The Nigerian State and Boko Haram Insecurity Incidence 2009-2015

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A b s t r a c t

It is common knowledge that failed states are fertile grounds for terrorism which threatens their national security. Nigeria is one of such states where the elements of failure such as corruption, low GNP, loss of legitimacy, high rate of poverty among others have given rise to the activities of Boko Haram defined as horrendous, murderous, violent, hateful, and which uses terror and violence to make demands on the state. These acts of terror by the terrorist group has been fingered as being responsible for the attacks that have led to wonton destruction of property with varying degrees of damage in addition to inflicting bodily harm, debilitating permanent disabilities and outright loss of lives. This study explored the relationship between the Nigerian state and the incidence of Boko Haram therein. Also, the effect of the incidence of Boko Haram on the security and political economy of the Nigerian state were examined, more specifically, the study highlighted the conditions necessitating the emergence and persistence of the Boko Haram sect. This study which employed descriptive analysis relied mostly on secondary data sourced from books, journals and articles. In like manner, two hypotheses were formulated to guide the study while the frustration-aggression theory was adopted as theoretical framework. Some of the findings showed that features of failure as articulated in the study are present in Nigeria. These features provided a strong correlation and direct link between the Nigerian state and incidence of Boko Haram. The study concluded that these factors created the conditions necessary for terrorism to thrive in Nigeria and consequently, threaten the security and political economy of the country. The study recommended that to deal with these challenges, the Nigerian state need to reexamine its character so as to address the issues that gave rise to acts of terrorism as well as re-strategize on how to provide the needs of the vast majority of her citizens, the proverbial common man.

Keywords: *Nigerian State, Boko Haram Insecurity Incidence*

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Background to the Study

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state with a population of about 170 million people cutting across the divides of ethnicity and religious beliefs with 36 states, a federal capital territory and 774 local government councils (Kalu, 2010). The complexity of Nigeria as a nation state is centered on its political formation, economic, social and religious inclinations. Administratively, Nigeria remained divided into the Southern and Northern provinces and Lagos Colony this situation remained until 1914 when the Niger area was united into the colony and protectorate of Nigeria.

It should be noted that the people of the South had more interaction with the British and other Europeans due to their coastal economy; they also adopted Western education and developed a modern economy more rapidly than in the North. The regional differences in economy continued to be made manifest in Nigeria's political life. As a result of poor economy, the North was being developed with the resources from the South. It is a common knowledge that failing states are fertile grounds for terrorism which threatens their national security. Nigeria is one of such states where elements of failure made manifest by high insecurity; high poverty rate, poor economic growth etc have given rise to such groups like Boko Haram which uses terror and violence to make demands on the state. The return to civil rule in 1999 inspired great expectations among Nigerians as a result of the horror and brutality that characterized the long military rule which was marked by state centric terror-intimidation, bombing of the homes of perceived or real opponents. Nigerians were indeed very eager for a breath of fresh air of peace expected to guarantee accountability in public, respect of human rights and transparency (Erinosho, 2012).

Despite the high hopes, it still appears that so many things are wrong with the Nigerian state as the economy, the polity, the legal system, education, diplomacy, cultural and religious values are clamoring and begging for reforms to say the least. The absolute and arbitrary dictation of the above sectors of the Nigerian political economy and its antecedent result of insurgency, rebellion, poverty, ethnic and religious chauvinism on the part of the masses, greed, deceit, collaboration, exploitation and unfulfilled promises on the part of the ruling elite have impacted negatively on the Nigerian society.

Given the above scenario, not many Nigerians were surprisingly disappointed or even jolted by the figures published by Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2011) to show increased rate of severe poverty by percentage of population in Nigeria;
North-Central 33.8%,
North-East 67.2%,
North-West 60.0,
South-East 9.3%,
South-South 11.6%,
South-West 9.4%

Endemic corruption, structural violence and above all progressive decline of public services continue to manifest. Odunfa (2010), observed that corruption is unarguably institutionalized in the system and it will take nothing short of a revolutionary overhauling

to change the situation. The current Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria that originally took the form of sectarian violence has escalated into terrorist activity with international linkages and affiliations making it a relatively difficult nut for Nigerian government to crack (Gilbert, 2014). Consequently, Nigeria has not known peace for some six (6) years now and counting. The emergence of the fundamentalist sect, has led to the fight for security and safety of most Nigerians residing in the North-East flank of the country, especially Christians. Since the commencement of the terrorist operations of the sect, they have adopted several methods to unleash terror on the people. Most states of Northern Nigeria have experienced their dastardly activities, but the worst hit have been Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, FCT (Abuja), Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Yobe (Nwakaudu,2012)

It is against this backdrop that it has become imperative to mention that the Nigerian state has failed in the provision of basic needs for the people and these groups have capitalized on it to recruit hapless individuals who in turn use violence and terror to make demands on the state. This study will for all intents and purposes look at how the characterization of Nigeria as a failed state has impacted in making the country a breeding ground for terrorism. The study highlights the conditions necessitating the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorist sect.

