

## Reflections on the Consequences of Insurgency on Educational System in Kano, Nigeria

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### Abstract

Acts of terror and/or insurgency across the world including those linked to *Boko Haram* in Nigeria have become issues of widespread concern attracting explanations among academics, policymakers, researchers, etc. The images emanating from acts tied to the activities of insurgency are many with devastating consequences, especially as they affect the educational and other social structures. This paper examines the consequences of insurgency with a focus on how violent activities of *Boko Haram* have affected, negatively, the educational structures in Kano. In some parts, educational institutions and the communities housing them have been affected by the activities of *Boko Haram* notably through abductions, killings, destructions, afflictions of injury (physical and psychological) and other harms and trauma. In Kano, tertiary educational institutions have been the most hit by *Boko Haram* attacks. The tertiary schools most affected include the Federal College of Education (FCE), Bayero University Kano, School of Management Studies, Aminu Kano College of Legal and Islamic Studies and the School of Hygiene with unexpected consequences of killings, destructions and injuries on countless victims. The cogent views of social disorganization and cultural transmission, relative deprivation theory were used as theoretical framework. Using multi-stage cluster sampling procedures, a population-based sample was used in collecting both quantitative and qualitative data from respondents after piloting the instruments. The findings reveal that *Boko Haram* insurgency has led to the destruction of structures or buildings in Kano, largely affecting western-oriented schools thereby forcing government to shut down some of the schools. The most victimized are students and teachers; the activities have affected students' motivation in going to school while some parents have become discouraged in sending children to schools any longer. This paper recommends fighting poverty, unemployment and illiteracy among youth in Nigeria to prevent radicalization and curb against possible recruitment into extremist circles.

### Keywords:

Boko Haram,  
Deprivation,  
Insurgency, Kano  
metropolis,  
Terrorism

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### **Background to the Study**

Terrorism can be seen as a form of violent civil disobedience, usually placed on a spectrum of conflict (White, 2002). Terrorism denotes a multitude of actions; and results in a variety of social, psychological, physical, and economic consequences (Butler, Panzer, & Goldfrank, 2003). Thus, acts of terror and/or insurgency across the world including those linked to *Boko Haram* in Nigeria have become issues of widespread concern attracting explanations among academics, policymakers, researchers, etc. The images emanating from the acts tied to the activities of insurgency are many with devastating consequences, especially as they affect the educational and other social structures of the regions affected (including northern Nigeria). Using Kano as area of study, this paper examines the consequences of insurgency on education with a focus on how violent activities of *Boko Haram* have affected, negatively, the educational system of Kano. In northern Nigeria, educational institutions at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels and the communities housing them have been affected by the activities of *Boko Haram* notably through abductions, killings, destructions, afflictions of injury (physical and psychological) and other harms and trauma. In Kano, tertiary educational institutions have been the most hit by the *Boko Haram* attacks.

The tertiary schools most affected include the Federal College of Education (FCE), Bayero University Kano, School of Management Studies, Aminu Kano College of Legal and Islamic Studies and the School of Hygiene with devastative consequences of killings, destructions and injuries on countless victims. At governmental level, the state faces low-level challenges with ordinary crime, which increases with group violence, then rioting and wider disorders, and finally terrorism. Traces of these challenges are evident in the current confrontations between authorities and various insurgent organizations in Nigeria, *Boko Haram* in particular. Morgan (2004) and Campbell & Weitz (2006) consider the suicidal collision of hijacked commercial airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 as the most destructive terrorist attacks in world history because it led to deaths of approximately 3,000 people in those attacks, but *Boko Haram* insurgency has recorded more fatal consequences with more far-reaching destructions. Babatunde, Unwana-Obong, & Olanrewaju (2014) confirm this by arguing that, Nigeria has witnessed brutal confrontation and massive assault from terrorist groups which are undoubtedly the most blood-thirsty and destructive, both in terms of demonic brutality, mindless savagery and flagrant disobedience to the principles of peace and stability of a noble country. The activities of this group resulted in the killings of thousands of lives, injured thousands, and displacement of millions more from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States to other parts of the country and neighbouring countries of Niger, Cameroon and the Republic of Chad.

