

## **Caught Between the Whirlpool of the Failed State of Somalia and Piracy: The Security Challenge Facing the Horn of Africa**

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### **Abstract**

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One of the threatening and devastating security dilemma, which truncates and disturbs global peace and security, is the transnational criminal acts of sea piracy. Thus, the international water ways have seen the flow of business, persons, ships for both commercial and mobility reasons, perturbed by attacks from sea pirates. This has manifested mostly in the Horn of Africa's Somalia sea coast off the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean leading to kidnappings, hijackings, arms trade and proliferation etc. The study adopts the content analysis as its methodology. Data were retrieved from mainly secondary sources (textbooks, journal publications, magazines etc). While the failed state and securitization Theory were explored to buttress the work. Based on the findings, the study discovered that the magnitude and high incidence of piracy in the Horn of Africa, emanates from the collapse of Somalia State during the regime of President Siad Barre: a regime that reign based on ethnic sentiment, high-handedness, victimization of oppositions. This bred up a society of dissentment and challenge to legitimacy as the state could not ensure its existence, and its failure to provide social amenities, and finally fell prey to militias. This paved the way for the emergence of various criminal groups, warlords, militias, religious fundamentals etc struggling the state with the central government. The study recommends among other things: prioritizing the concept of human security, effective governance, establishing and maintaining effective security in both land, waters and air, the emergence of a formidable regional security bloc to counter terrorism, state piracy and other criminality in the region.

**Keywords:** *Piracy, State Failure, Somalia, Horn of Africa and Security, Securitization.*

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### **Background to the Study**

One of the threatening and devastating security dilemma, which truncates and disturbs global peace and security, is the transnational criminal acts of sea piracy. Uadiale observed that, maritime piracy has recently received renewed attention with the release in January 2008, of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 2007 annual report. Based on statistics compiled by the IMB's Piracy – Reporting Centre at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, reveals a ten percent increase in incidents of piracy worldwide, (Jesugbamila, 2010 in Uadiale 2012). Until very recently maritime piracy which has been largely concentrated in Asia; Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Phillipines as the traditional dangerous hotspot of global piracy, (Onuoha 2012 in Uadiale 2010) has shifted its concentration to African waters owing to a combination of factors, amongst which includes: the increased and profound impact of globalization, which as a consequence, has increased global trade and commerce: the intensification of global trade; the end of the cold war; technological advances; weapons proliferation: as well as the state-failure to fulfill their quintessential and traditional role and security provisions much of which also extends to the maritime security domain, frontiers and corridors and other myriads of factors, (Uadiale 2012 in Uadiale 2016), such as alienation and marginalization; the social problems of poverty and unemployment, resource disputes among others, have contributed to fueling a significant increase in piracy and deterioration in Africa's Maritime Security Environment, (Jesugbamila, 2010 in Uadiale 2016).

Bowden (2010), opined that, at the end of 2010, around 500 seafarers from more than 18 countries were being held hostage by pirates. Piracy clearly affects the world's transport industry which according to the One Earth Foundation (OEF) Research, piracy is costing the international economy between \$7 to 12 billion per year. Approximately 80% of the world's trade currently travels by sea, representing around 93,000 merchant vessels, 1.25 million sea farers, and almost six billion tons of cargo. Since the end of the Second World War, sea bourn trade has doubled every decade. In recent years, the International Community has contended with one of the world's oldest crimes against sea trade-piracy. Beginning from 2006-2010 there have been around 1,600 acts of piracy which have caused immeasurable harm to the world's seafarers, including deaths of 54 individuals.

That the African Continent is caught between the problematic of Fail state and piracy is not to be disputed. Thus, the rate of insecurity manifesting from civil wars, governance pathology in the form of legitimate crisis, poor human security record, state's inability to hold grip to the monopoly use of the coercive means of violence as the upsurge of warlords, clan, ethnic militias, continuously challenges the power and ability of central government in most African states. This readily brings to mind, the continent being a veritable breeding ground for certain security threats and transnational crimes like, terrorism, piracy, smuggling, trafficking that spells doom to the continent. Thus, piracy and other international crime can be understood within the purview of certain individuals creating, running and willing to preserve by violence means, a parallel economy of a criminal kind in order to close the vacuum created by any insensitive, misguided and failing governments.

Brown (2014), echoed the views above concerning Africa thus: for several years, Africa has surpassed South-East Asia as the world's number one hotspot of maritime piracy. Approximately one-half of the world's reported pirate attacks now takes place either off the coast of Somalia or Gulf of Guinea principality off the coast of Nigeria. Although during 2012 and 2013, the incidence of piracy off the Horn of Africa declined considerably compared to the peak years of 2009 and 2010. However the incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has continued unabatedly. Between 2010 and 2012, the rate of Somali pirates attacks declined by 80 percent, with 851 sea farers tried upon in 2013 compared to 4,185 in 2010, (Hurlburt et al. 2013 in Brown 2014). Nonetheless Somali pirates have extended their reach beyond the Gulf of Aden and Somalia into the southern part of Red sea, the east coast of Oman, the Bab el mandeb straits, and increasingly deep into the Indian ocean. Moreover, the incidence of piracy off the Somali coast has merely been suppressed, but the root causes of piracy-poor state control of land, the lack of legal economic opportunities and the absence of the rule of law have not been resolved. This piracy off the coast of Somalia could easily escalate again should the naval patrolling lessen.

The Somali states, is a semblance of a fail state where the central government accepted its fate of malfunctioning and extinction. The vacuum created by the fall of siade Barre regime which paved the way for factional war lords, ethnic militias, external power interest in Somali, became a contagious epidemic which instantaneously cobwebs the region. Thus, among the regions in Africa borrowing O'docks words, "The Horn of Africa, conceived in its wider rather than the restricted connotation is widely seen as Africa's most persistent and enduring conflict and security complex and a region held hostage by conflict", (Mesfin 2010, and Healy 2011 in Odock 2013:402). Thus, a continent already trapped in the web of drought, famine, poverty, longer years of inter-state rivalry, unemployment as the worst hit in the world, coping with the challenge of piracy remains a matter of serious international, regional and domestic concern. It is upon this backdrop that this paper seeks to interrogate the security implication of the failing state of Somalia and its attendant's piracy in the Horn of Africa. The study defines some concepts- piracy, security and failed-state. Then examine the fail- states problematic within the context of Somalia state. There after x-ray the security implication of piracy in the Horn of Africa finally and concluded the work with recommendations tendered.

