where the state fails to act against the use of cult and militant groups to manipulate elections democracy cannot succeed.
3. Where the state fails to promptly respond to unprovoked violent attacks that create an atmosphere of insecurity the democratization process would be threatened and weakened.

Theoretical Framework

To provide an adequate framework for the analysis of political violence in Nigeria the study adopted Thomas Hobbes' Theory of State Dissolution. From his theoretical position, the social contract forms the basis for the existence of the State, whose primary responsibility is the protection of lives and property. The state's right to make laws and demand obedience to its laws is also based on its sustained ability to maintain peace and stability. However, where the state fails to maintain general peace, stability and prosperity the contract would automatically dissolve and everybody would return to the trenches in the state of nature. He argued that;

when in a war (foreign or intestine) the enemies get a final victory; so as (the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of subjects in their loyalty; then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him (Hobbes, 1982 p. 375).

Hobbes prescribed some conditions under which the sovereign would have difficulty maintaining peace and security. Citizens are subject to the sovereign only in so far as he satisfied that obligation. Consequently, "if the essential rights of sovereignty be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returns into the condition, and calamity of a war with every other man, it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights entire" (Hobbes, 1982 p. 376). The state is dissolved when it can no longer maintain law, order and peace, either because it is incapacitated or compromised. The implication is that everybody would begin to take up arms and defend himself as Retired General T. Y. Danjuma advised recently. It is the thesis of this paper that Nigeria has almost degenerated to such a condition. "But by safety here, is not meant a bear preservation, but also all other contentment of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself" (Hobbes, p. 376). If the condition persists in which the state shows itself incapable of maintaining security the moral right to expect obedience and loyalty from its citizens no longer exists.

Methodology

This study relied exclusively on secondary sources of data such as books, journal publications, newspapers, magazines and internet sources. Data presentation was mainly historical and a logical presentation and analysis of facts about violence and insecurity in Nigeria (Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2010).

Threat of Anarchy

Here the paper presents data to demonstrate the descent in Nigeria to a state of war as the state could be said to have failed to live up to its primary responsibility of protecting lives and property. The data presented would indicate whether the social contract still persists in Nigeria, in a situation in which there is so much violence and unexpected death and injury in virtually all parts of the state.

For War, consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a track of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lies not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto (Hobbes, 1982 pp. 185-186).

He argued that even when there is no outbreak of war but insecurity lurks or hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the entire society, when people cannot sleep with both eyes closed when they cannot travel freely and in safety, when investments are no longer secure, the country has degenerated into a state of war. That is the present condition in Nigeria since 1999, especially with Boko Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen genocide in the Middle Belt.

Table 1: Timelines on Killings in Middle Belt January – April 2018

S/No	Date	No. Killed	LGA	State
1.	January 1	73	Logo and Guma	Benue
2.	January 1	2	Awe	Nasarawa
3.	January 1	25	Keana	Nasarawa
4.	January 3	3	Makurdi	Benue
5.	January 4	6	Wukari	Taaraba
6.	January 4	1	Gassol	Taraba
7.	January 5	4	Lau	Taraba
8.	January 5	15	TseAkombo, Tse Vii, TseAgule	Benue
9.	January 6	55	Lau	Taraba
10.	January 8	3	Sadauna	Taraba
11.	January 8	2 Policemen	Logo	Benue
12.	January 13	10	BirninGwari	Kaduna
13.	January 13	1	Makurdi	Benue
14.	January 14	1	Bassa	Plateau
15.	January 14	1	Ibi	Plateau
16.	January 16	5	Madagali	Adamawa
17.	January 16	5	Guma, Logo, Okpokwu	Benue
18.	January 18	11	Madagali	Adamawa
19.	January 21	1	BarkinLadi	Plateau
20.	January 21	6	Juman	Adamawa
21.	January 23	9	Ardo Kola	Adamawa
22.	January 24	4	Kaiama	Kwara
23.	January 25	15	Bassa	Plateau
24.	January 26	3	Bassa	Plateau
25.	January 26	2	Ukum	Benue
26.	January 29	1	Guma	Benue
27.	January 31	1	Jema'a	Kaduna
28.	January 31	9	BirninGwari	Kaduna
29.	February 1	4	Gassol	Taraba
30.	February 2	10	Song	Adamawa
31.	February 5	2	Guma	Benue
32.	February 6	8	Obi	Nasarawa
33.	February 8	6	Shellen	Adamawa
34.	February 10	2		Benue
35.	February 10	3	Bassa	Plateau
36.	February 11	4	Jema'a	Kaduna
37.	February 12	2	Guma	Benue
38.	February 26	12	Kajuru	Kaduna
39.	February 27	20	Demsa	Adamawa
40.	March 1	15	Sadauna	Taraba
41.	March 4	20	Sadauna	Taraba
42.	March 5	25	Okpokwu	Benue
43.	March 7	2	Takum	Taraba
44.	March 8	11	Bassa	Plateau