In recent years, according to Mantzikos (2013:7), the phenomenon of *Boko Haram* has dominated policy debates among academics and policymakers interested in Nigerian and African politics such that it is opined that “academics working on state theories and post-colonial studies understand the group as a symptom of Nigeria's failing state. Sociologists and several social anthropologists attribute it to poverty.” The violent

activities of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria have become issues of widespread concern because of the mystery surrounding the objectives as well as the devastating consequences of the radicalized group on the educational and other social structures of the country and Kano sub region in particular.

In the northern Nigeria in general, many educational institutions – primary, secondary and tertiary- have been terrorized by the *Boko Haram*, notably the abduction of over 200 secondary girls in Chibok, Borno State, kidnapping of more than 100 secondary school girls in Dapchi, Yobe State, and the numerous invasion and killings of students and teachers of primary secondary and tertiary educational schools in the region. Within the Kano Metropolis, in particular, higher educational schools are more victimized by the *Boko Haram* terrorism. Tertiary schools, such as Federal College of Education (FCE), Bayero University Kano (BUK), School of Management, and School of Hygiene have all been affected by the activities of the *Boko Haram* with devastating consequences of killings, destructions and injuries on the people. In view of this background, this study reflects on the consequences affecting the educational system due to the activities of *Boko Haram* group in Kano Metropolis. The paper is divided into six sections - introduction; literature review and theoretical framework; methodology; results and discussion; conclusions and finally the section on recommendations.

### **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

Terrorism includes a range of actors including the perpetrators, the targets, and third parties that sponsor, collaborate, and sympathize with terrorists; a multitude of actions; and results in a variety of social, psychological, physical, and economic consequences (Butler, Panzer, & Goldfrank, 2003). Terrorist groups vary in their ideology. Some of them are secular, others are religious. Secular terrorist groups are usually formed on the basis of nationalist, separatist, ethnic, and Marxist or communist related movements. Groups with religious motivations currently come from Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Sikh, Buddhist and Hindu backgrounds, and the more obscure cultist offshoots of the major faiths (Silke, 2006), such as Ashashins, Davidians, ISIS and the *Boko Haram*. Some terrorist groups have less than ten active members while others boast of over twenty thousand. Some have massive resources at their disposal with budgets and assets estimated in millions or even billions of pounds, while others struggle to raise more than a few thousand pounds a year. Tactics and methods also vary between groups. Some favour hijackings and hostage-taking, others bombings and assassinations. Some will be willing to kill hundreds and even thousands in a single attack; others deliberately try to keep casualties to a minimum. Some use suicide tactics, some will use drug-trafficking to raise money, others abhor the activity. In short, on these and a vast range of other variables and measures, it is possible to find major differences between groups who are labeled by someone, somewhere, as terrorists (Silke, 2006).

*Boko Haram* in the northeastern Nigeria possesses many features regarded by some researchers as an anti-education terrorist group (Perouse-de-Montclos, 2014), partly because of the literal meaning in its name – *Boko Haram* (western education is forbidden)

and partly because of the frequency of its onslaught or attacks on educational institutions, especially western-oriented schools. This is a paradox because within *Boko Haram* as a group, and its splinter groups, some elements went to university, including the British-born Nigerian Army deserter, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, allegedly involved in the 2014 bombings at Nyanya, Abuja (Perouse-de-Montclos, 2014). The patterns of the activities of *Boko Haram* paints a picture reflecting education as under attack. This is evident considering that incidents of violence against schools, students, teachers, union, and government officials are on the rise worldwide and in Nigeria in particular. However, attacks on schools became more worrying due to *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria. The group was nicknamed “western education is sin,” as a given name by locals based on the group's strong rejection of western education as corrupt. Also, the group's decisive attack on education facilities, students, academics and teachers is an indication of how they despised not only western political and administrative systems, but seeking to destroy western education as well.

Many school students and their teachers, including university professors have lost their lives in the group's terrorist attacks in Yobe, Borno, and Kano States. In May 2014, the group again drew international attention when it kidnapped more than two hundred schoolgirls of a government secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. That particular kidnap incidence of Chibok girls, according to Onuoha (2014b), was an attempt to broker a prisoner exchange. The scenario was condemned internationally such that a concerned community organized a joint campaign known as “Bring Back Our Girls” in order to ensure that the abducted girls are reunited to their respective families and communities. In addition, *Boko Haram*'s deliberate threat against education facilities, academics, students and teachers has created barriers to accessing quality education for all northern Nigerians (Ugwumba & Odom, 2015). In Kano Metropolis, the *Boko Haram* insurgency has affected the educational system through some strategic, and violent attacks in schools, particularly institutions of higher learning, like Bayero University Kano (BUK), Federal College of Education (FCE), Kano State Polytechnic and School of Hygiene. Each attack in the institutions was accompanied with loss of lives and victims sustaining serious injuries in the incidences.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The violent activities of insurgent and terror networks have become issues of widespread concern across the world (and Nigeria in particular - *Boko Haram*) because of the mystery surrounding the objectives as well as the devastating consequences of the radicalized groups on the educational and other social structures of the country and Kano sub-region in particular. This article reviews social disorganization and cultural transmission theory, differential opportunity theory and relative deprivation theory in explaining why people, especially youths get involved in the activities of insurgency and terror groups, *Boko Haram* in particular.

