

Political Instability and Insecurity in North-East Nigeria: Sustaining Factors

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Keywords:

Political instability,
Insecurity,
Corruption,
Terrorist, and
Sustaining Factors

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Northern Nigeria is witnessing an upheaval in its political and social space; the significance and complexity of challenges in northern Nigeria make determining priorities for the region extremely difficult. Yet overcoming the North's considerable problems relating to development and security are crucial to the realization of a shared and prosperous future for all of Nigeria. This paper examined the effect of political instability on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria. Cross sectional survey research design was employed for this study. Set of structured questionnaire were administered for the collection of the primary data. In order to get a valid sample, a group of 510 respondents made up of key security agents and experts, political officers, internally displaced persons, market leaders, religious leaders, civil right organisations, traditional rulers, repentant Boko Haram fighters and vigilante officers were analyzed. Pilot study was carried out to test the validity and reliability of the research instrument using Cronbach Alpha reliability test. The data collected were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. The findings of this study revealed that political instability significantly contributes to insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria ($\beta = 41.598, p < 0.05$). It was concluded that political instability had a significant positive effect on insecurity, and the study recommends that Nigerian government must recognize that unless issues of bad governance and systemic corruption, especially the problem of political corruption stemming from interreligious and interethnic rivalry aimed at the control of the state machinery for economic and political gains, are seriously addressed, all other measures will be nothing but cosmetic and pro tempore.

Background to the Study

The effect of contemporary terrorism incidents on Nigeria's economy have been subjected to investigations by various scholars (Izah; 2014; Idahosa & Akov; 2013; Hudsgon; 2012; Friere & Macedo; 2015; Bankole; 2014; Anyadike & Nkechi 2013; Aisosa & Ebenezer; 2016; Adeoye; 2015). Terror incidents occur in Nigeria just like other countries globally leading to significant political and economic consequences. The terror incidents and violence are suffered with relatively greater intensity in the Northern Nigeria than the southern states of the country. Although the characteristic of terrorism has been changing in recent times; the primary objective of terrorism is still to impose sufficient political and economic pressure on a government so that it concedes to the demands of the terrorist (Enders & Sandler; 2015). The more challenging problem; however; is that the motivation for terrorism in a resource-rich; socially heterogeneous developing country like Nigeria could be confounded by additional dimensions; such as resource competition; ethnic fractionalization; and economic deprivation; all of which interact to make the situation more intricate to understand or deal with; especially because of the relatively lower capacity of a typical developing economy to confront the increasing sophistication of terrorist activities. Hence; the consequences of terrorism in such an environment is likely to extend beyond the destruction of lives and property to longer term macroeconomic impacts (Aghedo & Eke; 2013).

Terrorism affects the different economic sectors unequally; some are directly targeted and others suffer from the aftermaths of terrorist incidents. Terrorism creates direct and indirect economic costs to a targeted nation. These economic repercussions can easily spill over to other countries. Most extant studies confirm that both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks are costly; but often not as grave as the panic reactions of investors following a major attack suggest (Idahosa & Akov; 2013). Terrorism has had a negative impact on the people regardless of status and the society at large. It has disrupted and offset the normal social life and a good number of innocent lives have been lost (Aghedo & Eke; 2013). Terrorists' activities have dislocated people from their usual bases to different unintended locations. The mass movement of people creates refugee problems with substantial costs to the individual; host communities and the government. In addition; these episodes of violence has hit strongly against and disorganized the socio-cultural tranquility; the fragile religious tolerance among the people and polluted the serene and spiritual based of the environment. The human costs in terms of lives and properties can hardly be valued and quantified since the upsurge of the violence began (Otoghile & Akov; 2011).

The Boko Haram insurgencies in the Northeast of Nigeria have threatened the very existence of the living beings; ranging from political; economic and cultural aspect. The sect has create a kind of Hobbesian state where life is solitary; nasty; brutish and short because of nihilism and violence of men (Akov; 2012). The country's economy has been sunk into the river of distress which had recently called for disintegration of indissoluble entity of Nigerian state. Boko Haram insurgency since 2009 has created a state of palpable fear in Nigeria; while the helpless posture of the government is worrisome and

intimidated (Olameji & Olusegun; 2012; Titus; 2016). Boko Haram insurgency has disastrous impacts on Nigeria's economy. Boko Haram has caused most Nigerians injury and pains. It has brought to Nigerians hunger and unleashed untold hardship on the Nigerian citizens; the economy is bleeding. The insurgents unchecked creates uncertainty; reduces confidence and increase risk perception and risk premium leading to low rates of investment and low economic growth (Titus; 2016). Economies which fail to combat terrorism and ensure the safety of trade and people movement could expect to incur significant cost in terms of loss of investment and trade opportunities; threat of Boko Haram reduces trade flows. Its activities continued to deepening national economic crisis (Badejogbin; 2013).