### **Statement of Problem**

One of the threats to peace and security, in the contemporary world, is that emanating from the nefarious activities of sea pirates. This particular group of actors in the transnational criminal actors has been responsible for the inhumane and criminal act of seizure of goods and services, killing of humans onboard ships who go for their legitimate business through water ways, kidnapping at high sea and (collecting of huge ransoms), trade in many illegal commodities in the form of cocaine, small arms and light weapons etc to finance their ventures. The globalization era, with its concomitant flow of goods and services across nations, and the interconnectivity between people across nations, made easy by the revolution in information and communication technology, and mostly easy transportation, makes piracy like other transnational crimes to thrive.

According to Petretto (2011), though the issue of piracy recently dropped out the top headlines, the world's oceans have certainly not become safer. On the contrary the level of risk remains high especially around the Horn of Africa. Despite a strong presence of Naval forces patrolling along the Gulf of Aden and the adjacent Indian ocean, merchant vessels are regularly attacked and hijacked. Of 445 attacks reported globally in 2010, 219 were attributed to Somali pirates. Forty-nine of these were successful hijacking. Yet waters off Somalia are far from being the only piracy hotspot for international shipping. Vessels also fall prey to attack especially off the coasts of Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh, and in the South China Sea. Although the attacks may differ in location, method and impact, they all share one thing in common: they have become a problem of international politics. There are two reasons for this: firstly, shipping routes form this artery of the global economy accounting for 80% of international trade, so violent attacks have the potential to cause real harm. As such, piracy touches directly on the elementary interests of all trading nations. Secondly, security problems on land are increasingly linked to questions of maritime security in the global context. Political and social instability in Somalia, Nigeria or Bangladesh may not at first glance appear to endanger German or European security but the emergence of "piracy" as a business shows once again that state fragility and regional conflicts cannot be understood or tackled in isolation from the international system; they have blow-back effect.

The focus of this work, is specifically on the Somalia state. The state like every other African and third world countries have their diverse security threats and disturbances. It's a colonial creation and also experienced military coups and many developmental challenges such as: drought, famine, hunger, poverty etc to the upsurge in warlords wrecking havoc on the corporate existence of the state. The emergence of pirates off the Somali coast remains a threatening and serious security issue that touches the cords of both the immediate environment, Horn of African Region and the International environment.

It is on this note, the study delves into unraveling the consequences of the existence of sea pirates off the Somalia coast. The study also gives answers to what are the factor(s) which spur or give room for the emergence of sea pirates in Somalia? and also how has piracy off the Somali coast affects regional security in the Horn of Africa.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study is to examine the extent which piracy off the Somali Ogaden coast remains a threat to regional peace and security. The study also considers some specific and critical issues that are intricate in the discussed below:

1. To what extent does the failing state of Somalia beginning from the time of president Siad Bare regime paved the way for chaos and the existence of different warlords and criminal networks that led to piracy.
2. To what extent has this piracy that emanated from the failing state of Somalia affected the Horn of Africa regional security.

### **Definition of Concepts**

Just like any other concepts, that has grabbed the minds, interest and thinking of scholars in

the fields of social science, international relations, security studies etc, giving a thin definition of piracy is always smacked by inherent ambiguity based on the diversity of scholarly interpretations. However, series of definition exist in literature, (Neething, 2010; Onuoha, 2009: UN, 1982: IMB, 2009; Gilpin, 2007 in Stephen and Toakodi 2015). The United Nations Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS, 1982; part article 101) as quoted by Stephen and Toakodi (2015) states that piracy consist of the following:

*Any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of deprivation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed on high seas; against another ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any states:(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a private ship or aircraft(3) Any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in (1) and (2), (UNCLOS 1982 in Stephen and Toakodi 2015:2014)*

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), defined piracy as an act of boarding or attempt to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft of any other crime and with the apparent intent to use force in furtherance of that act (IMB,2009 Report in Stephen and Toakodi 2015:215). On his part, Jimoh described piracy in terms of its political, economic and social context. In the political aspects the criminalization of politics and the politicization of crime have contributed to the modernization of maritime piracy. Economically, some attacks are executed purely for personal economic gain in a sporadic and spontaneous manner, (Anthony 2003 in Jimoh 2015). The level of corruption, has also increased the financial temptation where business opportunists are now engaging in oil theft and bunkering in order to live in style. The revenue profile of such pirates includes but is limited to the theft of cash on board, sale of stolen cargo, ransoms paid by victims. Also, the inability for the government to effectively utilize oil wealth to develop, the nation. Finally, the social aspects is the ability of sea robbers to network with other organized criminal group both within and without maritime domain. Pirates are well organized having their own regulation. Like many criminal groups, they operate under rules backed by secrets oaths and allegiance to leadership. This ensure that information concerning their network is rarely revealed, while they have access to intelligence through their informants within the security institutions. Pirates also connects with gangsters onshore through the so-called cult societies that is, mafias and students' fraternities that often draw their philosophy from the maritime world, (David 2007; Perouse de Montclos 2014 in Jimoh 2015). These social network guarantee access to sophisticated weapons to control, patrol and surveillance, security personnel during operations black markets to dispose of stolen items. Communication channels to negotiate and receive ransoms, and the the protection of political “God Fathers” to infiltrate security officers indirectly (Jimoh 2015:9).

The above, clearly brings to mind the various reasoning of scholarly interest in conceptualizing piracy. The extent to which piracy has severally devoured the intentional water ways of nations is appalling and devastating. This resonates the thinking of policy makers, maritime security agents/experts, international statesmen to put forth a diverse interpretation on the meaning of piracy. In this work the definition given above by Stephen

and toakodi, (2015) is adopted for the study, as it is all encompassing and touching the major aspects of maritime crime, perpetrated by unlawful combatants who engage in all manners of high sea criminal act against people who ply the seas, oceans and water ways for their legitimate business. The definition was also adopted by Karande in his study on “Responses to contemporary maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: the case of Ghana, being a master degree thesis submitted to the University of Ghana legion for the award of masters of Arts Degree in International Affairs.

### **Security**

According to Waltz, security may be defined as the study of threat, use and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make use of force on individual and states adopted in order to prepare for, prevent and engage in war, (Waltz 1991 in Akinyemi 2013). Akinyemi further observed that, the concept security has been subjected to various interpretations by scholars or analysts in international system and can also be divided into two: traditional and non-traditional schools of thought: The former school (traditional) favors the maintenance of the cold war system and thinking: that is the ideological rivalry between the west and the east which focused on the rolling back of communism and containing capitalism as security was defined in military and state-centric approaches. While the non-traditionalist school on the other hand, broadens the meaning of security to include issues as human, economic, environmental, social, feminists and other threats. These include what possibly endangers the survival of individuals as well as the state. In common sense, security is the lack of threat, and the opposite is insecurity (Akinyemi, 2013). Onuoha opined that most times security is seen as the sum total of the vital national interest of the state to which a nation is willing to resort to war, (Onuoha 2007 in Tshuwa 2015).