### **Social Disorganization and Cultural Transmission Theory**

Social disorganization theory was developed by Clifford Shaw & Henry McKay (as cited in Brown, Esbensen & Geis, 2010), when they built upon some studies on delinquency to

form a particular strand within the Chicago School of Urban Sociology tradition. The theory focuses on the conditions within the urban environment that affect crime rates. A disorganized area is one in which institutions of social control - such as the family, commercial establishments, and schools-have broken down and can no longer carry out their expected or stated functions (Siegel, 2010). Using three different types of maps, Shaw & McKay plotted rates of male delinquency in Chicago between 1900 and 1933, from which they examined the relationships between a number of community variables and delinquency. They found that areas with high delinquency rates were characterized by a decreasing population; a high percentage of "foreign born" and "Negro" heads of families; a high percentage of families on relief; a low rate of home ownership; and low median rental values (Brown *et al.* 2010: 260). As a consequence, residents in these areas experience conflict, despair, and antisocial behavior flourishes (Siegel, 2010). This is upcoming because high unemployment, school dropout rates, deteriorated housing, low-income levels, and large numbers of single-parent households as the indicators of social disorganization. In sum, social disorganization centered around three variables: poverty, residential mobility, and racial heterogeneity (Brown *et al.* 2010).

These factors are conceptualized as independent variables that generate social disorganization, which in turn contributes to crime and delinquency. The idea is that poor communities foster social disorganization because they lack the resources to address their problems. Funds are unavailable for developing viable recreation areas, for example. Social control declines because people do not know who belongs and who does not, inhibiting development of a sense of community. This is further exacerbated in heterogeneous communities where, because people do not come to know one another, common values fail to emerge. This absence of community values allows a tradition of delinquent behavior to develop that is handed down from one generation to the next through a process called cultural transmission (Brown *et al.* 2010).

The theory is helpful in understanding why *Boko Haram* terrorism is motivated, because social scientists, including sociologists, political scientists, economics and social anthropologists attributed radicalism and terrorism to, among other factors, poverty (Ajayi, 2012; Mantzikos, 2013; Adewumi, 2014; Abrahams, 2017). Under these conditions, the probability for mobilizing and recruiting youths to join violent movements like *Boko Harm* is very high. Perouse de Montclos (2014: 10) has made this clearer when he asserted that a "combination of structural and circumstantial factors explains the radicalization of the [*Boko Haram*] sect and its transition to violence... *Boko Haram* took root against a backdrop of poverty". Not only that some young members of the society are neglected by their parents and the society, but both parents/guardians and some of these young people are living in uncompleted or dilapidated buildings within city centres (ghettos), zones of transition (to borrow Shaw & McKay's word) and even at the urban fringes.

This theory is limited in that it focuses more on structural and environmental factors underlying the involvement of youths in criminal and delinquent behaviours rather than psychological factors. In addition, the theory cannot explain the political aspects of *Boko*

*Haram* problem, because Schmid & Jongman (1988), White (2002), Henslin (2010), Haq (2010) and Purpura (2011) have all agreed that there is state-sponsored terrorism. In this form of terrorism, the state decisively creates terrorist groups to suppress dissidence and crush opponents of the ruling party. For this article, the theory can only explain how increasing complexity of cities like Maiduguri of Borno State and Damaturu of Yobe State can become breeding grounds for violent youths because most of them were originally from different localities only residing there temporarily for menial jobs, but it cannot explain how religious manipulations can easily recruit these youths.

