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CRIME, SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICAN NATION STATE

Editorial Contacts
Dr. Bassey E. Anam
Institute of Public Policy and Administration
University of Calabar, Cross River State
Nigeria- West Africa
admin@internationalpolicybrief.org
Tel: +234 8174 380 445

Collaborating Research Units
International Scientific Research Consortium
Dr. Abdulazeez D. El-ladan
The Future Institute
10 Coventry Innovation Village
Coventry University, CV1 2TL

ED. Jonah Ulebor
Lextra Education LTD
Oakhurt Avenue.
Leeds, LS11 7HL, United Kingdom

Rohit Kumar Verma
Institute of Law, Jiwaji Univeristy India.
Gwalior (M.P.) India

PT. Hussein Botchway
University of Energy and Natural Resources
Sunyani, Ghana.

IDPR, Nairobi
Dr. Andre Yitambe
School of Public Health
Kenyatta University, Nairobi

Africa Research Council on Sustainable Development (ARCSD)
Prof. Chukwuemeka Jude Diji
Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research, Innovations, Consultancy and Extension)
Kampala international University, Kampala - Uganda

International School of Advanced Research Study (ISARS)
AG Registrar
Dr. Veronica Babajide
Department of Science and Technology Education
University of Lagos, Nigeria

First Assured International Schoolof Business (FAISB)
AG Registrar
Prof. Nathaniel Ozigbo
Department of Business Administration
University of Abuja

▬▼ DEDICATION

Dedicated to the International Institute for Policy Review & Development Strategies for providing a platform and supporting Institutional and Collaborative Research and Sustainable Development.

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Contributors are greatly acknowledge for supporting the agenda towards achieving sustainable development in developing economies of the world, especially in Africa.

The following members of the Institute Editorial Team are specially acknowledged for their useful contributions;

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PREFACE

Renewed International Commitment to Tackle Crime and Insecurity in Africa

Dr. Bassey Anam
Managing Editor
African Development Charter Series
Crime, Security and the Future of the African Nation-State

Africa has suffered a long history of exploitation, with the successive impacts of the slave trade, colonization and, more recently, Cold War manipulation. Current national borders were imposed by the colonial powers without reference to culture, language, ethnicity, or to the economic viability of the states thus created. In recent time, there are issues of criminality and insecurity; cross-border crime, illicit proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking, corruption, and terrorism constitute serious threats to security and stability. They hamper the harmonious economic and social development of the Continent. Thus, the development challenge in Africa remains great, perhaps greater than anywhere else in the world.

Most profoundly, the effects of crime and insecurity are far-reaching. It has weakened the political, social and economic institutions of African countries. Crime and insecurity drive away business from Africa. They undermine social and human capital by destroying the trust relations between citizens on which functioning societies are based. With corruption with fuels crimes, there is broken trust between the people and the state, undermining democracy. When people lose confidence in the criminal justice system, they may engage

in vigilantism, which further undermines the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state. Current development strategies may not succeed in Africa if, among other things, crime and insecurity are not properly addressed.

It is important to note also that remarkable progress has been made by many African states, regional economic communities, and the African Union in creating the legislative and organizational framework for combating and preventing crime, but the capacity for implementation may be in need of support in many instances. The international community remains committed to helping the African people overcome the barriers that confront them. Understanding the dynamics between conflict, crime, corruption, and development constitute an important part of this process, with a view to addressing what appears to be an under-appreciated source of suffering in Africa (Costa, Crime, and Development in Africa 2005).

This book, which is the 7th in the African Development Charter Series, addresses specific issues of Crime, Security and the Development of the African Nation States. The project was launched at the IBB University, in Lapai, Niger State during the Global research Conference on Governance, Security, Management, Technology, and Development Administration (30th-31st January 2018). With support from the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Spain and Global Affairs Canada, it is part of renewed international efforts to help tackle the challenges of crime and insecurity in Africa and set a path for sustainable development.

International Organization of Securities Commissions

Paul P. Andrews
Secretary General
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Madrid, Spain

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is the international body that brings together the world's securities regulators and is recognized as the global standard setter for the securities sector. IOSCO develops implements and promotes adherence to internationally recognized standards for securities regulation. It works intensively with the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on the global regulatory reform agenda.

Scope of Activities

IOSCO was established in 1983. Its membership regulates more than 95% of the world's securities markets in more than 115 jurisdictions; securities regulators in emerging markets account for 75% of its ordinary membership. The *IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation* has been endorsed by both the G20 and the FSB as the relevant standards in this area. They are the overarching core principles that guide IOSCO in the development and implementation of internationally recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement. They form the basis for the evaluation of the securities sector for the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

IOSCO Objectives

IOSCO members have resolved:

- To cooperate in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic risks;

- To enhance investor protection and promote investor confidence in the integrity of securities markets, through strengthened information exchange and cooperation in enforcement against misconduct and in supervision of markets and market intermediaries; and

- To exchange information at both global and regional levels on their respective experiences in order to assist the development of markets, strengthen market infrastructure and implement appropriate regulation.

By providing high quality technical assistance, education and training, and research to its members and other regulators, IOSCO seeks to build sound global capital markets and a robust global regulatory framework.

Source: https://www.iosco.org.

Global Affairs Canada

High Commission of Canada
13010G, Palm close, Diplomatic drive,
Central Business District Abuja, Nigeria
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is the department in the Government of Canada that manages Canada's diplomatic and consular relations, to encourage the country's international trade, and to lead Canada's international development and humanitarian assistance. It is also responsible for maintaining Canadian government offices abroad with diplomatic and consular status on behalf of all government departments.

The department has undergone numerous name changes and reorganisations in recent years. Within the past decade it has been known as Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada; and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. Canada takes an active role in multilateral forums, demonstrating our commitment to peace, security, sustainability and prosperity. GAC work to advance these global priorities through our support for research organizations, summits and forums.

The Government of Canada supports a number of multilateral development institutions, global initiatives and international humanitarian assistance organizations to fulfill its international development mandate of helping people living in poverty. Working closely with these partners, Canada can respond quickly to humanitarian crises and pressing global development challenges. Canada works to ensure that these institutions and the multilateral system function effectively, deliver strong results, and remain viable mechanisms for building consensus on important global issues.

Canada is also providing security assistance in Nigeria:
Global Partnership Program (GPP)

1. : strengthening biological security in Nigeria;

Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building (CTCB) Program

2. : training on investigation and interrogation techniques , and on post-explosion investigation techniques in accordance with international standards and human rights;

3. Regional technical assistance: strengthening border control, criminal justice systems and the capacity of law enforcement authorities to prevent and address terrorism in the region

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Nature of Crime in Africa: a Critical Perspective

1

CHAPTER

Beida Onivehu Julius
Department of Private and Commercial Law
Faculty of Law, Bingham University
Km 26 Auta-Balefi Karu, Nasarawa State Nigeria

Introduction

Organised crimes and other criminal activities have reached frightening levels in African continent since the post-cold war era (Williams and Godson, 2015). This sad occurrence has continually hindered genuine development effort. Many criminal organizations have not only become transnational in scope but also exhibit a degree of flexibility and adaptability in methods and modes that poses considerable challenges for intelligence, law enforcement agencies, and society at large.

The inability of African State actors to systematically enforce the rule of law and guarantee the security of individuals and economic stakeholders provides the most conducive environment for the development of all sorts of criminal enterprises aimed at generating easy profits at the expense of human beings, societal security and by implication development (Amado, 2014).

Wars, lawlessness, and corruption have also fostered international crime on an immense scale in Africa to the extent that it now acts as a way station for illegal drugs from Latin America and Asia that are destined for Europe. Africa

is the centre of an upsurge in piracy in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, and Nigeria is a notorious source of Internet-based crime (Bouchat, 2010). In South Africa, statistics point to alarming increases in serious crime over recent years (Lemanski, 2014). This position was also shared by Gould(2014)insisting that crime and violence remain disturbingly high in South Africa; attributed to increasing poverty and inequality as well as the failure of the system to secure confidence in and respect for the rule of law. Gould (2014) further maintained that crimes, such as rape, domestic violence, and assault - including assaults against children - the cases recorded are a small fraction of the incidents that actually occur.

There were 827 children murdered in South Africa in 2012/13. That is more than two a day. Added to that is the 21,575 children who were assaulted, with almost half of those assaults being severe (Centre for the study of violence and reconciliation, 2017). In the same year 2,266 women were murdered, and 141,130 women were victims of attempted murder, assault GBH and common assault. As horrifying as these statistics are, the number of women and children who became victims to violence is dwarfed by the number of similar attacks on men. In 2012/13 alone, 13,123 men were murdered. At best, half of these cases would have made it to court, and not all of those that make it to court result in a guilty verdict and the perpetrator being punished.

There are several consequences of this; with each year that violence remains so prevalent, the number of South Africans who have experienced and witnessed violence increases, and so does the extent of national trauma. This has serious consequences on overall development. It is worthy of note that the violent nature of crime in South Africa can be explained in historical context- until 1994, South Africans had little reason to respect the law, and no reason to believe in the rule of law. During apartheid, not only were many of the laws unjust and intended to entrench white domination, but unfair laws were also applied unfairly. In addition, the security forces, particularly the police, were used by the state to ensure that all South Africans lived in fear of the state, regardless of their race.

The apartheid state was deeply corrupt at all levels, and those who held positions of power, whether as politicians or functionaries, were very seldom called to account before a court for acts of corruption or the abuse of power.

The situation was no different in relation to inter-personal violence and crime. Black men who murdered were more likely to face harsher sentences than white men who murdered, especially if the white murderer's victim was poor and black. Black women who were raped were less likely to have their cases investigated than cases in which white women were the victims. In this context, who could be expected to have much respect for the law, or the rule of law? It is this sort of mindset that fuels criminal activities which often undermine development because development cannot occur in an atmosphere of extreme crime. In a related development, Gastrow (2016) argued that criminal activities remained endemic in South Africa throughout its recorded history; cases of rape, street gang, xenophobic attacks, and illicit drugs have surged in post apartheid era. The profits from drug trafficking were also central to the rapid expansion of organised crime.

Furthermore, Costa (2015) maintained persuasively that, in Africa, crime is both a cause and a symptom of chronic underdevelopment. The growing inequalities between the wealthy and the poor in Africa, as well as the continent's booming cities and large youth population have made the situation particularly volatile. This is complicated widely by perceived police corruption and inefficiency—according to the UNODC report, only 11% of homicide cases in Africa end with a conviction, versus 63% in Asia and 69% in Europe.

Besides poverty, another contributing factor is the continent's unending civil strife/conflicts — in 2000, 50% of global war deaths occurred in Africa. The instability caused by armed conflict also creates openings for large-scale organized crime, which profit from the smuggling of, drugs, persons and weapons. While drug use in Africa consists primarily of locally produced cannabis, relatively lax customs services have made the continent an increasingly attractive transit point for narcotics en route to European and American markets. Human trafficking has become an issue of increasing concern among African police and politicians, but there must be greater cooperation by police forces in developed countries, as roughly half of all trafficked humans are destined for Europe.

With regard to arms trafficking, Africa has relatively few light arms overall, although an accurate estimate is nearly impossible. However, the smuggling

and "recycling" of weapons between conflict zones, the large percentage (81%) of light arms in private hands, and the "disappearance" of military and police weapons mean that firearms are readily available, and give Africa one of the highest rates of gun violence. Additionally, while much weaponry is imported from developed and former Soviet countries, 10 African countries have the ability to produce firearms and ammunition domestically, and illicit handgun industries have been reported in Ghana, South Africa and elsewhere.

Beyond international crime, so-called "conventional crime"—including murder, assault, and burglaries also pose serious obstacles to African development. Security concerns drive away foreign direct investment, and financial crimes and corruption lead Africans to send their wealth abroad—nearly 40% of the continent's private wealth is invested overseas. The situation in West and Central Africa is nothing more that the most visible symptom of a much deeper and destabilizing disease which is slowly but progressively affecting the bodies of African states and institutions (Amado, 2014). Harsh economic and social conditions, widespread corruption, conflict and post conflict scenarios, porous borders, failing national administrations, and a growing culture of impunity feed the development of criminal practices in the region as well as the relevance of the West African region in international criminal ventures.

Cross-border crimes in West Africa have been in existence since the 1970s. Initially, they were manifested in the form of individuals or groups of traders and businessmen and women smuggling goods across the borders. These activities eventually assumed alarming proportions when human trafficking, for the purposes of domestic slavery and illegal sexual activities, accompanied such activities as the peddling of narcotics and car-jacking among other things by transnational syndicates. The outbreak of intra-state conflicts in West Africa, beginning with Liberia in 1989, added mercenarism, small arms trafficking and the recruitment of child soldiers and fighters to the cross-border crimes. West African criminal networks are generally characterized by their flexibility and their ability to take on different forms and modes of operation. The criminal enterprises in West Africa use similar techniques to that of the legitimate traders and business people, typical of lineage-based societies. The standard procedure entails a successful

individual entrepreneur inviting one or more junior relatives or dependants to join him or her in an illegal business deal.