Security, from the aforementioned represent an amalgam of connectivity of certain factors to be considered in any fruitful thinking of the term. Taking issues like assurance of safety from physical harm, threats, fear and respecting the dignity of each individual in a manner that ensures justice, fairness and equity in the allocation and distribution of societal goods and values, to the protection of the state against internal insurgency or insurrection on the one hand and the protection of territorial integrity via air, land and waters to ensure states' survival that gurantees its sovereignty status on the other hand. This kind of thinking towards security encapsulates both human and state security. Thus maintaining an equilibrium and balance in the security thinking. Taking this into consideration, brings to mind the philosophy of good governance as tenets of fruitfully, judiciously and prospectively releasing the dividends of good governance and democracy to the door steps of the citizenry. But this is the part where most African countries have failed in realizing the social contract. This has resulted into legitimacy crisis and challenge of central government by some sections, mostly rebels and ethnic militias, leading to the collapse of central governance. Hence, the contagious effect of this beyond the immediate frontier and territory of the problem state into neighbouring states, which becomes a regional epidemic. The failure of the government and mangers of the respective states in the Horn of Africa to perform their core functions in the contemporary era has seen the upsurge and eruption of violent attack and challenges to the legitimacy of state by several clandestine actors-rebels, terrorists clans ethnic militias, etc would be demonstred in the case of Somalia.

### **Conceptualization of Fail State**

Born out of the 1648 Westphalian treaty, as a sovereign body to reaffirm and establish its superiority and sovereignty in a more formidable gadget. States thrived to shield itself from any future catastrophe with a semblance of the 30 years war. Such ideology made the state to become the sole controller and monopolistic entity on coercive means of violence. This gave birth to the creation of elements of modern international politics-territorial states, sovereign rulers, centralized military structures and overseas ventures, (Knusten 1992, 11 and 69; Rourke and Boyer 1996). A state is a tangible entity. It has territory. People, organization and other observable characteristics. whether large or small, populous or not, states normally share six characteristics - sovereignty (which is the most important characteristics of a state. Here the state is a sovereign actor and does not recognize as legitimate any other higher authority) population (people are an obvious requirement of any state); diplomatic recognition (the United Nations must recognize such state as sovereign while at the same time granting such state equal status in matters of international politics with other states): internal organization (states must normally have some level of political and economic structure); internal loyalty (this implies that a state's population supports that state (patriotism) and granted it the authority to make rules and to govern (legitimacy). For all the coercive powers that a state usually possesses, it is difficult for any state to survive without the least passive acquiescence of its people); territory (A state must have physical boundaries, and most states do) etc. (Rourke and Boyer 1992)

The above scholarly appositeness, on the concept of state, brings to light the panoply of certain tenets of statehood. Thus one can dovetail certain vital and sacrosanct characteristics of state-the only viable entity to enviously monopolies the use of coercive means of violent like the Army, Navy, Airforce, Police and other paramilitary and security agencies etc. It is through these myriads of agencies and other civil institution that the government, as the machinery of the state, perform its core and vital functions of maintaining law and order, protects its territory from external aggression and violation of sovereignty, engage in international peace keeping to curb humanitarian menace, provide essential goods and services in the form of wealth, employment, education, welfare schemes etc. It is by the judicious and equitably performance of these functions within the frame work of, upholding national interest that is citizen-driven, that the state enjoys the legitimacy of the citizens. This is so, as such predatory environment where the masses or some segment of the society feels cheated, oppressed and marginalized in scheme of things, turns back against the state. At this point, the aggrieved masses may resort to all manner of attack to challenge the legitimacy of the government, which if not carefully nipped in the bud may snowball into a serious security threat of a catastrophic proportion as evident in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and Somalia episode concerning the upsurge of Al Shabaab terrorist sect and the flourishing of piracy off Somalia coast.

Conceptualization and linking “Fail state, as a platform for the surge of terrorism and other transnational crimes have flummoxed the interest of researchers in the field. Godfrey posited that, failed or weak states and the risk they pose today is given prominence in the mass media and is an uppermost priority for many policy makers. These states largely in the third world,

are framed as one of the greatest threats to the international system since the cold war, (Godfrey 2012). There is a considerable confusion over what the term “Failed state means with a long list of adjectives used by scholars, often interchangeably, such as weak or quasi-state and collapsed or failed state. This has resulted in a wide range of states labeled as failed, despite a variety of features and context, (Patrick 2007, in Godfrey 2012). The term failed-State came into prominence after the end of cold war. As the cold war ended in the early 1990's, analysts became aware of an emerging international security environment, in weak and failing states became vehicles for transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation pathways, and hotspots for civil conflict and humanitarian emergencies, (Wylter, 2018 in Godfrey 2012). The term failed state is broadly understood to mean that a state cannot function administratively, provide essential services to its citizens, or has lost control over its coercive function and control over territory (Hehir 2011 in Godfrey 2012).

The views, concerning failed states above, encapsulates plethora of variables to be considered when envisaging the problematique and security implications of failing states to domestic domain and beyond. The definition and characteristics given by Hehir as cited in Godfrey captures the governance challenges manifesting in contemporary African political landscape. This is the unabated problem of the government and managers of the state's insensitivity to the hues and cries of their masses. Thus the independence slogan of “seek ye first the political freedom and all other things will be added unto you”, have been abruptly thrown into the dust, while the common man languishes in pain, penury, and total and unredressed victimization and exploitation. Even the attainment of democracy by some African states, which citizens in the continent saw as a new and second phase of political independence, has not yielded any meaning dividends. This is so as the erstwhile military rule which entrapped and chained the masses to all manner of authoritarian garrison, was to be replaced with a more people-oriented atmosphere. During the military era, the press, judiciary was severely muffled, human right, liberty was disregarded, upsurge in coup and counter coup, civil war, corruption, repression, hence democracy was to usher in a governance structure that takes pride in enhancing the living standard of the formally oppressed scapegoats of authoritarian military repression. But regrettably the reverse of such hope and aspiration is what the continent continues to grapple with.