Statement of Problem
As a highly plural society, Nigeria is replete with heterogeneous incompatible, structural deficiency and mirage of inconvenience, resulting in abuse of power position, disregard for the rule of law and human rights, ignorance, unfairness, religious fundamentalism, that have further enhanced lack of legitimacy for virtually all regimes in the country, lack of loyalty and transparency, corruption, political immaturity hence, the country is faced with state and ideological terrorism. Adedapo (2008), further asserted that not only is the Nigerian nation – state deficient in effective and efficient super structure, that is the control of the material environment, good government (leadership), that are required for statehood and development, the relationships of these elements are poor and unfavourable for human development.

Fafowora (2012), noted that it is the systemic failure more than any other factor that accounts for the deep seated grievance of the high rate of insurgence. Elements of failure in Nigerian state are fingered as responsible for the incidence of Boko Haram. Heywood (2000), and Niwora (2007), conceived the state as an instrument for solving people's collective problems and funded at public expenses.

When the state fails as this instrument through which these individuals and groups attain their goals, the next thing that follows is frustration. As Dowse and Hughes (1972) have argued, the frustrated individual, or group is likely to attack the believed source, and if the attack fails to remove the frustration, the aggression is likely to reoccur. Helman & Ratner (1993), were concerned about 'a disturbing new phenomenon' whereby a state was becoming 'utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community. They argued that a failed state would ('imperil)' their own citizens and (threaten) their neighbours through refugee flow, political instability and random warfare'.

The problem is thus establishing a link between all those elements of failure and incidence of Boko Haram. Whether or not they were responsible for the numerous attacks the country is facing today and how in turn the Nigerian state has been affected by the incidence of Boko Haram. We are going to ask two pertinent questions which will serve as our research questions;

1. Is there any relationship between state failure manifested in high unemployment, high corruption rate, poverty etc and incidence of Boko Haram in Nigeria?
2. How has the incidence of Boko Haram affected the security and political economy of Nigerian state?

Objectives of the Study
The broad objective of this study is to examine the state of Nigeria and the incidence of Boko Haram.

The specific objective of this study is;
1. To determine the relationship between elements of failure and the incidence of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
2. To ascertain the effect of incidence of Boko Haram on the security and political economy of Nigerian state.

Conceptual Literature
Concept of the State
In the words of Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010), the state is composed of a set of interconnected and coordinated institutions that concerned with the organization of power and the structured domination and ordering of society. He argued that state essentially monopolizes certain powers- the making and execution of binding rules, the control and utilization of institutional organized violence, the legitimate use of physical force, the extraction of resources including taxation of citizens and the right to representation in the international community. On the other hand, Miller (2003), in line with Ikelegbe and Okumu, (2010) agreed that the state has institutional and functional attributes and dimensions that is, structural apparatus of governance and the exercise of public authority that is generally recognized by the people as binding and the critical roles, needs and expectations that are performed or fulfilled.

All the stated roles, duties and responsibilities of state notwithstanding, the ability and potentials for the enhancement and the realization of the critical state functions is dependent on the capacity of the state. Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010), further asserted that state power and capacity can be measured in terms of the effectiveness of secured control of territory, the supremacy of laws over the society, the operational capabilities to extract revenues, make and implement binding rules and regulate society, and effectiveness of control over resources and people. In this connection, extractive regulatory, administrative and technical capacities are crucial to state execution of its essential roles. Essentially, measuring the nature of the state using the above ingredients, it is obvious that not all states possess the capacity to carry out the categorization of state.

Also, Miliband (1969), sees the state in the advanced capitalist form functioning to maintain the economic and social relation under which bourgeoisie's accumulation take place. In the periphery of capitalism, he outlined factors such as level of development of the productive forces through its several institutions and apparatuses as a direct instrument for accumulation of surplus by the dominant class. The state is exemplified as the ruling elites while organs of government are simply there to reinforce their will. Molien (2001) argued that, it is not a matter of hard work or the socio–cultural group one belongs to but rather which divide of the power bloc one belongs to. On his own, Sodaro (2001), argued that the state is the totality of country's governmental institutions and officials.

It possesses the legal authority to make laws and enforce it on the population. This argument incorporates all government officials and agencies from the highest officer of the national government to the lowest officer at the local level. Heywood (2000), and Niworu (2007), conceived the state as an instrument for solving peoples' collective problems and funded at public expenses. It protects people against external attack and maintains internal peace and order. They provide economic and technological progress, social, security and group identity. By implication the power of the state applies to every member of the society.

Dokken (2008), is of the view that there are certain functions states have to undertake successfully to be a full-fledged entity. For example the security of its inhabitants, its redistributive functions and the administration of general justice to its citizens. It is these attributes or the urge to acquire them that can judge the success or failure of a modern state. Malliken and Krause (2002), saw the three core activities of the state in providing security, representation and welfare as the main function a state is expected to perform. The researchers have therefore concluded that a state can be seen as an organized body of people having a government and living in an area occasioned by geography; showing then that a state must as a matter of course have human beings present and occupying such geographic territory.