### **Relative Deprivation Theory**

As a theory, relative deprivation is traceable to Ted Robert Gurr's book *Why Men Rebel* (1970), but as a concept, the term relative deprivation is traceable to ancient Greece. Aristotle has articulated the notion that revolution is motivated by a *relative* sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an *absolute* measure. Like social disorganisation theory, the relative deprivation theory also believes in the influence of poverty, unemployment and unequal distribution of resources on crime. Unlike social disorganisation theory, which is a social ecology theory, relative deprivation is a social movement theory. The relative deprivation theory holds that the way people evaluate their circumstances depends on whom they compare themselves to. With regards to this, Giddens (2009) states that feelings of deprivation do not conform directly to the level of material poverty that people's experience. For example, a family living in a small home in a poor area, where everyone is in more or less similar circumstances, is likely to feel less deprived than a family living in a similar house in a neighbourhood where the majority of the other homes are much larger and the other people more affluent.

Relative deprivation postulates a subjective state that shapes emotions, cognitions, and behavior. It links the individual with the interpersonal and intergroup levels of analysis, it melts easily with other social psychological processes. Moreover, relative deprivation challenges conventional wisdom about the importance of absolute deprivation for collective action, individual deviance and physical health (NPTEL, 2003). Gurr (1970) argued that two mechanisms provide the basic components on the nexus between relative deprivation and the potential for collective violence; namely, the frustration - aggression and the related treat - aggression. The other three concepts, according to Gurr, which are connected to relative deprivation, include dissonance, anomie and conflict. The first is perceived discrepancy between what people actually get or have and what they think they deserve to have. The second concept, anomie, is significant in its effect to estimate opportunities. Those who observe deprivation and as a consequence realize an impression of disappointment become violent; they are jealous of those who possess more. They protest or revolt against those who have more. They do not take measures to resolve the problem related to the sources of deprivation (NPTEL, 2003).

The theory is considered relevant in explaining *Boko Haram* activities from a psychological perspective; instrumental in understanding the emergence of *Boko Haram* activities in the northern Nigeria. Lutz & Lutz (2013) notes that, repression and

discrimination can lead to dissidence, they can cause relative deprivation wherein a group sees its position in society degraded compared to other groups. Regardless of the underlying causes in social and political system, one causal factor for terrorism is virtually universal - when some sub-group in the population has grievances, be it on realistic or perceptible ground. Relatedly, Moghaddam (2005) recognized that relative deprivation is a social psychological concept, because in comparison to other people, groups or even themselves at different points in time lead people to believe that they do not have what they deserve, they will be angry and resentful. Relative deprivation describes these subjective evaluations.

### **Methodology**

The target population for the study included all adults and youths of the Kano Metropolis that comprises Dala, Fagge, Gwale, Kano Municipal, Kumbotso, Nassarawa and Tarauni Local Government Areas including students, teachers of various educational institutions from secondary to tertiary, as well as those who attended non-formal schools; law enforcement agents, civil servants, businessmen/women, and community leaders. All those who fall within any of these categories in Kano Metropolis are part of the population of the study irrespective of where their places of residence are. Using multi-stage cluster sampling technique, a population-based sample of 328 (320 for quantitative and 8 for qualitative data) was drawn. The procedures used in the selection includes adopting cluster sampling technique in dividing the study area into eight clusters; two political wards were selected using simple random sampling and two locations (as part of a political ward) were randomly selected from each location. Two streets each were also drawn from each location from where five houses were randomly selected from each street and one adult or youth (male and female) was selected using random quota sampling technique. The pattern of the random selection involved picking from a pool of folded papers identified by the names of locations within the selected wards until the desired number of locations was achieved.

For the qualitative component, eight respondents were drawn purposively from students (2), teachers (2), law enforcement agents (2), Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (1), and traditional/religious leaders (1). In sum, 328 respondents formed the sample size. Interviewer-administered questionnaires and in-depth interviews (IDIs) were adopted in generating the data. However, these were supplemented by secondary data from related journals articles, internet materials, conference proceedings, seminar and/or workshop documents, etc. Archival data in form of articles from newspapers, magazines, government official gazettes and relevant publications were also used. All the data collection tools were designed in the English language and administered with the help of trained research assistants. Specifically, during the in-depth interviewing, the assistance of trained note-takers was required for the extensive documentation of the qualitative data. The quantitative data were processed, presented and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.0, including frequencies, percentages, cross tabulations and regression analysis. In order to establish association between variables, regressions were run that allowed for determining the statistical

relationship between random variables and independent variables. The qualitative data generated from the IDIs were appropriately organized, coded, transcribed, analyzed and appropriately utilized in enriching the quantitative data complementarily.