45.	March 9	9	Bokkos	Plateau
46.	March 12	26	Bassa	Plateau
47.	March 13	7	Guma	Benue
48.	March 13	1	Lokoja	Kogi
49.	March 14	32	Daima/Omala	Kogi
50.	March 14	6	Bassa	Plateau
51.	March 15	5	Takum	Taraba
52.	March 19	10	Omala	Kogi
53.	March 20	11	BirninGwari	Kaduna
54.	March 22	3	Jos South	Plateau
55.	March 24	5	Makurdi	Benue
56.	March 30	6	Jema'a	Kaduna
57.	April 4	6	Chikun	Kaduna
58.	April 4	4	Takum	Taraba
59.	April 4	10	Gwer West	Benue
60.	April 5	5	Dogba	Taraba
62.	April 5	30	Gwer West	Benue
63.	April 5	50	Offa	Kwara*
64.	April 7	4	Bali	Taraba
65.	April 7	2	Agatu	Benue
66.	April 8	5	Birkin Ladi	Plateau
67.	April 8	5	Obi	Nasarawa
68.	April 8	4	Keana	Nasarawa
69.	April 9	1	Guma	Benue
70.	April 10	10	Guma	Benue
71.	April 10	51	Wukari	Taraba
72.	April 12	2	Makurdi	Benue
73.	April 12	2	BirninGwari	Kaduna
74.	April 13	5	Bassa	Kogi
75.	April 14	4	Logo	Benue
76.	April 14	78	Obi	Nasarawa
77.	April 17	1	Logo	Benue
78.	April 18	4	Bassa	Plateau
79.	April 19	1	Kutigi	Niger
80.	April 19	1	Gwer West	Benue
81.	April 20	31	Guma	Benue
82.	April 25	19	Gwer East	Benue
83.	April 25	38	Guma	Benue
84.	April 25	7	Awe	Nasarawa
85.	April 28	14	BirninGwari	Kaduna
86.	April 29	5	Gwer West	Benue
TOTAL		885		

*Offa killings from multiple armed robberies

Source: Scannews Nigeria April 30, 2018, tabulated by author

Colonization, Conquest and Political Violence in Nigeria

Nigeria was colonized through violence and that appears to be a legacy that the British have bequeathed to Nigerians (Onimode, 1983, Chinweizu, 1978). From the coastal areas, the British carried their conquest campaign up north. In 1900 Gwandu was occupied and in 1901

Yola fell. On the eastern front they marched on Igboland through Arochukwu in 1901 and established their hegemony. Within that short period, Sokoto, Kano, Maiduguri, etc. all capitulated to the British (Ogali, 2005 p. 111). Before the perpetration of this violent conquest by the British, the Fulani had conquered the Hausa, but while imposing their Islamic religion on them adopted the language of the vanquished. With the twin tools of religion and language, the Fulani steadily expanded their territorial influence toward the south and east. Several wars were fought between the Fulani and the Kanuri. Toward the south the Nupe, Gwari, Katab, Jarawa and the Bariba were serially attacked and conquered as the Fulani Kingdom spread outwards.

Sklar (1963) has identified three Fulani groups, the 'settled Fulani, the pastoral nomads called "cattle Fulani", and a third group that is semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural. Shehu Othman dan Fodio revolted against the King of Gobir, triggering off a series of wars which saw the Fulani gain political ascendancy in Northern Nigeria. Othman Dan Fodio revolted and took control of Sokoto in 1804. With Sokoto as his base he conquered the Habe (Zazzau or Zaria) kingdoms and brought them under his effective suzerainty. The influence of the Hausa/Fulani Empire spread to the whole north between the Rivers Niger and Benue. Two areas the Hausa/Fulani could not really conquer were the Tiv in the middle-belt and the Kanuri in the north-east. However, the violent attacks on them continued until halted and taken over by the British. Current violence in Kaduna State, which has claimed 70 lives, from President Buhari's response, including the paramount ruler of Adara Chiefdom, Agwom Adara, His Royal Highness, Maiwada Raphael Galadima, is the result of efforts to extend emirate Fulani rule to non-Fulani kingdoms in the State.

The Tiv particularly proved to be a hard nut to crack even to the British. About the Tiv resistance Anifowose (1982) stated that "Today, most of the Tiv proudly claim that, unlike other ethnic groups in Nigeria, they were never conquered by any outside authority, including the Hausa/Fulani. They contend that the Europeans were invited into Tiv land only to settle disputes. However, by 1914, British penetration of Tivland was complete and the whole area was brought under effective British administration". Being partly a nomadic people the Fulani penetrated and settled in several communities of the middle-belt through trade and conquest. The Fulani Jihad was however halted by the British, who by force of superior arms conquered and colonized the entire country of Nigeria, including the Fulani. The administrative instrument adopted by the British, called "Indirect Rule" relied mainly on the Emirs in Northern Nigeria, most of whom were Fulani. With time Indirect Rule (also called Native Administration) which proved to be highly successful in the north, became a tool for expansion and political conquest in the hands of the Fulani. In several areas Fulani Emirs were appointed over territories and communities in which the Fulani were in minority.