The contradictions caused by Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria manifested in its political economy ranging from abject poverty; poor quality education; lack of jobs among others; breeds the atmosphere of frustration expectations and these predicament find its expression in various shades of antisocial behaviours such as kidnapping; drug abuse and robbery among others. The damages it has done to Nigerian political economy are astronomical (Ogege; 2013), Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa and is blessed with a lot of mineral resources. But unfortunately its political economy is facing with contradictions ranging from lack of good governance; exploitation and stagnation; chaos and state of anarchy. To be sure; the post-colonial political economy of Nigerian state has been marked by missed opportunities; truncated development and frustration hope (Izah; 2014). The failures of governance manifested in poor socio-economic performance; causing suffering and unfulfilled expectations as well as facilitate insurgency; conflict and political instability.

Literature Review

Political instability involves having demonstrations in form of violence; workers' going on strike or the possibility of a coup d'état. It means a government or polity with no much of stability; it is a society with so much violence. In this study; political stability will be well related with violence erupting from terrorist activities in the Nigeria. Political instability is a situation where by a country is currently going through political turmoil. It may also involve the death of people within that country (Ayotunde; 2014). Political instability is generally related to economic instability. Some people believe that all political instability comes from an inequality among the classes of people within a certain country or environment. Political instability might also be caused by a large gap between the wealth of the upper class and the lack of wealth in the lower classes. This type of instability is often related to the birth of a country or nation and once the nation matures the instability disappears (Ayotunde; 2014).

Political instability (PI) is described by economists as a serious strife harmful to economic performance by limiting policymakers' outlook which might lead to short term macroeconomic policies. Therefore; the political stability of a government does not mean; necessarily; the stability of the power of any civilian elected to rule any way he wants. Political instability" is defined as the propensity of a change in the executive; either by

“constitutional” or “unconstitutional” means (Victor; 2016). Political instability; defined as the propensity of an imminent government change; is not directly observable (Tunde; 2014). Political instability is described as partial state failure (Marshall; 2016). Political instability is operationalized as the presence or absence of four discrete events or a combination of them termed “complex”. The four events are: revolutionary war; ethnic war; adverse regime change; and genocide. Political instability is the propensity of a government collapse either because of conflicts or rampant competition between various political parties (Luke; 2014).

Insecurity; in a general term; refers to a state of being subjected to fear; threat; danger; molestation; intimidation; harassment etc in all aspect. For example; insecurity can be conceived as threats to the state which often accounted for the race for arms and nuclear weapons to defend the state as opined by Ajodo; Adebajoko and Ugwuoke (2014). The state of insecurity became prominently featured during the post-Cold War era as well as post September 11 world trade centre bombing when people views and attentions are more centered about security. According to Saliu; Luqman and Abdullahi (2007), human threats of life emanate not only from situation of violent conflicts but also other non-conflict sources. Thus; insecurity is a situation of fear or anything that causes fear; harm; or has the capability to cause fear or harm; injury; destructions to an individual; group or nation. Insecurity is a critical term employed as a measure primarily aimed at raising subjective security without a genuine or commensurate concern for the effects of that measure on objective security.

Underpinning Theory

This study was anchored on rational choice theory. The rational choice theory offers useful explanations of Boko Haram sect terrorist activities from an economic point of view. The rational choice theory takes individuals who engage in terrorism as rational beings; and their behaviour is motivated by the costs; benefits; and the opportunity costs of violent activities. It believes terrorists are homo economicus who weigh the cost and benefit before engaging in terrorist activities. They however; do not act in a vacuum. If the cost of terrorist activity is great; or if peaceful means are available which can be as effective as a terrorist activity they will not choose terrorist activity being rational actors (Muller & Weede; 1990).