Concept and Theories of State Failure
The literature on 'state failure' has received considerable attention across the range of social science enquiry. Sovereign states are expected to perform certain minimal functions for the security and well-being of their citizens as well as the smooth working of the international system. The political science and international relations literature have been concerned with identifying why the state itself ceases to perform core Weberian functions. States that fail to meet these minimal standards have been described as 'weak', 'fragile' or 'poorly performing' (Torres & Anderson, 2004). More extreme cases have been labeled 'failed' or 'collapsed'.

The growing interest in state failure is no coincidence. This is because the number of new or embryonic states has grown dramatically in the last half of the 20th century (Rotberg, 2003). The interest in state breakdown at this core level has been sparked by the urgency of understanding the factors behind political violence and civil war, and the growth of terrorist organizations in many less-developed countries (Cramer 2006, Menkhaus, 2004). The proliferation of labels – ranging from 'crisis states', 'countries at risk of instability',

challenging environments' and 'countries under stress'-reflects the range of ways in which the core problem has been conceived (Torres & Anderson, 2004, p. 5). In recent times, the failure of US interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan have heightened academic and foreign policy interests in conceptualizing the notion of 'failed' states. Helman & Ratner (1993), were among the first analysts to use the term 'failed state'. They were concerned about 'a disturbing new phenomenon' whereby a state was becoming 'utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.

They argued that a failed state would ('imperil)' their own citizens and (threaten) their neighbours through refugee flow, political instability and random warfare'. Michael Ignatieff (2002), adopts a Machiavellian/Weberian understanding of state failure when he argues that state failure occurs when 'the central government loses the monopoly of the means of violence'. In the wider sense of state failure, Zartman (1995), develops the idea of state failure along the lines of Hobbesian social contact theory. For Zartman, state failure occurs when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed as well as referring to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart. There are many categories and definitions of 'state failure' that have proliferated in the literature State failure can occur in many dimensions such as security, economic development, political representation, income distribution and so on. According to Rotberg (2002), 'nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people.

Their governments lose legitimate, and in the eyes and hearts of growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate. 'Failed' or 'collapsed' in his view is the end stage of failure. In extreme cases, failure may occur on all dimensions simultaneously as in Somalia. However, in most cases, there is a wide variation in the extent to which a state 'fails' across different dimensions. In Colombia, for instance, the state has been relatively impressive in macroeconomic management, but has been unable to control large parts of its rural areas where guerilla and paramilitary groups and drug cartels are powerful. It is thus imperative for any definition of 'failure' to be explicit in which dimension a state fails. Given the variation in state capacity across sectors, aggregate measures or categorizations of 'failure' can be misleading.

The failed-state literature stresses that there are certain indicators that are necessary (if not sufficient) to categorize a state as 'failed'. Rotberg (2003), identifies three important indicators. First, the persistence of political violence is salient in most definitions of 'failed states'. For Rotberg (2003), 'failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested by warring factors. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more warring factions. In his definition, the absolute intensity of violence does not define a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence (as in Angola, Burundi and Sudan), the direction of such violence against an existing government or regime, and the vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence that identifies a failed state.

A closely related indicator of state failure is the growth of criminal violence. Here, the presence of gangs, criminal syndicates are the most cited. As a result of the failure of a state to provide security from violent non-state actors, people often seek protection from warlords or other armed rivals of the state. A third indicator of failed states concerns their inability to control their borders and/or significant chunks of their territory. Often the expression of official power is limited to the capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones.

Indeed one measure of the extent of state failure is how much of the state's geographical expanse a government genuinely controls. Rotberg (2003), also introduces the idea that it is possible to rank failure according to the number of dimensions in which a state fails to deliver positive political goods. In order to rank the severity of state failure, Rotberg suggests that there is a hierarchy of positive state functions. These are;

1.   Security;
2.   Institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts, rule of law, secure property   rights and contract enforcement;
3.   Political participation; and
4.   Social service delivery, infrastructure and regulation of the economy.

In this analysis, strong states perform well across these categories and with respect to each separately. Weak states show a mixed profile, and failed states are a sub-category of weak states. There have been several theories that seek to explain why states fail. The 'resource curse' is perhaps the most influential explanation and has been written on and critiqued extensively (Di John, 2007, 2009; Rosser, 2006). A second set of important theories of state failure have been subject to less scrutiny. These are the functionalist theories of the state. A series of authors working on post-colonial African states have challenged the idea that 'state failure' is a useful way of examining how elites in actually existing political systems legitimate rule, accumulate capital and maintain a semblance of political stability in the context of underdevelopment (Keen, 1998; Bayart, 1993; Reno, 1995, 1998; Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

They challenge the basic idea of measuring degrees of 'stateness' along a continuum starting with those that meet classical Weberian criteria of statehood and ending with those that meet none of the criteria of 'successful' statehood. In general these authors seek to explain how anti-developmental states have emerged as well as attempting to explain the political logic holding these states together. The starting point for most of these theories is to explain the emergence of patrimonial and client list politics. Many authors point out that the speed with which independence occurred created the context which generated politics based on political patronage (Cooper, 2002). The need to construct political alliances at short notice with minimal resources and the absence of party organization outside urban areas mean that nationalist-typically urban, union-based teachers, union leaders and administrators-had to rely on existing political structures. This meant finding individuals-often chiefs or other prominent notables- and using patronage to bind these individuals to the party and local voters to candidates.

