

The Quest for Political Power, Political Violence and Insecurity in Africa: The Odinga–Tsvangirai Experience

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Abstract

The scramble for power in most cases often degenerate into political violence and insecurity in Africa hence, this study examined the quest for political power, political violence and insecurity in Africa: The Odinga–Tsvangirai experience. The paper argues that the quest for political power often degenerate into large scale conflict and insecurity in Africa because such desires and ambitions are driven and motivated by selfish and unpatriotic desires and objectives. Data for the study were drawn from secondary sources while the resource curse theory was adopted as the theoretical framework to guide the study. The descriptive research method was also adopted while the analysis was based on the qualitative method. Findings revealed that political aspiration and actions of most politicians and members of the ruling class in Africa are not backed by genuine patriotic motives hence, such quest for power and inordinate ambition often lead to pre and post-election violence and insecurity. Therefore, to change this perception and chart a new course for Africa, there is need for a comprehensive, constitutional, political and electoral reforms that will review the leadership recruitment process in Africa with a view to setting new standards and guidelines that will strengthen political institutions and the democratic process in Africa.

Keywords: *Quest, Political power, Violence, Insecurity and Africa*

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Background to the Study

The political process in most societies is governed and guided by rules and regulations but despite these established rules and processes the political process in Africa is characterised by deceit, subterfuge, over-ambition and other socio-economic factors that endanger the democratic/political process. In most cases, the violent posture of the ruling class often degenerates into pre and post-election violence which in turn threatens national peace and security in most African states. The situation is even worst in multicultural and plural societies like Nigeria, Kenya, and Cote d'Ivoire etc. where political parties are formed on the basis of ethnic, cultural and religious lines. The political ambition of Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola of the Social Democratic Party and Alhaji Uthman Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC) almost destroyed the political formation of Nigeria in June 1993. Similarly, the political dreams and aspiration of Raila Odinga Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Morgan Tsvangirai's of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) almost destroyed the political sovereignty of Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Political violence and insecurity due to the scramble for political power by political elites is now a common feature of the political process across Africa. It is in the light of this background that this study examined the quest for political power, political violence and insecurity in Africa with specific reference to Raila Odinga Odinga of Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe (2007 and 2008 respectively).

Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis

The need for analytical framework in an investigation was presented by Lieber (1973) who stated categorically that behind a theory or concept or an analysis, there is a theory or viewpoint which makes it possible for the presentation and interpretation of facts. Thus, to ensure reliability in any research/investigation, there is need to also come out with models or theories; for empirical theory seeks to create knowledge that is impersonal, retraceable and cumulative. This study therefore relied on the resource curse theory as its theoretical framework in order to evaluate and explain why conflict, violence and insecurity arising from contest for political power and supremacy persist in Africa. The main idea behind the resource curse theory is that mineral, fuel and gas abundance in less developed countries (LDCs) tends to generate negative developmental outcomes, including poor economic performance, growth collapses, and high levels of corruption, ineffective governance and greater political violence. Thus, it is assumed that the natural resources, for most poor countries, are deemed to be more of a curse than a blessing. The resource curse theory is anchored on the following models:

1. The Dutch Disease Model
2. The Rentier State Model
3. The Institutions Model

The Dutch Disease model refers to the potential negative effects natural resources windfalls and accompanying appreciations of exchange rates can have for the rest of the economy. This model contends that a country's economic performance following a resource boom depends to a considerable extent on the politics followed or pursued by the government as even small economics have considerable influence over their own economic performance. Evidence

from Venezuela for instance, suggest that policy responses (such as industrial policy and exchange rate management) determines how oil booms affect the growth prospect of the economy. This model therefore argued that it is not in all cases that natural resource abundance in states tends to generate negative developmental outcomes. On the other hand, the Rentier State model argues that there are substantial costs to the workings of an economy when the allocation of resources is channelled primarily through states leaders who have discretionary authority rather than through bargains between private economic agents. Thus, in the rentier state model, the predominant view is that oil economies are subject to a higher level of rent-seeking and corruption in comparison with non-mineral abundant economies.

Ostron (1990), however argued that there are no collective actors within the state that can impose some domestic conditionality on how those who occupy the state should exercise their power hence, the proposition that oil abundance induces extra-ordinary corruption, rent-seeking and centralized interventionism and that these processes are necessarily productive and growth restricting is not supported by comparative or historical evidence.

