

Effects of Insurgency on the Physical and Socio-Economic Activities in Maiduguri

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Abstract

The activities of the insurgency constitute a serious threat to lives and properties of residents in Maiduguri. Infact, the physical and economic implications of their activities cannot be quantified and the social costs are enormous. Despite the state of emergency that was declared by the Federal government in the affected states the killings, bombing of structures and kidnapping by the insurgents continue unabated. It is against this background that this research is carried out to determine the effect of the insurgency on Physical, social and economic activities of the residents of Maiduguri, with the view to proffers physical planning measures that would reduce the problems to barest minimal. This was achieved through careful interviews with some police officers, Military personnel, Civilian JTF, Wards heads and some residents of Maiduguri. Use of internet services and Newspapers have greatly contributed in compiling of this write-up which shaded more lights on the effect of the insurgency on physical, social and economic activities of residents of Maiduguri. The activities of the insurgents have led to destructions of Houses, Schools, mosques, Churches, market centres and even the military and paramilitary formations. So many utilities were also bombed. Examples, GSM masts, electricity labels and transformers. The insurgents have destroyed many lives and properties that cannot be quantified. From the research conducted, it was discovered that the crisis and violence are not unconnected to poverty, unemployment and misinterpretation of the teaching of the Holy Quran by some Islamic "Ulamas". It is these combined factors that worked against the faith and morals of every member of the group that resulted to such violence. Finally the research has considered some of the causes and effects of the attacks before designing some physical planning measures as recommendations to the key issues. These are: social, economic and physical factors affected by the insurgency.

Keywords: *Insurgency, emergency, social and economic activities*

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Background to the Study

Insurgency is a movement within a country dedicated to overthrowing the government recognized by the United Nations. When those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as a legitimate authority (United Nation 2008). An insurgency can be thought via counter insurgency warfare and may also be opposed to by measures to protect the population and by political and economic action of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents claims against the incumbent regime. However, not all rebellion is insurgencies. There have been many cases of non – violent rebellions using resistance as in the “People Power Revolution” in Philippines in 1980s that ousted President Marcos. Example of insurgencies includes, Al – Nusra front of Syria 2011 and the MPLA and UNITA during Angola's civil war.

When insurgency is used to describe a movement's unlawfulness by virtue of not being authorized by or in accordance with the law of the land, its use is neutral. However, when it is used by a state or another authority under threat, “insurgency,” often also carries an implication that is rebels' cause is illegitimate. Whereas those rising up will see the authority itself as being illegitimate. Also, advanced learners dictionary the fifth edition (2009) defined insurgency as an attempt by a group of people to take control of their government using force and violence. Insurgent in the same vein refers to one of a group fighting against the government of their country.

It can be undoubtedly said that the threat posed by insurgency is undermining the existence of Nigeria as one sovereign political territory and that of its states: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa especially when the insurgents in the north eastern Nigeria intensified attacks and even declared some areas that falls under their control as a new Islamic caliphate which is to be governed according to strict Islamic laws,(Blanchard 2014and Sahara Reporter,2014). Undoubtedly, the activities of the so called led insurgents have seriously affected various fields of human endeavors which can be considered under physical, social and economic factors. Physically, the attacking of schools, places of worship, market structures, Houses and some infrastructures like roads, bridges and electricity cables have led to halting of other developmental projects that have bearing on the lives of the entire community. Socially, the insurgent crisis have resulted to increase in crime rate in Maiduguri , reduction in the standard of living of the inhabitants of the study area, increases in number of refugees influxes, and a setback in the educational system across Maiduguri township. Economically, the crisis have affected market linkages between Maiduguri and other neighboring towns, cities and countries like the Niger, Chad, Cameroun and even Central Africa where dozens of trailers were always in routes to these countries which suddenly came to an end today and many business have closedown . These have resulted to a drop in the formal and informal sector of the economy compared to what was obtainable some years back.

Objective of the Study

This research intends to examine the effect of the insurgency on physical and socio-economic activities in Maiduguri. The research intends to achieve this through studying the nature of the crisis, the physical and socio-economic activities affected in Maiduguri, as well as considering the ongoing development initiatives of the state government in order to determine abandoned projects as a result of the insurgency. Finally, the study will also look at efforts made by the federal and state governments in curtailing the crisis, then proffers a physical planning measures that will accelerates both physical and socio-economic development.