There are several influential theories worth considering. First, Bayart (1993), develops the idea of the 'politics of the belly', which is defined as the predatory pursuit, or rush for spoils, of wealth and power that, as a mode of governance, takes historically-specific forms appropriate to the post-colonial state in Africa. The predatory nature of the state, according to Bayart, generates incentives for leaders to 'eat' from the resources of the state.

In this model, the invasion of ever-wider spheres of economic activity by informal political networks leads to the 'criminalization of the state'. The criminalization of the state and its associated corruption at all levels in Africa is less a sign of state 'failure' than a mechanism of social organization that has to be related to the specific historical experiences, cultural repertoires and political trajectories of the sub-continent through which political power is disseminated and wealth re-distributed.

A second model is the idea that the late colonial legacy created incentives for leaders to use 'disorder as a political instrument' (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). This refers to the process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty and sometimes even chaos which characterizes most African politics. The use and creation of personalized informal patron-client networks is central to their argument.

For Chabal & Dalkoz, these might include kinship, witchcraft, ethnic or religious forms of identity that are the outcome of different rationalities, and the instrumentalisation of different forms of disorder that are more attuned to maintaining social bonds that 'work' in Africa. Implicit in their arguments is that the legitimacy of rule depends less on delivering rapid economic growth and employment creation than on accommodating powerful elite factions. A key policy prescription of the model is that the introduction of economic liberalization and multi-party electoral politics are likely to allow even greater scope for those powerful 'businessmen of crime' (such as warlords and high-level political patrons who use disorder and violence to accumulate capital) to flourish, as such liberalization policies tend to reinforce the power of 'shadowy' entrepreneurial elites (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).

A third model is the idea of the 'shadow state' developed by William Reno (1995). The idea of elite accommodation is central to the argument. For Reno, the end of the Cold War and the rise of economic and political liberalization policies put traditional patterns of patronage under pressure in sub-Saharan Africa. Such liberalization processes, he argues, further undermined the incentives of the rulers of weak states to pursue conventional strategies for maximizing power through generating economic growth and, hence, state revenues.

In this context, economic motives and objectives are not the unique purview of rebel forces, but can also include those of personalistic rulers of corrupt 'shadow states' who maximize the use of violence to 'manage their own economic environments' siphoning off state resources for personal enrichment and the establishment of patronage networks, instead of providing public goods such as security and economic governance. Rulers address the internal threat of warlord politics by transforming their own political authority into an effective means of controlling markets without reliance on formal state institutions.

Weak state rulers use new and strengthened alliances with outsiders to shed old clients and discipline those who remain. Reno (1995), in his analysis of central African states- Angola, Sierra Leone, Zaire/DRC-, describes how leaders have based their personal power and derived individual wealth from the overt and clandestine manipulation of markets, at times with the connivance of foreign investors in natural resource enclaves such as oil.

Concept and Theories of Terrorism

Taking a critical look at international terrorism, we have to first examine the concept and origin. The term 'terrorism' was coined from terror derived from a latin verb 'terrere' that means to frighten; Alao (2011), cited in Campbell (2001). Sample (1987), observed that 'it is a clandestine act of violence against non-combatants for the specific purpose of bringing about political change'.

According to him, terrorism is usually characterized by a variety of tactics, such as assassination, hijacking, kidnapping, sabotage and by the exploitation of innocent victims to affect a third party. It is intended moreover to produce fear in a population in order to force the existing system to meet the terrorist's demands. In modern time, it has been adopted to mean a wide range of deployment of force largely targeted at civilian population by disgruntled elements with the society to direct the attention of government to their plight or to force a change of government. Edward (1978), on his part argued that, it is the use or threat of use of anxiety inducing extra normal violence for, on in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victim.

The difficulty associated with evolving an acceptable definition of terrorism leads Hoffman (1996:25) to observe that:

> If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however one identified with the perpetrators, the violent act is regarded in or more sympathetic if not positive (or at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism. Regardless of the problem associated with the definition of the concept certain attributes of terrorism manifest in bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnapping, hostage situations and hijackings.

The fact that state and non-state actors engage in acts of terrorism informed the position of Falk in Legley, (1990:50) that:

> 'It is futile and hypocritical self-deception to suppose that we can use the word terrorism to establish a double standard pertaining to the use of political violence. Terrorism then, is used to designate any type of political violence that lacks an adequate moral and legal justification, regardless of whether the actors are a revolutionary group or a government'.