Since the 1990s, cross-border criminal activities have become widespread and highly sophisticated (Kwesi, 2012). They have served as an industry for former combatants and transnational criminal syndicates who undertake illegal or criminal activities in the sub-region and in the process undermined state security structures and abused human rights. The smuggling of goods, especially cocoa, timber, ivory, petroleum and diamonds across national borders is most prevalent along the Côte d'Ivoire-Ghana-Togo-Benin-Nigeria and Burkina Faso corridors of the sub-region. Ordinary businessmen and women, and sometimes rebels and criminal gangs involved in civil wars in the sub-region engage in the smuggling of there or other products. These goods are smuggled in vehicles or on foot, using secret and illegal routes across borders to evade special regulations, levies or taxes, thereby making more income through the transaction of these products.

For example, Nigeria, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire were named and shamed for allegedly fuelling the illegal ivory trade. Having largely wiped out their own elephant production, the three countries were believed to be importing and selling tones of ivory which has been poached in nearby countries, according to a new report from conservation watchdogs. Analysts and counter-terrorism experts point to the fact that the terrorist group, al Qaeda, is used, and is continuing to use, rough diamonds in West Africa. The think-tank Global Witness presented evidence that confirms that al Qaeda has been involved in the rough diamond trade since the 1990s. Firstly in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. This report argues that there are several reasons why al Qaeda has used rough diamonds:
1. As a means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells;
2. To hide money targeted by financial sanctions;
3. To launder the profits of criminal activity;
4. To convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and is easily transportable.

The same goes for the trafficking of illicit arms and light weapons manufactured locally or imported from other parts of the world, drugs or narcotics and human trafficking. Some of these activities are made possible by common ethnic affiliations (in terms of language, beliefs, perceptions and support) at either side of the borders and intense economic activity undertaken along these corridors. Armed attacks and extortion at illegal check points, and '419' robbery and criminal activities experienced especially along the Benin-Nigeria corridor of the West African borders also constitutes common cross-border crimes.

Fire Arms trafficked across the sub-region are eventually used by rebel combatants and criminal gangs for armed robbery including vehicle theft and trafficking, and for committing highway robberies of passengers moving from one ECOWAS State to the other. Williams (2011) puts the estimated amount of small arms in circulation in West Africa at 8 million. The weapons are recycled between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and among belligerents in other conflict zones such as the casamance province and the rest of Southern Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau, typical cross border destabilizing activities stem from the circulation of small arms and movement of refugees, partly facilitated by local conflicts.

Some of these arms are manufactured locally, while others are imported into the sub-region. Additionally, some of the countries in the sub-region, but especially Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, have a flourishing artisanal industry of local arms manufacturer. These arms are smuggled out of Ghana through Togo, Benin to Nigeria, and used for violent crime. In this context, the Nigerian Customs Service reported the interception of large arms and ammunition worth billions of naira imported or smuggled into the country in 2017. Important quantities of small arms have come through the border with Benin, and were brought into Nigeria either overland or by sea – in small boats. Equally active in this respect are the northern borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

The scope of the human trafficking crime is widespread in West Africa. Child trafficking in particular spreads across eleven of the fifteen Member States of the ECOWAS including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali. Available statistics

indicates that the scale of the problem is enormous with an estimated 200,000 children experiencing this practice in both West and Central Africa. Till date, cases of human trafficking remained rampant as the criminal traffickers continue to devise strategies to manoeuvre security agents.

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso experience cross-border raids and attacks based on pastoral disputes between cattle herders and settler farmers (Fulton and Nickels, 2017). Front de Liberation du Macina, (FLM) Islamist militant force led by Hamadou Kouffa carried out several attacks in central Mali, including assassinations of local political figures and security forces, as well as the destruction of an 'idolatrous' mausoleum. Other Islamist terrorists groups operate in the Sahel and Sahara regions of Africa; a case in point is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).FLM has employed the strategy of rallying nomadic Fulani herdsmen to its Islamic agenda through common Fulani language. If this is achieved, it would give terrorists traction among deep-seated societies that cover wide expanses of territory. It would thus confer a new ferocity, persistence, and reach upon terrorism in Africa. Conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmer populations has a long and brutal history in West Africa that considerably predates the sub region's terrorist challenges. Since 2001, over 60,000 people have died in pastoralist-related violence in Nigeria alone, often in murderous spikes of bloodshed. In early 2001, 913 people in Jos, Nigeria, died in Fulani herdsman–farmer violence in just a few days. Such killings have occasionally involved atrocities and desecrations. Fulani herdsmen are rumoured to have removed hearts from victims. Farmers, meanwhile, can be seen apparently eating the charred flesh of Fulani victims in videos circulated on Nigerian social media. In 2015, over 1000 Agatu people of Benue were massacred by Fulani headers; in January, 2018, about 73 Benue state indigenes mostly women and children were slaughtered in cold blood in a night attack by the rampaging herdsmen.

While herder-farmer tensions will undoubtedly persist in Africa, they will be worsened through association with terrorists who actively aggravate hostilities and manipulate ethnic and religious differences attached to the two lifestyles. Pastoralist-farmer grievances are common across Africa. In many cases, these tensions are deepened by Muslim-Christian divisions. By making inroads with the Fulani, the FLM is targeting one of Africa's largest ethnic groups, a primarily cattle-raising community of some 20 million people

spread across nearly 20 nations in West and Central Africa. In addition to the Fulani, other African Muslim pastoralists are currently facing a terrorist challenge in areas such as the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa. Northern Kenya is home to several herder communities, including the Turkana and Pokot, whose clashes with neighbouring communities are becoming more violent through increased gun trafficking. Uganda and South Sudan have seen pastoralist violence as well. In one 2012 poll, almost half of respondents living along the South Sudan–Kenya border region had witnessed at least one violent event (Leff, 2012).

General pastoralist grievances and conflicts could facilitate terrorism's push into new areas. Islamist terrorists might mobilize herder communities in order to penetrate the Central African Republic and accelerate religious elements of that conflict. They also might exploit pastoralist tensions to extend their influence into Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As desertification and drought displace transhumance zones, new conflicts over water and land could provide terrorist groups further opportunities to make inroads. It should be recalled that pastoralists too have been victimized by terrorists. Boko Haram has not only raided farms for food, it has attacked herders to take livestock. Cattle markets have been destroyed, devastating pastoralist livelihoods, and breeder's associations report losing thousands of lives and hundreds of thousands of animals to the conflict. And Boko Haram exploits communitarian tensions, reportedly disguising its members as Fulani herdsmen in order to escape detection and move into new areas, then conducting attacks that intensify herder-farmer hatred and instability.

Nigeria in recent times has witnessed an unprecedented level of violent crime and general insecurity for-instance, armed banditry, kidnapping, insurgency, oil bunkering to mention a few remained unabated. This has made national security threat to be a major issue for the government and has prompted huge allocation of the national budget to security (Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce, 2016). In order to ameliorate the incidence of crime, the federal government has embarked on criminalization of terrorism by passing the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2011, fundamental surveillance as well as investigation of criminal related offences, heightening of physical security measures around the country aimed at deterring or disrupting potential attacks, strengthening of security agencies through the provision of security facilities and the

development and broadcast of security tips in mass media. Despite these efforts, the level of crime and insecurity in the country is still high. In addition, Nigeria has consistently ranked low in the Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012), signifying a worsened state of insecurity in the country.

Security and Development in Africa: An Appraisal

Africa plays a strategic role in global affairs and this explains why her security and development continue to gain international concern. As Bouchat puts it: "Africa poses important security concerns for the world because of its frequent internal conflict, corruption, and weak political structures that have made African states insecure and unstable"(2010, p.11). But the burdens of poverty, disease and under-development have constrained Africa's active involvement and participation in global affairs. This is further exacerbated by weak political will and institutions that tolerate rampant conflict, crime, and corruption all of which threaten Africa's security and prosperity. Put succinctly, President Barak Obama's first official visit to Africa in 2009 purposefully underscored Africa's interconnectedness with the world by making his visit to Ghana part of his mission to a G-8 summit in Italy. He explained, "Africa is not separate from world affairs," but is a fully integrated part of the global economy. As Africa has grown more important to both the United States and the rest of the world, we need to better understand its debilitating problems and their causes, so that we might chart courses of action by which to address them. But this starts with an understanding of the root causes of insecurity in Africa.

Assessing Insecurity Causes and Concerns in Africa

For Africa to achieve genuine security and development, certain fundamental factors need to be highlighted. It begins with the realisation that the drivers of conflict and violence include young populations, high unemployment, lack of equal opportunities, urbanization, poverty, inequality, too many guns, bad governance and corruption (World Economic Forum, 2016). The frequent unrest and upsurge in violence have caused huge socio-economic devastation with the attendant chronic instability in the region. This provides fertile ground for violent extremism to grow thereby forcing millions of people to flee their homes with no sign of abetting.

The first factor of consideration is bad governance. Perhaps the most important driver of violence and conflict in Africa today is weak and unconsolidated governance. Bad governance and corruption don't just undermine development; they also drive violence. Yet the moral and financial investment in fighting downstream consequences of corruption - including terror, drug trafficking and organised crime - is much greater than the investment in stopping graft. In addition, too many developed countries tolerate the export and enabling of corruption by Africa's corporate and individual citizens.

The second factor is the large army of unemployed youth. The alarming rate of youth unemployment continues to pose serious threat to Africa's security and development. Many young people are deprived of a quality education, stable employment, political voice/participation and other important essentials of life. This has increased the risk of violence, criminal activities and general insecurity. In the case of Nigeria, the lack of basic necessities by the people in Nigeria has created a pool of frustrated people who are ignited easily by any event to be violent. The migration of jobless youths from rural areas to urban centres is also one of the causes of insecurity in Africa. Africa is one of the continents in the world with very high rural/urban drift. Most urban areas in Africa have grown beyond their environmental carrying capacities and existing infrastructure and this has resulted to increased poor quality of the living conditions in urban areas. Out of frustration, these youths are drawn into crime. As a result of the high level of unemployment and poverty among Africans, especially the youths, they are adversely attracted to violent crime. Failure of successive administrations in Africa to address challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequitable distribution of wealth among their ethnic nationalities is one of the major causes of insecurity in the continent.

The third factor is the method of natural resource exploitation. Africa is blessed with abundant natural resources and land, but they have often been exploited irresponsibly. This has damaged the environment, widened wealth inequality and fuelled resentment and conflict. The militants in the Niger delta often cite environmental degradation and destructive effect of oil exploration as the reason for the blowing up of pipe-line and other violent activities. Other factors are as follow:

Ethno-religious conflicts: These have arisen from distrust among various ethnic groups and among the major religions in the country. Ethno-religious conflict has become a major source of insecurity in Nigeria in particular and other African States in general. Ethno-religious conflict is a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation. Frequent and persistent ethnic conflicts and religious clashes between the two dominant religions (Islam and Christianity), present the continent with a major security challenge. For-instance, in most parts of Nigeria, there exist ethno-religious conflicts and these have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often structured around ethno-religious identities. The claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government, councils, control of markets and sharia among other trivial issues have resulted in large scale killings and violence amongst different ethnic groups in Africa.

Conflict of perceptions between the public and government: Over the years, there has been a standing mismatch between public and government perceptions. A situation which often results in the reactions of the public to the excesses of the military regimes which characterised the greater period of African continent has continued after the end of protracted military regimes and created sensitivity by those in government at public intrusion in matters of state.

Weak security system: This result from inadequate equipment for the security arm of government, both in weaponry and training. This is in addition to poor attitudinal and behavioural disposition of security personnel. In many cases, security personnel assigned to deal with given security situations lack the expertise and equipment to handle the situations in a way to prevent them from occurring. And even when these exist, some personnel get influenced by ethnic, religious or communal sentiment and are easily swallowed by their personal interest to serve their people, rather than the nation. Thus, instead of being national watch dogs and defending national interest and values, and protecting people from harm by criminals, they soon become saboteurs of government effort by supporting and fuelling insecurity through either

leaking vital security information or aiding and abetting criminals to acquire weapons or to escape the long arm of the law. Again, the porosity of African states borders have serious security implications for these countries. Given this porous borders caused by the weak security system, weapons move freely among countries most especially in West African region. Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation and the availability of these weapons have enabled militant groups and criminal groups to have easy access to arms and unleash mayhem on the people. For-instance, Nigeria is estimated to host over 70 percent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa. Also, the porosity of the Nigerian borders has made it possible for unwarranted influx of migrants from neighbouring countries such as Republic of Niger, Chad and Republic of Benin. These migrants which are mostly young men are some of the perpetrators of crime in the country.