Theoretical Framework

This study will use the poverty breed conflict hypothesis for the theoretical framework according to Kanbur (2007) as cited by Awojobi O.N (2014) in international Journal of innovation and Science Research, Vol.11 2014. Ted Gurr (1970) deprivation theory described to this assumption. Academic debates continued on the correlation between poverty and insecurity. Some scholars have argued that most conflicts in developing countries are caused by the prevalence of poverty. According to the deprivation theory “aggression is always a consequence of frustration”. and “frustration always leads to aggression” (Leeds, 1978).

Causes of Terrorism, Conflicts and Violence in Northern Nigeria

Insecurity whether Terrorism, conflicts and violence are caused by the high poverty rate in most societies, Gurr 1970, Burton 1997, Samiento and Bacerra,1998, and Sarmiento1999). These people are the leading scholars on the poverty breeds conflicts hypothesis. However, the likes of Gaitan (1995); Rabio (2000); Sanchez and Nunez (2001) objected to this hypothesis. Empirical evidence from the works of Mohammed (2012) and Ford (2007) indicated that poverty was the major cause of conflicts in Africa. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examined conflicts in Africa, from their findings, they noticed the interface between income and conflict. Rice et al (2006); Colier and Hoeffler (2002); Fearson (2004); Wlter (2004) subscribed to the notion that poverty helps to extend conflicts once it started. Evidence has shown that when income drops there is tendency for conflict to surface or re-ignited. A study by Paul Collier and AnkeHoeffler from the Oxford University, James Fearson and David Laitin both from the Standford University, and Professor Nicholas Sambanis from the Yale University gave credence to this hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The table below illustrates their finding.

Table 1: Key Finding of Per Capita Income and Conflicts.

Countries at different income levels have the following risk experiencing civil conflict:
at \$250 GDP per capita, 15% risk of war within 5 years
at \$ 600 GDP per Capita, a 7.5% risk of war within 5 years
And at \$5,000 GDP per capita, less than 1% risk of war within 5 years (Humphreys, 2003)
Countries at different income levels have the following risk of experiencing civil conflict:
at \$ 579 GDP per capital, a 17.7 risk of war within 1 year
at \$ 2043 GDP per capita, a 10.7% risk of war within 1 year
and at \$ 9,566 GDP per capital, less than 1% risk of war within 1 year.

Source: Fearson and Laitin (2003)

Table 2: Findings Continues

Average GDP per Capital for countries that did not experienced war within 5 years is \$5.173

Source: Sambanis (2003)

Table 3: Finding Continues

Average GDP per capital for countries that experienced war within 5 years is \$1.100.
Average GDP per Capita for countries that did not experienced war within 5 years is \$5.764

Source: Collier, Hoeffler and Rohnar (2006)

Conflict and violence has been blamed on the high rate of poverty in Nigeria. However, some security experts have debunked this assumption. But in the words of experts who persist that whatever argument surrounding the cause of the insurgency, the salient facts cannot be dismissed easily. The most important of this is that, we have to admit that even if the group has its antecedents in theology; its swelling rank is a result of a huge reservoir of unemployed urban youths from many part of the country Mohammed (2012). These youths, who have completely become disenfranchised, are readily to provide the group with foot soldiers who commits all manners of atrocities, including assassination and suicide bombing in the name of religion. Onuoha (2013), empirical study on why do youths join the insurgents here the study indicated that poverty played a major roles in luring the youths in joining the group.

Another causes of terrorism, conflicts and violence is the group's breeds of new ideology, the ideology of the so-called Islamic sect is to bring an end to the secular system of government and introduce sharia law in Nigeria. However, Mohammed (2012), did not subscribe to the notion that insurgency aim is to Islamize Nigeria through the introduction of sharia law. According to him, the foot soldiers of the sect are disgruntled youths who have been paid by unscrupulous Northern politicians to cause mayhem in the country because of their selfish interest. This is the assumption from the southern part of Nigeria, where the immediate past president came from, that the activities of the sect was more intensified because of the emergence of the president from the southern part of Nigeria.

Generally, the conflicts and violence of the insurgents is attributed to high rate of poverty, unemployment, politics, corruption have been blamed for the elongation of the crisis. Most of the foot soldiers of the insurgents are youths that are frustrated because of lack of employment, income and have been disclaimed by the politicians after being used by these politicians for their election victory. Cook (2013), Awojibi (2014) and Onuoha (2014) all asserted that the youth were enlisted into insurgency because of poverty prevalence in the north. The poverty profile of Nigeria that was release in 2011 by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicate that the northern region has more people in poverty that their counterpart in the south.


