Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme Implementation Challenges in Africa: A Study of Nigeria and Angola DDR Programmes

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Abstract

Global statistics indicate that post-conflict resettlement of victims of violence and war through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is faced with various problems in Africa hence, this paper examined the issues confronting DDR programmes in Nigeria and Angola. The study adopted the basic human needs theory (BHN) as its theoretical framework and derived its data from secondary sources, which included official government documents, textbooks, published journals, magazines, the international news media, newspapers, the internet etc. Data collected from these sources were analysed through qualitative method and content analysis. Findings in the study revealed that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a nonviolent post-conflict resolution framework that entails systematic processes and procedures which are often ignored by African States and leaders. Further findings and analyses also revealed that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) exercise in Nigeria and Angola helped to resettle and reintegrate several ex-combatants and victims of conflict and war who could have naturally constituted threat to the security of the state. However, to ensure effective DDR exercise, there is need for African States and its leaders to adhere to international standards by ensuring that ex-combatants and militants are exposed to professional nonviolent tests and trainings that will transform them as productive members of the society once again.

Background to the Study

Most countries in Africa face internal security challenges caused by a number of factors which include: mass poverty, uneven development, mounting external debts and periodic outbreak of violence and in some cases military coups and insurgency. This development has also affected the economy of the continent adversely. At the regional and global levels, conflict of various dimensions also exists hence, with the attack of the United States on September 11 2001, terrorism has been projected as the new international security challenge of the 21st century. Understanding the conditions conducive for terrorism and insurgency could produce a more logical and consistent approach to combating terrorism. The 1999 Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism dearly state the deep concern over the scope and seriousness of the phenomenon of terrorism and the danger it poses to the stability and security of states thus, Article 4(2) of the convention urged members of the African Union to adopt national legislations aimed at preventing and combating terrorist acts. It is therefore important to state that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a nonviolent conflict resolution mechanism that contributes to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin.

The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions which deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development. It will be recalled that the United Nations first became involved in disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) through the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), which was deployed in 1989. Thus the UN has continued to support DDR programmes in more than 20 countries around the world. Available statistics shows that from 1989 – 1992, DDR lacked adequate coordination among the UN peace keeping mission, agencies, programmes and funds: and it was compromised by poor planning and support hence, a consensus emerged among the UN and DDR stakeholders about the need to improve all UN supervised DDR programmes. This development no doubt led to the establishment of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) which was developed by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAW GDDR) between 2004 and 2006.

The UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) as part of its mandate provided direction and guidance to those engaged in preparing, implementing and supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes across the world. However, it's important to state that Nigeria's amnesty policy in the Niger Delta region led to the demobilization and reintegration of 30,000 ex-combatants while the DDR programme in Angola also disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated over 90,000 ex-combatants including UNITA soldiers in 2002. The problems encountered in the two DDR Programmes and the level of compliance by Nigeria and Angola forms the major trust of this paper.

Methodology and Scope
This aspect of the paper provides a description of the sources of data used and the applicable methodology. The data used in this study were curled from published scholarly works such as textbook, publishes articles, journals and the internet (secondary sources). Data collected from these sources were analysed through qualitative method and content analysis. Emphasis was placed on the problems faced by African states in the process of carrying out post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and re-integration programmes with specific reference to Nigeria and Angola.

Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Analysis
The need for analytical framework in an investigation was re-enforced by Lieber, (1973) who contends that behind every conception or an analysis, there is a theory or viewpoint, which made it possible for the presentation and interpretation of facts. Clearly therefore, for there to be reliability in an investigation, there is need to also come out with models, or the formulation of theories; for empirical theory "seeks to create knowledge that is impersonal, retraceable and cumulative (Lieber, 1973). In the light of the above, this study relied on John Burton's Basic Human Needs theory as its theoretical framework in order to explain the factors that led to Nigeria's Niger Delta crisis and the rebellion that took place in Angola.

Dexit (2004) posited that human needs are core issues creating conflict and violence in the first place hence; ignoring such fundamental issues no doubt makes the interest-based model and others limited and contradictory. It is for this reason that a theory that looks at the root causes of conflict is needed hence: this study will examine the basic human needs theory which was made popular by John Burton (1997). Burton (1997) argued that when an individual or group is denied its basic need for identity, security, recognition or equal participation within the society, protracted conflict becomes inevitable hence, to resolve such conflicts, it is imperative that needs that were threatened by identified and placed at the front burner. In addition, Burton (1997) stated that the needs of all individuals and groups must be accommodated in decision making process. He argued further that basic needs can influence our beliefs, the values we place on them and the emotional impact of the frustration of these highly viewed beliefs (Avruch and Back, 1987: Sandole, 2001). This no doubt explains why compliance systems result in alienation and anti-social behaviour since there are limits on the ability of human systems of elite-sponsored institutions and norms to induce compliance given the fact that if needs are frustrated by these institutions, they will b e pursued by other means (Sandole, 2001).