The rational choice theory of terrorism is based on three foundations. Firstly; is the opportunity cost of terrorism in which poor economic condition lowers the opportunity cost of terrorism? Secondly; the material cost of terrorism which is premised on the operating cost of terrorism. If a terrorist group has public support and sympathy they will find a sanctuary from the population. From an economic point of view if economic conditions are poor and unfavorable; the opportunity cost of terrorism will be lower and terrorist will have more popular public support. Thirdly; the benefits of terrorism which are closely linked to the tactical and strategic goals of terrorism suggest if economic conditions are poor the likely pay-off from terrorism is attractive. (Meierrieks; 2015). When economic conditions are poor; the opportunity cost for engaging in terrorism is low;

invariably making it more attractive in order to drive mental rewards. (Freytag; 2011) Terrorist being rational actors seek to use terrorism to effect a socio-political change because they are subjected to constraints of manpower and financial resources. The rational choice further believes terrorists consider the benefits of either gaining government concessions and or the costs of punishment for their actions.

Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria

Islam was entrenched in northern Nigeria for centuries before it rapidly spread southwards following the early 19th-century Islamic jihad of Uthman dan Fodio (1754-1817); a Fulani Islamic scholar; who went on to establish the famous Sokoto caliphate; Africa's largest independent polity (Hoffmann; 2014). From the time of its inception; the caliphate; which consisted of autonomous emirates; consolidated its political control in many parts of northern Nigeria through Islamic values and practices. During this era; power was primarily legitimized by religious authority. The older Kanem-Bornu Empire in the northeast was weakened by the political rise of Sokoto but it resisted total domination. This was; however; at the cost of its leaders being excluded from emerging Islamic networks of power. The opposition of the Kanuri in the northeast to subjugation under Sokoto shaped the relationship between both power structures and is an important backdrop for understanding the violent contestation for control over northeast Nigeria (Hoffmann; 2014).

During the 100-year existence of the caliphate; the hegemony of the Fulani ruling class and its interactions with the local Hausa aristocracy laid the groundwork for their combined political domination of northern Nigeria. This set of power relations remained after the defeat of the Sokoto caliphate by the British and was in fact further strengthened under colonialism. By 1903 the takeover of the Sokoto caliphate was complete. Its well-established administrative structures were repurposed and progressively standardized to facilitate the British colonial policy of indirect rule. For this to work; the status of local traditional elites was invested with formal and legal authority while the colonial state drew upon their social and religious legitimacy. Although colonial arrangements narrowed the influence of traditional religious authority in northern Nigeria eventually limiting Islamic law to only civil matters the delicate balance of indirect rule was dependent on this layer of authority staying in place (Hoffmann; 2014). This accommodation had an important impact on non-Hausa-Fulani; non-Muslim communities in the region; which had long struggled to assert their independence and distinctiveness in the face of emirate power. For these smaller; politically constrained groups; colonial rule had the unintended consequence of driving up conversions to Christianity; which could be interpreted as an expression of protest against the reinforcement of emirate administration. At the same time, it encouraged the suppression of non-Hausa-Fulani cultural identities so much that; when Nigeria became independent in 1960; the Hausa language; political culture and values had been widely assimilated by minority groups but so was the fear of continued marginalization in a self-governing Nigeria.

The swell of contemporary demands and competing claims to political autonomy; economic rights and opportunities from various communities in northern Nigeria has its roots in this fraught past. Similarly, within the northern Muslim community; internal disagreements produced divisions between groups aligned with the two-centuries-strong Sufi heritage of the Sokoto caliphate and those who held a range of hardline to moderate 'reformist' views (Hoffmann; 2014). This led to the exclusion of Muslim leaders and groups that fell into the latter category from local mainstream power structures. Even though over time some 'reformist' elements were co-opted and absorbed into the established system of religious and political authority; others who maintained their dissension were systematically pushed out to the margins and also rendered politically voiceless. The layers of political; social; religious and even doctrinal grievances produced during these successive phases still impact upon present-day power relations in northern Nigeria and have been heavily appropriated in the past three decades of ethnic and faith-based political identity conflicts in the region (Hoffmann; 2014).

Chronology of some Major Boko Haram Attacks from 2010-2018

In September 21th; 2010; two persons were killed by militants riding motorcycles in Gwaidomari neighborhood in Maiduguri; in September 5th; 2010; there was attack and killings by unidentified gunmen in Bama; Borno; and in Kalari area in Limanti; Maiduguri and one person was killed. In September 7th; 2010; a prison was attacked in Bauchi but no death was recorded; in October 9th; 2010; an attack was recorded on Sheikh Bashir by unidentified militants in Maiduguri and two persons were killed; in October 19th; 2010; three unidentified militants were killed in Maiduguri. In May 29; 2011; Bomb explosion on the day of President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration; at an artillery brigade in Bauchi; 13 people killed and 40 others injured. In June 6; 2011; three explosions; attack on a church and killing of a Muslim cleric; in Maiduguri; 14 people were killed. In September 12; 2011; Simultaneous attacks in Misau Bauchi; 6 persons killed; in September 13; 2011; attack in a bar in Maiduguri; 4 people killed (Global Terrorism Index; 2018).