The Nature and Activities of the Insurgency in Maiduguri

The activities of the insurgents are very glaring and constitute a crime against humanity in the state and also posed a serious threat to our national security. Since then the group intensified its attacks on security agents and their formations, attacking top governmental establishments, mosques, churches, markets, business centres, and motor parks attacking and kidnapping the general populace (Ajah, 2011). This has claimed the lives of more than 15 thousand people (NEMA, SEMA, 2014).

The activities of the insurgents are crime against humanity. In the strict legal terms of a crime is a violation of the criminal law which is subsequently followed by legal punishment in criminal laws. A crime is an act of omission which attracts sanctions such as fine imprisonment or even death sentence. These attacks have led to the killings of 15,000 people and displacement of 2,000,000 people in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe state (Displacement Tracking Matrix 2014). In response to this, Federal government declared a state of emergency at different stages, but this did not stop the group from the continuation of bombings, killings, kidnappings and destruction of lives and properties. In a nutshell, the attacks by the group in period of the state

of emergency surpassed when there was no state of emergency. The question many Nigerians asked was, “what is the purpose of the state of emergency when the insurgents continue to intensify its attacks on innocent Nigerians?” Professor, Clionadih Raliegh of the University of Sussex created a data that demonstrates the attacks before and after the declared state of emergency.

Table 1: Reported civilian death in the attacks in September 2010-April 2011.



Source: Clinadih 2014

Effects of Insurgency

Physical Effects

The activities of the insurgents have definitely retarded development initiatives of Borno state government. The frequent attacks of public structures, like the government establishments, shelters, market structures and infrastructure like roads, bridges, electricity cables and the GSM masts are quite devastating (Ajah, 2011).

Also contracts awarded by the state government to the Chinese construction firms for rehabilitation and construction of roads and drainages like the Lagos Street, Bullumkuttu Abuja, Abuja Sheraton settlement have also come to standstill as a result of frequent attacks by the so-called groups. The effects of the attacks have left so many viable projects uncompleted. Other projects abandoned by various construction firms include Bakasi Housing Units, and the Legacy Garden Estates along Jos- Kano road. Had these projects been completed, they would have touch the lives of residents of Maiduguri and facilitate development in the area.

Social Effects

To say that the deadly activities of the group has impaired the social activities of the residents of Maiduguri metropolis is an understatement. The activities of the group have resulted in large number of people relocating to Maiduguri causing shortages in accommodations and over-stretching the available facilities and social services. About 604,260 people from 13 Local governments have moved to Maiduguri, which recorded the highest number of refugees in the Northern states, (Displacement Tracking Matrix 2014).

In Maiduguri, people were abducted over the years are still missing. This case has socially attracted global attention and many national and international personalities. According to Ruquayyatu (2013), “the constant threat posed by the insurgents who started in 2009 has resulted to number of schools to close down. In some cases, school enrolment has drop drastically. Infact, who ever survived their attack will not like to go back to school having considered students who lost their lives and number of classmates kidnapped at government girls' secondary school Chibok. Lecturers and teachers were also killed during these attacks”. Education Data survey (2011) showed a gloomy picture of education particularly in the north eastern part of Nigeria. According to the report, Borno state has only 29 children in school out of every 120 children (British Journal of Education 2013).

Socially, from the above highlights, insurgency had destroyed the education system and so many promising youths who would have been future leaders of the nation. No doubt the group had also dealt a fatal blow on the enrolment of pupils and students into schools in Northern Nigeria, especially in Maiduguri the centre of the Crisis. Parents and Pupil lives are in perpetual fear of attacks and this may have direct effect on the school attendances.

The seemingly intractability of the insurgents saga is exerting a very high cost on the people affected particularly, in terms of high loss of lives, properties and disruption of socio-cultural structure of Maiduguri. It has also affected the family settings in many communities. Re-union of such affected families is difficult because so many have lost their loved ones. In fact, men could not trace the where about of their wives and women could not also trace their children. These have negatively affected the image of the country in the international communities.

Economic Effects

Maiduguri is the principal trading hub for the Northern Nigeria. Its economy is largely based on services and trade with small share of Manufacturing. Maiduguri where the crisis originated and frequent bombings and clashes between the insurgents and the security agents have weighed down seriously on commercial and business activities in the city. Many businesses have reportedly crumbled and many people have fled the state to southern part of the country. The Monday market in the city is reported to have been seriously affected as hundreds of shop owners especially the southerners are said to have closed their businesses and have left the trouble city. About half of the 10,000 stalls in the market were said to have been abandoned by traders who fled the city (Thisday Newspaper, 2014).