According to Burton (1997) since these needs appear to be more important than food and shelter, individuals are prepared to go to extreme lengths to defy authorities and systems in order to pursue their deeply felt needs even through death by suicide bombings or by hunger strikes. The need for security, identity, recognition, and personal development are indeed salient to the understanding of destructive social conflicts and the failure of existing state systems to satisfy the need for identity is the primary source of contemporary ethno-nationalist struggles (Burton, 1997). Within the context of this study,

the basic human needs theory as applied in this paper serves as a tool that gives direction to policy makers and third party interveners to help make a distinction between struggles that can be dealt with by employing force, law and power based negotiations and those struggles whose resolution require more conciliatory measures (Sandole, 2001). While corroborating this position, Burton (1990:34) stated thus; deterrence can not deter and coercive methods are not effective to modify behaviour when individuals and groups are compelled to act on the basis of imperative needs. With reference to the subject matter, this theory also helps in designing a peace process that reflects the underlying generic sources of conflicts by providing the basis for linking conflict analysis with conflict resolution since the later requires a process that helps parties to identify salient unsatisfied needs and at the same time consider methods of accommodating social arrangements to demands of individuals and groups (Rubenstein, 1999:173).

Thus, the agitation and uprising in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and Angola can also be explained using John Burton's Basic Human Needs theory which is closely related to Robert K. Merton's theory of Anomy (crime). It will be recalled that the rebellion carried out by the opposition and UNITA soldiers in Angola occurred due to neglect and prolonged alienation of the people from the affairs of the state. In the case of Nigeria's Niger Delta region, it is a fact that decades of frustration, alienation and marginalization of the people from the affairs of the state no doubt helped to escalate the conflict in the oil-rich region. In the same vein, initial policy actions from the Nigeria government also did little to recognize the feelings and aspirations of the people hence, the bloody confrontation between the Niger Delta youths/agitators and the Nigeria armed forces (military). Using unsatisfied needs as an independent variable, John Burton's basic human needs theory also helps to explain why ruling class manipulation or cultural differences sometimes degenerate into conflict in some societies and systems (Rubenstein Crocker, 1994).

Gunning, (2000) corroborated the above position and added that political violence does not appear in a vacuum but that there are usually long histories of violent contestations, group formation and increased hostile interactions within the state of other forces before violence becomes a more viable option. Gunning's position clearly describes both the Angola and Nigeria's Niger Delta situation as presented in the study. It will be recalled that the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria initially started as a mere civil protest against alienation and marginalization but rather than address the issues raised, the government of Nigeria resorted to the use of hard power (military force) which was resisted by the Niger Delta agitators through arms struggle hence, the militarization of the Niger Delta region by the federal government of Nigeria became counterproductive as it led to increased militancy and destruction of Nigeria's critical infrastructure and economic interests. This also applies to the Jonas Savimgbi –led rebellion in Angola which the authorities under mined at its earlier stages. This, therefore, implies that the conflict resolution mechanism or method adopted by the state is crucial and fundamental to the survival of the state itself as it is a determinant factor to the resolution or escalation of the conflict. This further explains why the Nigerian government reviewed its policy action in the Niger Delta through the proclamation of amnesty which was followed by a

disarmament, demobilization and re-integration programme in June 2009 while the DDR programme for ex-combatants including UNITA fighters in Angola also commenced in 2002.

The disarmament, demobilization and re-integration programmes in Nigeria and Angola clearly revealed that every conflict resolution method, framework, or theory has its merits and demerits hence, states and policy makers must continue to engage with their citizens and review events when necessary. The basic human needs theory has its limitations hence; it has been criticized by scholars like Avruch (1998) who described the theory as being indefensibly essentialist, decontextualized and historical. Another limitation lies in the lack of uniformity in how we define basic salient needs. For instance, Sixes (1973) identified eight (8) basic needs, Burton (1997) identified four (4) basic needs, Maslow (1943) identified five (5) types of needs while Galtung (1990) also identified three (3) basic needs. Thus, the distinction between wants and needs also constitute a major challenge that limits the utility and relevance of the basic human needs theory. In spite of these limitations and weaknesses, it is pertinent and also instructive to state unequivocally that John Burton's basic human needs theory is very much relevant in this study because it is useful as a tool that gives direction to policy makers and third party interveners to help make a distinction between struggles than can be dealt with by employing force, law, and powerbase negotiations and struggles whose resolution requires more conciliatory measures (Sandole, 2001).