### Results and Discussion

This section deals with the presentations and analyses of the data collected through the use of questionnaires and in-depth interviews. In the first place, responses are presented on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents and the section on the consequences of *Boko Haram* activities on educational system with reference to Kano Metropolis. Sums of 320 questionnaires were administered with the aid of trained research assistants; 302 questionnaires were filled and returned while eight IDIs were conducted. Therefore, the analysis hereunder is based on the data contained in the 302 questionnaires and the transcribed data from the 8 IDIs.

**Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents**

Characteristics	Distribution	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)
<b>Age of Respondents</b>		
18-27 Years	68	22.5
28-37 Years	147	48.7
38-47 Years	66	21.9
48-57 Years	13	4.3
58 Years and Above	08	2.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Sex of Respondents</b>		
Male	211	69.9
Female	91	30.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Single	179	59.3
Married	108	35.8
Divorced	10	3.3
Widowed	05	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Religion</b>		
Islam	269	89.1
Christianity	28	9.2
Others	00	0.0
No Response	05	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The age distribution of the respondents presented in Table 1 indicates that a majority (48.7%) are youths between the ages of 20-30 followed by 22.5% aged below 20; also, 21.9% were found to fall within the age bracket of 31-40, while those aged 41 and 50 constituted 4.3%; only 2.6% constituted those aged 51 and above. It is evident from the data, therefore, that a majority falls below 40 years of age.



**Table 2:** Other Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents

Characteristics	Distribution	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)
<b>Educational Background</b>		
Non-Formal	41	11.6
Primary School	17	5.6
Secondary School	52	17.2
Tertiary	192	63.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Occupation of Respondents</b>		
Trading/Business	97	32.1
Civil Service	91	19.5
Farming	27	9.0
Artisanship	18	6.0
Student	43	14.2
Others	52	17.2
No Response	06	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Income Distribution</b>		
N15, 000 - N24, 000	31	10.3
N25, 000 - N34, 000	53	17.5
N35, 000 - N44, 000	45	14.9
N45, 000 - N54, 000	72	23.8
N55, 000 and Above	101	33.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The data on Table 2 show respondents' educational attainment, occupation and income, which indicates that 63.6% had completed tertiary level of education, 17.2% had their secondary school complete and 11.6% had non-formal education. In the same vein, 5.6% had completed primary school. The data on the occupation of the respondents show that those in trading/business constitute 32.1%, civil servants account for 19.5%, respondents who indicated other occupations (such as land agents, bankers, and those working with NGOs) constitute 17.2%, students represent 14.2%, farmers account for 9%, artisans – 6%, and 2% of the respondents did not respond. The result on respondents' monthly income indicated that 33.5% of the sample reported N55, 000 and above while 23.8% indicated a monthly income of N45, 000 to N54, 000. In addition, 17.5% earn between N25, 000 and N34, 000, followed by those who earn between N15, 000 and N24, 000.

### **The Consequences of Boko Haram Insurgency on Educational System of Kano Metropolis**

This section is on the consequences of *Boko Haram* insurgency on the educational system of the study area. It covers issues on whether the insurgency has affected the area, whether western oriented schools are more affected in the area, ways through which the schools are affected, motivation of the students to go to school, and whether or not students vis-à-vis their teachers are more victimized

**Table 3:** Education and the Effects of *Boko Haram* Insurgency in Kano Metropolis

Education	Effects of Insurgency on Education		
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Tertiary	187 (68.2%)	05 (17.9%)	192 (63.6%)
Secondary	44 (16.1%)	08 (28.6%)	52 (17.2%)
Non-formal	29 (10.6%)	12 (42.8%)	41 (13.6%)
Primary	14 (5.1%)	03 (10.7%)	17 (5.6%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>302</b>

Source: Fieldwork, 2016

From Table 3 above, the effects of *Boko Haram* insurgency are more felt at the tertiary level of education (68.2%) than secondary (16.1%), non-formal (10.6%) and primary (5.1%) respectively. In line with the results, a respondent stated that:

*Boko Haram destroys schools. The group's terrorist attacks resulted in killing of some university lecturers, such as in Bayero University, and some students in School of Hygiene and Federal College of Education (FCE), and so on (IDI, in Kano Metropolis, 2016).*