Banks and their customers are said to be operating under difficult conditions and have reduced their business hours to guard against being attacked by the insurgents. According to Borno state former commissioner of Information Mr. Inuwa Bwala: “It will take the state 20 years to recover from the current predicament it has found itself” Bwala in an interview with Thisday Newspaper said that: “The security situation has taken its toll on the economy of the state as many people have fled”. He added, “It is only natural that when you have a situation as we have now, it will affect the economic fortunes especially where people go out to do their business under the atmosphere of fear. There is no doubt that the crisis has taken its toll on our resources, our business and on the economy”.

The attack on Maiduguri had been very devastating because the city had always been commercial centre of Western Sudan for the past 500 years. The city had been economic base of the north and the neighboring countries like the Niger republic, Chad and Northern

Cameroun before the evolution of Nigeria as a nation. The security challenges have impacted negatively on both the public and private sectors of the economy as many business men and traders have relocated their business from the city. In fact, about 36 percent of Igbo business men and traders in the city, who engaged in both small and medium scale businesses are reportedly have fled to Abuja and south east due to growing insecurity posed by the insurgents (ThisdayNewspaper2014).

Other economic activities affected by the insurgency include verse irrigation lands abandoned around the river Alau dam for more than 6years and the fishing activities of the inhabitants of the settlements around the Alau dam. Similar problem were experienced in some settlements around Maiduguri where fertile agricultural lands were abandoned for years rending the inhabitations jobless.

It can be undoubtedly said the economic activities in Maiduguri and its environs were drastically affected by the insurgency which resulted to increased unemployment, low income level and poor condition of living of the majority in Maiduguri.

Government Efforts toward Combating Insurgency in Maiduguri

In order to curtail the heinous crime of the insurgents against humanity, Federal government in 2013 declared a state of emergency in the three states where the activities of the insurgents are predominant. Yet the state of emergency did not continuation of bombing, killing, kidnapping and destruction of lives and properties. (Ajah, 2011).

Sadly, the governor of Borno state appears to be helpless in containing the situation in Maiduguri and the entire region, as the bombardments continuous. Though the governor have complained to the federal government that the military is short of war equipments, while the rebels have sophisticated war equipments than the Nigerian Army. The then government of Mr. Goodluck Jonathan responded that the governor is not a military expert and did not know anything about war strategies. Federal government on its side kept assuring the nation, especially people in the three states who were under frequent attacks that the problems are under control. Federal government also promised the nation that the insurgents will be destroyed in six weeks and the abducted Chibok girls will be brought back to their parents and that the situation would be contained. Unfortunately, we neither set eyes on the Chibok girls nor see the situation controlled as promised by the federal government. The state of emergency imposed did not stop continuation of bombing, killing, kidnapping and destruction of lives of properties.

It wasn't until this new administration came into power that people started witnessing positive impact of the military's fight with the so-called insurgents. Under the Buhari administration, change in the military leadership and the National Security Adviser, purchasing and rehabilitation of the country's war equipment have yield positive results. Besides, the present chief of Army Staff, Brigadier general T.Y Buratai was given three months to crush the group in fact some appreciable effort were recorded following changes in the military leadership and war strategies. Today, many insurgents are surrendering to military that are carrying out offensive attacks on them, which was the reversed during the past administration where military personnel were on the defensive side of the attacks. The insurgents have finally requested for amnesty from the federal government. In response, Mr. President gave them some conditions one of which they should bring back the abducted Chibok girls and that the insurgents

authentic leaders to come forward to negotiate the amnesty. According to the president as reported by Thisday newspaper (2014), “Conventional attacks by the insurgents would be rooted out by November, 2015 but that the deadly attacks will likely to continue.”

General Findings of the Study

No doubt insurgency had posed challenges of weapons armament and other ballistics possession. Report shows that their fighters possessed more superior war equipment that is far than those widen by the security agents of the country. Other problems documented pointed to the challenges of gathering accurate and timely intelligence and security tips that could assist security organization in fighting against the insurgents. In short, all of the respondents believed that the insurgents have made security a difficult task as this is not un-connected with a high level of corruption within top ranking officers of government parastatals, the use of poor and out-dated weapons, problems of logistics and many other internal security issues.