In the same vein, the institutions model focuses on the role of rent seeking and institutions in resource abundant countries. Mehlum et al. (2006) argued that some form of rent seeking might be less harmful than others hence they maintain that natural resources abundance puts institutions of states to some kind of test thus resource curse appears only in countries with inferior institutional arrangements. Citing Botswana and Norway which have good institutions and low level of corruption compared to countries like Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico and Congo with inferior institutions and poor economic performance Kendall-Taylor (2011) contended that lack of good institutions alone does not explain the variance in economic performance and growth in resource abundant countries. The main argument and idea behind the resource curse theory is that mineral resources in less developed countries tends to generate negative developmental outcomes, including poor economic performance, growth collapses, high levels of corruption, ineffective governance and greater political violence. Scholars in this school of thought therefore posited that natural resources for most poor countries are deemed to be more of a curse than a blessing. This theory is relevant to the study in the sense that the struggle for political power among African leaders and citizens often degenerate into conflict and in some cases civil war because of the control over natural resources in different parts of Africa hence indicating that there is a nexus between the quest for political power and the control over natural resources in the state. Describing the resource curse theory as a paradox with reference to the African situation, Sachs and Warner (1995) wondered why resource-rich countries tend to grow more slowly than resource poor countries. Proponents of the resource curse theory include: Auty (1993), Sala and Subramanian (2003), Smith (2004), Gyfason (2001), Gelb (1988) etc.

Conceptual Analysis

The quest for political power entails the contest for power between several forces and interest within any giving society hence scholars are of the opinion that public policy is a product of bargaining and competition by a constellation of forces or interests within society and within the political system that collectively give meaning and direction to public policy (Adams J.A.

cited in Bassey, and Ozumba, 2012: p. 151). While establishing the link between the political process and politics, Ikeji (2001:41) posited that public policy is a derivative of politics and political processes.

According to him, the theoretical underpinning in this relationship is that policy outcomes are determined by political processes which are rooted in the political cultures of the society. In the words of Ake (1979), the concept of political culture refers to the underlying propensities, attitudes, values and beliefs which define the context in which the political act takes place. He added that political culture may also be defined as the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located. For White (1979), political culture involves mass attitude towards politics; the extent of other participation in political affairs; citizens' perception of efficacy and alienation from politics; the legitimacy ascribed to political elites, and the patterns and basis of authority within the social system and its various subsystems. The political systems or processes may also be viewed as consisting of inputs from the environment or from within the political systems themselves, the conversion of these inputs within the system and the production of outputs into the environment. In his work "Political Sociology" Maduagwu (2012) stated that the family, religion, ethnic groups, social organizations, schools, unions, workplaces, etc. are some of the settings within which ideas, feelings and motives are acquired which influence a person's pattern of political participation. In his words:

All these social systems constitute agents of political socialization, which is a prelude to political participation. What is meant by political participation? Any act involving the making of binding decisions or the attempt to influence the content of such decisions is an act of political participation, so also are acts involving the selection of those who will make the binding decisions. Political participation, then, includes not only the acts of ordinary citizens, such as voting, but also acts of political office holders. Political participation is categorized into two: routine and non-routine (Maduagwu, 2012 cited in Bassey, and Ozumba, 2012: p. 359).

This therefore imply that the quest for political power and the attitude of the political class are influenced by several sociological factors which explains why some leaders perceive power as a do or die affair hence, leaders exhibit different leadership styles and characteristics based on their background and orientation acquired through the socialization process. Leadership style according to Newstorm (1993), entails the total pattern of explicit and implicit actions performed by the leaders. However, the first major study of leadership styles was performed in 1939 by Kurt Lewin who led a group of scholars to identify different styles of leadership. Thus, further studies helped in the discovery of the following leadership styles: Authoritarian or autocratic leadership style, participatory or democratic leadership style and the delegated or laisez fair leadership style. While trying to explain why the struggle for political power often degenerate into conflict and war in Africa Achebe (1984), identified leadership failure as the major problem facing Nigeria and most African countries. According to him, the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. While describing democracy as the best form of government, Akinyanju (2000) posited that genuine democracy means equal