In April 8; 2012; Church Bombing in Kaduna; 38 people killed. In June 17; 2012; Bomb attack of 3 churches in Kaduna 19 people were killed. In September 19; 2013 Benisheik attack; Benisheik in Maiduguri 161 persons were killed September 20; 2013; shootout in Abuja; in Abuja 7-9 persons killed (Global Terrorism Index; 2018). September 29; 2013; attack in Gujba College; in Yobe State; 50 students were killed; in October 10; 2013; attack at Damboa in Damboa in Maiduguri; 20 killed. December 10; 2014; Female suicide bombers in Kano; 4 people killed and 7 injured December 11; 2014; Attack at Galiganna; Galiganna in Borno State; 30 people were killed December 13; 2014; Gumsur Kidnappings Gumsur; 35 people were killed; 185 kidnapped December 22; 2014; Gombe bus station bombing; Gombe State; 27 people were killed. In February 28; 2015; Suicide bomb attack near Damaturu; 4 civilians killed March 2; 2015; Disguised killing; Kundunga town in Borno State; 73 killed March 7; 2015; Killing; by suicide attack and declared allegiance to Islamic State in Maiduguri; 54 persons killed and 143 wounded.

February 12; 2016; attack on a village in Kachifa village; 8 people killed. In July 8; 2016 suicide bomb attack on a Mosque in Borno State 9 people were killed and dozens injured (Global Terrorism Index; 2018). November 5; 2016 Killing of army officer and soldiers in Borno State 7 killed. May 13; 2017; suicide bombing in Maiduguri; 5 killed May 15; 2017; attack on farmers; Maiduguri 11 killed. In Oct 22; 2017 Detonation of explosive in Maiduguri 13 killed. In Dec 2; 2017; twin suicide bomb attack Borno 15 killed. Mar 5; 2018; insurgent attack Gudda; Mafa Local Government; Borno State Killed 5. In June 9; 2018; Detonation of Explosive Maiduguri 1 killed June 11; 2018; Detonation of Explosive by Boko Haram Suicide Bomber Maiduguri 2 killed; 4 injured June 16; 2018 Detonation of Explosive by Female Suicide Bombers Damboa; Borno State 43 killed; 84 injured. In July 20; 2018 Insurgents attack Jilli; near Geidam; Yobe State 31 killed Nov 22; 2018 Insurgents overran a Nigerian Army Battalion Metele; Guzamala 70 killed January 6; 2018; A raid by Boko Haram Jihadists Village Near Army Chief Family 6 killed; 14 injured; 4 vehicles seized and 2 destroyed (Global Terrorism Index; 2018).

Methodology

Cross sectional survey research design was used for the study; this research design is appropriate because it enables the researcher to collect data that will represent the perception and view of people across a large geographical area; which in this case were three selected Northeast state in Nigeria. The adoption of this design is consistent with the studies of (Awino; 2013; Olajide; 2015; Shabbir; 2018; Walala; Waiganjo & Njeru; 2015). The unit of analysis of the sample for the study were key security agents and experts; political officers; internally displaced persons; market leaders; religious leaders; civil right organisations; traditional rulers; repentant Boko Haram fighters and vigilante officers were analyzed. The justification for this unit of analysis is based on the fact that it aids the quantitative description of study variables in relations to a given population.

A total population of five hundred and ten (510) respondents were sampled for this study. The total enumeration or census method was used for this study as the total population is not large. A structured questionnaire was adapted from previous studies Titus; Aminu and James (2017); Adeoye (2015); and Salisu; Mohd; and Abdullahi (2015) along the constructs with sections capturing demographic information; political instability and insecurity using a six point likert scale ranging from strongly agree (6) to strongly disagree (1). Afterwards; primary data for the study which was retrieved by well-trained research assistants from the field was treated to conform to the assumptions of regression as well minimize errors in data collected and provide for better results. The researchers developed a structured model for the study using the main constructs; and the data was analysed using linear regression.

Results and Discussion

The results of the analysis are presented in table 1 showing the effect of political instability on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria.