Loss of socio-cultural and communal value system: The traditional value system of the Nigerian society like most African societies is characterized by such endearing features as collectivism, loyalty to authority and community, truthfulness, honesty, hard work, tolerance, love for others, Mutual harmony and co-existence, and identification of individual with one another (Other distinctive features of Nigerian traditional society are abhorrence for theft and high value for live. Stealing was considered extremely disgraceful and lives were also highly valued). All of these values which made society secured and safe have all gradually been thrown away and lost. New values have taken over their place over the years, with the so called 'modernity and civilization'. All our endearing values and morals have been traded off for western values.

Terrorism: At the most proximate and least disputable level, terrorism is the most fundamental source of insecurity in Africa today, and its primary bases and sources of support have generally been located in religious fanaticism and intolerance. As "the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts" which has cost 13.4 per cent of the world gross domestic product. Africa has lost more than 60000 lives since 2009 to the insurgency. Infamous sect such as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, Al-shabab in Somali/East Africa are the leading terrorist groups in

Africa and they have carried out destruction of lives and properties on a large scale. Political instability - A country which lives in political instability is an insecure country. These countries attract criminals, terrorists and all those taking advantage of disorder. Political instability, as the State weakness, does not enable a country's institutions to function normally and this causes disorder and leads to underdevelopment.

All of the factors above are succinctly summarized in four factors: political conflicts; unbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities; religious/ethnic distrust; and leadership failure. It could be associated with low level of economic development as a result of poor governance and high level corruption.

Rethinking Security and Development in Africa
(Progressive Approach)
Internal and regional security are strong pre-requisite for attaining development in Africa and at the core of this is good governance which is the structure upon which other problems will be solved(Bouchat,2010). Similarly, Mazzitelli (2017) argued that African governments, institutions, and the international community as a whole should review its approach to development policies by not only mainstreaming the issues of security in their bilateral and multilateral agenda, but also by making it an essential cornerstone of policies and programmes aimed at supporting good governance and by implication development. What this means is that Africa may not achieve the much desired security and development if it continue to treat the issue of good governance with levity. The advanced countries of the world have what it takes to demand good governance from African leaders.

Security and development are inextricably tied in the sense that Security influences a country's developmental process. On the other hand, Insecurity disrupts countries and prevents the achievement of development programmes (Kotia, 2016). Development provides well-being to population. A country that does not experience economic and social development cannot lay claim to welfare. The three factors are interrelated, which means, ensuring security in order to support the development process that leads to social well-being of citizens should not only become a priority but a matter of state policy. However, dashed expectations due to political mal-governance undermine

security. Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu believes that in apartheid South Africa, "Stability and peace came when the inalienable rights of all were recognized."Political access and change are necessary to allow the readjustment and balance often required to avert violence in fragile states of Africa. Former President Bush of USA in his last trip to Africa in 2008 summed it up by insisting that with proper international assistance to Africa in the areas of security and good governance, its contributions to the world and to the continent's own well-being will improve.

Development is used in a broad sense as the "progressive improvement of the human condition in both material and nonmaterial ways. Economic growth may occur without improving human, political, or physical well-being. Economic development is closely associated with human development and together they lay a foundation for an economy to sustainably boost itself through more sophisticated value-added activities by building social capital in education, equality, freedoms, culture, security, stability, and good governance; demographic well-being through improved health and population distribution; and economic capital in terms of better infrastructure, investment, diversification, and management.

Economic development seeks to lessen environmental degradation, social and political inequality, and other stresses that sometimes accompany unregulated economic growth. By any measure of national income, the economies of Africa perform poorly when compared to the rest of the world.

Africa's economy has only grown as fast as its population. With only 10 percent of the world's population, Africa has 30 percent of the world's poor. The number of poor people doubled from 1980 to 2017 to about 500 million, making Africa the only region in the world where the number of poor is rising over the long term. Africa lags the rest of the world in development in large part because its economies are the smallest and least productive in the world. This comparative global disadvantage has grown rapidly since the great age of European discovery began in the 1450s. At that time, the difference between Europe and Africa was small, with Europeans impressed by the African empires' wealth, organization, and strength so that Europeans traded with Africans as equals and the Portuguese entered into alliances with African states.127 Today, despite the often negative indicators of Africa's situation,

there are some success stories on the continent and a general, although not universal, trend toward economic growth averaging over 5 percent annually between 2000 and 2017.

Political will is required to achieve development in Africa and Africa is making progress in this regard. Indeed, the African Union (AU) recognises that national and regional governance institutions need to be strengthened. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is seeing somewhat of a revitalisation, and the AU's African Governance Architecture (AGA) is increasingly part of mainstream discussions on the need for more integrated responses to Africa's security and development challenges. But task of building and consolidating institutions requires long-term persistence. Furthermore, there is a growing need to tackle corruption, improve transparency and secure the democratic space. State presence needs to be strengthened in "grey zones", where problematic non-state actors such as extremist groups, terrorist organizations and criminals have flourished in the absence of government control and even established their own administrations. Grey zones in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular, are becoming global hubs for criminal activity, including illicit fishing, piracy, and trafficking of drugs, arms and people.

The (growing) imbalance between levels of human development and economic growth and political and social inclusion remains a key threat to stability. In settings where democracy has not been entrenched, there is a lack of transparency and trust in the process, or where the government has been actively factional in benefiting one ethnic group above others, election-related violence often occurs. The role of social media as an "amplifier" is still not contended with by regional leaders. Leaders have sometimes been unwilling to step down when ousted in a vote and use various methods, both legal and otherwise, to prolong their stay in power such as in Burundi and the unfolding situation in the DR Congo. The increasing connectedness of the population should also be viewed as an opportunity to address the deficit, including better civil education programmes and election monitoring and the quality of civic processes.

Strengthening Regional Institutions

After years of talking about it, African regional organisations are finally starting to provide solutions to African problems. These institutions must further improve their ability to positively influence national politics, monitor internal behaviours of member states and prevent human rights violations. Over time, more robust regional and national conflict resolution structures and mechanisms are being developed but still struggle to raise necessary funds and mobilise sufficient political support to become fully operational. These need in turn to be given space and support by non-African actors who are accustomed to intervening in African affairs. There is a need to go beyond existing mechanisms to create regional and sub-regional forces that are equipped to deal with security issues, including the spread of transnational organised crime, terrorism and election-related violence. However, this must be done in ways that avoid adding to the region's problems with increasing militarization (in spite of the overall defence expenditure of the continent remaining low).

Investing in the Youth

Africa is a young continent, with the median age at just 19 years. The protruding youth population could become an important economic boost to the region. It is also critical to promote an education system "fit for purpose" with a strong focus on entrepreneurship and technology to optimise opportunities and re-frame narratives. Failing to do so will have wide-ranging consequences. If large populations of youth are sufficiently disillusioned with their prospects that they try to migrate elsewhere in search of economic opportunities, social cohesion could be challenged, within and outside of Africa. It is critical to harness the potential of the continents youthful population and meet their expectations for education, opportunities and jobs to create long-term security.

Tackling Poverty through Inclusive Growth and Social Welfare Scheme

Poverty and social injustice have long been drivers of insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. In some countries this is further exacerbated by armed insurgencies and terrorist groups who feed off widespread frustration, especially among young people. Economic growth on the continent is forecast to continue at healthy average rates of 5-7% per annum, but there is an urgent need to ensure it raises living standards more broadly to tackle extreme

poverty and inequality across the continent. The rapid growth and the uneven spread of foreign investment around cities and certain sectors are cementing this. The infrastructure needs remain high, and the importance of fully internalising the importance and needs of cities and the built environment more critical. Putting into place policies for inclusive growth, investments in education and health, and providing public services to the poorest, would improve social cohesion and harmony in African societies and ensure the economic allure of Africa as an area of investment for regional as well as external partners.

There is further need to adopt and place more emphasis on what Beebe (2011) referred to as tactical level survival approach (sustainable security) in dealing with the issues of Africa's security and development. Given the atmosphere of violence and uncertainty prevalent in Africa, people living under the threat of death from violence, disease, or other factors concentrate specifically on 'tactical' level survival for that single day. Over the long term what this means is that those populations mortgage their future 'sustainable development' for survival today. The choices made for survival today most likely make survival tomorrow more difficult as these people destroy their natural environment for immediate resource requirements; pollute or deplete water sources; go for years without formal education, making them more susceptible to recruitment into local militias, gangs, transnational criminal organizations, or terrorist groups; remain outside the possibilities of global market connections. There is a reason one can't cry, "Fire!" in a crowded theatre - panic ensues. Yet, this is exactly the case in many parts of Africa. Desperate populations living in panic and a vortex of violence will continue to make desperate decisions befuddling many traditional international development efforts. Populations must first perceive they have some persistent degree of safety for themselves and their families to break this vortex of violence and tactical level survival panic decisions. This is what is meant by sustainable security. So, once this point is understood, the need to increase the level of African security comes far more into focus. The question then shifts from 'if' Africa needs a higher level of security to 'how' to go about it.

This is where a new security paradigm is needed that better aligns with the needs and wants of Africans. Until the western countries tarry a while in dictating for Africans on what is right for their security and begins to listen to

what Africans see as *relevant* to their security, the west will continue to marginalize its influence, in a time when Africa has a choice for its strategic partners and can readily choose an alternative Chinese or other model. What is needed is a security model addressing the conditions of instability rather than the kinetics traditional security threats. Africans best understand a human security approach. Focus on human security will help a great deal in accomplishing developmental needs of the continent. A human security model would see the shift in the needs of African military away from standing armies trained in traditional national defence roles to a more tailored and responsive security force to counter those creeping vulnerabilities the country might face; African militaries trained in civil engineering and infrastructure development, water and sanitation, medical and health professions, aviation, finance, and even farming techniques. Why? One of the greatest impediments to African development is the lack of a skilled work force. One of the greatest impediments to 'downsizing' African militaries is that they have no vocational skills other than basic infantry skills. Putting former combatants and soldiers on the streets with no skills other than how to pull a trigger, and no job prospects, certainly doesn't lend itself to the stability and security of the continent.

The reality of African militaries is that they tend to be one of the only functioning elements of the government. To begin using the military to train skilled vocations that would then become the foundation of the national work force has multiple benefits. First, by training the military on job skills crucial for national development, the military becomes a value-added to the society and not a predatory element. Second, these trained labourers can then be released from the military to make the foundations of a skilled national workforce, giving African governments more independence from foreign companies and influence. Finally, through shifting the focus of militaries away from defence and more towards human security concerns, these militaries can immediately begin to provide for the much-needed sustainable security. Not only is this important for the security and stability of one country, but these same skills can then be transferred and shared with other developing countries in Africa.

The concept of African solutions to African problems should leverage on human security paradigm to achieve the desired security and development in Africa.

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Social Factors and Challenges of Effective Crime Control and Prevention in Nigeria

2

CHAPTER

Olabode Bashir Olakunle
Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan

Introduction

Social problems are global issues in the present word. Every society across the globe has its peculiar problems and challenges including Nigeria. Nigeria like other developing countries which are mostly located in the continent of Africa is bedevilled with myriads of social, political, economic and cultural problems which have in no small measure affected the well-being of the populace. One of such problems bedevilling the country is the rising wave of crime. This study examined the increasing wave of crime in Nigeria and the factors incapacitating the police and other security agencies in the task of crime prevention and control. This study reveals that the security agencies are inadequately equipped and motivated, coupled with poverty, unemployment and the breakdown of family values among others have made crime prevention and control a difficult task. The paper proffered that the police should be better motivated and greater effort should be made to address poverty and unemployment coupled with enhancement of the work of private security outfits.

Nigeria as a nation is reported to be blessed by enormous human and natural resources. It is thought that the exploitation and utilization of these resources will no doubt enhance the development of the Nigerian nation but in spite of the exploitation, sales and generation of revenues, and other forms of utilization of these resources, Nigerian nation is bedevilled by serious crises of development.

Fundamental to the emergence of the modern state is the need to cooperatively exploit the productive potentials available to a sovereign people towards the attainment of a qualitative standard of living. In the opinion of Aristotle in Nzelibe, Amobi and Emejulu (1996), the state originates for the sake of life and continues to exist for the sake of the best life. The state is usually assisted in this direction by a government. Wilson (1936) clearly asserts that government is the instrument of the state (and so for the people) by means of which the purpose of the state are sought to be realized.

There has been the tendency right from independence to view national security in Nigeria as an exclusive domain of the coercive agencies of the government. In assessing security arrangements, greater focus has away been on internal security. In this respect, the main thrust of security was to suppress and repress the Nigeria people. This approach to national security is premised on the fact that security is always seen not from its causes but from its effects. Hence security has always come to be viewed from the criminality of the people and not what turns them into criminals. The usual answer to the crime level is to equip the coercive agencies, that is, the police and the military to deal squarely with the phenomenon. In the process the security becomes militarize.