Tivland was for some time administered as two groups of districts with headquarters at Abinsi (later Makurdi) and Katsina-Ala. In Abinsi Division, a Yoruba Muslim, Audu Dan Afoda, who had formerly served as a political agent for the DOs who had been appointed the Sarkin Makurdi (Chief of Makurdi) in 1914 was the dominant political figure in the Division. He gradually arrogated

to himself additional powers. However, an attempt to have his son succeed him after his death produced much opposition from the Tiv who found anathema the rule of a Hausa-installed chief (Anifowose, 1982).

The resentment of the Tiv stemmed from two sources, first the idea of a centralised authority was alien to them, and second, people they regarded as 'strangers' were being put in authority over them. The Tiv were used to an egalitarian pattern of life. The anger over this political cum traditional onslaught by the Hausa/Fulani over the Tiv was aggravated by the politics of the nationalist struggle and the post-colonial state, which were ethnically pigmented. The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) later took over the Native Authority system from the colonial masters as an instrument of political conquest against the minority tribes in the Middle Belt. Professor Peter Ekeh has rightly observed that: "Sadly, despite the innovations of the 1950s, the newness of political practice in Nigeria and the brash notion that politics was a game of conquering other ethnic nationalities bedevilled Nigerian politics after Independence, leading to political violence and the arrival of military rule in 1966".

Conquest politics is the ingrained attitude by political actors, who see other ethnic/religious groups or political parties as enemies to be conquered and subordinated, rather than being partnered. On the other hand, the minorities and the southern majority ethnic groups are locked in a struggle to resist this enduring tendency towards political conquest and domination (Dappa-Biriye, 1995, Ojiako, 1981). This is essentially the defining feature of Nigerian politics and the source of violent conflicts in Nigeria. The colonial state failed to unite the various ethnic nationalities in Nigeria into a single, cohesive, integrated national force by rising above these parochial interests (Ekekwe, 1986). The post-colonial state (Alavi, 1972) inherited the problem and it did not take long to explode, essentially because of the continuity of conquest politics (Sklar, 1963, Nnoli, O. (1978). The declaration of a state of emergency in the Western Region could therefore be seen as an attempt by the Hausa/Fulani, in collaboration with the Igbo to politically conquer that Region. The same situation eventually snowballed into the Middle-Belt Ademoyega, 1981) Onimode, 1983) Ojiako, 1981) Anifowose, 1982). The long years of military rule only succeeded in suppressing these feelings of neglect, domination and mutual suspicion among the peoples of Nigeria Akinjide, 2001a, May 14). The Fourth Republic was therefore greeted with armed attacks and counter-attacks that reverberated all over the Federation.

Furthermore, military rule became an extension of conquest politics in Nigeria. What the major ethnic groups could not achieve by civil means they accomplished even much more with military rule. For example, through military rule more local government areas were created in the North than the South, and the revenue allocation formula was changed in favour of the ethnic majority. The states were reduced to beggars and the Federal Government a benevolent uncle. Personnel from the majority ethnic groups were entrenched in positions of authority within the state, the civil service, and public corporations, the worst being the Buhari Administration (2015-2019). They also got the plum contracts, oil blocks, and bunkering licenses to operate in the Niger Delta. All these are manifestations of conquest politics. Even

the basis of this return to civil rule, the 1999 Constitution has been identified as a monumental fraud aimed at institutionalizing the conquest, domination, oppression, exploitation, and frustration of the minority ethnic groups by the majority. This could be described as institutionalized and constitutional violence. The Middle-Belt has been in flames since civil rule was instituted in 1999.

The Tiv and Jukun are different ethnic groups in Nigeria's Middle Belt Zone, the Jukun being of Fulani extraction. There have been intermittent clashes between them, a reflection of prolonged enmity. In January 1992 violent clashes 'erupted between the two ethnic groups in which many lives were lost. In October 2001 there was again a major outbreak of violence between them. During the October 2001 clash soldiers were drafted to control the situation, nineteen of whom, were killed and their bodies badly mutilated by Tiv militia who took them for disguised Jukun militia. The Tiv militiamen were so sure of the Jukun origins of their uniformed victims that they permitted their operation to be covered by camera. Another group of soldiers drafted to fish out the killers ended up razing several villages to the ground including Zaki Biam. Many people were killed and property worth billions of Naira destroyed. The home of an ex-Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu, was destroyed and four of his relatives killed (ThisDay News, 28 October, 2001).