In their bid, to challenge such debilitating atmosphere, citizens of respective African states have resorted to violent means through employing brute force to challenge the legitimacy of their oppressors (the states). Apart from the use of violence to challenge the state, the masses often time resort to running a parallel and informal economy in a pure illicit form, so as to sustain themselves since the government refuses to provide the necessary public goods for the wellbeing of the masses. This comes in diverse forms, oil bunker/ theft as the case with Niger Delta of Nigeria, black marketing of diamonds, golds and other resources, piracy on the high sea as the case of Somalia will suffice.

A state, failing in this context, presupposes the extent which a sovereign states sees itself incapable of using its monopolistic power over the instruments of violence to suppress internal insurrection from dissenting force: with such threats capturing its territory via air,

land, sea, to the point of losing certain parts of its territory to rebels, warlords, clan/ethnic militia etc. This is capable of going beyond the domestic environment to affecting and entangling neighbouring states as surfaced and evident in the failing states of Somalia. Such has resulted in the Al Shabaab terrorist onslaught touching states of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda and response of this state too in the form of responsibility to protect and preserving a good humanitarian gesture with the aid of the United states. The failing state of Somalia became a double-edged monster, carrying two faces of both: terrorism and piracy. Thus, one can confidently deduce that security through the monopoly use of the coercive instrument of violence and employment of security institutions touches air, land and sea. Hence, as the state losses its grip over such means of violence, porosity and weakness of its territory-air, land and sea becomes a lee way and flood gate to all manner of manipulation by transnational criminal syndicates-drugs and human traffickers, arms smugglers, terrorist, piracy etc.

### **Theoretical Framework**

#### **Securitization Theory**

The theory of securitization, emanates from the thinking of the Copenhagen school of thought. According to this school, security is about survival. That in international relations, something becomes a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to some object- a threat that needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures. The main argument of securitization theory is that in international relations an issue becomes a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state (or another referent object), but rather because an actor has defined something as existential threat to some object's survival (Disakaya 2013)

The input of this theory to the study, brings to the fore the level of threat posed by Failing States and piracy in the world. Thus Failing state is such a threat that could lead to many threats like: terrorism (where terrorists use such Failed states as safe havens, though not in all instance, as recruits, where the absence of central government and its inability to provide essential services- health, roads, welfare, social amenities, citizens safety can pave the way to other non-state actors, militias, ethnic or religious extremist, a running of parallel economy etc.

#### **Failing State Theory**

The failing state thesis, has been touched and diagnosed as serious security threats to world peace and stability by domestic and international actors. As trenchantly put by Schoema (2008), the 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted the emphasis of failed states as just a regional humanitarian problem to one that could present a global threat. The increased concern about the “failed state” problematic can be traced to the events that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 (Wesley-Smith, 2014 in Shoeman 2008). The term failed state was first coined to describe a number of humanitarian disaster that took place in the 1990s in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Great Lakes region of Africa and particularly Rwanda. (Wesley-Smith 2004, Sur 2006 in Schoeman 2008). Although the focused on failed state was initially an issue of insecurity relating to humanitarian

consequences: refugee, displacements, human rights abuses and genocide. Thus, it was based on domestic or regional problem. However, this narrow view saw a radical change and was abandoned after the September 11, 2001 AlQaeda terrorist launched a devastating attack against the financial and military targets in New York and Washington D.C. This turned the thinking of scholars in the field of security studies to a broader view of failed state to be an issue of international security concern.

Juxtaposing the failed-state paradigm to this study, “caught between the whirlpool of Somalia failed state and upsurge in piracy: the security challenge facing the Horn of Africa”, the failing state of Somalia as already indicated in the work, was the cause of the emergence of different militia, ethnic, religious groups, challenging the state to the point of succeeding in having some regions out of control of the central government. This led to the invitation of outside forces- the United Nations, African Mission in Somalia-AMISOM, Intergovernmental Association of Development- IGAD, and individual state like Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya to help tackle the rebels in Somalia. The failing state of Somalia saw the emergence of Al Shabaab terrorist, which was a fraction of the Islamic court union. The piracy off the coast of Somalia too, is also a consequence of the failing state of Somalia. The both issues in the discourse, fail state and piracy are mutually reinforcing in this study. Piracy on its own it's a serious international security issue due to its domicile and operation along international waterways of the Ogaden region, to the Indian oceans. This is so as not just Somalis are affected, but other Nationals of neighbouring countries, Europeans, Americans, Asians, etc.

### **The Collapse State of Somalia: A Historical Overview and Precursor to Upsurge in Piracy**

The case of Somali failed state problematique, can be well understood within the purview of the fall of President Siad Barre's regime with its concomitant consequences of terrorism and piracy. According to Marangio, the Somali colonial period was characterized by the establishment of a bureaucracy to control the territory and exploit its economic potential mainly agriculture. The colonial power, Italy in the first place, but also Britain in what is now Somaliland-exploited the division between clans and social groups by granting benefits to those that were willing to cooperate. Thus, a major division between collaborators and opponents to foreign rule as well as elements of rigidity were introduced in the fluid traditional Somali society. Furthermore, in the Italian Somalia, the fascist rule established the so-called new order, which foresaw a new agricultural policy based on grants to the shidle farmers considered as lower class than nomadic shepherds. As a consequence, Italian rule reversed the social order by conferring power on the groups which traditionally exchanged goods for protection, thus undermining the grounds for cooperation with other groups, (Marangio 2012).

As the United Nations charter envisaged the need for granting independence to colonial territories, based on the principle of “Self Determination” of people in 1960, Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland attained independence and subsequently merged to form the new independent State. Just few months after he took office as president of the Republic, and perhaps as a prelude to what was to come on 15<sup>th</sup> October, 1969, President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by one of his body guards while visiting the northern part of the

country. Merely a week after the assassination of the president on 21 October, 1969, the democratically elected civilian government was ousted from power in a military coup d'etat. Successfully and abruptly terminating the fledging multi party democracy. The head of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which effectively seized power was major General Mohammed Siyad Barre. Barre consolidated his coup reason on the prevalence of corruption, bribery and nepotism, theft of public funds, injustice and disrespect to religion and laws of the country. The military takeover, as in the case of other countries in Africa, was greeted with enthusiasm of possibility in effecting positive changes by the populace. Thus, the hope that the well-organized Army would religiously and sincerely fight corruption and nepotism that was restraining the nascent institutions from performing their developmental functions. One of the landmark achievements of the regime was adapting Latin scripts for Somali language, which was until then unwritten. The government carried ambitious literacy campaign both in urban and remote rural areas, (Khayre 2016).