Inability to use the appropriate tools in analyzing Nigeria's national security problems right from the colonial period till date is the reason for the difficulties in our national security. The national security problems of Nigeria hinge on the factors of the nation's economic underdevelopment, which has led to social injustice, acute food shortage, population explosion low level of productivity and unemployment just to mention a few. Any country that seeks to achieve adequate security against the background of acute food shortage, population, and low level of productivity, fragile infrastructure base for technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic problem of unemployment has a false sense of security.

The prevalence of crime in the world today is a cause for serious concern for all and sundry. It undermines the social fabric by eroding the sense of safety and security. Crime impacts on society in a variety of ways according to the nature and extent of crime committed. It constitutes a problem when its incidence is so rampant in the society as to constitute a threat to the security of persons and property, as well as social order and solidarity. The costs of crime are tangible and intangible, economic or social, direct or indirect, physical or psychological, individual or community. In fact, it is from the cost that the consequences of crime are derived. The cost of crime can be incurred as a result of actual experience of criminal activities, when there is physical injury, when properties are stolen, damaged or destroyed. It could also be in the form of psychological and emotional pains as a result of shock due to the crime done against the victim. Also the cost of crime can be incurred in an attempt to prevent or control crime. As a consequence of the prevalence of crime in society, the demographic composition may be altered through mass movement of people from crime-prone areas to areas perceived to be relatively crime-free. This can also lead to brain-drain and other socio-economic problems.

Crime is a threat to the economic, political and social security of a nation and a major factor associated with underdevelopment; because it discourages both local and foreign investments, reduces the quality of life, destroys human and social capital, damages relationship between citizens and the states, thus undermining democracy, rule of law and the ability of the country to promote development. Emile Durkheim considered crime to be an integral aspect of society and a "normal" social phenomenon in the sense that it has existed in all societies throughout history. Durkheim believe that *mala prohibita* crimes (crimes which violates social norms) functions in society as a means of defining the limits of acceptable behaviour, serving as vehicle for social change by extending and testing those boundaries.

The Notion of Crime
Crime is like other concepts in social sciences, which have no generally accepted definition. At first sight, it seems easy to define crime as doing something wrong or relating crime to immorality. Is there any agreement over what is morally wrong or right? Should all moral wrongs be crimes? It could also be asked whether all crimes are moral wrongs. In a strict legal sense, crime

is the breaking of rules or laws for which some governing authority (via mechanisms such as legal systems) can ultimately prescribe a conviction. Crime in the social and legal framework is the set of facts or assumptions that are part of a case in which there were committed acts punishable under criminal law, and the application of which depends on the agent of a sentence or security measure criminal. In criminal law, crime is an act of omission which attracts sanctions such as fines, imprisonment or even death.

According to Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (2009:139) "a crime is held to be an offence, which goes beyond the personal and into the public sphere, breaking prohibitory rules or laws, to which legitimate punishments or sanctions are attached, and which requires the intervention of a public authority… for crime to be known as such, it must come to the notice of, and be processed through, an administrative system or enforcement agency. It must be reported and recorded by the police (or other investigator); it may then become part of criminal statistics; may or may not be investigated; and may or may not result in a court case." Furthermore, a normative definition views crime as a deviant behaviour that violates prevailing norms – cultural standards prescribing how human beings ought to behave normally.

This approach considers the complex realities surrounding the concept of crime and seeks to understand how changing social, political, psychological and economic conditions may affect the current definitions of crime and the form of legal, law enforcement and penal responses made by society. For example, as cultures change and the political environment shifts, certain behaviour may be 'criminalized' or 'decriminalized', which will directly affect the statistical crime rates, determine the allocation of resources for the enforcement of such laws and influence general opinion. The conflict orientation sees crime in the perspective of the ruling class. They defined crime as an act or behaviour selectively identified by the few who governed in the society. Society consists of competing interest groups which are in conflict with each other, due to unequal distribution of wealth which results in inequality in economic and social powers. According to Quinney (1980), "dominant class creates laws that will protect their own interests. That lower class crime as a function of miserable life condition and conflict with the interest of the dominant class; and that the dominant class constructs beliefs about crime which makes the dominant class look good and the powerless look bad."

Dambazau (1994), defined crime as "an act or omission against public interest, and which is prescribed by law enacted by the legislature in the overall interests of the society, and to which prescribed punishment is attached in the event of violation and it involves four major principles which are public wrong, moral wrong, law and punishment for the criminal. Crime is also seen as a violation of the rules agreed to be respected by all members of the society, and upon which the rest members of the society mete sanction upon those guilty of the violation. It is for the same reason that the legal system views crime as a public and moral wrong. For Mathews (1993), crimes are the outcome of social changes, which is brought about by social developments and exposure of Nigerians to the Western culture and their life style. Crime is in an important sense, a socially constructed phenomenon. Its meaning is profoundly influenced by considerations of time and space. Its construction is based upon the interaction of four key elements – victims, offenders, the state and the public. The interaction of four key elements which are; victims, offenders, the state and the public. Criminologists infer that crime has two major elements, - criminal act which is either a commission or an omission and mental element which is called the criminal intent/committed. Both of the elements may pose serious threat to the physical, mental health, life and property. Therefore, crimes must have these two elements and if either of them is lacking, then there is no crime.

Problem Statement

Nigeria is currently confronted with serious security challenges that constitute immediate, short term and long-term threats to security and development. Resolving these challenges is the constitutional and statutory responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and other public security agencies. However, Nigeria is poised with the problem of providing policing services to all the citizens. This is due to a combination of structural, political, economic, and socio-cultural factors, as well as, institutional inadequacies, policy, resource, and image constraints. The desire to reduce the burden on state agencies of protecting their citizens has been a major decision driver in the growth of the private security sector in Nigeria. Private Security Outfits provide another level of law enforcement outside mainstream policing that should not be ignored. For instance, Arase (2013, p.18) discussed the importance of private security outfits when he highlighted their achievements in Cape Town, South Africa.

They are responsible for patrols and safety of the city center. Perhaps, they maintain contact with the city police control room by radio and supervise the area's Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).

However, in Nigeria, the services and resources they offer have not been adequately harnessed by the government. For example, we witness Policemen being detailed to protect wealthy people, known as VIPs, a function which could have been contracted to Private Security Outfits by these VIPs. In more ways than one the resource offered by the private security sector of Nigeria has been ignored, as evident in Ekhomu's (2013) statement, when he referred to these private security outfits as "likely" allies in the fight against crime and insecurity. Many ex-police officers and others with an interest in crime prevention and public safety are engaged in the private security sector and many of these people have expertise that could enhance the success of a national crime prevention and public safety program. These Private Security Outfits have the same aims as the public police, i.e. crime prevention and safety. This paper contends that omitting such a large body of personnel that could contribute so much to the anti- crime program would be a waste of national resource.

The Concept of Security

Security is a very important issue in the survival of any Nation. Without adequate security of lives and property, the system will be rife with lawlessness, chaos and eventual disintegration. This is why security is considered as a dynamic condition, which involves the relative ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interests. The security so concerned with by states, is multifarious. It might be military, economic, ideological or cultural.

Accordingly, the security for any state embodies a notion of order, or of the conditions necessary to maintain the smooth functioning and reproduction of an existing society. According to McGrew (1988:101), the security of a nation is predicated on two central pillars. On one hand, it entails the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order in the face of internal and external threat. On the other, it entails the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimize the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order.

In a similar manner, Nwolise (2006) explained that security is an all–encompassing holistic concept which implies that the territory must be secured by a network of armed forces: that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government, which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the people themselves, the people must not only be secured from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals, unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental   degradation, pollution and socio-economic injustices.

Furthermore, the primary objective of Nigeria's national security is to advance her interest and objectives to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development progress and growth, and improve the welfare and wellbeing and quality of life of every citizen.

The second aspect of the nation's national security entails the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country's integrity and its interests. Also the concept of Internal security duties are generally related to activities which takes place as protest against the actions of government and non-government bodies, religious intolerance, political thuggery and agitations which are likely to overstretch there sources of the police and other law enforcement agencies.

Similarly, the enforcement of internal security duties have seen the Army establishing various units like the joint task force in the Niger Delta and deploying troops to flashpoints to douse conflicts in these areas. The crises in these troubled areas no doubt are manifestations of agitations and discontent exhibited by various groups due to government policies of deprivation, marginalization and social injustice – a situation, which has created avenues for "crises of legitimacy; the struggle for ascendancy between sub national and national loyalties, which, tend to open the floodgates of irredentists and separatist claims" (Omotosho, 2004).

Theoretical Framework
Durkheim (1933) believed that the specialized division of labour and the rapid expansion of industrialized society contained threats to social solidarity. They tended to produce a situation of anomie, which literally means normlessness.

Anomie is present when social controls are weak, when the moral obligations that constrain individuals and regulate their behaviour are not strong enough to function effectively. He argued that crime is an inevitable and normal aspect of social life. It is inevitable because not every member of society can be equally committed to the collective sentiments (the shared values and moral beliefs) of society. Durkheim saw a number of indications of anomie in late 19th century industrial society in particular in high rate of suicide and other crimes, industrial conflicts etc. With increased prosperity, desires increase; the traditional rules lose their authority and behaviours become more exigent and impatient of control. He believed that solution to anomie could be provided within the existing framework of industrial society. Globally, the police as an agent of government have the legal function to prevent and control crime in the society. In the Nigerian context in the 21st century, the breakdown of family values, high unemployment rate, the prevalence of the twin evils of bribery and corruption, and the inability of the police to function effectively in the prevention and control of crime due to inadequate equipment and demoralized personnel, have all contributed significantly to the breakdown of law and order. It is a fact that there is a reign of chaos and terror in the polity and citizens sleep with virtually one eye open. On the highways and in the homes, every minute is lived on the edge as criminals may strike anytime. Criminal activities such as murder, rape, theft etc are on the increase and these have thrown the polity into greater confusion and fear. It is indeed a situation of normlessness as the anomie theory stipulates.

Crime Prevention and Control in Nigeria

Nigeria is among the developing countries of the world, and it's experiencing a prevalence of rising crime waves, criminal intentions and varying degree of delinquencies. Nigeria has been on the global crime map since 1980s.[10] The nature of these crimes includes armed robbery, murder, rape, car theft, burglary, fraud, bribery and corruption, food and drug adulteration, gambling, smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping, drug trafficking, money laundering, internet scam, advanced fee fraud and other illegal activities.

It is preposterous that in Nigeria, there is no adequate will and genuine intention by any government to rid the society of the criminal tendencies and manifestations, as people in the leadership positions are also guilty of

corruption and crime. An example of such flagrant disregard for diligent prosecution is the case of the former Governor of Delta State, Nigeria, Chief James Ibori who was found not guilty of corruption in Nigeria, but has since been jailed in the United Kingdom money laundering crime. The trial of many former Governors for corruption while in office has been going about 8 years with no end in sight, while they have moved on to other political offices while the trial drags on without diligent prosecution. Dambazzau (2007) defined crime as a pattern of attitudes and behaviours directed both at reducing the threat of crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security to positively influence the quality of life, and to develop environments where crime cannot flourish. It is also the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of crime risk and the initiation of some action to reduce or remove it."[11]. He further asserts that crime control involves the idea of solving crime problems, arresting suspects, prosecuting and incapacitating offenders.[12] The control of crime, therefore, deals with the immediate situation and rests on the discovery of past criminal behaviour.

The establishment of other agencies like State Security Service (SSS), Independent Corrupt Practices and other offences Commission (ICPC), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is a laudable effort towards crime prevention and control, their narrow focus and few personnel inhibits them from functioning in a broad day to day manner like the police. Some of them apart from the State Security Service that is consigned to the gathering of intelligence reports don't exist even at the State or Local Government levels. The leaves the day to day policing of the entire country more at the door-steps of the police. The capacity of the police and other security agencies in Nigeria to effectively prevent and control crime in has often been called to question. As a matter of fact, many have lost faith in the security agencies going by the incessant increase in the crime rate. According to Okunola (2002), crime prevention basically involves the disruption of mechanisms, which cause crime events. In other words, the central question to crime prevention is how to disrupt the causes of crime. Crime prevention is a pattern of attitudes and behaviours directed at both reducing the threat of crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security to positively influence the quality of life and to develop environments where crime cannot flourish. Also crime prevention is defined as "the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce

it. [13] Crime prevention and control are, however, closely related and their elements overlap. Crime prevention involves the community, government as well as individuals; crime control involves the whole of the criminal justice system, that is, the police, courts and prisons. [14]

Models of crime prevention vary across countries, but for Robert (2003), Criminologists have adopted three perspectives of crime prevention as primary, secondary and tertiary preventions. a. Primary Prevention: This attempt to change environmental conditions that provide opportunities for or precipitate occurrence of criminal acts. At this stage, the police are the primary focus and three main issues are involved which are – increasing the effort, increasing the risk of committing crime, and reducing the reward for the potential offender. b. Secondary prevention: This involves engagement in early identification of potential offenders by seeking to intervene to prevent criminal behaviour from developing. In other words, it seeks to change people especially those at high risk of embarking upon criminal career before they do so. The mass media, various bodies and organizations like Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and propaganda are involved. c. Tertiary Prevention: This measure deals with actual offender and interventions aimed at preventing further criminal acts. It also focuses upon the truncation of the criminal career in length, serious and frequency of offending. The intervention or treatment of known criminals is centred at the prisons and probation services.[15]

The Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Crime Prevention and Control by the Police in Nigeria
Section 4 of the Police Act No 23 of 1979, specified the functions of the Nigeria Police Force as: the Police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property, and due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and perform military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required of them by, or under the authority of this or any other Act. According to Critchley (1978) the police was founded to deal with social problems. [16] However, the following are some of the factors militating against the efficiency of the police as required by this provision of this Act.