This is further supported by a revelation on the effects of *Boko Haram* insurgency on tertiary level of education. During an in-depth interview, a community leader stressed as follows:

*This group is a threat to our collective security. Educationally, the group kills, kidnaps or abducts school students. Therefore, the group is a merciless one and we pray for Allah to bring an end to Boko Haram (IDI, community leader in Kano Municipal, 2016).*

**Table 4:** The Impact of *Boko Haram* Insurgency on Western and Qur'anic Schools

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strongly agree	117	38.8%
Agree	104	34.4%
Disagree	42	13.9%
Strongly Disagree	25	8.3%
No Response	14	4.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Fieldwork, 2016

From the data in Table 4 above, 38.8% of the respondents strongly agree that *Boko Haram* insurgency has affected western-oriented schools than Qur'anic schools. This is followed by those who agree (34.4%), disagree (13.4%), and strongly disagree (8.3%) respectively. However, 13.9% and 8.3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the statement that *Boko Haram* insurgency has impact on western-oriented schools compared to Qur'anic schools. Those who did not respond constitute 4.6%. This indicates

that there is general feeling among residents that *Boko Haram* insurgency had some impact on the western-oriented schools than the Qur'anic schools as evidenced by the combination of responses of both those who agree and strongly agree (73.2%) as against 22.2% of the sample that disagreed.

**Table 5:** Ways through Which Schools are affected by the *Boko Haram*

Ways Schools are Affected	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Destruction of school buildings/structures	172 (57%)	130 (43%)	302 (100%)
Terrorizing students and teachers	141 (46.7%)	161 (53.3%)	302 (100%)
Abduction of some female and male students	181 (60.0%)	121 (40.0%)	302 (100%)
Recruiting students into the group	152 (50.3%)	150 (49.7%)	302 (100%)
Forcing governments to close some schools	166 (55.5%)	136 (45.0%)	302 (100%)
Discouraging parents to send children to school	190 (62.9%)	112 (37.1%)	302 (100%)

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2016

Table 5 shows respondents' views on the ways through which schools are affected by *Boko Haram* activities in Kano Metropolis. More than half of the sample (57%) reported destruction of structures or buildings as against 43% who do not see it as one of the ways through which schools are affected by *Boko Haram* activities. Also, 62.9% indicated that *Boko Haram* activities have discouraged parents from sending children to schools while 37.1% do not see it as an effect of *Boko Haram* activities. Those who reported *Boko Haram* activities as forcing government to shut down some schools constitute 55% while 45% do not view it as one of the effects of *Boko Haram* activities. Up to 60% mentioned abduction of female and male students as part of the consequences of *Boko Haram* activities on education though 40% disagree. An interviewee in the study area also added more light to the way and manner *Boko Haram* has affected educational system of the Kano Municipal, thus:

*Indeed, Boko Haram has affected the educational system of Kano people. You know, it [has] instilled phobia in the minds of parents to allow their children to go to schools. Even if one let his/her child to go to the school, he/she is filled with the fear on whether or not the child will return home (IDI with a respondent in Kano Metropolis, 2016).*

Another respondent buttressed further on the effects of *Boko Haram* insurgency in Kano Metropolis:

*Going by what we witnessed in other places where the group has more terrorizing wield-for example, Borno State and Yobe State, students, especially female students have been abducted and their whereabouts are not known. Similarly, our people are always scared that their children could be kidnapped or abducted (IDI with a respondent in Kano Metropolis, 2016).*

A study commissioned by the New York City Board of Education examined the psychological consequences of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on 8, 266 public school students in grades 4 - 12 throughout the five boroughs of New York City six months after the attacks (Hoven *et al.* 2002, as cited in Butler *et al.* 2003). Results indicate widespread distress responses and symptoms of psychiatric illness that were not limited to students in proximity to the World Trade Center. Prevalence rates of symptoms such as those related to PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, and separation anxiety were significantly higher than would be expected in children not exposed to a traumatic event. However, because pre-event baseline data are not available for the children surveyed, it is difficult to ascertain whether these findings reflect exposure to the terrorism event or other features of the population.