Cult/Militant Groups and Election Manipulation in Nigeria

The political nature of the enmity between the two ethnic groups, Tiv and Jukun, was exposed when the ex-Minister of Defence, General T.Y. Danjuma, a Jukun, was openly accused on the floor of the House of Representatives of masterminding the attack on the Tiv. The Jukun are in Taraba State while the Tiv are part of Benue State. Whatever had initiated the animosity was completely taken over by personalities holding top positions in government. They gave a new pulse to the crisis. They sponsored, triggered and mobilized forces against their neighbours. If one group had the upper hand in one clash the other planned for a future sudden premeditated attack, and so it continued with no end in sight. Reuben Abati (Guardian News, 04 November, 2001) has observed that:

The case has been made that the battalion from which the soldiers who stormed Tivland were sent has its base in Danjuina's home village. To show just how serious this matter is, a Tiv legislator in the House of Representatives moved a motion for the removal of Lt. General Danjuma as Defence Minister. The motion failed. Danjuma is still keeping his job.

There is always the individual element as a tool for political conquest. Whether real or imagined it has become an integral part of Nigerian politics. In May 2004 members of the Tiv Defence Corps, a militia group, invaded Unongo village in Adikpo, Kwande Local Government Area of Benue State killing about five persons, the same day as a government initiated peace meeting was being held. Dr. Paul Unongo, ANPP Gubernatorial candidate's house was burnt and his father's tomb vandalised. While Dr. Unongo accused the State Government of involvement, the State Government in turn called for his arrest, accusing him of sponsoring the Unongo Village vigilante. The state also serves as the instrument for primitive capital accumulation. Political appointees see their offices as opportunity for rabid accumulation of wealth. This is the reason politics in Nigeria is so violent and corrupt.

On 7 September 2001, there was an outbreak of violent clashes between the Berom and Jasawa (i.e. Hausa) over the control of Jos North Local Government Area. The crisis soon took a religious coloration between Moslems and Christians. It was the culmination of a lingering disagreement over political appointments and elections in Jos North which were always going to the Jasawa (Hausa) whom the Berom regard as 'settlers'. The government confirmed 51 deaths but eyewitnesses put the figure much higher. Curfew imposed by the government was ineffective and the military had to take over security from the police. Even at that, surreptitious killings continued which caused stampede everywhere. With this development it was impossible to say which religious sect was having an upper hand over the other. In an Editorial Comment the Guardian (September 16, 2001) observed that:

With all the dangers of a violent collision by the two contending forces, the government could not read the handwriting on the wall to swing into action to avert the clash which claimed many lives and property worth billions of Naira destroyed . . . The chief cause of last Friday's carnage is the underlying fear of domination. Everybody who matters in Plateau politics is interested in who controls Jos North Local Government Council . . . Last Friday morning, the central cemetery on Zaria Road, Jos, witnessed another mass burial. The bodies were driven in a trailer led by an army vehicle and headed straight for the Zaria Road Cemetery.

Elsewhere in Plateau State, ten people were killed on February 13, 2004 at Mayo Village, and in a reprisal attack, four-armed mobile policemen, and several civilians, were killed by Fulani insurgents at Tunqa village in Plateau State. Four rifles belonging to the policemen were removed, including arms and ammunition. The crisis and killings in Plateau State soon snowballed in Kano State when the Kano State Government under Alhaji Ibrahim Shekarau granted a procession permit to a Moslem group to protest the violence against the Hausa/Fulani in Plateau State (Ogali, 2005). In course of the procession, some Islamic teachers were said to have incited the youths to action leading to the indiscriminate killing of non-Hausa/Fulani residents in Kano. Some of the victims were burnt alive for a crisis in another state, which they neither caused nor contributed to in any way. Southerners, particularly Ibo were even more affected. Their shops and houses were burnt down. Neither the governor nor any of the Islamic preachers was called to question.

Table 2 below is a graphic profile of inter-ethnic violence in Nigeria during the protracted period between 1999 and 2002. One could easily glean from the table that the Hausa/Fulani were involved in 32, i.e. 80% of the ethnic/religious violent conflicts in Nigeria during the period, and they are uniformly spread all over the country. They have clashed with Yoruba, Igbo, Kataf, Nupe, Birom, etc. not only in the North but also in the West, East and Middle-Belt. The real masterminds are never apprehended. That gives them the impetus to do it again and again in a vicious circle. Over the years Kano has gained reputation as the capital of sectarian violence in Nigeria. In October 2001 there was a riot in Kano, which lasted for days. Casualty figures rose between 150 and 200, mainly southerners. It was ignited by a solidarity-protest by Muslim youths against the Anglo-American air strikes on Afghanistan. Properties worth billions of Naira were destroyed in Kurua Asabe, Brigade, Badawa, Rimin Kaba, Dakata, Zango, and Naibawa areas.

Transport vehicles (Luxury buses), shops, churches, buildings belonging to southerners were destroyed. Rioting started after the usual Friday Jumat prayers, giving credence to the suspicion of incitement by the Muslim clerics. Shops were looted, women raped and many wounded. Eyewitnesses described it as “hell on earth”. The demonstrators also condemned in strong terms the pronouncement earlier made by the External Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido indicating Nigeria's support for the military campaign against Afganistan. Several riots also accompanied the declaration of Sharia Law in Northern Nigeria, which started from Zamfara State in 2000. Despite assurances that Sharia Law is meant for only Muslims, the implementation targeted the southern/Christian population. Sharia police is called HISBAH, found in all Sharia States of the North. From Zamfara State, one after the other all the Northern States began to declare Sharia law (Ogali, 2005).