1. Inadequate equipment: The police lack modern equipment to effectively combat crime in Nigeria. A former Inspector General of Police, Mr. Sunday Ehindero, in 2008 observed that infrastructural facilities and the much needed equipment are in short supply in the police force. Vehicles, communication equipment, scientific tools for investigation, intelligence gathering control equipment are grossly inadequate. Less than 5% of policemen in the States and Federal Capital Territory have walkie-talkie for communication during patrols. Less than 20% of the Police Stations have telephones to respond to distress calls from the public during emergencies. In terms of vehicles, about 5% of the commands have one or no lorry and other operational vehicle.[17] The situation has not really changed till now. According to Michael Askew, retired Superintendent, metropolitan Police, at a training workshop for senior officers of the Nigeria Police in Uyo "Inadequate funding can hamper Police efforts in Nigeria. If they do not have the necessary tools to work; you will be providing room for what will aid corruption in the sector. The police officers in UK and Nigeria do the same job, they want to save the community, deal with crime, terrorism but the difference is that there is great infrastructure in the UK, every officer has a radio, have access to vehicles, petrol but here, a police officer does not even have enough money to put petrol in the police cars. The basic job is the same but Nigeria has less resource that is needed on the ground... inadequate resources and infrastructures have made the Police less effective, and is responsible for the corruption experienced in the force... government must rise to the responsibility of providing sufficient resources to make the Nigeria Police effective in fighting crime as well as efficient in service delivery".[18]

2. Lack of motivation for the police: Motivation is a serious factor as far as efficiency in any endeavour is concern. Motivation goes a long way to encourage a worker to work to maximum capacity. There are policemen who have been on the same rank for fifteen (15) years. It is a fact that less than 25% of the policemen in Nigeria have Barrack accommodation. Also a visit to some of the barracks will reveal the sorry state of the barracks. Some of the barracks are in various states of dilapidation and squalor and are in dire need of renovation to make it habitable for decent conditions of living for the policemen. [19] Also, Sulaiman Musa noted in a Saturday column of Weekly Trust, 4-10 March 2006, page 48 that "the Nigeria police cannot be said to be functional. Apart from the fact that they are underfunded and reduced to mere object of

degradation with meagre salaries, they also have to operate in less habitable places as offices in addition to poor shelters (barracks)… Our police are demoralized and yet they are the ones assigned the tedious and dangerous jobs of patrolling our highways, chasing armed robbers, fishing out criminals, as well as restoration of peace… And are quick to blame them once they perform below our high expectation; unmindful of the condition under which they have to operate.[20] Though this has improved slightly over the years, but much more still needs to be done in order to motivate the rank and file of the police.

3. Lack of co-operation from the public and negative perception of the police*: Crime prevention and control is a collective responsibility. The police cannot do it alone. But the vast majority of Nigerians do not believe in the saying that 'police is your friend', either because of past experience with police or for some other reasons known to them. The public perception of the police in Nigeria has greatly affected the level of support given to the police in combating crime. As a result of this, many refrain from giving valuable information which could have helped to checkmate crime to the police. Public participation is very important in assisting the police to achieve the desired effective crime prevention and control.

4. Poverty: According to Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, poverty is a state in which resources, usually material but sometimes are lacking. Poverty in absolute terms refers to a state in which the individual lacks the resources necessary for subsistence.[21] In other words, poverty is the state of one who lacks a certain amount of material possessions or money. Absolute poverty or destitution refers to the deprivation of basic human needs, which commonly includes food, water, sanitation, clothing, shelter, health care and education. Relative poverty is defined contextually as economic inequality in the location or society in which people live. Poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being, and comprises many dimensions.[22] It includes low incomes and the inability to acquire the basic goods and services necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also encompasses low levels of health and education, poor access to clean water and sanitation, inadequate physical security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity and opportunity to better one's life. Poverty may also be understood as an aspect of unequal social status and inequitable social relationships, experienced as social exclusion, dependency, and

diminished capacity to participate, or to develop meaningful connections with other people in society.[23] The poverty level in Nigeria is very high and this has resulted in an increase in criminal activities. Many have taken up to crime to make ends meet and as a result, the police are over-stretched both in personnel and equipment.

5. **Unemployment:** In Nigeria, the unemployment rate is worrisome. It has consistently increased in the last few years. Recently, a former presidential aspirant in Nigeria, Pat Utomi, wonders why Nigeria experiences rising rate of unemployment despite its rating as one of the fastest growing economies in the world.[24] Unemployed youths are readily available for anti-social criminal activities that undermine the stability of society. The rising rate of unemployment has further affected the effectiveness of the police to combat crime. The police are most time overwhelmed with the enormity and frequency of crime committed. [25] Because unemployment readily creates a large army of potential criminals, effective policing has remained a mirage in Nigeria.

6. **Family breakdown***: The role of the family in maintaining a stable and crime free society cannot be over-emphasized. The increasing rate of family marriage breakdown and its attendant effect on the children and the society at large has become ticking time-bomb because it has given rise to increase in criminal activities by the children of the broken homes. For Iain Duncan Smith, UK Work and Pensions Secretary, "it is important that we recognize the role of marriage in building a strong society, especially if we want to give children the best chance in life. Family life affects all of us – what happens on our streets; in our communities; and in our economy. What you learn from a very early age has a great deal to say about the person you will eventually become and the life you lead."[26]

7. **Bribery and corruption***: The Nigeria police is well known for its rottenness as many of the police officers are known to be corrupt. Bribery and Corruption are twin cankerworms that have eaten deep into the fabrics of the Nigerian society. The police are known not to be exempted from this reckless orgy of financial ignominy. Funds released to the police are known to have been diverted into private pockets. Also, criminals are known to usually bribe their way through and escape the long arm of justice. This has led to the

increase in criminal activities since the criminals know that the police could be bought at a price. Arrested criminals are back on the streets again the next day if they or their god-fathers can negotiate and pay an agreed sum. This has greatly affected the effectiveness of the police in crime prevention and control in Nigeria.

Health Issues

Health care is also important in the equation of national security Chen (2003) says there is a link between global health and human security. One quarter of deaths in the world is due to infectious diseases. The impact of HIV/AIDS on national security and development is also enormous. It creates political and social tension, stunts economic and human development, and reduces the effectiveness of the military. A nation that is dominated by the sick or hungry majority is already an incapacitated nation. Food security, heath security and even ideation security are therefore aspects of national security.

Religious Issues

Religious has been described by Karl Marx as the "Opium of the masses". Doctrines that are at variance with the principles of nationhood are likely to be a source of insecurity to the nation. Religion is the powerful instrument for good and for iii. This power of religion was the principal reason for tussle between church and state in England in the 15th and 16th centuries. A lot of crisis experienced in this country have traces of religious undertone. Examples include, the Maitasine riots, the uproar that greeted Nigeria's admission as the 46th member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Religious issues of this nature tend to constitute security issues to a nation.

Collapsed Infrastructures

The evidence of the dismal state of national security can also be in what Onyegbula (2000) described as the diminishing standard of living and the deterioration of social infrastructure and educational system. For instance, the roads, electricity, pipe born water, refineries, hospitals and schools have not been functioning at their optimum level.

Egwu (2003) says that the security calculus of the Nigerian state failed because it did not include vital aspect of social and national development, such as

provision of basic social amenities. Thus, the Nigerian state could not meet the social, economic, or even the military conditions for national security. These are a clear indication that the core social values and physical infrastructure necessary for establishing and sustaining national security, nation survival and socio-political wellbeing of the people are not there. Some example of the infrastructure that has remained in the chronic or permanent state of disrepair low performance and even stagnation thus consisting a several threat to the national security of the country include the county's airports, sea ports, oil refineries, strategic inter-state highways, rails, bridges etc.

Nigeria has demonstrated that it lacks the fundamental requirements for national security namely a major stockpile of strategic defence, civil or general-purpose infrastructure. This situation exists due to lack of knowledge skills and vision concerning the requirements of true national security. This is compound by the fact that political manipulation and corruption have led to the misuse, embezzlement and misappropriation of the vital material and resources needed to improve the infrastructure for guaranteeing genuine security.

Consequences of Insecurity to the Nigerian Nations
A nation that is riddled with crisis and insecurity can hardly make progress. For one, genuine investors are scared away from such counties. This has in large part become the burden of governments in Nigeria. Government officials either at the states or federal level who have been wooing foreign investors for foreign direct investments have always had the issues of the state of national security dominating their discussions with foreign investors rather than the potentials and opportunities that exists in the state. The foreign direct investor profile of Nigeria for the period 1990-2005 aptly reflects he dire economic consequences face by a nation riddled with insecurity Secondly insecurity in the lands diverts money supposedly meant for development to meet the cost of violence. Likely investors would usually demand for country risk insurance. Most often, large sums of money are spent by Individuals and government on one form of security outfit or another. A typical household in Lagos or Onitsha spends about N5, 000.00 per month on security. This is in addition to fortifying his space at enormous cost.

Third, the tourism potentials of the state are threatened as both tourists and potential investors in the industry will prefer to take their money to a place where there is peace and safety not where the risk of being killed is high.

A fourth point about insecurity is the devastating effect it impacts on the psychological health of individual and the state as a whole. When an individual feels unsafe such state of security may also affect his productivity.

It is obvious that insecurity in the land produces enormous negative consequence that affects meaningful development into the state. The natural question that follows therefore is what should be the way out?

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations
Summary
Nigeria's security concerns and threat perception emanated from many quarters. Over the years, the inability of the government to address the root causes of dissatisfaction, anger and agitation among various groups in the country resulted to serious security challenges confronting the contemporary Nigerian state. This ugly situation has not only denied the Nigerian government enormous revenues, but also led to serious problems such as unemployment, infrastructural decay, poor health status, poor image of Nigeria at regional and global scene, low participation of investors in Nigeria's economic development, relocation of existing investors to peaceful states in Nigeria, among others. These problems are traceable to internal security challenges in Nigeria occasioned by the activities of militias in Niger Delta region, kidnapping in the South-East, these Islamic extremists in Jos crisis, Boko Haram group, armed robbery in many parts of the country, bunkering of Nigeria's oil outlets by saboteurs, among others. In consideration of the consequences of these challenges on the economy of the Nigerian state and to save the country from the brink of total collapse, the need for an effective Nigerian police force is needed despite various shortcomings which includes absence of comprehensive and sustainable welfare policy; inadequate and improper budgetary allocations by government; and corruption both in the budgeting and expenditure processes of the Nigerian police force.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that there is still a long way to go in other to rid the Nation of insecurity. The onus is on the government to work hand in

hand and also aid the Nigerian police force with more human, financial and material resources as well as monitor and ensure the optimal utilization of these resources.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our study on the Causes and effects of insecurity in Nigeria: The challenges and relevance of the Nigerian police force as a panacea has shown that the Nigerian police though statutorily empowered to fight insecurity, has been highly limited by inadequate manpower in terms of quantity and quality; Inadequate funding, Poor crimes and operational information management including inaccurate recording and collation, poor storage and retrieval, inadequate analysis and infrequent publications of criminal statistics, Poor remunerations and Un-hygienic working environment. Even with these various limitations, the Nigerian police force has also made some effort in redeeming her image in some instances, but it is crystal clear that its operations were affected and rendered incredible by the spate of pervasive kidnapping and the boko haram criminality, which saw the army coming in to act on what is statutorily within the purview of the Nigerian police force.

One can conclude that the relevance of the Nigerian police force in relation to the security of the country can be questioned and is incapacitated by the inability of the government to address root causes of insecurity and proffer solution to these root causes.