Furthermore, this theory is equally useful in the study since it helps in designing a peace process that reflects the underlying generic sources of conflicts by providing the basis for lining conflict analysis with conflict resolution since the later requires a process that helps parties (in this case, the ex-combatants and the governments of Nigeria and Angola) to identify salient unsatisfied needs and at the same time consider methods of accommodating social arrangements to demands of individuals and groups (Rubenstein, 1999:173). In all, the basic human needs theory as applied in this study clearly explains the fact that understanding the real causes (basic needs and aspirations of people) of any conflict helps the state and the society to solve such conflicts without much friction hence, the granting of general amnesty to ex-combatants in Angola (UNITA soldiers) and Nigeria's Niger Delta agitators and ex-combatants.

Conceptual Analysis
It will be recalled that the United Nations first became involved in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) through the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), which was deployed in 1989. Ever since, the UN has carried out and supported DDR programmes in more than 20 countries around the world, both within and outside peacekeeping operations. Prior to this period, DDR as a post-conflict peace-building measure was carried in a fractured way; it lacked adequate coordination among the UN peacekeeping mission, agencies, programmes and funds; and it was compromised by poor planning and support. Thus, a consensus emerged among the UN and DDR stakeholders about the need to improve the United Nations performance in this

area. In the process of standardizing guidelines for DDR programmes at the global level, the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) were developed by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAW GDDR) between 2004 and 2006. It is important to state that the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) provided a global framework, direction and guidance to those engaged in preparing, implementing and supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes.

The challenges encountered by states especially African States in the process of implementing DDR programmes form the major thrust of this paper. However, conflict arising from political instability is no doubt a major challenge confronting the African continent. In most cases, such conflicts often degenerate into ethnic massacre and genocide which has caused the loss of several lives hence, according to the United Nations (2005) report, about 25 African countries were engaged in armed conflict or were experiencing political crisis. The report noted further that most of these African countries have also experience UN/AU-led DDR programmes and this included countries like Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Republic of Sierra-Leone, and Zimbabwe etc. Furthermore, it is also important to add that seven (7) African countries in the Great Lake Region benefitted from the Multi-country demobilization and reintegration programme (MDRP) with a target of 400,000 combatants and financed by the World Bank and thirteen (13) other donors which included twelve (12) European countries and the European Union (EU) (MDRP:2008). It will be recalled that the MDRP project started in 2002 and ended in June 2009 with about 300,000 ex-combatants demobilized and 232,000 ex-combatants reintegrated. The role of local actors in the DDR process is no doubt a source of debate among scholars and researchers. A striking example from local actors' involvement in peace building with positive impacts is contained in the work of Aall (2007:484). Using the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum in Plateau State of Nigeria where militants from both sides were brought together to pursue the goal of understanding each other's perspective and identifying the common elements of Christianity and Islam. These dialogue leaders utilized their community relations and influence to encourage Muslim – Christian dialogue in a highly charged inter-communal conflict to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict that threatened peace and stability of Plateau State and the entire northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1998.

Thus, the Christian-Muslim dialogue success is indeed one of the evident proofs that peace cannot be foisted on others by external actors. Richmond, (2008; 114) declared support for indigenous peace practices and processes hence, working from bottom-up, and founded upon local cultures and traditional practices. Citing Collier (2007:215) Richmond asserted that the use of indigenous people in the conflict resolution process can clearly be found in Sierra-Leone where a rebel leader was appointed into the government as Minister of Mining in an attempt to give rebels a greater interest in peace. The involvement of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and other stakeholders in the planning and

implementation stages in Nigeria's presidential amnesty panel and committee is no doubt in line with Richmond's hypothesis that "local actor's involvement in peace-building revolves around a tendency to romanticize the indigenous contribution hence, their consent, participation and cooperation are vital to peace" (Richmond, 2008:106). However, this study will examine and analyze the following key concepts:

1. **Disarmament:** According to the United Nations 2005 report (A/C.5/59/31), disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunitions, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

2. **Demobilization:** The United Nations 2005 report also defined demobilization as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

3. **Reinsertion:** This is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of re-integration. According to the United Nations report, reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, cloths, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year.