material capacity to reach and mobilize the people hence, he argued that political democracy cannot be attained without economic democracy and that democratization occurs as a protest to monocratic authoritarian regimes and the perceived gains of democracy. While corroborating this position, Jega (2007) posited that for any society to experience good governance there must be transparency and accountability on the part of leaders in the discharge of their duties. In his words: a democratic political culture developed overtime creates the basis for sustainable processes of good governance in democratic countries including Nigeria (Jega, 2007: p. 158). From the above analysis, it is imperative to note that the political process is a product of bargaining and competition by a constellation of forces or interests within society and within the political system that collectively give meaning and direction to public policy. In the same vein, the views expressed by Ikeji (2001) clearly shows that public policy is actually a derivative of politics and political processes hence, indicating why the quest for political power is driven and influenced by several forces and factors. In societies where these forces and factors are driven by positive values, leadership often translate into sustainable development and growth. On the other hand, where the underpinning factors driving the quest for political power in any society are controlled and influenced by negative forces, leadership and the constant struggle for power automatically translates into conflict, underdevelopment, retrogression etc. as the case in several African countries.

Quest for Political Power, Political Violence and Insecurity in Africa: The Odinga Odinga-Tsvangirai Experience

This aspect of the paper examined the quest for political power and the political violence that ensued in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2009 respectively. Thus, it will be discussed under the following headings:

The Raila Odinga Odinga-Mwai Kibaki Political Tussle for Power in Kenya, 2007-2008

The tussle for political power between Raila Odinga Odinga and Mwai Kibaki was purely a post-election conflict which occurred after the release of the presidential election results on the 28th December 2007. It will be recalled that Mr. Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement who had scored the highest number of seats in the parliament alleged that the presidential election was rigged in favour of the then incumbent, Mr Mwai Kibaki. This development degenerated into civil unrest which left about 1,500 people dead and over 1,000 people homeless. The intervention of the United Nations through its former Secretary General, Kofi Annan saved the situation as all the parties and their supporters agreed to form a government of national unity with Mwai Kibaki remaining as the President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister. This was immediately followed by constitutional amendments to accommodate the power sharing arrangement between the key actors.

The Tsvangirai-Mugabe Political Tussle for Power in Zimbabwe, 2007-2009

Just like the Raila Odinga Odinga-Mwai Kibaki power tussle in Kenya, the Tsvangirai-Mugabe leadership crisis was also a post-election conflict but this time, the incumbent, Robert Mugabe utilized all available opportunities to remain in power at all cost. Thus, after the presidential elections of 29th March 2008, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission refused to release the election results claiming that it cannot release the results until it investigate all

anomalies which required a patient recount of the total votes cast in the presidential election. During this period, Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) also insisted that its candidate won the election and that the delay in releasing the results was to manipulate the figures in favour of the then incumbent, Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF government. This development no doubt set the stage for conflict which left over 6,000 person's dead and several others maimed and displaced. Again the international community through the G8 group of major industrialized countries issued statements calling for the official results of the election to be published and a speedy, credible and genuinely democratic resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe.

However, after series of negotiations brokered by the United Nations, all the parties involved in the crisis agreed to form a government of national unity (a coalition government) with Robert Mugabe returning as President and the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The leadership tussle in Kenya and Zimbabwe clearly shows that both the opposition leaders (represented by Morgan Tsvangirai and Raila Odinga Odinga) and those in power (incumbent presidents) ended the conflict by sharing power and amending their constitution to accommodate their interests and that of their families and supporters at the detriment of the citizens and the state hence, affirming the views of Francois Beyart (2009) that politics in Africa is all about the politics of the belly which in turn produces weak states and institutions in Africa.

Lessons and Impact of the Political Actions of Raila Odinga Odinga and Morgan Tsvangirai