Not long, as a similar pattern of all post-military regime in other African country would always fail to redeem campaign/coup promises, the regime of Siyad Barre found itself confronting certain political, social and economic problems as the government it over threw. It began “shuffling the same limited policy options. The military government suspended the constitution along with its many rights it guaranteed. For example, freedom of association was circumscribed: the right to habeas corpus was abolished. In 1995 ten religious leaders were court marshaled and subsequently executed when they publicly and vociferously criticized the law, which the government enacted to give women equal rights to male counterparts, arguing that such law is an anathema to Islamic doctrine as the Somali state was not a signatory to the convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Woman (CEDAW). Things began to change immediately the Somalian military was defeated by Ethiopia. As the Somalian military hurriedly left the Ogaden region back to their home, some military officers, mainly from majeertan clan to overthrow the regime attempted a coup that failed. This radicalized Siad Barre and made him more paranoid. Siad Barre became more violent and repressive as he embarked on implementing some destructive policies of nepotism to consolidate his power at all cost and means. His regime violently flushed the captured leaders of the coup, charging them with treason and executed them after a trial in a military way. Furthermore, the families of the coup leaders were targeted, (Khayre 2016). This repressive policy represented a clear shift from policies based on populism to more militaristic approach. The lesson Barre learnt was that no one save his relations, could be depended on to hold the regime together. Evidently, the policy change upheld the divide and rule tactics employed by the regime that culminated in the full-blown civil wars that followed the collapse of the regime in 1991. Consequently, the military regime used coercion and oppression to maintain its grip on power. Unfortunately, there were no organization based on ideology or common interest that were to challenge the military, (Khayre 2016).

The Cold War, bipolar stand-off, between the United States and the Soviet Union too, had a major role to play based on their strategic interest in Somalia. Despite Barre's poor human rights record, and corrupt governance, Mohammed observed that, United States provided him with economic aid to sustain his government and military aid to protect Somalia from

Ethiopia's Marxist regime. Barre's regime survived the 1980's, receiving grants and flexible loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and food aid through USAID which was distributed amongst camps and displaced communities, as a result of a refugee, flood and war-torn Ogaden region of Eastern Ethiopia. In return the United States received its strategic Naval Base at Berbera. This bounty flowing from the United States was going into a country ruled by a dictator who never tolerated political opposition or attempted to compromise in crafting solutions acceptable to all parties. Rather he chose to act as a thug, using force to eliminate any clan-family sympathizing with the opposition. Its military force committed atrocities in central Somalia in particular, where they burnt villages, slaughtered thousands of innocent people, and raped women. Barre was highly antithetical to what the United States was supposedly pursuing. It is no wonder that in the 1980's, a rising opposition movement demanded fair representation in the government. When Barre suppressed such clamor for change, the opposition became aggressively radicalized, using brute force and turning into an insurgent known as Somali National Movement (SNM), with the sole aim of overthrowing the Barre regime, as the SNM guerilla army immediately seized two cities in Northern Somalia-Hergesia and Buro. In 1988, Barre and his superior American weapons reacted by emphatically suffocating and dismantling the SNM movement by leveling the rebel cities leading to the death of many civilians, while thousands fled the home for country side, to seek refuge for basic means of livelihoods, (Mohamed, 2009).

As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed, and met its Waterloo in 1991, so too did the polarized world which was ideologically polarized end. Hence, the United States no longer had any need for Somalia. It was convenient to withdraw the initial support that long emboldened Barre's rule and the anomalies that characterized it. The weakness, vulnerability of Barre's regime became palpable, as his security apparatuses collapsed from here, the rebels forces taking the form of the United Somali Congress (USC) – led by Mohammed Farah Aided Stormed Mogadisu. Barre fled the capital in January, warlords, ethnic/clan militias United to fight among themselves for power and control (Mohammed, 2009:13). Beginning from 1992-2004 Somalia had no formal National government. In January 1992, the UN Security Council imposed a “general and complete embargo on the provision of arms and military equipment to Somalia which was extended to include military training and assistance in 2002. A transnational federal government was formed in 2004 but it was only internationally recognized and received backing from the International community, but no legitimacy inside Somalia. In 2006 Ethiopian Forces entered Somalia to drive back opposition groups who threatened the survival of the transnational federal government, while not authorizing the intervention, the UN did not formally oppose it, and Ethiopian Force remained in the country till early 2009, (Mohammed 2009)

This interplay, and involvement in the Somalia conflict by external forces have culminated into support of factions in the conflict through the supply of small arms and light weapons. From the judgments of UN *Monitoring Group on Somalia*, non-state actors in Somalia acquired arms and ammunitions from a variety of sources. Such weapons include low volumes of ammunitions, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and a few heavier, crew served infantry weapons such as portable anti-air craft and anti-tanks weapons from neighbouring states: like

Eritea is thought to have supplied arms and other assistance to Somali opposition groups. Commercial arms markets in Somalia have flourished openly despite the embargo and are important sources of arms and ammunition from non-state actors and criminal groups. Belarus, Bulgaria and France have all been reported as making transfers of arms and military equipment to Eritrea between 2006. Belarus supplied nine BM 22 multiple rocket launchers in 2007 and Bulgaria reported the export of items related to light weapons €164 429 and unspecified ammunition worth €2.1 million in 2008 (Wereman 2010:14). Thus arms flow not only goes into the hands of the constituted and internally accepted transnational Federal Government, but into the hands of rebels and opposition so as to give them a better footing to formidably challenge the transnational Federal Government. Large segment of the populace saw the transitional federal government as alien and not accepted. The *International Crisis Group* observation gives credence to this view thus:

*Somalia remains the quintessential “Failed state” without an effective national government for more than twenty years. The latest version of the transitional Federal government established with much fanfare in January, 2009, but remains weak confined to part of Mogadishu rivened by political squabbles and dependent for its survival on the troops of the African Union (AU) mission (AMISOM). Relatively stable regions to the North refuse to recognize its authority, and central Somalia is controlled by Al Shaabab, a Salafi Jihad group bent on overthrowing the TIFG and imposing its extreme version of Islam on the entire country, if not the entire region. The level of corruption within the TIFG increased significantly, and many local and foreign observers regard the constituted TIFG as the most corrupt since the cycles of ineffectual transitions began in 2000.*