Furthermore, some respondents revealed that the insurgency had severely affected the Nigerian security formations. About 90% of the respondents opined that the insurgents remained faceless within the mainstream Nigerian population. Hence, the targeting of security personnels and even the private life has placed the men of these services extremely in danger. The security had also been affected in terms of spirit and morale in facing the enemies squarely. Evidence has shown that many of them have fled and abandoned their post or turning mutiny. As a result, the Nigerian military hierarchy had sentenced about 200 of the military personnel's to death. About 300 have been expelled from the service, a situation that negatively affected the Nigerian security formation(Thisday Newspaper, 2014).

Generally, the security system has been weakened by its inability to win the war which is seriously affected as some of them were turned into helpless force with no clear focus, or blue print on how effectively to stop the insurgency. Liolio, (2012) This can be validated in the recent cases of muting and fleeing of Nigerian soldiers to neighboring countries and the consequent trials of many soldiers in military court martial where many soldiers have either sentenced to death or expelled from the service. In summary, the insurgents have killed innocent civilians whom they claimed have collaborated with the state security.

1. They have killed innocent critics, especially Muslims clerics.
2. They have killed innocent Christians and forcibly convert those kidnapped.
3. They have bombed and killed members of churches and Muslims in their conventional worships.
4. They have killed innocent security personnel's.
5. They have bombed facilities like Banks, hospitals and military installations.
6. They have burnt so many villages that were not in support of their activities.
7. They have kidnapped innocent school girls, travelers and villagers.
8. They have prevented villagers from carrying out their primary activities and forcing them to flee their homes.
9. Communication routes between the Borno state capital and other local government areas were blocked, while bridges and GSM masts were bombed.
10. So many schools were destroyed which led to the closure of all government owned schools in Borno state.
11. They have looted money, foods stuffs and domestics animals that belong to villagers, etc.

Conclusion

The activities of the insurgency constitute a serious threat to lives and properties of Nigerians. The physical, social and economic effects of the insurgent's atrocities cannot be quantified and so also the cost is enormous. These can be seen from number of people, mosques, churches, schools, markets and military formations bombed by the so-called insurgents. These have posed a serious threat to the development of this great nation. Which resulted to thousands of people flee their homes, abandoned all their social and economic activities making them to be dependent on individuals and organizations.

This nation cannot continue to lose its people and properties on a daily basis from the insurgents' co-ordinated bombing. It is time to make adequate provision of modern war equipment to the Nigeria's security to counter the challenges of the insurgents' sophisticated weapons, which is their strength.

Although the present Buhari administration has swing into positive action to end the activities of the insurgents, the fight should not be left to Nigerian Army alone, but all hands should be on deck in the big fight. Individuals, associations and corporate bodies should join hand in the fight in one way or the other, especially by tipping the concerned security on relevant information and giving necessary support.

Recommendations

Since, sectionalism, corruption, poverty, unemployment, poor infrastructure and social services provision are the major factors behind the crisis and violence in most developing countries, especially Nigeria and in particular the northeastern part of the country, this recommendations cut across physical, social and economic measures that will check the insurgents menace in Maiduguri.

1. Government policies should constitute a policy in action against poverty to enable the poor or the more vulnerable sections of the society to achieve sustainable livelihoods. The approach is to economically empower communities, families and individuals through sustained and well-coordinated poverty alleviations.
2. Government through ministry of works to establish appropriate infrastructure and support system to facilitate the alleviation of poverty by implementing projects, programmes, enterprises and life styles sustainable even at the grass roots level. The programme areas are provisions of adequate shelter, environmental infrastructure, redevelopment and rehabilitation of burnt down houses, schools, mosques, churches, market centres and military formations. There is also the need for improvement in the areas of health, water supply, drainage, sanitation and solid waste management.
3. Nigerian government should initiate policy that will generate employment opportunities for the unemployed and desperate youths of the country.
4. The government should deploy its security intelligence to fish out those financing the insurgents.
5. Government should sustain provision of modern war equipment to meet up the current security challenges.
6. All outstanding military allowances should be settled. This can help restore lost courage and morals of the military personnel to face the insurgents squarely to end this terrorism.

7. Districts, villages and wards heads and the general public should join in the fight through tipping the security personnel's on the camps and routes taken in carrying out operations and any other vital information that can lead the security to where about of the so-called insurgents.
8. Finally, government should open a dialogue channels to know what the grievances of the insurgents are in order to determine line of action to be taken to restore peace and order in all affected areas.

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