Both leaders represent a vast majority of opposition politicians who have worked tirelessly to wrestle power from incumbent presidents (Mwai Kibaki of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe) who have refused to relinquish political power even when it was clear that they are no longer needed. Available records show that the conflict in both countries started when the incumbent presidents of Kenya and Zimbabwe attempted to manipulate the constitution through the constitution and the electoral commission in order to prolong their stay in office against the will of the people hence, the 2007 presidential election in Kenya and the 2008 presidential election in Zimbabwe offered the people the opportunity to exercise their franchise and political rights. The initial hard-line position maintained by the parties involved led to political violence and insecurity across Kenya and Zimbabwe with over 2,000 people dead in Kenya and another 3,000 persons dead in Zimbabwe. According to 2011 Human Rights Watch, over 8,000 persons in Kenya and Zimbabwe were rendered homeless and displaced as a result of political violence and insecurity arising from the political actions of Raila Odinga Odinga (Kenya) and Morgan Tsvangirai (Zimbabwe). This explains why Gurr (1994) cautioned that if the rights of minorities are not respected and their feelings taken into consideration in the process of policy formation and implementation, the rate of conflict and insecurity may increase in Africa in the 21st century. The unholy alliance between the incumbent presidents and the electoral commission set up to drive the democratic process also calls for questioning. It will be recalled that in Kenya and Zimbabwe, the government set up Electoral Commissions which were controlled and financed by the state hence, lacked the courage to be firm and truly independent.

This further explains why Jega (2007) contended that for leaders and followers to experience good governance and effective leadership, there must be transparency and accountability by public office holders in the discharge of their official responsibilities (Jega, 2007: p. 158). According to Eskor Toyo, democracy refers to the extent to which actual political to determine their social destiny belongs to the vast majority of citizens who constitute the people distinct from a ruling oligarchy or class. The ruling class in this context refers to incumbent presidents in Africa who always carry out fraudulent electoral and political reforms that will prolong their stay in office against the will of the people. Apart from the killings, maiming and displacement of citizens arising from the political actions and aspirations of Raila Odinga Odinga and Morgan Tsvangirai of Kenya and Zimbabwe respectively, the conflict in Kenya and Zimbabwe also breached and violated all known democratic ethos and principles as clearly reflected in the agreements brokered by the United Nations where both leaders (opposition politicians) and the incumbent presidents agreed to carry out constitutional amendments and power sharing in order to form a coalition government. In the said arrangement, Morgan Tsvangirai and Raila Odinga Odinga abandoned their presidential ambitions and became Prime Ministers in their countries through negotiation rather than election hence prompting scholars to question their motive for seeking political power in countries (Kenya and Zimbabwe) where the citizens have been mobilized and conscientized for change through the electoral process. Another silent factor that instigated the conflict involving Morgan Tsvangirai and Raila Odinga Odinga was that political elites were mobilized along ethnic and tribal lines. Thus, post-election violence and insecurity in both countries revealed that both actors later narrowed the crisis to their native tribes through the use of ethnic militias. For instance, it was reported that the election results in Kenya pitched the then incumbent President Mwai Kibaki from Kenya's largest tribe, Kikuyu, against opposition leader, Raila Odinga Odinga of the Luo tribe. This position was confirmed by Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations and UN's special envoy to Kenya when he stated thus: if recent events are anything to go by, then one cannot fault the agreement of some analysts who posit that the 28th December 2007 presidential elections in the East African country of Kenya has exposed it as a country where tribal bonds remain stronger than national identity (The Pulse Weekly Magazine, April/May 2008).

The leadership crisis in both countries also witnessed elements of blackmail and state sponsored terrorism perpetrated by the incumbents in their bid to remain in power. In a report captioned "Mugabe accuses Tsvangirai of treason," published in the Pulse Weekly Magazine, it was reported that immediately after the presidential polls, and the Zimbabwean government stepped up its campaign against the opposition MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai by accusing him of treason. In the words of former Zimbabwe's Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa: "It is clear from the correspondence that Tsvangirai along with Prime Minister Gordon Brown are seeking regime change in Zimbabwe, and on the part of Tsvangirai, this is treasonous" The deliberate refusal by the electoral commission in both countries to release election results and other desperate measures taken by the state and its agents (Justice Ministry, the Judiciary and Electoral Commission) shows the extent post-independence African states and its leaders can go in acquiring and sustaining political power. The exchange of a presidential mandate with the post of Prime Minister as exhibited by Raila Odinga Odinga and Morgan Tsvangirai at the