Recommendations

After careful analyses of the insecurity challenges confronting the country today, there is a great consensus among analysts that the country is currently in a state of siege, not by acts being perpetrated by Boko Haram, but also by other issues and developments. Those who hold this view have called on government to be very careful and tactful in dealing with these issues and developments in the country, so that things do not spiral out of control. They contended that so many issues tackled by government rather than assuage the hurt of Nigerians increased it, citing the fuel subsidy removal strike and protests which they claimed government mismanaged.

Therefore, a cardinal responsibility of any government properly so-called is the control of the instruments of coercion and provision of security, which by

statutory provisions is in the purview of the Nigerian police. The Nigerian police having been saddled with this responsibility must be able to secure the life and property of the average Nigerian. It is on this basis that the following recommendations are made:

i. The act of policing should not be left in the hands of the Nigerian police force alone. States and other organs like the traditional institution, the clergy and civil organizations should be actively involved.

ii. The Police Force should be well equipped to perform its functions well and in compliance with the rule of law.

iii. Presently, the police are highly and visibly subservient to the rich and powerful politicians. Policies should be put in place to withdraw police men attached to these politicians.

iv. Sensitization exercise should be taken as a priority in addressing relationship that exists between the public and personnel of the Nigerian police force.

v. As a matter of urgency, police personnel who are no longer productive as well as those who are corrupt should be retrenched and more skilled youths be injected into the system.

Finally, the role of the police as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, as it concerns crime prevention and control cannot be over-emphasized. The development of a society largely depends on the rate of crime. If the crime rate is high, it could scare away or discourage investors. Also the safety of lives and property is an issue of priority in any given society. Consequently, the government needs to increase its funding for the police so that modern and adequate equipment to combat crime could be acquired. However, such funds are to be properly monitored to avoid diversion into private pockets and also rid the Nigeria police of its corrupt elements. It is also important that the police must be motivated through regular promotion, good salary, and decent accommodation. There is need to strengthen the family institution as well as develop a welfare programme for the children from broken homes, as well as unemployed youths as this will prevent them from being recruited into criminal gangs. If crime is to be reduced to the barest minimum, the government must take pro-active measures towards poverty alleviation. Poverty readily offers a breeding and fertile ground for crime. As such, any effort made towards poverty alleviation automatically translates to

effort made towards crime prevention and control in the society. The police cannot fight crime alone. Intelligence gathering is a veritable tool for crime prevention and control. This is why the members of the public must wake up to assist the police in its functions. The public should be ready at all-time times to give necessary information to the police. This is because, crime is a challenge that all and sundry must confront headlong for a stable and safe society.

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An Examination of Criminology and Cyber Crime in Contemporary Society

3

CHAPTER

Nnawulezi Uche Augustus
Criminology and Security Studies,
Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo,
Abakaliki Ebonyi, State

Introduction

The evolving global environment has as of late seen formative difficulties bordering on cyber crime and its attendant effects. This paper looks at what constitutes an offense of cyber crime under the tenets of International Law as no nation can lay bona-fide claim in managing cyber crime as a criminal phenomenon. Therefore, there has been a plethora of ideological, conceptual and mental propositions of policies aimed at domesticating cyber crimes – an international crime. These policies were as a result of parochial consideration and social foundations which negate the spirit of internationally accepted procedures. The study also noted that the non-domestication of cyber crime laws by most countries has led to an increase in cyber crimes and its attendant effects have remained unabated. The author has pointed out emerging international rules as a panacea for a sustainable cyber crime-free society. The paper relied on documentary evidence and hence scooped much of the data from secondary sources such as text books, journals, articles and periodicals and more so, opinion papers, emanating from international criminal court. It concludes that the necessary

recommendations made in this paper, if fully adopted, shall go a long way in maintaining a cyber crime-free society. Ultimately, the domestic and international law mechanisms capable of dealing with cyber crime offenses should be expanded and be made proactive in order to deal with the demands of modern day challenges.

In this era of technology and progression, obviously understanding the concept "criminology" has to do with a better understanding of the phenomenon of crime. An endeavor to understand crime and aberrance originates before history (Schmalleger, 2009). There is some proof that the term criminology was coined in 1889 (Beirne 1993) by a Frenchman, Paul Topinard, who utilizes it to separate the study of criminal body types within the field of human studies from other biometric interests (Topinard 1894). Besides, Topinard, while he may have authored the term, did little in the meaning of Criminology. As with concept of Crime, different meanings of criminology can be found today in a few written works. 10 years back, a criminologist, Joseph Sheley expressed, "There seem to be almost the same number of meanings of contemporary criminology as there are criminologists" (Sheley 1991). So also, from a phonetic investigation of the word, criminology signifies "the investigation of something", while the word, Crimen originates from the Latin word meaning allegation", "charge" or "blame".

Therefore, semantically, the term criminology truly signifies, "the investigation of criminal allegations that is the investigation of crime". Altogether, a standout amongst the most extensive meanings of the term criminology that is accessible today originates from the European Society of Criminology (ESC) which in its constitution characterizes Criminology as "all insightful, logical and proficient information concerning the clarification, aversion, control and treatment of crime and misconduct, offenders and casualties, including the estimation and detection of crime, enactment, and the practice of criminal law and the law enforcement, legal, and restorative frameworks"(European Society of Criminology Constitution). It should to be noted that ESC's accentuation is particularly on learning, and despite the fact that it mentions the "Practice" of what would term criminal justice that is policing, courts, and corrections, it is the examination and knowledge of such practice that structures the essence of the ESC point of view. For the purposes

of this paper, criminology is just characterized as an interdisciplinary profession, built around the logical study of crime and criminal conduct, including their structures, causes, legitimate angles and control. Thus, this definition demonstrates that criminology incorporates thought of conceivable answers to the problem of crime and as well confirms the perspective of a notable contemporary criminologist who writes that the motivation behind criminology is to offer very much examined and target answers to four fundamental inquiries: (1) "For what reason does crime rates vary?, (2) Why does people vary as to criminality? (3) Why are there varieties in response to crime? (4) What are the conceivable methods for controlling criminality?" (Gibbs 1987).

Definition of Crime

To define crime is task which so far has not been palatably accomplished by any author (Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General of Canada 1931). In any case, a crime may be described, although not defined because of human conduct dynamic or detached which it is the strategy of the administering power in the state to prevent. In any case, the extraordinary qualities of a crime, therefore in current circumstances are that it typically results to punishment that an exceptional legal system is followed in deciding on the guilt of the accused person. The term crime can be defined in a variety of ways, and a few researchers have recommended that no less than four definitional points of view can be found in contemporary criminology. Thus, these various points of view see crime from (1) legalistic, (2) political (3) sociological and (4) mental perspectives. It thus, implies that the perspective that we utilize when viewing crime determines the sort of questions we solicit, the nature of the research we conduct and the kind of answers that we hope to get. Also, the motion of crime as conduct that violates the law derived from earlier work by Paul Tappan, a Criminologist who defined crimes as "a deliberate demonstration infringing upon the criminal law committed without defence or pardon, and punished by the State as a felony or misdeed" (Tappan 1947).

From the legalistic approach to crime, it was righty observed that there are deficiencies to that approach to crime which provides that it yields to the ethical high grounds to powerful people who can impact the making of laws, intense however improper people can get away from the name "criminal".

Albeit developed nations like United States, France and United Kingdom would appear to be safe from such misuse of the authoritative procedure, yet history shows otherwise, the second point of view on crime is the political one, which put the procedure of law creation and criminalization on focal point of the audience. This second viewpoint sees crime as a result of criteria that have been incorporated into law by powerful gatherings and after that used to label selected undesirable forms of conduct as Illegal. A contemporary Criminologist summarizes the political point of view of crime when he writes that:

> One can best comprehend crime in a class-organized society, for example, the United States as the result of a chain of connections including powerful groups that use their forces to establish criminal laws and sanctions against less powerful people and groups that may represent a risk to the group in control. (Galliher 1989).

Additionally disciples of the sociological viewpoint considers crime to be a hostile to social demonstration of such a nature, to the point that its constraint is fundamental or should be important to the conservation of the current arrangement of society (Fattah 1989). Moreso, a few criminologists have gone so far as to assert that any meaning of crime must incorporate all types of solitary conduct (Mannheim 1965). Significantly, a more far reaching sociological meaning of crime was offered by Herman Schwendinger in 1975 wherein he said that Crime incorporates "any unsafe demonstrations", including infringement of the key essentials for prosperity, for example, sustenance, shelter garments, restorative administrations and in addition security from ruthless people or harsh and imperialistic elites (Schwendinger 1975). Additionally, the psychological point of view on crime characterizes crime as a type of social maladjustment which can be assigned as a pretty much articulated trouble that the individual has in responding to stimuli of his environment, so as to stay in agreement with that environment. From the different points of view of crime, it was observed that a unified or straightforward definition of crime is hard to accomplish. Thus, the four viewpoints of crime centres around one end strict legalistic elucidations of crime and on the other by considerably more fluid behavioural and moralistic translation.

Conceptual Understanding of Cyber Crime

Understanding global progression in technology truly has an equal association with computer crimes or cybercrimes. Thus, under the predominant situation, experts have contended that since computer crime may include all classes of crime, a definition must underscore the disposition, the learning or the utilization of computer technology. Cybercrime vary according to a country's socio-cultural idiosyncrasies. In any case, cybercrime can be characterized as far as any criminal activity that uses a computer either as an instrumentality, target or as a methods for sustaining further crimes. More so, cybercrime envelops those types of customary crimes emerging from whether the computer is an object or subject of the conduct constituting the crimes (Singh 2011). Besides, by definition, a computer incorporates any electronic, magnetic, electrochemical, digital, optical or other, rapid information processing, performing consistent, arithmetic or storage functions and incorporates any data storage facility (Rise of Law in Cyber Space 1996). It should be noted that cybercrime alludes to criminal offenses which are with the aid of ICTs, e.g. Internet or cell phones. Likewise, cybercrime is regularly transnational in character; perpetrators can exploit gaps in existing law to keep away from dread or indictment. Cybercrimes today as a rising global phenomenon has extremely represented an extraordinary risk to social orders and economies around the globe. It has additionally been recorded that cybercrimes today is one of the greatest legal frontier which has animated an alternate type of crime and subsequently making a hotspot for new avenues of crime, for example, data fraud, theft, embezzlement, robbery, undercover work, burglary, intrigue, blackmail as well as conveyance of explicit entertainment. All crimes that can be committed in person can now be committed through computers.

In the same vein, cybercrime as a term of art covers an extensive variety of culpable conduct constituting offenses in the typical cybercrime enactment. It is hard to build up a typology or arrangement framework for cybercrimes (Cybercrime, Phenomena, Challenge and Legal Response, Telecommunication Sector, ITU, 2012). Essentially, cybercrime has expanded the frontiers of traditional criminal law as it has come to apply to new sorts of culpability identifying with offenses both under statute and customary law. For example, Cybercrime as characterized in the smaller sense is basically a computer crime which covers any unlawful conduct coordinated by methods

for electronic tasks that objective the security of computer system and the data processed by them (Kumar 2009). Conversely, in a more extensive feeling of computer related crimes, which covers any unlawful conduct conferred by methods for or in connection to a Computer System or network (Stanford Draft International Convention to Enhance Protection from Cybercrime and Terrorism 1999). Prominently in this paper, web innovation has risen as the key facilitator for the tremendous and distinctive types of criminal conduct (Internet Organized Threat Assessment 2011). Subsequently, cybercrime as a global phenomenon cannot be managed just at the national, local or sub-territorial level since there is a parallel improvement of remote offenders and culprits who can while physically situated in one nation can too wreak an unsalvageable harm in other countries, thus, universal cooperation is consequently required to manage the issue of cybercrime by ensuring that cyber criminals cannot exploit gaps and loopholes in procedural laws to avoid capture and prosecution.

Overview of Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Rights in Nigeria

As the world is transformed by the evolution in information technology that is presently in progress, cyber crooks work to every opportunity they find. While cybercrime threats may originate from anyplace, the best test starts where innovation empowers once-detached criminals to unite with each other. In Nigeria today, there is a typical connection between cybercrime and intellectual property rights, which originates from the memorable and multidimensional cooperation amongst law and innovation on one hand and intellectual property rights on the other hand. Thus, the previous has not just impacted on the interaction between man and his innovation, machine, but more significantly, on the unavoidable impact on the current lawful standards and creating new ones, with huge effect on the mode of dissemination of information with reference to intellectual property rights in the new technological milieu. There are numerous laws that regulate both the computer operators and intellectual property rights in Nigeria. These laws are aimed at protecting the operators, creators, author's nature, the frameworks, staff, and in addition giving empowering condition to partners in the two areas. Nonetheless, as for licensed innovation rights, it ought to be comprehended with regards to satisfying certain targets, and in addition adjusting the legalistic pressure that might be found in the examination of the association which puts the weight of securing significant learning resources in

the data correspondence innovation process, which cybercrime control try to administer.