Manrangio argued in conforming to the above views concerning the TFG, thus: the underlying problem within the TFG concerns its internal division and reluctance to devolve powers according to “decentralized system of administration base on Federalism thus relapsing into a generalized struggle for power which is at the basis of the Somalia crisis. This unleashed the twin problem of piracy and Islamic fundamentalism. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism was a powerful force in Southern Somalia led to renewed international commitment towards Somalia to unite all actors involved against the common enemy Al-Shabaab. Also, the spread of piracy off the coast, which emerged under the shadow of the civil war, have catalyzed the attention of international and regional actors in Somalia, led to action by various international players willing to defend the threatened commercial routes. These actions include EU missions EUNAVFOR, Alanta and the new Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RCMB), as well as the NATO and other national counter-piracy operations in Gulf of Aden. Despite the magnitude of the effort no substantial change has been recorded so far. This difficulty in curbing and eradicating piracy, stems from the fact that piracy constitute only one aspect of the wide Somali crisis and is strictly connected to the lack of alternative remunerative activities. The only viable solution to the phenomenon of piracy involves addressing its root causes: human security and development. Ploch et al (2013) trenchantly augured in the same wavelength as regards the undivided nexus between the collapsed state of Somalia and upsurge in piracy off the Somali coast thus:

*The increase in pirate attacks of the Horn of Africa is directly linked to continuing insecurity and absence of rule of law in war torn Somalia. The absence of a functioning central government there provides freedom of action for pirates and remains the greatest challenge to regional security. The lack of law enforcement capacity creates haven where pirates hold hostages during ransom negotiations that can last months. Some allege the absence of Somali coastal security authorities has allowed illegal; international fishing and maritime dumping to go unchecked, which in turn has undermined coastal communities' economic prospects providing economic and political motivations for pirates. The apparent motive of most pirate groups, however, is profit, and piracy has proven lucrative. Somalia's "pirates economy has grown substantially in the past two years with ransoms now averaging more than million. These revenues may further exacerbate the ongoing conflict and undermine regional security.*

Sugiki (2012), informed that, there are diverse disagreements regarding the emergence and progenitors of piracy in Somalia. However, there is general consensus that piracy started in 1991. It was not until 2008, that the frequency of Somali piracy began to increase rapidly. Somali claims of defending their fishing grounds against illegal fishing. Toward the end of 2008, Somali pirates captured two vessels the M/V Sirus star, a massive Saudi oil tanker. These two cases illustrate that Somali piracy is no longer carried out by small ragtag groups of Somali fishermen defending their fishing grounds. Rather pirates' groups are organized systematically and professionally by various actors such as negotiators, spokesmen, accountants, financiers, logistic coordinators, and caretakers as well as pirates. There are two major pirates: one operates in central Somalia, comprising primarily of members of Habar Gidir clan; and the other is based in Puntland, and consists mainly of members of Majerteen clan. The most influential pirate groups operate in Eyulihuile, other groups are based in Gara'd Aluula, Haafun, Bossaso, Bayla, Bagal and Quandala, (United Nation Report on Somalia 2012 in Sugiki 2012).

Beloff also argued, in tandem to the views of Sugiki saying: the root cause of piracy is prevalent in Somalia, mostly the Puntland area and the rest of Horn of Africa is debated, but most analyst agree piracy stems from the economic hardship of Somalis as a result of economic desperation relating to the fishing rights violations. For instance, fishing by other countries in the territorial waters of Somalia is a very serious problem for Puntland. Estimates indicate that the coastal water off Puntland have a vast supply of fish that are considered ideal for export causing many neighbouring countries to illegally fish there. A veteran African journalist, Peter Eichstaedt debunk the theory of the "violation of fishing rights" as a precursor to the upsurge of piracy, claiming piracy is a product of self interest of the pirates and their financiers and not from illegal fishing. However, testimonies from Somali pirates indicate that piracy surfaced shortly after the fall of Somali Government in 1994 when Foreign Fishing boats sailed to fish in the Somali waters in the Gulf of Aden. Yemeni Fishermen became the largest group of Foreigners to fish illegally Somalia coast. There are claims by former fishermen that Yemeni's Fishing vessels would dismantle and/or steal Somali's fishing

nets so that the Yemenis could catch more fish. To combat this illegal fishing tactic, Somali fishermen would use small boats and basic weapons in order to force their victims overboard before spraying them with water to retaliate, they would further threaten other potential ships that would consider entering Somali waters. Some foreign fishermen would be released without any harm as long as they paid a considerable fine.

Thus, it is reasonable to deduce that piracy in the region began with Somali fisherman who threatened to attack foreign sailors if they did not leave their waters. Ultimately, Somali piracy would grow into an international problem when two events unfolded. One relating to the diminishing rate in the number of fishes in the Gulf of Aden, causing the area to no longer be economically viable for Somalis to fish as a result of the indiscriminate fishing by illegal fishing vessels and Somalis. This significantly affected the livelihoods of the native population as the inability to catch and shell fish resulted in local families not being able to purchase food. This led many Somalis to supplement their wages, but it was nearly impossible for Somali to find another profession that would earn them a living wage in the war-torn country. An example of testimony recorded by Eichstaedt, is of a pirate named Musi. He became a pirate simply because of poverty and lack of opportunities in the Horn of Africa. His mother earned only of couple of dollars a day selling milk in local markets in Galkayo. His father on the other hand tended camels, cows, and goats-feeding them on sparse vegetation found throughout the arid windswept lands. To provide money to purchase necessary supplies and maintain the house for his family, he must become a pirate. Secondly, the 2004 tsunami, destroyed the lives of millions of people who resided and visited countries that surround the Indian ocean. Somalia was heavily hit by this catastrophe and consequently suffered severe economic hardship. This disaster caused the deaths of an estimated 289 people in Somalia, and the economic damage was greater than in any other part of Africa. For instance, the Tsunami destroyed an estimated 800 buildings and 600 fishing boats. Instantly, the livelihoods of many Somalis were affected, and unlike any other affected parts of the Indian coastline, Somalia received meager foreign aid from the international community. Because of the lack of centralized legitimate government in Somalia, the United Nations and other organizations, sent very little aid to Somalia for their reconstruction efforts. Accordingly, many Somalis began to experience health challenges as a consequence of illegal dumping of harmful waste that began washing up the soil and increasing the venture of piracy as a means of survival; (Beloff, 2013).