Inspite of the difficulties, efforts have been made to explain the meaning of terrorism from two major perspectives, mainly liberal and radical perspectives. To the liberal scholars, if one side to a dispute succeeds in attaching the terrorist label to its opponent, it has gained an

important psychological advantage. This group of scholars attaches the label of terrorism to some acts of violence, whose underlining objective they do not accept.

For instance in the case of Niger–Delta militants, there was a call by some groups to tag them as terrorists because they do not accept their objective. Essentially, the United States government uses the label 'terrorism' to tag any group fighting against American interests. For instance, the group that fought against former Libyan leader Gadhafi were not labeled terrorists.

On the other hand, it is important to note that radical scholars see terrorism as a form of protest and political participation Mojekwu (1978) cited in Onuoha (2008), argued that these acts of terrorism, violence and political crime that produce psychic fear should be looked upon as the normal behavior expected of a desperate people in our human society. According to him, these atrocities, although highly reprehensible, could be acts of protest which our technological and modern society has neglected to look into at the initial stage. Oats (1989), observed that terrorism is, first and foremost, a violent aggressive act of political participation. According to him', Terrorism is an act of political participation because its perpetrators seek political goals. Thus, terrorists are not simply insane socio-paths bent merely on destruction: On the basis of the above assumption, he has asserted that:

> *Political terrorism is the use or threat of use of violence by an individual or a group whether acting for, or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group in acceding to the political demand of perpetrators*(Oots: 1989).

State Failure and the Incidence of Boko Haram
On the issue of state failure and the incidence of Boko Haram, we can see that when these two phenomena are juxtaposed, one seems to be a determining factor for the other to occur. These two concepts can further be explained using the frustration – aggression analysis. It is assumed that individuals and groups have goals of sort that much of their behavior is purposive in the sense of goal-seeking and that if this behavior is not prevented in some way, the group or the individual is likely to behave quite peacefully.

For instance, Heywood (2000), and Niwora (2007), conceived the state as an instrument for solving people's collective problems and funded at public expenses. When the state fails as this instrument through which these individuals and groups attain their goals, the next thing that follows is frustration. As Dowse and Hughes (1972) have argued, the frustrated individual, or group is likely to attack the believed source, and if the attack fails to remove the frustration, the aggression is likely to reoccur.

Taking a look at presumed failed states we will see that the type of terrorist attacks seem different from strong states. Most strong states like the United States of America do experience terrorist attacks from groups outside who believe their strength and wealth comes from the sweat of poor countries. Walter Rodney captured this in his book entitled. How Europe underdeveloped Africa.

In the weak states the terrorist groups come from within and attack the state apparatus. They believed that the state has failed in its primary function of providing basic necessities of life. The views of the radical scholars could be said to be misleading in all ramifications. There have been a whole lot of protests and political participations that does not involve the killing and destruction of properties to achieve a goal. Also, Falk in Kegley (1990), failed to take note that there are so many political violence that cannot be categorized as terrorism which made his generalization intellectually unassuming.

Boko Haram and Nigeria's Political Economy
Nigeria is a country that is grappling with issues of development since independence to date. Nigeria is a country with low per capita income, high unemployment rate, low human capital development, poor income, infrastructural decay and developmental challenges. Aro (2013), argued that the economic effects of insurgency in Nigeria can generally be viewed from two perspectives: they are the effects on the state (Nigeria) and individual members of the state (Nigerians) particularly, residents of Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Plateau, and neighbouring Northern states.

Economic activities have been massively disrupted; the insurgents destroyed more than 25 telecommunication in the region (The Guardian, 12 September 2012). Isakpa (2012), in his view on the negative impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the economy opined that 'there can be no real progress made in any economy that is hostage to security' In August 16, 2012, Boko Haram attacked Bornu state capital, Maiduguri and destroyed lives and properties. The Maiduguri incident affected businesses as traders closed their shops at the popular Monday market. It must be noted that Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has led to people abandoning their businesses, closure of banks and government parastatals amongst other issues.

Aro (2013), was quick to assert that: Boko Haram insurgency has not only led to closure or abandonment of people's business activities within the affected region but also led to immigration of people from the affected region as well as led to reduction of patronage of products from Northern region because of rumour that Boko Haram strategists are planning to send poisonous products to other parts of the country. Also, the insurgency of Boko Haram has reduced drastically government developmental projects, investment and growth in private business initiatives in the affected areas.

Furthermore, Boko Haram insurgency has discouraged Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. Investors all over the world are afraid of coming to do business in Nigeria. This is very bad signal to economic development and growth. Also, the country is experiencing set back at the political level of governance. The Boko Haram insurgency has to a large extent paralyzed government institutions and has also created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust among political class, which is not healthy for our nascent democracy. The insurgency has drastically reduced government performances in the area of infrastructural development, employment generation, and improved worker's welfare amongst others. The current budgetary allocation to security and the increased security votes of governments at all levels especially in Northern Nigeria is a drive towards poverty and underdevelopment.