4. **Reintegration:** This is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. According to the United Nations 2005 report, reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame primarily taking place in communities at the local level. Thus, it is usually part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility hence; it often necessitates long-term external assistance and funding. The 2005 United Nations report clearly states that the aim of any DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is no doubt a complex process, with political military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions hence, it aims to deal with the post-conflict problem that result from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development. It is imperative and fundamental to state unequivocally that the implementation of DDR exercises across the world has several important policy and operational implications which must be adhered to by states and policy makers. In the light of the above, this paper will examine the challenges faced by Nigeria and Angola in its DDR programme implementation.

Analysis Showing the Challenges and Observable Differences in Nigeria and Angola DDR programmes

This section of the paper will examine the views of scholars and conflict resolution experts in other to determine the real challenges encountered by Nigeria and Angola in the implementation of their DDR programmes. Where necessary, tables will be presented and analyzed via qualitative method and content analysis as earlier stated. Most scholars including Ted Gurr (1994) believe that exclusion and failure on the part of the state to provide basic needs for it citizens accounts for conflict and insecurity in most African states. While explaining the situation and conditions in pre-amnesty Niger Delta Ibeanu (2008) stated categorically that the consequences of government inaction is youth restiveness, militancy, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, oil theft and other forms of criminality and violent confrontation. He added that the inability of the Nigerian state to address genuine demands of the people in the area stimulated long years of clashes and confrontations between several youth groups and security agencies as well as oil multinationals. David, A. and Adeyemi, O. corroborated the above position and added that the whole amnesty policy of the Nigerian government was over politicized and limited in scope to carter for the welfare of militants alone.

Zibima Tubodenyefa and Allison Timipere Felix (2013) in their work titled "The state in conflict management: The amnesty programme and the nature of stakeholder cooperation in Nigeria's Niger Delta", published in the Journal of the Centre for Niger Delta Studies, contended that the DDR exercise carried out by the Nigeria government did not follow international standards in terms of content and methodology hence, they argued that the fact that the amnesty programme succeeded in drastically reducing the incidence of violence is a short-term gain arising from the greed of militant Commanders and Generals under the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) flagship and of the state represented by the political class. They argued further that the fundamental objective of any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise is to discourage ex-combatants from engaging in activities that could re-militarize their psyche or put in jeopardy the existing peace.

Thus, they maintained that the main aim of a DDR programme is to help ex-combatants and militants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income without compromising the security of the state and its institutions. Citing UNAMID, 2012, Nzeshi 2012 and Ezigbo 2012, they stated categorically that the case in Nigeria's Niger Delta is full of inconsistencies and contradictions which could scuttle the entire amnesty programme. According to them "it is inappropriate and a threat to national security, the deliberate strategy of the Nigerian ruling class to co-opt ex-combatants into the economic mainstream while the fundamental issues instigating armed conflict in the Niger Delta region remained unattended to. While substantiating this position, they maintained that in Bayelsa State which arguably was the boiling pot of militant activities before DDR, a group of ex-combatants were awarded oil pipelines and facilities security contract in the state through their security firm BAJEROS while in Delta State where hostilities were equally intense, the Oil Facilities Surveillance Limited (OFSL) also owned

by a former militant leader was contracted to police oil facilities. Wondering why this form of patronage must continue even after the DDR, they argued further that the relationship between the federal government and ex-combatant leaders raise doubts about the potentialities for DDR sustaining peace in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria as a whole. Thus, in their paper, they cited The Wall Street Journal (2012) which revealed the value of the oil pipeline security contracts awarded to ex-combatant leaders during the amnesty exercise by Nigeria's state oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Details of the contract according to The Wall Street Journal 2012, and Aluede, 2012 are listed below.

Table 1: Security/surveillance contracts awarded to top ex-militant Commanders in the Niger Delta Region

S/N	Name/Beneficiary	Contract Value	Purpose
1.	Gen. Ebikabowei Victor Ben (Boyloaf)	US $3.8 million (N559.64 million)	Oil pipeline security surveillance in Bayelsa State
2.	Gen. Ateke Tom	US $ 3.8 million (N559.64 million)	Oil pipeline security surveillance in Rivers State
3.	Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo	US $9 million (N1.420 billion)	Oil pipeline security surveillance in Rivers State
4.	Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo)	US $22.9 million (N3.614 billion)	Oil pipeline security surveillance in Delta State.

Source: Adapted from Tubodenyefa and Felix (2013: pp 17-18).