**Table 6:** Boko Haram Insurgency and the Motivation for Attending Schools

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	284	94.0
No	18	6.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2016

From the data on Table 6 above, respondents that agreed that *Boko Haram* activities have affected students' motivation in going to school constitute 94%, while 6% represents those who did not agree that it has affected students' willingness to go to school. A respondent in an interview mentioned that:

*Not only students, even parents were reluctant to risk the lives of their children for schooling. Therefore, many parents stopped their children from going to school. Until recently, many students were not going to schools in this town (IDI with a respondent, 2016).*

According to Butler *et al.* (2003), behaviors and outcomes reflecting functional impairment after terrorism events are in need of further study because school dropout rates, divorce, and domestic or interpersonal violence and conflict are potential future research topics in this area. Increases in school or work absenteeism, which may indicate functional impairment, have also been noted following terrorist attacks.

**Table 7:** Opinions about the most Victimized in the Education Sector

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Teachers	64	21.2
Students	231	76.5
No Response	07	2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Fieldwork, 2016

Table 7 presents responses on the most victimized between teachers and students. Those who mentioned students as more victimized constitute 76.5% of the sample while those

who mentioned teachers are more victimized represent 21.2%, and 2.3% represents those who did not respond. In view of the above, the qualitative data from an internally displaced person from Gujba Local Government Areas of Yobe State stressed as follows:

*Although everyone is not safe from the activities of this group, but in the educational system, students seemed to be more vulnerable than teachers. Many students have been murdered or beheaded in places like Yobe and Borno; others were abducted (IDI with a respondent, 2016).*

## **Discussion**

To explain the phenomenon of the consequences of insurgency on education in Kano, understanding some aspects like how violent the activities of *Boko Haram* have affected, negatively, the educational institutions of Kano is vital. The key findings on the background characteristics of respondents show majority are single male youths, though females are substantial too, with significant portion of the married. Many have schooled up to tertiary level and are into trading/business, civil service; are of stable income – earning N45, 000 and above. The explanations tied to these findings are that males are more exposed to situations that propel them to be vulnerable to the consequences the more. The findings indicate that *Boko Haram* insurgency has negatively affected the educational system in Kano. It has been established that, *Boko Haram* insurgency has led to the destruction of structures or buildings in Kano Metropolis. It was believed that, *Boko Haram* insurgency had discouraged parents to send children to schools, while few think otherwise. This finding goes in line with the observation of Patrick & Felix (2013) that the *Boko Haram* movement had directly affected school attendance among children; some were forced to change location and school. Also, Dauda (2014) has stressed that, *Boko Haram* has destroyed schools; universities inclusive in order to further its course. It is also obvious that the group attack more of western-oriented schools than Qur'anic schools.

While several theories could be used to explain how the consequences of the violent activities of the group have affected educational institutions/structures, social disorganization and relative deprivation theories as adopted as the framework reflect a holistic, empirical and practical relevance to the issue at hand. The cogent views of the chosen theories have provided an understanding of the impact of the violent activities of *Boko Haram* on educational structures in Kano. Developmental strides in societies are profoundly affected by the social forces present in social settings. All intellectual fields are shaped by the social conditions that exist in a society (Ritzer, 2012). In the case of Kano, the violent activities of *Boko Haram* cross time have had some utmost significance in shaping the position and direction of educational structures over the crises period.

According to Onuoha (2014), the core objective of the group is to replace the secular Nigerian state with a strict Islamic *Sharia* law, applicable throughout the entire country. The group's attack on educational system is an indication of this objective and warped perception about education and the value of education. In Islam, education is glorified and prioritized. Prophet Muhammad, (may Peace and Blessings of Allah be Upon Him – PBUH), received the instruction to read; that is *Iqrabi is miRabbikallazikhalaq*, i.e. read in the

name of thy Lord the Creator (Quran, 96: 1) as the first revelation and commandment in Islam. Yet, the group's fault for the misconstrued understanding and wrong interpretation of Islam is glaring perhaps, partly, because of ignorance, illiteracy, poverty and other social problems thriving in various parts of the country. Ogege (2013) reiterates that most of Nigerian citizenry wallow in poverty and do not have access to modern health care delivery system, pipe-borne water, quality education and job opportunity and cannot afford three square meals daily. These unpleasant development indicators have led to the country being rated among the poorest nations in the world. The conditions in Nigeria could be said to have provided the breeding ground condoning the spread of extremist ideologies and warped interpretations of injunctions such as Boko Haram's. This necessitates incorporating rational public education into childhood-based education framework, the efforts of faith-based organizations, workplace and communities whenever educational opportunities arise (Goldfrank, 2003).