expense of several lives and properties lost as a result of political violence and insecurity clearly revealed that economic motives were the underpinning factors driving the political ambition of both men (Raila Odinga Odinga-Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai-Zimbabwe) in 2007 and 2008. This position was confirmed when BBC's Karen Allen in Nairobi castigated the new coalition government in Kenya for maintaining the largest cabinet in the country's history. In the words of BBC journalist: each minister receives about \$16,000 a month and entitled to two official cars and five security personnel and 45 for the Prime Minister. In his response, Raila Odinga Odinga who was the leading voice in the opposition acknowledged the fact that the size of the cabinet government was an aberration but added that "I know that people preferred a cleaner cabinet, but it was a price that had to be paid to balance everyone's interest. The reaction further affirms the advancement of personal interest, greed and control over the nation's economic and mineral resources as the basis for political participation and aspiration in Africa. Available records also show that in spite of the alliance and coalition that was formed via the compromise made by Raila Odinga Odinga and Morgan Tsvangirai thousands of people especially victims of the post-election violence and insecurity in the two countries are yet to be resettled while majority of the citizens are living below poverty line due to the violence and insecurity that ravaged the two countries from 2007 – 2009. Despite the change of government in both countries, poverty, human rights abuses and corruption still persist as reflected in the tables below:

Table 1: Perception of "Very Common" Corruption Technique

S/N	Corruption Technique	Benin Republic (25)	Cote d'Ivoire (34)	Ghana (30)	Guinea Bissau (36)	Liberia (22)	Nigeria (80)	Senegal (32)	Sierra-Leone (34)
1.	Bribery of government officials	40.0%	55%	56.7%	44.4%	45.5%	87.3%	28.0%	85.3%
2.	Bribery of foreign officials	40.0%	14%	6.7%	16.7%	4.5%	23.6%	0.0%	5.9%
3.	Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversions of property by government officials	52.0%	58%	56.7%	66.7%	54.5%	88.6%	25.0%	82.4%
4.	Abuse or misuse of office	35.0%	50%	46.7%	58.3%	40.9%	79.7%	19.0%	76.5%
5.	Trading in influence to get things done or not done	44.0%	62%	50.0%	58.3%	36.4%	67.9%	44.0%	64.7%
6.	Bribery or embezzlement in the private sector	12.0%	23%	10.0%	8.3%	22.7%	41.6%	13.0%	44.1%
7.	Illegal transfer or taking of money abroad	32.0%	14%	13.3%	36.1%	45.5%	57.0%	9.0%	35.3%
8.	Inflation of contracts	28.0%	56%	56.7%	55.56%	45.5%	86.1%	16.0%	82.4%

Source: Collation from Country Reports of field survey published in the Nation Newspaper of 2nd June, 2010, p. 26.

Table 2: Indices of Poorest African Countries

S/N	Indicator	Sudan	Madagascar	Mali	Mozambique	Rwanda	Togo	Zambia	Nigeria
1.	% of population below poverty level	85	74	69	69	70	72	68	66
2.	Adult illiteracy rate (age 15 – older) %	47	51	65	60	37	47	25	41
3.	Female illiteracy rate (age 15 -24) %	33	41	49	59	21	11	18	20
4.	Children under five who are underweight %	34	40	40	26	27	25	24	36
5.	Children under five who are wasting	13	7	23	8	9	12	14	9
6.	People not expected to survive to age 15%	5	14	26	24	27	17	19	20
7.	People not expected to survive to age 40%	9	22	34	40	46	35	47	33

Source: UNDP poverty Report 2000: This Day Newspaper vol. 6, No. 1912, p. 24, 17th July 2000.

Despite the fact that several political elites and leaders have emerged in Africa from 1960-date, political violence, insecurity, poverty, maladministration, corruption and other societal problems that pose serious threat to democracy and the democratic process still persist in different parts of Africa hence, calling to question the real motive for political participation and the struggle for political power among the elites and ruling class in Africa. The level of underdevelopment, poverty and high mortality rate in Kenya, Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa clearly explains the paradox of the resource curse theory as applied in this study. Furthermore, the struggle over the control of Gold, Diamond, Ivory, Timber, Oil etc. by rebel leaders and anti-government forces in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola etc. affirms the argument of this paper that the control of natural resource and the apparatus of the state for personal or group interest is the underlying motive why violence and insecurity is associated with politics and the political processes in Africa. The table below further affirms this position.