Another point to note is that the legitimate history of the effect of mechanical changes on the dissemination of information is vital to the innovative account of intellectual property rights encroachment or crime as the case may be and cybercrime. Also, technological development, especially with progress in information communication innovation and the advent of the web has rapidly shaped the contours of legitimate principle with the introduction of inventive standards to customary legal speculations especially in the orders of public and private law. As noted in this paper, the definition of the boundaries between intellectual property rights and cybercrime lies decisively in their normal technological root. They have both engaged the different and dynamic manifestation of technology. Cybercrime initially evolved as "computer crimes" with the advancement of computer technology in the 1960s and 70s which later completely with the rise of the web, while then again, intellectual property rights sentiment with technology has had a long standing custom that dates as far back in the seventeenth century origin of copyright law.

Furthermore, by way of emphasis, it should be noted that the advent of computer innovation denoted the beginning of the connection between protected innovation rights and cybercrimes which came about from the different discussions on acts identifying with the utilization of and access to information communication technology. The improvement of new advancements and development of web have altogether affected both protected innovation rights and cybercrimes standards, and have kept on developing unyieldingly as essential parts of legal standards of the global information society. Though computerized theft is particular to licensed innovation rights, cybercrime captures and criminalizes identified offensive conduct that debilitates the integrity of the system or framework or its substance, comprehensive of intellectual property rights. In any case, with the advanced transformation in place, it is no longer in doubt that intellectual property rights infringement has assumed new dimension specific in mirroring the duality of capacities in the effectiveness of dispersion of data and content in the digital environment.

Jurisdictional Issues in the Prosecution of Cyber Crime

Jurisdictional issues have been broadly talked about by writers particularly when prosecution of cybercrime is in issue (Megias 2011). Also, jurisdictional issues additionally emerge from state prosecutors when cause of actions arose in various states, on the grounds that the jurisdictional rules of criminal law require the prosecutor to demonstrate that the respondent proposed to cause harm within his state. The critical place of jurisdiction in prosecution of cybercrimes is tied to its nature of crime that transcends criminal justice system. In this manner, the criminal place of jurisdiction in any criminal prosecution, including cybercrime was aptly cited in Nigerian case (Utih and Onoyivwe 1991). Wherein the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that "Jurisdiction is the blood that offers life to the survival of an action in a courtroom" without which, "the action will resemble a creature that has been depleted of its blood". More so, a comparative perspective of (UBA Plc v. Ademola 2008), where the court established that jurisdiction "is the livewire of a court as no court can entertain any matter where it lacks jurisdiction." Thus, on procedural laws in Nigeria, especially the Evidence Act (Evidence Act 1990) which was enacted in the light of an agragarian and pedestrian society have turned out to be grossly inadequate to cover the present progression in technology with the attendant refinement utilized in the commission and financial crimes.

In the case of (Yestuv v. ACB 1976), the issue as to whether "entries in books of record" as contemplated by the Evidence Act includes computer generated statement or printouts however has turned into an issue of civil debate. The Nigerian Supreme Court only expressed by way of obiter, a readiness to decipher the area more literally in perspective of contemporary business practices and techniques when it noticed that:

> The law can't be and isn't uninformed of present day business strategies and must not close its eyes to the mysteries of computers. In present day times, generations or engravings of records or different reports by mechanical procedures are regular place and s. 37 can't in this manner just apply to books of record so bound and the pages not effortlessly supplanted.

It should be noted that there is a convincing need to reconsider the restrictive parts of Nigerian Laws. The inadequacies of the enactments have ended up being significantly more serious when a consideration of lack of analogies between most cybercrimes and their conventional system. Nonetheless, Professor Yemi Osinbajo (SAN) noted that:

> One particular issue that has emerged from the utilization of electronic budgetary exchanges is the way and methodology for demonstrating the types of confirmation created by these methods or essentially evidence of such exchanges themselves.

In the light of the above, the Federal Government of Nigeria strengthened its commitment against cybercrimes by approving a computer crime prosecution unit under the supervision of the public prosecution unit of the Federal Ministry Justice; this unit will work together with organizations, for example, the EFCC and the telecoms and bank sector. Thus, in the United Kingdom, the English Court held that their current laws did not oblige nor ponder the progressions brought by Computer innovation. Subsequently, in (R v. Gold 1998), the litigant was vindicated in light of the fact that there were no laws to avert unlawful access to a computer; this prompted the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990.

Be that as it may, this Act was soon observed to be ineffectual in addressing cybercrimes; however the obsolete computer Misuse Act was amended and came into force in England and Wales on the first October 2008. More so, the court in (Rv. Smith 2004), held that: in, determining jurisdiction of the court in entertaining the matter, the court shall consider the physical presence of the respondent within England, the fact that considerable criminal activities occurred in England and regardless of whether it was important for the "last act" to be carried out within its jurisdiction. The court also held that:

> The question of whether the English courts have jurisdiction or not relies upon where the last act occurred, and if it is established that a substantial part of the offence is within the jurisdiction of United Kingdom, the English Courts will assume jurisdiction to try the offender..

While in the United States, the issue of jurisdiction has been resolved on a case by case court analysis as opposed to applying strict composed systematized rules. The U.S. approach has generally considered notion of "sensibility" and "fundamental fairness" to the two offended parties and respondents; the base contacts approach and the real and substantial connection with the forum. The United States has a plethora of case laws that has tended to the issue of jurisdiction in various zones of the control of the web. For this situation, a litigant in the US might be sued in the state where he resides, yet when the respondent isn't an inhabitant of the state in which the suit is brought, a court may hear the case just when the court legitimately practices personal jurisdiction ward over the litigant.

The above discussion shows that the United States leads the pack in addressing cybercrimes. The community activity involving the police, the private segment and academics is an encouraging endeavour to include all role players in the battle against cybercrimes and additionally its approval of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention which is commendable in the global battle against cybercrime. In perspective of the significance of the subject and the difficulties it has postured so far in prosecution, the issue with summoning the standard importance of jurisdiction for purposes of prosecuting cybercrimes is precarious principally on the grounds that figuring out where a cybercrime was "committed" is difficult since the guilty party and the casualty might be in different Nations, and further, the offender may exploit computer systems in more than one nation, in the course of committing the offence (Schell 2007). A prescribed approach thus is to expand the definition to arraign in a way that allows the nation to prosecute any cybercrime that is carried out mostly or entirely within the domain of the prosecuting nation. It aligns with the perspective of the essayist that in the light of the challenges postured by jurisdictional issues, even where cyber culprits are detected, arrested and was detained, arraigning them could be difficult aside from where some form of collaboration exists between the arresting authority and the country where the criminal is found. The solutions to resolve conflict of laws, issues and determination of aspects of pertinent laws and jurisdiction for cross border transactions among private parties are generally accomplished through the application of private international law. For this situation, harmonization of both substantive and procedural laws has turned out to be important, given the common conditions. All nations need to

reappraise and reconsider its rules of evidence, search and seizure, electronic spying to cover digitized information in order to conform to present day computer and communication system and the global nature of the web. Likewise, better coordination of procedural laws, in this manner would encourage collaboration in investigation that covers different jurisdictions.

Budapest Convention on Cybercrime

The convention on cybercrime, which likewise is known as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime or the Budapest Convention is the principal global Treaty trying to address web and computer crime by harmonizing national laws, enhancing investigative systems and expanding participation among countries (Convention on Cybercrime 2001). The Tradition and its Explanatory Report was embraced by the ministers of the Council of Europe at its 109th session on 8th November 2001 and was opened for signature in Budapest, on 23 November, 2001 and entered into force on 1 July 2004 (The COE International Convention on Cyber Crime 2004). It is clear that since Budapest Convention entered into force; a few nations like Brazil and India have declined to embrace the convention in light of the fact that they didn't take part in its drafting. More so, Russia opposes the convention, expressing that its adoption would violate Russian Sovereignty, and has as a rule declined to participate in law relating to cybercrime under the Budapest Convention; parties are enjoined to enact legislation and different means that criminalize and punish cybercrime offenders.

Under the above course of action, Nigeria Cybercrimes Prohibition and Prevention Act 2015 was planned after the Budapest Convention despite the fact that the offense under the CPPA are not put under particular groupings as in the case with the Convention. More essentially, under segment 2 of the Budapest Convention, five particular aspects of procedural law were addressed as follows: the sped up conservation and revelation of information (Article 16&17, Budapest Convention 2001), collection of collection of real time traffic data (Article 20, Budapest Convention, 2001), capture attempt of substance information (Article 21, Budapest Convention, 2001), and the pursuit and seizure of computer data (Article 19, Budapest Convention 2001). Budapest Convention as a criminal justice treaty is open for accession by any state that is prepared to execute it and take part in collaboration. Likewise, worldwide calls for technical assistance to fortify criminal justice limits on

cybercrime have been made for quite a long time. Of note in this is Budapest Convention has possessed the capacity to address the difficulties in securing e-evidence for criminal justice purposes. Especially with regards to cloud computing where information is conveyed over to various administrations, providers, areas and often jurisdiction, and where mutual assistance is often not plausible. The Budapest Convention through its arrangements takes into consideration trans-border access to information and therefore encroaches on national sovereignty (Article 32(b), Budapest Convention 2001). In this manner, after an intensive investigation, the cybercrime convention committee affirmed that Article 32(b) o the tradition is restricted in scope in a Guidance Note in 2014. On the other hand, knowledge into the Malaysia's Legislative Framework has demonstrated that (Malaysia Computer Crimes Act 1999) Malaysia Computer Crimes Act 1997 and Mutual Assistance in Criminal issues Act 2002 must be altered to consent to the lawful necessities under the Budapest Convention.

Recommendations

It is recommended that a public private association specifically can help in the adaptability of the private sector to overcome some of the jurisdictional difficulties and in this way give access to evidence held by Private industry. A more effective and dependable global system that will work together with the Attorney Generals of all the state parties to the convention in assisting with procession of extradition and mutual legal assistance request will tremendously help in crime reduction help in crime diminishment and arraignment of cybercrimes around the globe. The International and Domestic laws on cybercrime ought to have the capacity to define access, use and shape ICT's for its capability to transform power relations towards a vision and reality of equality which incorporates cooperation with the media to make mindfulness and place the issue on the public and policy agenda. Every nation should subscribe to the Budapest Convention since it is right now the main global instrument on cybercrime that has provided assistance to state parties in the harmonization of their national laws and furthermore enhance their investigative methods and collaboration. Likewise, since most EU Countries, the US, Japan, Australia, Canada and others have ratified the convention, different nations, for example, Russia, China, India that have declined to approve the Budapest Convention ought to do same since cybercrime is an issue of global concern. Offenses and punishments identifying with basic

national data foundation ought to be legitimately recognized. Subsequently, the foundations would for the most part likely be the instruments, machines, devices and invention used in modern communication and telecommunication services. The idea behind this is to secure capital media transmission resources due to its pertinence to the survival of the nation.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the nature of criminology as it relates with crime and magnitude of cybercrime and the need for coordinated global effort to handle the scourge. The paper observed that divergent legal systems, substantive and procedural laws of various jurisdictions could be a militating factor against efforts to guarantee compelling global participation. Likewise, by the very nature of cybercrimes, its examinations require broad cross-border coordination. The international legal framework needs to catch up with this reality. This implies culprits seeking refuge in countries that provide safe havens for them where there are no or inadequate cybercrime laws to implement an extradition request will automatically be free from any liability. Existing national and territorial laws and implementation instruments ought to be aroused to give the truly necessary driving force to global participation.

In the light of the previous, the unpredictable and delicate nature of the electronic social affair prove process which requires nimbleness in its accumulation, while ensuring its uprightness and keeping up the chain of authority wanted genuinely necessary consideration now or never. Additionally, the need to establish an unmistakable, extensive and strong enactment for individual information security and protection inside the worldwide group can't be over-underscored.

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Crime Prevention Strategies: Issues, Challenges and Benefits in Nigeria

4

CHAPTER

[1]**Kabir Bello** & [2]**Bello Ibrahim,**
[1&2]Department of Sociology,
Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to open a discourse on crime prevention, identify its challenges and provide the means through which Nigeria will benefit from the strategy. To achieve this, the paper thoroughly deconstructed the concept of crime prevention, its strategic levels and then discussed some of the critical issues of crime prevention which will serve as a compass to the proper application of the strategy in Nigeria. These issues are: theoretical, measurement, implementation and evaluation issues. Theoretically, some crime prevention theories were briefly explained and blended into the theoretical issues. They are: situational crime prevention and life course theories. In addition, some social control theories (social bond and self-control) were incorporated to assess the strength of the crime prevention theories. Methodologically, the paper used secondary data and it was able to come up with some important findings; that is, crime prevention strategies have some benefits, the most fascinating of which is the diffusion of benefits. Diffusion of benefits is the unintended advantages that crime prevention strategies bring to individuals, social groups, community or the larger society. However, crime prevention has some weaknesses and/or challenges taking into cognizance the submission of some critics, notably crime displacement

polemics. To overcome these weaknesses, the paper recommended that government, and other public organizations should come up with an agreed yardstick to measure crime prevention using the 'before' and 'after' methods with a view to see the impact of post intervention strategy, etc.