Reflecting on both theories, social inequality is widespread nowadays and it multiplies social problems. Inequality hampers national development, because vast majority of population are in squalid conditions. For example, education as one of the most effective ways to increase a person's prospects in life becomes affected. The premium for college education is a powerful force in wage inequality (Oxfarm, 2014). It becomes problematic when access to good quality college education is determined by socio-economic preconditions that limit the life chances of poor people and benefit the rich - either through access to financial aid, poor quality secondary education, discrimination, or stunted aspirations, because access to quality education determines the individual's chance of getting a well-paid job (Oxfarm, 2014). Before widening their targets, *Boko Haram* directed their frustration at educated urban dwellers, seen as corrupt, accused of being bad Muslims and inevitably compromised because they are wealthy (Perouse de Montclos, 2014). These and other contexts amplifies the relevance of the relative deprivation theory to the understanding of insurgency, terrorism and other rebellious movements across time. However, the theory is not without limitations; Gurr treats "deprivation" as primarily psychological thus he does not handle the socio-economic framework, which is the origin of deprivation (NPTEL, 2003). If such sense of deprivation is confined to an individual against another individual, it leads to crime. When it is transformed to collective transformation a deprivation of region, community or caste - it assumes the shape of collective activity but not an ideology for the social system; it lies to be a demonstration or agitation and rarely takes a form of social movement (Moghaddam, 2005). Relative deprivation is an important but not an adequate factor for protest movements. According to Rao (as cited in NPTEL, 2003) a sufficient level of understanding and reflection is required on the part of the participants, and they must be able to observe and perceive the contrast between the social and cultural conditions of the privileged and those of the deprived, and must realize that it is possible to do something about it.

For the purpose of this article, both theories are adopted since they have cogent propositions amplifying that socially isolated, living in disorganized neighborhoods, and marginalized people are those most likely to join *Boko Haram* activities. In line with

the arguments advanced by both theories, Siegel (2010) states that criminal behavior is an expression of conformity to lower-class sub-cultural values and traditions and not a rebellion from conventional society. Sub-cultural values are handed down from one generation to the next in a process called *cultural transmission*. Similarly, relative deprivation theory's core assumption is that inequality and poverty are some of crime-producing social forces that can lead some people to rebellion or terrorism. The theories also entail some implicit policy recommendations for preventing insurgency and terror through fighting socio-economic and political inequalities as well as pro-poverty alleviating measures in the northern Nigeria.

### **Conclusion**

This paper unveils that the consequences of the activities of *Boko Haram* violence have affected the educational system in Kano. From the activities, the educational system has been affected by the destructions meted through planting of bombs/explosives in schools, gatherings and offices, abductions, indiscriminate gun shootings, leading to loss of lives and properties thereby making many people sustain injuries (physical and psychological) and other harms and trauma. Specifically, tertiary educational institutions have been the most hit by the *Boko Haram* activities in Kano including the Federal College of Education (FCE), Bayero University Kano, School of Management Studies, Aminu Kano College of Legal and Islamic Studies and the School of Hygiene with students, teachers, parents and the host communities being victimized. As such, the violent activities of the group could be said to have affected western-oriented schools more than other types of school orientations in the study area.

### **Recommendations**

Based on the findings of the research, this paper recommends as follows:

1. The Federal Government (in conjunction with other levels) should provide adequate security in the educational system. Institutional security across schools must be genuinely conceptualized, overhauled and strengthened enough with requisite skill and logistics to promptly detect and repel any violent tendencies;
2. To prevent the victimization of educational institutions, there should be the application of modern technology in crime prevention, such as the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in classes, offices and public spaces, such as school car parks, football pitches, and commercial areas. The institutional security personnel in schools should be adequately equipped for preventive measures to be enhanced;
3. There should be concerted efforts to fight poverty, unemployment and illiteracy among youths to prevent radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist activities in Nigeria;
4. Teachers and students need to be security conscious and well educated; all stakeholders should have access to emergency numbers for swift contact to nearest security agencies;
5. School administrators and/or proprietors, teachers, parents and students need to cooperate fully with the institutional security and state security infrastructure by alerting them on any suspicious and strange movements and proliferations within school premises and communities at large.

6. This paper recommends fighting poverty, unemployment and illiteracy among youth in Nigeria to prevent radicalization and curb against possible recruitment into negative circles.
7. Enriching existing school curriculum on the dangers of extremist ideologies is also key in countering insurgency-related tendencies

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