Table 1: Regression Results for Political Instability and insecurity

(a) Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	41.598	1.045		39.805	.000
	Political Instability	.128	.043	.136	2.951	.003
R = .136 ^a						
R ² = .019						
Durbin-Watson= 1.153						
a. Predictors: (Constant) Political Instability						
a. Dependent Variable: Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities						

Source: Field Survey, 2020

The table above presents regression results on influence of political instability on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria. The R represents the relationship of correlation coefficients between the predictors used in the model of political instability and insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities. The R² represented the measure of variability in insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities that is accounted for by political instability. From the model, (R = 0.136) shows that political instability account for 13.6% variation of insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities.

The value of R² was 0.019, showing that the prediction of political instability on insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities account for 1.9% less variance. The R-squared of 1.9% means that the political instability explains approximately 1.9 percent of variations in the insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities, the model failed to explain 98.1% of the variation, meaning that there are other factors associated with insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities which were not fitted in the model.

Table 1 also shows the results of regression coefficients which reveal that a positive effect was reported for insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities ($\beta = 41.598, p < 0.05$). Further, the results showed that at 95% confidence level, political instability ($\beta = 0.128, p < 0.05$) was statistically significant as the p-value was less than 0.05 and the t values greater than 1.96. This implies that political instability had significant positive effect on insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities North-East Nigeria. From the results, the equation for the regression model is expressed as:

$$ISTA = 41.598 + 0.128x_1 \dots \dots \dots \text{Eq. (i)}$$

Where: ISTA = Insecurity and Sustenance of Terrorist Activities and x_1 is Political instability.

The results also show that β was significant ($\beta = 0.128, t = 2.951, p = 0.003$) indicating that for one unit increase in political instability, insecurity and sustenance of terrorist activities increases by 0.003 units. Since p -value < 0.05 , the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant effect of political instability on insecurity and the substance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria is hereby rejected.

Discussion of Findings

The result of objective four reveals that political instability significantly contributes to insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria. The finding of this study was consistent with the findings of Hamburg, 2017; Adeoye, 2015; Idahosa and Akov, 2013; Ikezue & Ezeah, 2015; Izah, 2014; James, 2017; Kuku, 2012; Dauda, 2014; Lutz and Lutz, 2014 and Mackinlay, 2016. However, results from the study of Titus, 2016; Aisosa and Ebenezer (2018) do not support the study finding. Hamburg, 2017; Adeoye, 2015; Idahosa and Akov, 2013; Ikezue and Ezeah, 2015; Izah, 2014; James, 2017; Kuku, 2012; Dauda, 2014; Lutz and Lutz, 2014 and Mackinlay 2016, supported the study findings that political instability has positive and significant effect on insecurity and as a sustaining factor of terrorism. The study aligned with the authors above that political instability have positive and significant effect on insecurity and as a sustaining factor of terrorism, therefore this study rejected null hypothesis that that political instability have no significant influence on insecurity and the sustenance of terrorist (Boko Haram sect) activities in North-East Nigeria is hereby rejected.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study examined the possible effect of political instability on terrorism as a sustaining factor in Northeast Nigeria. The study found out that political instability had a weak but significant effect on terrorism; this implies that political instability is not a major contributory factor to the substance of terrorism but other factors such as poverty; illiteracy; corruption and weak government policies on human security are main sustaining factors of terrorism in the Northeast Nigeria. Also; the politicization of Boko Haram has greatly contributed to the hardening of the sect manifest in its growing lethal display; seemingly uncontrolled bomb explosions and deaths of innocent civilians. This is a clear demonstration of the poverty of effective; focused and articulate political leadership in Nigeria. In order to defeat this criminal terrorist organization; the study further recommended that the Nigerian government must recognize that unless issues of bad governance and systemic corruption; especially the problem of political corruption stemming from interreligious and interethnic rivalry aimed at the control of the state machinery for economic and political gains; are seriously addressed; all other measures will be nothing but cosmetic and pro tempore. Northern Nigeria's political leaders; particularly the state governors; must move swiftly and strategically to deliver on repeated promises to invest in infrastructure; education and other social services; as well as encourage new sources of income for the region. The government of Nigeria should partner with the international community in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency. Government should improve on the mechanisms of accountability by making it more participatory and inclusive to achieve a broad-based legitimacy. This will increase the

level of confidence in governance. Further study should investigate the effect of government policies on human security as a sustaining factor of terrorism in Northeast Nigeria.

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