Nigerian State and Terrorism

Literature on terror in Nigeria are awash with various causal factors that include the following: unmitigated despotism, injustices, discriminating political activities, institutional failure, national ideology, environmental security factor, problem of the youth, social and cultural perceptual factors such as ancient hatred among groups are responsible for the various violent conflicts that have assumed a new dimension and made the country a threshold of lawlessness and apprehension. Lack of confidence, danger or risk now permeates internal and national environments (Wafula and Ikelegbe 2010; Essien 2008; Ennals, 1998; Galtung, 1990; Mohammed 2010; Udofia, 2010).The above factors that are historical, cultural, economic, political, religious and social factors are herewith categorized under state induced; group promoted and externally enhanced factors. In the first instance, Miller (2003), asserted that: The chief object of every citizen's desire is self-preservation; to avoid loss of life; hence security is the greatest good and insecurity the greatest evil. A man is subjected to sovereign authority in order that he may be protected and achieve security, if the state cannot provide for his safety; the citizen need not obey the state; a state that cannot protect and provide for its citizen is no sovereign at all and does not deserve obedience from its citizens.

With the above in mind and perhaps, considering the Nigerian state inability to play the role of balancer amongst group interests and failure to provide basic things of life, the above assertion best situate the state centric cause of terror in Nigeria. Over the past years the country has been under the siege of terror manifesting in every clime and regions. This is because virtually all indicators of state fragility and failure as expressed by the United Fund for peace are pervasive in the country. These include loss of control of territory by the government, near loss of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, inability to provide public services, massive movement of refugee and internally displaced peoples, legacy of vengeance seeking group vengeance, chronic and sustained human flight, uneven economic development along group lines, failure on the part of national and regional leaders to mobilize their regions for development, sharp and/or severe economic decline, widespread violation of human rights, progressive deterioration of public service, rise of factionalized elite, intervention of other states or external factors. These state centric factors no doubt induce terrorism.

The various manifestation of terrorism has been adduced to responses of the disenchanted, frustrated, abused and marginalized youths of Nigeria to decadence, poverty, unemployment and manners of abuse which not only make them (youths) susceptible to violence but fuel unrest, violence and terror. For instance, many have come to agree with the thesis that the Boko Haram insurgency has carried out ceaseless attack on state institutions, religious groups and security outfits in a large scale manner in the last few years.

In fact, the United States Department of state country Reports on terrorism has it that the Islamic fundamentalists carried out 136 attacks and killed 590 people in 2011. On kidnapping for ransom (Nigeria was rated 15th in the 2011 assessment of the same reports), increased rate of armed robbery and the Niger Delta problems are a direct consequence of the large body of young unemployed or underemployed graduates of institutions of higher learning in Nigeria.

At the level of religion, in the words of Sam Harris (2006:18), the tenets of the dominant religions-Islam and Christianity which the people embrace create intolerance and have a way of instigating violence. The 'US-THEM' idea- (bigotry) creates division coupled with ancient hatred instigated by the religious claim of superiority. Even though the two dominant religions claim peace, the concept of peace is merely inclusive- peace to both religions is to fellow believer. In agreement to this opinion, Muhammad (2010), expressed that accentuation of religious identities and the phenomenal growth of religious revivalism instigates violence.

Also, the insensitivity and insincerity of political elites to the feelings of the citizens acts as a trigger to violence and terror. The return to civil rule in 1999 inspired great expectations among Nigerians as a result of the horrors and brutality of a long rule of the military which was marked by state centric terror intimidation, bombing of the homes of perceived or real opponents, extra judicial murder.

Nigerians were indeed very eager for a breath of fresh air of peace expected to guarantee accountability in public, respect of human rights and transparency, (Erinosho, 2012). However, Nigerians were surprisingly disappointed and jolted by the increased rate of poverty. Showing percentage in severe poverty; North-Central 33.8%, North-East 67.2%, North-West 60.0%, South-East 9.3%, South-South 11.6%, South-West 9.4%, (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 2011). Endemic corruption, structural violence and above all progressive decline of public services continue to manifest.

In the same vein, Olusegun Obasanjo once posited that, the changes of making governance accountable to the people in Nigeria is at the root of the problem of poverty, hunger, illiteracy and lack of access to the basic means of livelihood that face the majority of the people. The former Nigerian president concluded that the country's resources are personalized at the expense of the people, thereby resulting in the galloping rate of poverty, inadequate health care facilities and housing, a clear case of state failure. The fragility of the imposed and inherited federation /political institutions has rendered Nigeria as a single entity, politically and economically fragile and weak to contain the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the force union. The federal system of government is lopsided and unbalanced.