Most scholars have argued that there was nothing wrong in engaging top ex-combatants in securing and protecting oil facilities which they once destroyed and vandalized. Scholars in this school of thought maintained that it is a form of empowerment to the youths in the Niger Delta region since oil facilities are located in their creeks and hinterlands. On the other hand, others observed that exposing ex-combatants and their foot soldiers to such huge financial transactions immediately after a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) exercise is a breach of international standards prescribed by the United Nations inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (UN IAWG DDR). Critiques of financial inducement to ex-militants further argued that such economic empowerment could be counterproductive as it could in the long run lead to civil disobedience and rebellion against the state. The contradictions and ironies inherent in the DDR exercise carried out by the Nigerian government for Niger Delta youths therefore portends great danger for the region, Nigeria and Africa as a whole. Citing Courson (2011), Ibaba and Arugu (2013), observed that the commodity oil was a major factor responsible for the violence and insurgency in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. Ibaba and Arugu stated thus: Oil related conflicts which transformed into insurgency were triggered by the interface of grievances, greed and quest for survival (Courson, 2011). The table below clearly shows the observable differences, similarities, and challenges in Nigeria and Angola DDR programmes.

Table 2: Analysis Showing the Differences, Similarities and Challenges Between Nigeria and Angola DDR Programmes

		Angola	Nigeria
DDR Features			
	Period under review	01/09/2003	01/03/2010
	Nature of actors	UNITA Soldiers/ex-combatants	Environmental activists/ex-agitators
	Population	91,127 ex-combatants registered	30,000 agitators registered
	Setting	35 Quartering areas setup for the project	Only in 1 Quartering area in Obubura but disarmament don in different locations
	Type of Offer	General amnesty to all UNITA Soldiers in 2002 after the death of their leader	Amnesty to all who signed up
	Registration	Reception for both UNITA Soldiers and dependants	Reception to only ex-agitators
	Dependants	288,756 Family members registered	None
	Admittance to National Force	5,000 Integrated into National Army	None
Reintegration	Training Types	Vocational training	Yes
		Traditional apprenticeship and on the job training	Yes
		Community works access to tool kits	Yes
		Micro business training, advisory services and micro credit	Yes
		None	Academic trainings for degree qualifications
	Implementation Agency	Ministry of Ex-combatants and motherland veterans and IRSEM managing the DDR project	OSAPND
Duration and Speed		Between 2003 and 2005 over 20,000 ex-combatants benefiting from Reintegration	11,700 have received reintegration packages between 2010 and 2013
Funding		Donor and National Government Funding; received USD522, 950,865 from MDRP and UNPP as of July 2008	Only Nigeria Government Funding USD514,233.064 – 89.72 spent till date
Ministry		Ministry of Ex-combatants and Motherland Veterans	Ministry of Niger Delta (but not managing the DDR project)
Stipends		None	USD $400 monthly
New Trend		None	Introduction of training opportunities for 1,000 people from the conflict impacted communities

Source: Adapted from Abazie, 2014

Failure of African leaders to provide leadership through the provision of basic social amenities based on; equity justice, and fairness, is no doubt responsible for most of the conflicts in different parts of Africa. The above table clearly indicate that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process requires a decentralized, multidimensional, complex but coordinated action as reflected in Angola where 35 quartering areas were set up for the DDR project. In the case of Nigeria, only one quartering area in Obubura in Cross Rivers State was set up by the federal government while the disarmament exercise was

done in different locations. Thus, for any DDR programme to be successful, it must maintain several quartering areas which must be well conducted and coordinated simultaneously. The content of the above data also revealed that dependents of ex-combatants need to be factored into any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme to ensure compliance and commitment on the part of ex-combatants and their foot soldiers. In the case of Nigeria, this remains a major challenge in its amnesty programme. Analysis of the above data also revealed that Angola's DDR programme was national in scope involving UNITA soldiers and over 90,000 ex-combatants. On the other hand, the DDR programme in Nigeria was limited to the Niger Delta region with a total of 30,000 ex-combatants. In terms of funding, the DDR programme in Angola was funded by the Angolan government with the active support of external donor agencies such as the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which released a total of $22,950,865 dollars as at July 2008. In the case of Nigeria, only the Nigerian government through the office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta (OSAPND) funded the DDR programme and released the sum of $14,233,064,89.72 dollars (Abazie, 2014). In the same vein, a special ministry known as the Ministry of Ex-combatants and Motherland Veterans led the whole DDR programme in Angola while in Nigeria; the DDR project was domiciled in the presidency.