Also affected by the onslaught of the tsunami, was pastoralists who suffered the problem of depleting fishing area off the shores of Somalia. This bewildered pastoralists turned into hijacking foreign vessels in a combination of economic desperation and frustration at their perceived abandonment by the international community. Since the 2004 tsunami, piracy has quickly escalated from that of simple hijackings of foreign fishing vessels to the more complex hijackings of cargo ships, and private luxury ships. Formerly poorly organized pirates have seen tremendous transformation into more sophisticated and well-organized financiers' mothers' ships, financial distribution of ransom. Its international cost is estimated between \$13 and \$16 billion annually with real number possibly higher. In November 2010, the highest ransom \$9.5 million was paid to release the south Korean oil tanker, SAMHO

DREAM and its Sailors. In 2008, estimated ransoms were approximately \$50 million, a tenfold increase from 2007. Most importantly, the number has increased considerably since. The most famous hijacked ship was the U.S freight vessel MAERSK ALABAMA that was captured on April 8, 2009, and held by pirates for a \$10 million ransom. Four days later, U. S Navy seals fatally shot three hijackers and subsequently rescued the hostages. The only hijacker who survived the sniper attack was Abduwalt Abdukhadir Muse, who was onboard the U.S.S Bainbridge conducting negotiations and later convicted of piracy (Beloff, 2013).

The aforementioned, clearly depicts, the international effect of the activities of Somalia pirates. Thus one can confidently see the upsurge of piracy off the Somalia coast as a fallout of hybrid of factors culminating into a serious threat. As trenchantly captured by McKay:

*Piracy off the coast of Somalia has captured the world's attention as some of the most powerful states in the world are seemingly helpless to prevent groups of ragamuffin, survival-driven, Ak-47 wielding young men from attacking at will ships of all kind traversing the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. From luxury yachts to supertankers, no vessel seems safe the audacious and brash Somali pirates. On land, the pirates presides over coastal towns in the north eastern region of Somalia, the semi-autonomous "Puntland states of Somalia, and in central Somalia littoral east. The pirate economics have flourished, as networks of community's benefit from the millions of dollars paid in ransom for ships taken hostage. For the pirates and their communities, the risks in setting off to sea to attack vessels are far outweighed by the economic benefits they reap when successful. The dramatic upsurge in piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia during 2008 continued to 2009. There were 217 reported attacks on ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and Somali region in 2009. Of these, 47 ships were hijacked and a total of 867 crew member held hostage. By end of 2009, Somali pirates has taken 12 vessels and 263 crew members. In the first half of 2010, Somali pirates attacked 100 vessels, 27 of which successfully hijacked (McKay, 2011)*

Ploch et al (2011), further informed that, piracy threatened the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, much of which arrives by sea. According to the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), more than 5 million Ethiopians required emergency food assistance through mid 2011. The United states provided over \$340 million in food and humanitarian aid to Ethiopia in FY 2009, over \$363 million in FY 2010 and over \$22 million in the first half of FY 2011. In neighbouring Somalia, estimated 2.4 million people, one-third of the population were expected to require food in 2011, primarily in Southern and Central Somalia where poor rains have resulted in crop failure and deteriorating livestock conditions. The delivery of U.S food and humanitarian aid to Somalia was additionally hindered by a non-permissive security environment on land. Food insecurity in the region caused by drought and instability, has been heightened by high food and fuel prices in the region. Official froms the World Food Programme (WFP), which ships tens of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, reported that it became more expensive to ship

assistance to Mogadishu, and their ability to deliver relief was significantly hampered. Al Shabaab militants demanded in December 2009, that the WFP halt imports of food assistance in favour of purchasing supplies from Somali Farmers. WFP suspended operations in southern Somalis in January, 2010 amid growing threats and intimidation. Canada, NATO, and EUROPEAN UNION forces assumed escort responsibilities for WFP shipment in late 2008, followed by Russian escort convoy and later China in March 2010 in escorting WFP shipments, (Ploch et al 2011)

### **Piracy Off the Somalia Coast: A Source of Instability in the Horn of Africa**

Piracy, and its many negative effects does not only plague the Horn of Africa. Thus, it is serious regional and international security threats. That the oceans and waters of the world communities holds bountiful treasures is not to be downplayed nor overemphasized. Mostly in era of unfettered globalization that has seen the fast connectivity between peoples, ideas, culture etc. Also, the free movements of goods, service, commerce, plying both air, land and sea by virtue of the revolution in information technology and easy transportation means. But the activities of sea pirates have become a serious threat to transactions, trades, and movements along international water ways.

The strategic location, of the Horn of Africa increases its vulnerability and lucrateness to the incidents of piracy. The Northern coastline of Somalia lies to the South of the Gulf of Aden, a key transit zone for ships passing to and from the Red Sea and increasingly active port of Djibouti. The U.S Department of Energy estimates that 3.2 million barrels of oil per day transits the Babel Mandeb strait between the Gulf of Aden and Red sea in 2009. The Indian ocean waters off the southeast coast of Somalia are home to busy shipping lanes for trade between Asia and East Africa, as well as for ships making longer voyages around South Africa's Cape of Hope. The traffic to and from the Kenya port of Mombasa is particularly vulnerable to security disruptions in West Indian Ocean, (Ploch et al 2009). The Maritime Administrative testified in 2009 that:

*On average at least one U.S. commercial vessel transits the area each day. Many of these US-flag vessels carrying Department of defense cargo bound for operations Iraqi and enduring freedom. U.S-Flag vessels transiting the region also carry humanitarian cargoes generated by U. S Aid or international organizations to Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, Somali and other countries in East Africa or South Asia.*

According to Pogieter, (2008), contemporary piracy has assumed a sophisticated and brutal enterprise that ranges from petty thieving with machetes and handguns to the well-organized criminal ventures. As other criminal ventures, piracy does not only threaten finance and commerce, but also the peace and regional stability. The most prominent pirate group is the “Somali Marines” based at Ceer Haur (250 miles north of Mogadishi). Their modus operandi are as follows: to hijack ships close to the shore , pirates would lure them into ambush with a false distress call or they will attack ships directly with small and fast vessels while assaults further away from the coast will take place from open boats, often supported by “mother ships”. After boarding a ship, the crew will be quickly rounded up and taken ashore until

ransom is obtained, while smaller ships will be seized and anchored along the coast under the protection of a local militia. For many decades ago, confirmed occurrence of pirate's attacks have been documented in the Horn of Africa region by reputable maritime watchdogs. For example, between early 2005 and April 2006, 45 attempted hijackings and 19 successful hijacking were around Somalia.