It failed to provide an equitable distribution of power at the centre; it is this quest for equitable and balanced political system that has been at the centre of Nigeria's terrorism. Although Sani (2011), and Erinosho (2012), emphasized the international reference point in advancing terror in Nigeria citing cases of Al –Qaeda's Osama Bin laden ideological influence, the Palestine Israeli issues and the revolution in the Maghreb-Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria as triggers and motivation of terror in Nigeria, this study is of the opinion that these issues are less significant compared to the state-centric and structural causal factors depicting state weakness.

Also, another factor often considered is the unsavoury consequences and legacy of the colonial rule-a history and a social process that failed to ensure even development amongst the regions that make the country especially with the North lacking behind the South in economic and social development. The insurgency in the North is a symptom of deep seated

malaise traceable to the Colonia era when the policies adopted led to the North- the largest and perhaps the most populous part of the country failing behind in virtually all respects.

Boko Haram (western education is evil) is a direct consequence of the failure of the Northern elite to invest in the education of the people of the region which largely creates frustration among the Northern youths who find themselves unable to compete with their southern counterpart in all respects. It is this systemic failure more than religious difference that accounts for the deep seated grievance of the high rate of insurgence in the North (Fafowora, 2012).

The Boko Haram Sect
The emergence of Boko Haram sect and their operation is a departure from the trend of religious uprising in northern Nigeria. For instance in July 2009, the group which had been lying low before now, unleashed a dimension of violence that has never been seen in Nigeria, this Taliban like attack is the most serious outbreak of another kind of religious violence (The Economist 2009). The fighting lasted from 26 to 30 July 2009 affecting five northern states.

 In the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt, over 3 500 people were internally displaced, more than I 264 children orphaned, and over 392 women widowed. In addition, 28 policemen and five prison warders, as well as an undisclosed number of soldiers, had been killed. Properties destroyed include 48 buildings, three primary schools, more than 12 churches and a magistrate's court.

State security forces succeeded in arresting some members of the sect, who were later detained in prison facilities in the affected states. Many of those arrested were held at the Bauchi prison pending trial. Surviving members of the sect had promised to avenge the killing of their members, and on 7 September 2010, over 300 members of the Boko Haram Islamic sect did launch an attack on Bauchi central prison and freed their members detained since the July 2009 revolt (IWMC 2010). After freeing other inmates of the prison, they later set the facility and vehicles packed within the premises ablaze.

The group leader Malam Muhammed Yusuf was killed on July 30, 2009. Footage obtained by Aljazeera and published in several Nigerian newspapers showed Mohammed Yusuf mutilated body still wearing handcuffs (Aljazeera, 2010). Even though authorities in Nigeria were hopeful that the execution of Muhammed Yusuf said to be a charismatic leader would eventually lead to the disintegration of the group, evidence emerging proves the contrary as exemplified with the September 7 attack on the Bauchi prisons by the group to free its members. Since then, other attacks by the group had been staged against government interests and security operatives not only in Borno and Bauchi states but in most northern states including the Federal Capital Territory.

The exact date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect is mired in controversy, especially if one relies on media accounts. The group is known to the Nigerian authority to have existed since 1995 under the name of *Ahlusunnawal'jama'ahhijr*a (Taiwo, 2008). The sect has subsequently flourished under various names like the Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyyah sect,

and Boko Haram (literally, meaning 'Western education is a sin'). The name 'Nigerian Taliban' is used on a derogatory sense by the local people who despise the philosophy and teachings of the sect. Although the sect is fashioned like the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is widely believed that it has no formal links with its Afghan counterpart.

Boko Haram first took up arms against state security forces on 24 December 2003 when it attacked police stations and public building in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State. Members occupied the two buildings for several days, hosting the flag of Afghanistan's Taliban movement over the camps. A joint operation of soldiers and police called 'operation flush' dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members (Suleman, 2007).

On 31 December 2003 Boko Haram left the village and dispersed into other northern states after inscribing the word 'Taliban' on a captured vehicle'. In 2004 it established a base called 'Afghanistan' in Kanamma village in northern Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of Niger (Afowadeji, 2009).On 21 September 2004, members attacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition. Members later set the Gwoza police station ablaze. Apart from a few isolated skirmishes with the police the sect received marginal attention until the middle of 2007 and again in 2008 when their militant activities came under surveillance by security operatives in Abuja.

Similarly, July 2009 saw members of the sect stage the most spectacular attack on all institutions that represent the Nigerian state. The uprising affected five northern states, namely Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe. A military campaign led to the killing of over 700 members of the group including the leader Muhammed Yusuf, while several other were arrested and detained for formal trial. In terms of organization, Muhammad Yusuf was the Commander in Chief (*Amir ul-Aam*) or the leader of the entire group. He has two deputies (*Na'ib Amir ul-Aam 1 & II*). Each State where they exist has its own Amir (Commander/Leader), and each local Government Area were they operate also has an Amir. Below the Local Government Amirs are the remaining followers. They also organized themselves according to various roles, such as Soldiers and Police, among others (DCCN 2009).