Table 3: Recent Conflicts in Africa Linked to Natural Resources

Country	Duration	Natural Resources
Algeria	1992	Oil gas
Angola	1975 – 2002	Oil diamond, timber, Ivory
Angola (Cabinda)	1975	Oil
Burundi	1993	Land
Cameroon/Nigeria	1997	Oil
Chad	1980 – 1994	Oil, uranium
Congo Brazzaville	1993: 1997	Oil
DRC	1993	Copper, cobalt, diamond, gold, timber
Kenya	1991	Walter, grazing pasture, lives stock
Liberia	1989 – 1996	Iron, diamonds rubber timber, drugs
Libya	2011	Oil
Mozambique	1976 – 1996	Ivory, timber
Morocco	1975	Phosphates, oil
Papua New Guinea	1988	Copper, gold
Rwanda	1990	Coffee, land
Senegal	1997	Drugs
Sierra Leone	1991 – 1999	Drugs, Copper, cobalt, diamond, gold, timber
Somalia	1988	Bananas, lives stock
South Africa	1990s	Drugs, land, platinum
Sudan	1983	Oil
Western Sahara	1976	Phosphates
Zimbabwe	2000	Land

Source: Adapted from Mophosa, S.B 2012:p.3

Conclusion

The paper examined the quest for political power and insecurity in Africa: The Odinga-Tsvangirai experience in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Relying on the descriptive method and secondary data, the study observed that the contest and struggle for political power with reference to Raila Odinga Odinga of Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe was not driven and inspired by patriotic desires but by other underpinning economic and pecuniary factors hence, the violence and insecurity which caused the death of several lives and displacement of over 3,000 citizens from both countries. The unpredictable character of incumbent leaders from both countries (Nwai Kibaki of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe) further helped to create more insecurity which escalated the conflict in both countries. It will be recalled that both leaders through their electoral commissions attempted to annul the presidential elections with a view to prolonging their stay in office. The intervention of the United Nations and other regional organizations however restored peace and stability in both countries. Thus, the intervention of the United Nations and the integration of the major actors as Prime Minister in Kenya and Zimbabwe contributed immensely to the early resolution of the conflict in both countries. The study ended with recommendations aimed at improving the quality of political participation, service delivery and leadership in Africa.

Recommendations

The quest for political power among leaders and elites remains a major challenge in most African countries hence there is need for re-orientation and re-evaluation. The following recommendations will no doubt go a long way in addressing the gaps and problems identified in this paper:

1. The appointment of members of the electoral commission in Africa should not be left in the hands of incumbent presidents alone. Such sensitive appointments should be done by either the judiciary or the legislature to ensure neutrality and impartiality during and after elections. It will be recalled that in Kenya and Zimbabwe (2007 and 2008) the incumbent presidents attempted to elongate their tenure by manipulating the electoral commission.
2. There is need for a fundamental change and diversification of the economies of African states to ensure that all citizens have equal access to education, good health and improved standard of living. Data from the study clearly show that economic inequality makes the poor and unemployed veritable instruments that can be manipulated by the political class (elites) to perpetuate electoral fraud and malpractices during and after elections.
3. Policy actions and programmes that will guarantee and promote free and compulsory education at all levels should be pursued across African states to ensure that citizens are conscious of their rights and privileges. Records in some countries revealed that during political party meetings, rallies, conventions etc. illiterates and low income earners are usually recruited as thugs and mercenaries to cause confusion, political violence and insecurity.
4. African states should also carry out electoral and political reforms to ensure all that all forms of post-election political coalition and alliances by political parties and politicians are not encouraged. Thus, political parties who wished to form alliance or agreements should only be allowed to do so before the election. The case where Raila Odinga and Morgan Tsvangirai led their political parties to form a coalition government which saw them emerging as Prime Ministers in the new arrangement is a clear breach of democratic rules and principles.
5. The tenure of leaders especially presidents should be limited to a single term of five years to avoid sit-tight leadership and tenure elongation by incumbent presidents in Africa. This is necessary because the desire for a second always encourages and motivates African leaders to manipulate the constitution in order to stretch their tenure beyond the second term – mandate.
6. International and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the African Union etc. should consider the issue of political violence instigated by leaders at any level as a breach of international law especially when such political violence accounts for the death, maiming and displacement of ordinary citizens. In the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe, the United Nations only brokered peace which rewarded the key actors with the position of Prime Minister each while the incumbent (Mwai Kibaki – Kenya and Robert Mugabe-Zimbabwe) were not prosecuted for causing and instigating the violence which left several citizens dead and others maimed and displaced from their homes.

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