A critical aspect of the DDR programme in Angola further revealed that trainees and ex-combatants were not exposed to allowances or huge financial inducements during training and reintegration while in the case of Nigeria, ex-combatants were given N65,000 ($400) monthly before and during the training and reintegration period in addition to surveillance/security contracts to top ex-combatant leaders as reflected in table 1 above. The above development have prompted scholars to question the rational for such huge financial disbursements to ex-combatants who are yet to complete the DDR exercise hence, they argued that the relationship between the Nigerian government and ex-combatant leaders raise doubts about the potentialities for DDR sustaining peace in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria as a whole. On their part, Tubodenyefa and Felix (2013) maintained that the relative peace recorded in Nigeria's Niger Delta region is partly due to the unholy alliance or tripartite accord that ensures continued flow of cash between the federal government and the multinational oil corporations (MNOCS) on the one hand and militant leaders on the other. Ikelegbe, (2010) however, cautioned that taking militants out of the creeks without addressing the fundamental issues that triggered the violence will only create a new set of militants who will most likely to enact insurgency hence, he described the amnesty policy in Nigeria as a mere palliative measure. The data above also indicate that the DDR programme reintegrated and reabsorbed 5,000 ex-combatants including UNITA soldiers into the National army to avoid resurgence of violence and insurgency. This therefore implies that post-conflict security and survival of ex-combatants and their fighters must be accorded top priority in any DDR scheme. Thus, the resurgence of violence and attack on oil facilities can be traced to the activities of idle ex-combatants who are abandoned after the DDR exercise. Nevertheless, it is instructive to add that all DDR programmes have its peculiarities and challenges which are propelled and motivated by environmental, cultural and social factors.

Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis, it is obvious that the United Nations through its integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (UN-IDDRS) and other policy measures developed a common strategic framework to provide direction and guidance to those engaged in preparing, implementing and supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Despite these efforts, the situation in Nigeria and Angola clearly indicate that most African States engaged in post-conflict DDR programmes find it difficult to adhere to laid down rules and processes during implementation hence, the resurgence of conflicts and violence in such regions and states. It is therefore imperative for states especially African States to address the real causes of conflict by identifying the basic needs of their citizens and also provide such needs through people oriented leadership, good governance, strict adherence to rule of law and democratic principles.

Recommendations

It is therefore imperative to state unequivocally that post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a nonviolent conflict resolution mechanism that requires careful planning and execution in other to avoid a resurgence of violence and breakdown of the peace-building process. Thus, the following recommendations aimed at improving the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in Africa is hereby proposed:

1. The establishment of a DDR process is usually agreed to and defined during a ceasefire, marking the end of hostilities or a comprehensive peace agreement hence, there is need for a written undertaking or commitment by the parties to accept and implement all political, operational and legal frameworks guiding the entire DDR scheme or programme. This will ensure that parties who default or break the provisions of the ceasefire agreement/peace pack are held accountable.

2. The United Nations in its 2005 report describe DDR as an early step in a series of peace-building process which focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and groups. An effective DDR programme according to the UN lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens and in the process, build national capacity for long-term peace, security and development. In the light of this, disarmament and demobilization should be followed up with long-term reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life in order to avoid post-conflict security problems. Thus, ex-combatants should be provided with alternative ways of making a living (livelihoods) including military support networks. Loyal and committed ex-combatants should also be integrated into the national army of their respective states as it was the case in Angola where five thousand (5000) ex-combatants were reintegrated and reabsorbed into the Angolan national army.

3. Before the commencement of any DDR programme, less developed African States without enough human capacity and technical know-how should be encouraged to approach regional and international organizations such as the African Union

(AU) and the United Nations (UN) for assistance since contemporary international law permits third party agents to act as a broker to peace agreements and in the process, provide assistance for the planning and implementation of peace-building processes such as DDR. Such interventions will no doubt help to promote global peace and stability at all levels.

4. African States and leaders should be proactive by taking necessary steps to address the issues that can trigger or motivate violence, uprising and arms-struggle against the state. Thus, issues such as poverty, unemployment, hunger, political liberty and freedom outlined in the sustainable development goals document should be given priority attention to avoid violence and the outbreak of war.

5. Pre-disarmament consultations and interaction between the government and ex-combatants and their representatives should be open and transparent to allow for proper biometric data capturing and documentation of persons and arms to take place. Departments of ex-combatants should also be factored into the entire DDR process as it was the case in Angola.

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