The philosophy of the sect is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. Orthodox Islam in their interpretation abhors Western education and the civil service bureaucratic system. This explains why the sect is popularly known as the Boko Haram, literally meaning 'Western education is a sin' (Boyle, 2010). However, a statement allegedly released on August 2009 by the acting leader of Boko Haram, Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected such a designation. The sect in a pamphlet circulated in front of the Bauchi Prison and on major streets in Bauchi after 7 September attack again frowned at the name "Boko haram" stating that its name is "*Jama'atuAhlissumahLidda'awatiwal Jihad*", meaning a group advocating for righteousness and holy war (Daily Trust, 2010).

Their ideological mission is primarily to overthrow the Nigerian state and then impose strict Islamic Sharia law in the entire country (Sunday Vanguard, 2010) Boko Haram draws its members mainly from disaffected youths and unemployed graduates, including former

Almajiris (Street Children) who migrated from the rural areas to urban areas in search of better means of livelihood or to study under renowned Islamic teachers in cities like Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, and Maiduguri. The sect also has some well-educated, wealthy and influential people as members. The sect is estimated to have over 280'000 members across the 19 states of northern Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad and Sudan.

Established terrorist organizations and states that sponsor terrorism were behind most international terrorism in the 1970's and 1980's. But in recent years, ad hoc groups of terrorists, sometimes loosely linked, and often claiming to act on behalf of Islam, have been the most dynamic elements in international terrorist attacks. These are deviants and fanatics who are betraying the tenets of Islam, just as other terrorist who have sometimes used Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions to justify violence and in the process distort and abuse their faiths (Wilcox, 2000).

Conclusion

This paper concludes that terrorism was made to strive in Nigeria as a result of the inability of the state to perform its basic functions. This failure of the Nigeria state has expressed itself through; corruption, high poverty rate, youth unemployment etc and all combined together continue to weaken the state and make it unable to play the role of a balancer in the system. It is very clear from the foregoing that terrorism is an albatross on the development of Nigeria. It is also an incontrovertible fact that terrorism is cyclically interfered with lack of peace and security. The study shows that Nigerian state is on the road to total failure and could conflagrate and possibly disintegrate. Regrettably, Nigeria has not been fortunate enough to be governed by honest, transparent and accountable leadership.

The paper affirms that this leadership problem is a thorn in the flesh of the Nigerian state and not until it is fixed that Nigeria could begin to witness and experience a quantum leap in every facet. The study also concludes that terrorism in Nigeria was orchestrated by factors like high unemployment rates, violence, corruption which were necessitated by the state's inability to perform its roles. Terrorism and all the above mentioned factors definitely intertwine. Where they predominantly exist, they provide breeding ground for terrorism in such areas. Furthermore, the study points out that terrorism in Nigeria has had an adverse impact on development processes of the state and will continue to strive where peace and security is a luxury. No sensible investor will continue to invest in a volatile environment; indeed potential investors are scared to invest in such societies. In Nigeria, investors and potential ones have stayed off due to the unending violent environment resulting in the apparent waste of tax payers' money by successive administrations in an endless attempt at wooing foreign investors.

It is therefore necessary to look into the issues of leadership and governance more especially at this very time election is around the corner. The democracy in Nigeria is far from being democratic. The democracy in the country is far from being democratic, it is mere civil rule this is because all the principles of democracy; ability to provide felt needs, promotion of human rights, capacity to defend and protect individual are still in deficit. With the absence of these, peace and security cannot be achieved and will remain a mirage. The inability of the Nigerian state to respond adequately to nipping the phenomenon of terrorism in the bud

poses serious danger to the advancement of democracy and economic development.

Recommendations

That there is increased decline and inability of the Nigerian state to meet her responsibilities to her citizens cannot be denied. Attention must be therefore be paid to the following factors by way of recommendations in order to address these issues and remedy the situation.

1. First, it is imperative to restructure all the institutions of government with a view of getting optional results from them.
2. Second, it is necessary to address economic problems and to distribute the nation's wealth and its control evenly and equitably to take care of all interests. This will go a long way to reduce frustration and tension in the polity.
3. Third, all forms of corrupt practices and related vices should be abhorred and defaulters apprehended and comprehensively punished. Accordingly, the problem of corruption should be succinctly defined within the context of our cultural dispositions and appropriate laws enacted to address them.
4. Fourth, there should be transparency in the electoral system to the extent that the electors and elected radiate spirit of acceptance of outcome as free and fair. The people should be allowed to make the votes count in choosing the 'best' hands for leadership positions.
5. Fifth efforts should be made to improve the educational sector especially in the northern region of the country & be made to complement the value and religion of the people of the region in order to create a synergy between western education and the culture of the people.
6. Sixth, there should be establishment of functional social welfare scheme, reduction of the obvious low quality of public infrastructure, drastic reduction of wasteful public investment which will not only improve security situation in Nigeria but also provide direction for development.
7. Seven, all forms of insurrections and violent contrivance should be proactively checkmated before they become full-blown and more difficult to be contained or resolved. Eight, divisive politics based on religion, ethnicity and regionalism should be under played and deemphasized in the country.

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