According to the International Maritime Bureau, during the first nine months of 2007, 30 actual and attempted pirate attacks were recorded in the seas around the Horn of Africa (off the coast of Somalia, Djibouti, and Gemen). Most of these cult attacks, were off Somalia. It is 18% of the international total and more than double the figure for the same period 2006, (Potgieter 2008). The continuous incident, of the Somalia pirates has tremendous effects to the stability and survival of the Horn of Africa in the following ways: the maritime piracy has environmental impacts in the sea- at subsistent fishing has been threatened by large scale illegal and foreign fishing due to the lawlessness off the Somalia state. Thus, lack of central control and government presence in the air, land, sea etc. paving the way for free criminalized venture. Early 2006, the" Somalia land coast guard" captured Nine Yemeni fishing boats (and Eighty-Four fishermen). They released the fishermen shortly after wards claiming that the boats were part of a fleet of up to 200 boats from Yemen illegally fishing in the waters of Somaliland. Incident such as these were often interpreted as piracy, while Somaliland sources claim that they are just protecting their fishing resources. Due to the easy accessibility of the Somalia water ways, the dumping of toxic waste (usually in exchange for foreign currency) is another area of concern. The type of waste dumped apparently includes Uranium and radioactive waste, heavy metals like Cadmium and Mercury as well as industrial, hospital and chemical wastes.

After the Asian Tsunami, broken hazardous waste containers (that was probably dumped off Somalia a decade or so earlier) washed ashore. According to UN Environmental Programme Representative in Nairobi, Somalia was used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste since the early 1990's. It was cheaper to European companies to dispose of waste there (alleged to even be 2.50 compared to \$250 a ton) and specifically crime groups in Italy has been linked to it. Though it is uncertain if illegal waste dumping continues till date, according to the UN report of February 2005, it has severe and acute health implications for the inhabitants of the Horn of Africa. Lack of Maritime sovereignty; as the states in the Horn are weak, mostly Somalia, the mere existence of minor naval capability, leads to the attack and their maritime sovereignty, due to the lack of effective central authority. Humanitarian challenges emanated from the Somalian conflict of a failing state, level lack of central government to counter terrorism, the hindered humanitarian and aid deliveries to the drought –plagued Horn of Africa region, which is damaging to millions of Somalia who depended on international relief in times of crisis. Pirates seizes numbers of WFP Food shipments, including rice intended for the Somali victims of the Asian-Tsunami. By April 2006, the situation was urgent as almost two million Somalis were o the brink of famine that was also fueled by worst droughts ever to hit East Africa. Based on this, most food passed through Kenya. Also, the issue of human trafficking, though an anathema to Sharia, was prevalent and impossible to check. Many Somali refugees and humans trafficked cross the sea from Bossaso (a busy smuggling hub in

North-East Somalia) to Yemen. Horrific stories of boats floating around, people drowning after being forced at gunpoint to jump overboard by smugglers, or just being shot out of hand abounds, (Potgieter 2008).

Also discussing the regional implication of Somali pirate activities, Potgieter affirmed that, piracy in the horn of Africa it's mainly a consequence of the disintegration of central government authority in Somalia the lack of maritime security in the Horn of Africa becomes a grave problem. This is one of the few cases in Africa where security problems on land have spilled over and affected maritime security severely. Due to the geographic location of Somalia and the valuable cargoes traversing the seas around the Horn of Africa, the lack of maritime security has become an international concern. The fact that the sea serves as a very lucrative means of international maritime trade, hence securing the waterways becomes necessary for the economic wellbeing of the Horn of Africa. The threats of Somali pirates tantamount to high degree of loss to the means of livelihoods to the region. In most spheres of economic activity, Somalia is losing wealth, income impacting on the fishing industry, trade import and export as well as loss of revenues, duties and taxes linked to harbors. It is estimated that countries further South (Mozambique and Tanzania) loses more than a billion US dollars per year as a result of illegal fishing, reef destruction and the depletion of many species. Kenya has claimed that the cost of piracy had been substantial to be calculated in billions on Kenyan shilling, (Potgieter 2008). Piracy incidents do not happen in a vacuum, they are many motivational forces that trigger individuals into such acts of terrorism: geography weak law enforcement; maritime insecurity, economic dislocation; cultural acceptability, (Iloped-lucia, 2015, Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015 in Rohwerder 2016)

### **Recommendations**

The study proffers some suggested recommendation below:

1. The cogent need of prioritizing the human security in the scheme of things. Thus the Government with its agencies should ensure that the welfare of masses in terms of employment, education, welfare, scheme, curbing inequality in the distribution of societal goods, services and values, etc. together with the inequality in the distribution of societal goods, services and values etc together with the ability of enthroning a conducive governance framework that ensures populist and equal representation, tolerance and accommodation devoid of marginalization, repression, tenure elongation, corruption etc.
2. Strengthening the Various Security Institutions: this presupposes the cogent need of training, development and instilling a civil-military relationship devoid of extreme militarization of the masses. This goes with adequate provision of the needs of the security in terms of welfare, sophisticated equipment and gadgets. This will further go along with absolute and uncompromising territorial surveillance and protection, to ensure the curbing of the menace of arms smuggling, piracy terrorism etc.
3. Since the core functions of any government is to protect its citizens and territory. There is a need for maintaining strong a sound security that is people-centered and civil in culture, while still maintaining a sense of combat readiness. This goes hand-in-hand with a sound, fair and enticing motivational framework that takes into

consideration adequate provision of their needs- financial, logistics, insurance, after-service benefits, accommodations etc.

4. A clear and sincere prioritizing of human security that ensures the well-being of the citizens. Thus, the overbearing acts of social exclusion that makes governances, social services and resource disturbing on the prevegative and benefit of the ruling class at the detriment of the masses should be looked into and changes to that which places the masses first.
5. Regional cooperation in terms of security, development and peace building. This could be realized with an admixture of human side of such endeavor. There regional cooperation should be formidable by strengthening the already existing platform and framework saddled with the utmost responsibility of peace building, peace keeping and humanitarian interventions.

### **Conclusion**

The debilitating effect, of piracy within the Somalia and Horn of Africa at large remains a threatening security issue. Thus, when one considers the high rate, scale and audacity of pirate commercial activities, human death is alarming and calls for rethinking on the phenomenon of piracy. As evidently pointed above, as adumbrated by scholars on the reasons for the upsurge of piracy and its attendants effects which is prevalent, the problem of struggling to meet the necessity of life so as to survive should prompt one to consider the human side of security (Freedom from fear, want, employment, education, health, environmental preservation, responsive and people centered governance, corrupt-free political office holders, sound welfare scheme), should be seen as lacking in most developing countries-Asia, Africa, Latin America states, while African taking the lead in this societal anomalies. This has entangled the Horn of Africa in perpetual underdevelopment quagmire and security stress, giving the continent a gloomy and hopeless face.

One can confidently deduce that the threat from piracy and terrorism is extremely high and remains a big disturber of peace, security and development of entire region which is as result of unchecked governance pathology, and sickening security thinking which is totally bereft of human security.

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