In April 2001 there was a religious riot in Gombe State, which left many people dead and others wounded, and property mainly churches burnt down. The riot was organised by a group calling for Sharia. In August 2001 violence erupted in Bauchi State soon after the State Government established Sharia law as Muslim Fundamentalists went about killing, maiming and destroying property of Christians. The Christians also mobilised and defended themselves against the Moslems. 16 Islamic jihadists from Plateau State earlier arrested and detained, were ordered to be released as their statements implicated the Bauchi State Government, which, as they alleged, recruited them. “Just between 5 August and 21 August six successive renewed attacks were recorded, while well over 5,000 people were said to have lost their lives, and property worth millions of Naira destroyed on both sides”. Similar violence had erupted in the State in 1991 and 1995 (The NEWS, 10 September, 2001).

In December 2001 an Igbo truck driver, Uche Nwama was beaten to death for allegedly desecrating the Qur'an with his vehicle by Muslim Fundamentalists in Kano. His escape into a police post could not save him as he was finally beaten to death in presence of the police (Guardian 30 November, 2001). During the October 2001 Kano riots a survivor had alleged that “on Saturday night two men were abducted by security personnel from Burma Road and taken to Weather Head Road, where they were killed”. On October 3, 2001 the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the North met in Gusau, Zamfara State and raised an alarm over a statement credited to the Zamfara State Governor that “some Northern Governors had contributed N100 million to buy arms for the purpose of fighting for their faith because they no longer have army generals of northern extraction who are also Moslems in the military that would protect the North” (Guardian News, 12 October, 2001). One could identify different faces of state complicity in ethno-religious riots in Nigeria. At the individual level but functioning officially police personnel have looked the other way while violence is meted out to people perceived to be enemies of the state. That has also been the attitude of the various State Governments in the North during ethnic/religious riots. During the long period of military rule, the balance of local governments was tilted in favour of the North through authoritarian fiat. Other changes were the control of the army, the civil service, government parastatals, relocation of the Federal Capital, centralization of the Nigeria Police, etc. On its part the Federal Government found itself impotent and unable to face the Sharia challenge, which was and still is essentially political (Ali, 1999). State after State announced Sharia as

their legal code in a nation whose constitution has declared it a secular state and the Federal Government could not respond either out of fear that some big toes might be stepped upon, in which case the preference was to let sleeping dogs lie, or having been captured and incapacitated certain powerful segments of the ruling class would act as though nothing happened (Ekeke, 1986).

Table 2: Record of violent ethnic/religious conflicts in Nigeria between 1999-2002

S/NO.	STATE/CITY	DATE	ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS GROUPS INVOLVED
1.	OGUN (IMOSAN)	NOV. 9 1999	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. ORO CULT MEMBERS
2.	DELTA	NOV. 11 1999	ITSHEKIRI Vs. URHOBO
3.	LAGOS	NOV. 27 1999	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
4.	KWARA	DEC. 19 1999	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. CHRISTIANS
5.	OYO	JAN. 5 2000	HAUSA/FULANI Vs. YORUBA
6.	KADUNA	FEB. 21 2000	HAUSA/FULANI Vs. OTHERS
7.	ABIA	FEB. 28 2000	REPRISAL VIOLENCE ON HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS
8.	RIVERS	MAR. 18 2000	ELEME Vs. OKRIKA
9.	BORNO (DAMBOA)	MAR. 28 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
10.	OYO (SAKI)	APR. 24 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. CHRISTIANS
11.	ONITSHA	MAY 2000	HAUSA/FULANI Vs. IGBO
12.	OYO (SAKI)	MAY 6 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
13.	ABIA (ABA)	MAY 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. IGBO
14.	KADUNA	MAY 20 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
15.	OGUN (SHAGAMU)	JULY 18 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
16.	KANO	JULY 12 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
17.	LAGOS	OCT. 15 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
18.	OYO (IBADAN)	OCT. 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
19.	LAGOS (ALABARAGO)	OCT. 16 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. IGBO
20.	LAGOS	OCT. 17 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OPC
21.	KWARA	OCT. 17 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
22.	NIGER (MINNA)	OCT. 24 2000	NUPE, HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
23.	LAGOS	NOV. 25 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA
24.	KATSINA	APR. 7 2000	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. KATAF
25.	KADUNA (ZANGOKATAF)	APR. 22 2001	IKULU Vs. BAJJU
26.	BAUCHI (TAFAWABALEWA)	JUNE 18 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
27.	GOMBE	JUNE 18 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
28.	NASARAWA	JUNE 25 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
29.	JIGAWA	JULY 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
30.	BIRNIN GWARI	AUG. 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS

31.	JOS	SEPT. 7 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. BIROM & OTHERS
32.	TARABA	SEPT. 8 2001	FULANI JUKUN Vs. TIV
33.	ZAMFARA (GUSAU)	OCT. 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. OTHERS
34.	DELTA	OCT. 10 2001	ITSHEKIRI Vs. URHOBO
35.	KANO	OCT. 12 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. CHRISTIANS
36.	BENUE	OCT. 12 2001	JUKUN Vs. TIV
37.	OSUN (OSHOGBO)	NOV. 29 2001	YORUBA FUNDAMENTALISTS Vs. CHRISTIANS
38.	JOS	DEC. 29 2001	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. BIROM/ANAGUTA/IRIGWE
39.	DELTA	JAN. 2002	ITSHEKIRI Vs. URHOBO
40.	LAGOS	FFEB. 2 2002	HAUSA/FULANI MUSLIMS Vs. YORUBA

Source: Tell Magazine February 18, 2002

Violence, Insecurity and Politics in Nigeria

Violence and insecurity are not limited to the North. The Yoruba have a somewhat similar history. Putting Yoruba history in proper perspective Osuntokun (The Guardian, June 22, 2004) has asserted that autochthonous people existed in such places as Ife, Ijesha, Ondo, and Ekiti in the west before the arrival of Oduduwa, who conquered them and established various dynasties throughout Yorubaland. “The myth associated with Oduduwa is the myth of a conquering people who took over the rulership of autochthonous people and established representatives of the Oduduwa dynasty in almost all Yoruba areas”. Though essentially of the same Yoruba stock, series of internecine wars were fought among the Yoruba people just as they were being harassed by the Fulani from the North. These kingdoms violently clashed with each other in a struggle for domination and resistance to the same. Today other Yoruba are still regarded as 'native settlers' in Ibadan. Sklar (1963) says;

Ibadan armies clashed intermittently with the forces of Ibadan's Yoruba neighbours to the south, namely the Ijebu and the Egba, who controlled the routes of trade to the seaport of Lagos. During most of the nineteenth century the imperial state of Oyo was under military pressure from the imperial Fulani rulers of the North.

The contemporary politics of the Yoruba is still defined by these intra-ethnic forces and the age-long rivalry with Benin and the Fulani. Ife and Modakeke is a case in point. From 1999 in Yoruba land the dominant organisation behind ethnic violence was the Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC). The OPC appeared on the political scene in 1994 with a clear cut aim of fighting for the actualisation of the June 12 1993 Presidential Election won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. It had Lt. General Alani Akinrinade, Prof. Ade Ajayi, Prof. Subaru Biobaku on its Board of Trustees. At the OPC trial in Lagos on October 20, 2000 Dr. Frederick Fasehun said the “main purpose of OPC is to defend the rights of every Yoruba person on earth”: The organisation was banned by the Federal Government on October 19, 2000. The OPC went underground between 1995 and 1996 when the General Abacha Government linked it with series of mysterious killings in the West. The organisation was even supported by Chief Gani Fawehinmi and Prof. Wole Soyinka. High ranking Yoruba political leaders like Abraham

Adesanya and Oladipo Diya also condemned the ban on OPC and the trial of Dr. Fasehun (Ogali, 2005). It turned militant when Gani Adams became a factional leader of OPC. 'OPC was involved in violent clashes at Apapa Port, Mushin, Bariga, Mile 12, Alaba International Market, etc. where even many policemen were killed. The police were no match with their weapons. They also relied on juju and charms (Newswatch, November 6, 2000). In October 2000 there was a clash between OPC and Hausa residents at Idimu. The violence soon spread to Ajegunle, Ijora-Badiya, Suru-Alaba, Iporin, Ejigbo, Alagbado, Okokomaiko, and Agege in Lagos. The Hausa lost nine persons whose bodies could not be found. The clashes were frequently over economic and political space. In February 2004 there was an outbreak of violence between Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani residing in Lagos. It started from a misunderstanding between a Hausa man and some Yoruba at Idi-Araba on a Saturday. It later snowballed into a major inter-ethnic conflict, and by Monday it had spread to other parts of Lagos. For four days, security personnel could not control the situation. Official records put the death toll at 100 with thousands rendered homeless.

In February 2004 the two factions of OPC led by Gani Adams and Dr. Frederick Fasehun clashed at Mushin in Lagos in which many lives were lost. In an earlier clash at Ikorodu six deaths were recorded. Indeed, violent clashes between Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani have been very common since the early Century. Akinjide (2001a) has stated that in 1816 the Jihad, which had been raging in the Hausa kingdoms, was extended to Nupe and from there to Yorubaland.

These leaders saw their mission as continuing the wars of resistance against the Fulani until the last were driven out of Yoruba land. Alaafin Atiba shared their determination and resuscitated old titles and bestowed them on the rulers of the new towns. Oluyole of Ibadan was so successful that the Fulani army was defeated in 1840 in Osogbo, thereby recovering some of the lost Yoruba towns (Akinjide, TELL, May 14, 2001a).

In contemporary Nigeria the Igbo mouthpiece is Ohaneze Ndigbo, composed of the Igbo leadership. The Bakassi Boys came into limelight towards the transition to the Third Republic. It was essentially a volunteer force made up of young men to checkmate armed robbery and other criminal activities in Igboland. As the 1999 elections approached they became ready tools in the hands of politicians. On November 4, 2000 Eddy Okeke, also called Prophet Eddy Nawgu, from Nawgu Town in Anambra State was arrested and later killed by the Bakassi Boys (Anambra Vigilante Service, AVS) on November 9, 2000, for supporting and spiritually empowering criminals. The killing was allegedly executed with the consent of the State Governor, Chinwoke Mbadinuju the police having been rendered ineffective through connivance with criminals. On July 18 2001, 22 people were killed when suspected armed robbers attacked Awkuzu Town in Oyi Local Government Area of Anambra State. The attack was launched against the Awkuzu Vigilante Service. It was actually a reprisal attack launched by a group that was against the activities of the Vigilante to sanitise the town against armed robbers. It was an all-out war between the two groups as houses, cars, property, and even human beings were burnt with fire. This group was opposed to the activities of the Bakassi Boys supported by Governor Mbadinuju (Ogali, 2005).

On July 3, 2001 an armed robbery kingpin in Onitsha, Okwudili Ndiwe (Alias Derico) was arrested and killed on 9 July 2001 by the Bakassi Boys. Before then he had been declared wanted by the police but the Bakassi Boys refused to hand him over to the police. He was alleged to have killed over 100 people including about 15 policemen. He confessed to attacking a luxury bus in Onitsha and killing 30 passengers. He also confessed to operating as a thug to a local government chairman and a National Assembly member. Governor Mbadinuju rewarded the Bakassi Boys with a cash gift of N250,000.00 for their gallantry against the bandits. In December 2001 violence erupted in Owerri between traders and the Imo State Vigilante (Bakassi Boys) following the introduction of N200 security fee by Bakassi. The butchers resisted collection of the fee and the vigilante stormed their sheds. Many lives were reportedly lost. Thus what started as a security outfit was turning into an instrument of extortion. On April 16, 2002 just before a workers rally in course of a strike action by civil servants in Anambra State, the Bakassi Boys attacked the labour leaders at their secretariat and beat them mercilessly. Bakassi had degenerated into a tool in government hands to intimidate, harass, and exploit the masses. One protracted case of violent communal conflict in Igboland in recent times is that between Umuleri and Aguleri in Anambra State. This war over disputed lands continued for over a decade and even a Supreme Court verdict in 1984 could not end it. The two communities were virtually reduced to rubbles.

This is a graphic picture of the state of insecurity in Nigeria. The picture will not be complete without mentioning the series of unresolved assassinations and other forms of politically-motivated violence. In December 2001 the former National Chairman of the People Democratic Party (PDP) for the South/South, Chief Marshall Harry, who had decamped to the ANPP, was arraigned before a Port Harcourt Magistrate Court over a six-count charge of misdemeanour. He was accused of falsely stating that the Rivers State Governor, Dr. Peter Odili had perfected plans to kill him. On March 5, 2003 he was murdered in his Abuja residence. Ogonnaya Uche, All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) Senatorial Candidate for Orlu Senatorial Zone, and a former Commissioner under Governor Achike Udenwa (PDP) of Imo State was shot on February 8, 2003 at his home in Owerri. He died two days later. On Sunday 22 October 2000 Standard Trust Bank Chief Executive, Alhaji Hassan Alasa was shot dead on the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway. On December 7, 2000 a prominent politician and architect, Chief Lai Balogun was shot dead at his Lagos home shortly after he arrived from a trip to Abuja. On December 23, 2001 Chief Bola Ige, the serving Attorney-General and Minister of Justice was shot dead in his bedroom in Ibadan. August 29 2002 Dr. Victor Nwankwo was killed in Enugu. On September 1, 2002 the Chairman of the Nigeria Bar Association, Anambra State Branch, Barnabas Igwe and his wife, Abigail, were murdered in Onitsha. On October 20, 2002, Professor Chimere Ikoku, former Vice Chancellor University of Nigeria, Nsukka, was killed in his residence. On February 22, 2003 Theodore Agwatu, Principal Secretary to Imo State Governor, was murdered in his home. On March 3, 2003 Mrs. Emily Omope, an Alliance for Democracy (AD) member of the Ekiti State House of Assembly died after an acid attack. On February 6, 2004 Chief A.K. Dikibo, the National Vice Chairman of PDP, South/South was shot dead in his car on his way to Asaba to attend a South/South stake-holders meeting. A day after President Obasanjo announced to Nigerians, even before proper investigations started, that Dikibo was killed by armed robbers (Ogali, 2005).

On March 7, 2004 the Chairman of Kogi State Independent Electoral Commission, Chief Philip Olorunipa, was shot dead in his home. Armed bandits attacked the convoy of Governor George Akume of Benue State on Monday March 3, 2004 along Lafia-Akwanga Road in Nasarawa State. The former Managing Director of Nigeria Airways, who was also a member of the PDP Board of Trustees. Chief Andrew Agom was killed. Akume's Police Aide, Sergeant Joseph Ngam was also killed. It should be noted that virtually all these killings were either not investigated at all or investigation carried out so shabbily, not even one killer has been found. The spate of killings, particularly within the PDP subsided after Governor Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State openly accused Chief Tony Anineh, the Chairman of the POP Board of Trustees, of threatening to assassinate him. He also accused Chief Anineh of involvement in the deaths of Chiefs Bola Ige and A.K. Dikibo. This much Chief Anineh himself disclosed to Governor Kalu's Deputy, Dr. Chima Nwafor, as a warning if he (Kalu) did not stop accusing him of diverting N300 billion meant for construction of federal roads. Against all the threats of going to court to seek redress Governor Kalu refused to apologize, but quite ridiculously the PDP intervened on the ground that it was a party matter, and such a grievous case was swept under the carpet.

Table 3: Attacks by Herdsmen, 2012-2021



Table 4: Deaths by Herdsmen, 2012-2021



In 2014 there was an outbreak of hostilities between Fulani herdsmen and Tivs in Benue State involving the use of sophisticated weapons resulting in the massacre of about 3,000 people (Nigerian Newsworld, March 24, 2014). Since Buhari assumed office as President of Nigeria (2015-2022) there has been a killing spree or genocidal massacres across Nigeria, particularly the Middle Belt in states like Plateau, Taraba, Nassarawa, Kogi, Kaduna, Benue, etc. by Fulani herdsmen (as shown on Tables 3 & 4 below) and the Miyetti Allah, an umbrella organization of the Fulani cattle owners, has, with heartless impunity, defended the herdsmen claiming reaction against cattle rustling (Isenyo, G. et al 2022, March 22, Jimoh, A. M. et al 2021, June 11, Shehu, O. (2021, January 24). Rtd. General T. Y. Danjuma has accused President Buhari of being the founder and sponsor of the Miyetti Allah that supervises the

killings and accordingly called on the sedentary communities to arm and defend themselves (Spy Nigeria, October 26, 2018). All the four Tables show the number of deaths from sustained attacks in a country that is not at war, in what Hobbes defined as the state of war or the track of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. In addition, there's the massacre of 49 Shiite Muslims and the detention of their leader till date. Amnesty International's Director, Osai Ojigho stated that; "We have seen a shocking and unconscionable use of deadly force by soldiers and police against IMN, Islamic Movement of Nigeria" (Punch, November 01, 2018). Moved by frustration from the inaction of the Federal Government the Governor of Benue State, Samuel Ortom accused the President Buhari of complicity in the killings perpetrated by the herdsmen as several visits to the State House in Abuja yielded no positive result (Olufemi, 2021, June 10). That precisely is a state of war in the Hobbesian sense, to which Nigeria has degenerated and democracy cannot be practiced under such circumstances.

Conclusion

From the three objectives that form the bedrock of this paper, i.e. the relationship between violence, insecurity and democracy, the effects of the use of cult and militant groups to manipulate elections and how unprovoked violent attacks create an atmosphere of insecurity and threaten/weaken the democratization process in Nigeria the following conclusions have been made:

1. Separatist, secessionist, cult and militant movements like the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), OPC, Bakassi Boys, Tiv Defence Corps, etc. have been deployed to attack and harass political opponents and neighbouring communities or ethnic groups for economic purposes.
2. Communities and ethnic groups perceive each other as enemies to be conquered resulting in conquest politics that has made democratic politics unsustainable.
3. Colonialism introduced the politics of violence and bequeathed it to the Nigerian political leaders.
4. The failure of colonialism to introduce a culture of democratic politics among the Nigerian political leaders is negatively affecting democratic practice in Nigeria.
5. Violent attacks on neighbouring communities and ethnic groups have created an atmosphere of insecurity and threaten/weaken the democratization process in Nigeria.

Recommendations

1. The use of separatist, secessionist, cult and militant movements like MASSOB, OPC, Bakassi Boys, Tiv Defence Corps, etc. to attack and harass political opponents and neighbouring communities or ethnic groups for economic and political purposes is undemocratic and should be discontinued.
2. Though politics is a game of numbers practical steps should be taken to tolerate and accommodate other ethnic groups and give them a sense of belonging.
3. Employment opportunities should be provided to engage the youths so that they would not be available to be recruited for criminal activities, including election violence.

4. Government should give priority attention to violent attacks between communities and ethnic groups that have created an atmosphere of insecurity and threatened/weaken the democratization process in Nigeria.

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