The fact that reactive approach is regarded as an obsolete strategy to dealing crime and criminality because criminal justice shall not wait to witness the occurrence of the crime, as the damage has already been done to a citizen or the state. This notion has made crime prevention, rather than crime control, the best option to ensuring that the crime has not taken place. Crime prevention is the most useful activity that law enforcement agencies can offer since crimes have already been averted once successful crime prevention measures have been put in place; by implication, the victimization costs and/or societal suffering associated with the effects of crime are equally prevented. While the above explanation illustrates the essence of crime prevention, the strategy is viewed in multiple ways to have included some criminal justice policies that involves certain actions that are conceived as crime control. For example, Welsh and Farrington (2010) observed that programs and policies designed to prevent crime can include police arrest as part of an operation to deal with gang problems, a court disposal to a secure correctional facility, or, in the extreme case, a death penalty sentence.

It will be more appropriate to refer to above measures as crime control; because crime prevention strategies are literally efforts at preventing crime or criminal offending before the act has been committed. Yet, both forms of crime prevention share a common goal of trying to prevent the occurrence of a future criminal act, but what distinguishes crime prevention from crime control is that prevention typically operates outside of the confines of the formal justice system. There are, of course, exceptions, as in the case of problem-oriented policing initiatives that incorporate prevention measures (Welsh and Farrington, 2010). In view of this, prevention is considered the fourth pillar of crime reduction, alongside the institutions of police, courts, and corrections (Waller, 2006).

Despite its complementary role to the criminal justice administration, crime prevention is not so detached to the community participation in ensuring the safety and security of lives and properties. In fact, the programme recognizes

the role of individuals in averting criminal victimization. In line with the above assertion, National Crime Prevention Council has changed have changed the way Americans look at crime and crime prevention. According to national surveys, more than 75 percent of adults now recognize that they have a role in ensuring safer communities. Today, they are helping to define crime prevention, not only by focusing on personal safety and property protection but also by staying ahead of emerging crime trends and focusing on community engagement, improved quality of life, and social and public health(National Crime Prevention Council, 2013).This indicates that Nigerian criminal justice system can also make similar effort at redefining war against crime by incorporating the crime prevention, which is based on proactive, rather than reactive, approach. By so doing, the police will embrace the problem-oriented policing, community policing, surveillance detection through high-tech policing, etc. rather than the traditional responsive policing.

In view of this background, the paper is will examine the basic tenets of crime prevention; theoretical, measurement, implementation and evaluation issues on crime prevention; discuss some challenges of crime prevention and then its notable benefits. The ultimate goal of the paper is to ensure that the policy makers make the best use of, or benefit from, the crime prevention in the Nigerian context.

The Concept of Crime Prevention
Crime prevention has been defined as the deliberate attempt to tame the occurrence of crimes and the criminals from committing an offence. It aims at crime reduction as well as deterrence. At other times it is conceived to be the strategies adopted by governments (and the general public) to reduce crimes through the enforcement of the law and the maintenance of the criminal justice system. The public health inspired typology, using the terms primary, secondary and tertiary prevention to reflect the stages of (possible) entry into the criminal justice system, is still commonly used, but does not fully reflect the range of issues involved in preventing crime and developing safe communities(UNODC, 2010). Along this line it has been suggested that it is possible to distinguish the three levels of prevention as follows:

1. Primary prevention
2. Secondary prevention
3. Tertiary prevention

1.   Primary prevention focuses on the factors at the individual and family levels that are correlated with criminal participation. At the individual level factors such as attachment and involvement in school related activities decrease the probability of criminal involvement. Family factors such as consistent parenting skills reduce the individual risk, because the greater the number of risk factors present the greater the risk/tendency or vulnerability to criminal involvement. In other words, primary prevention is a type of prevention that is directed at modification of criminogenic conditions in the physical and social environment, it aims development of programmes or initiatives aimed at those who have never been involved in the criminal justice system, such as programmes to educate or alert the general public or young people about domestic violence or bullying in schools.

2.   Secondary prevention on the other hand addresses techniques that focus on at risk situations such as when youth drop out of school, or joined peers that engage in delinquent activities(as in gang membership).The target areas for secondary prevention are places or areas where the rates of crimes are high, such as in cities or 'hot spots'. In this respect it can be said that secondary prevention is a type of prevention that is directed at early identification and intervention in the lives of individuals or groups in criminogenic circumstances; further to this ssecondary prevention refers to programmes specifically targeted to children and young people who are identified by the social services, educational or justice systems as being at risk of involvement in crime.

3. Tertiary prevention is utilized as a reactive strategy of crime prevention. It is used after a crime has occurred and aimed at preventing the continuation of a particular criminal activity or to prevent successive incidents. For instance, after several attacks by insurgents, at police barracks, and some locations, preventive tertiary measures of new security policies were implemented to prevent future attacks in northern Nigerian States in recent times. To this end, tertiary prevention is directed at prevention of recidivism or repeat offenses among individuals in a given society. It refers to

programmes for those who are in the criminal justice system and/or returning to the community, with the aim of preventing re-offending (UNODC, 2010).

Andenaes (1958) has also differentiated between individual prevention (specific prevention) and general prevention. By general prevention it refers to the ability of criminal law and its enforcement to make citizens law-abiding. If general prevention were to be 100% effective there would be no crime at all but this is an ideal situation. In addition, general prevention rests on mere frightening or deterrent effect of punishment, the risk of discovery and punishment far out weighing the temptation to commit crime. Punishment may be a psychological coercion directed against the citizens; a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act helps to form or strengthen the public's moral code and thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime (Andenaes, 1958). As such, punishment as the key to general prevention has three sorts of general preventive effects:

    (a) It may have deterrent effect
    (b) It may strengthen moral ambitions (moralizing effect)
    (c) It may stimulate habitual law abiding conduct

Individual prevention, on the other hand refers to the effect of punishment on the punished, where the punished is rendered harmless-for good, by means of capital punishment, banishment or temporarily incarcerated. In a more comprehensive definition the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010), defined crime prevention as:

> Strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes (UNOIC, 2010: 9).

Issues in Crime Prevention
Tonry and Farrington (1995) have identified four major key issues in crime prevention the issues are theoretical, measurement, implementation and evaluation. These issues will be explained one after another.

Theoretical issues: Strategies of crime prevention should focus on the wide-ranging theories of the development of criminal potential in individuals as

well as the social interaction that goes between potential offenders and potential victims in circumstances/situations that provide opportunities for crimes. In order to provide useful basis for preventive strategies, for instance, theories that focus on individual development should direct their attention to make postulations about how individual and environment interact to produce crimes.

On the other hand theorists that are interested on the opportunities vis-à-vis crimes commission should predict the development of criminal potential in individuals. In both theoretical situations, however, they should take into account of the group context of offending, the community context in which the individual develops, as well as the opportunities for crime. In addition, theorists should also focus on individual differences between offenders. This is because it is possible to distinguish between "situational" and "chronic" offenders (Le Blanc, and Frenchette, 1989) or Mofitt's (1993) differentiation between 'adolescent centered' and 'life-course persistent offender'.

Tonry and Farrington(1995) further argue that it is important to investigate to what extent different crime prevention strategies are different in effectiveness with different kinds of offenders, offences, and victims in different places and as well as times. Another important theoretical consideration, is the extent to which offenders make rational decisions, as opposed to being impulsive (which lacks planning and foresight) or compulsive. Certain category of offenders may have internal inhibitions or generalized other which prevents them against offending (for instance a strong "social bond" or even "self control") In this situations they may have low criminal potential and consequently may not make /take decisions on the likely consequences of offending as such theoretical issues have to be tested on decision making with respect to criminal opportunities.

Measurement issues: According to Tonry and Farrington (1995), another important issue in the discussion about crime is measurement. For instance, a major problem in studying prevention in some organizations such as retail sector is how to obtain a valid measurement of crime. For example, most shops have no valid measure of shoplifting that can be used before or after prevention strategies are implemented. Retailers may be reluctant to cooperate in surveys covering all the shops in an area, because of their

competitive ethos. Innovative measures may be needed; for example, research on the systematic observation of offending as it happens may have disproportionate benefits in advancing knowledge about crime.

While the need for valid measurement is particularly pressing in the retail sector, it applies in all crime prevention research that affects different organizations whether public or private ones. Attempts should always be made to assess the validity of official record and victimization survey data, for example. Collaboration with public health practitioners may be useful in expanding the range of measures of crime. For example, data on victims of violence can be collected from emergency departments of hospitals, with careful measurement of injury severity, and can be compared with police data on violence (Shepherd, 1993).

Implementation issues: All strategies of crime prevention are anticipated to bring result in preventing crimes in the society. For example, situational prevention, if successful, typically has immediate benefits, whereas the benefits of developmental prevention may be long delayed. Because of this difference in time scale, it is easier to persuade governmental agencies to implement situational measures than developmental ones. In similar vein, the results of community and criminal justice are also being ridden with problems for immediate results to show due to complexities and changing circumstances of different societies. Political appointees tend to have short time horizons in Nigeria they range between two to four years. The challenge to developmental researchers is to persuade policy makers to plan on how to reduce crime in ten to twenty years time. Another important implementation issue concerns the transition from carefully controlled, high-quality, demonstrably effective, innovative, small-scale prevention programs to routinely administer and large-scale programs. Sometimes, the effectiveness of a program disappears in this transition, this so because of the problem of continuity and priority of policy makers in power.

More to this , Hope (1995) reports that several small-scale well-designed studies have shown that "neighbourhood watch" or "block watch" is ineffective in preventing crime, but this has not in any way dampened the enthusiasm of governmental agencies for this particular program. A key issue in implementation is whether to target the highest-risk individuals or areas or

more "normal" individuals or areas. In addition, there are "hot times" as well as "hot spots" of crime. The potential payoff, in terms of crime prevention, is greatest with the highest-risk units. Their need is arguably greatest, but they also tend to be the most resistant and uncooperative, and there is also the problem of undesirable labelling or stigmatization of high-risk units.

Hope (1995) points out in his work, for example, that most community prevention programs have not been implemented in the most disorganized areas. There are no easy solutions to this dilemma. In practice, it is easier to implement crime prevention research projects and programs targeted at high-risk areas rather than high-risk individuals. One possible solution to the problem of acceptability would be to make a crime prevention program attractive and desirable. For example, if all parents living on a particular housing estate were offered free high-quality day-care for their preschool children, the attractiveness of this offer might overcome concerns about its ultimate goals or why this particular housing estate had been chosen.

More to this prevention programs can also be "sold" by presenting them in a favourable light. For example, developmental and public health approaches are essentially concerned with promoting healthy development by maximizing protective factors and minimizing risk factors (individual, family, peer, school, and community). As most would agree the goal of promoting health may be more acceptable than the more negative and potentially stigmatizing goal of preventing crime, even though these goals may be essentially two sides of the same coin. These are all techniques that may make implementation less difficult by policy-makers interested in preventing crimes in the society.

Evaluation issues: High-quality evaluation research designs are needed to convince leading scholars, as well as intelligent policy makers and practitioners, about the effectiveness of crime prevention techniques with a view to justify to its effectiveness and implementation. The most convincing design is the randomized experiment, which can ensure that units in one condition are identical in all possible respects to units in another condition before a crime prevention strategy is implemented and hence permit the unambiguous attribution of any change in crime rates to the effects of the strategy (Farrington, 1983).

Tremblay and Craig (1995) have shown that randomized experiments have often been used in evaluating developmental prevention. Randomized experiments have rarely been used to evaluate community or situational prevention strategies, partly because the units of interest are typically areas rather than individuals. It is not usually possible to assign a large enough number of areas at random to different experimental conditions to achieve the benefits of randomization of ensuring equivalence of units in one condition to units in another. In evaluating situational prevention programs, it is essential to plan to measure possible displacement and diffusion of benefits. In addition, it would be desirable to measure possible indirect prevention, for example, where a reduction in drug abuse leads also to a reduction in burglary and robbery (because of the decreased need for money to finance the drug habit).

Furthermore, in evaluating developmental prevention programs, it is desirable to plan long-term follow-ups. For example, evaluating the benefits of intensive home visiting during pregnancy in preventing later delinquency and crime necessarily requires a fifteen- to twenty-year follow-up. As Tremblay and Craig (1995) point out, few pregnancy or infancy programs have had such long-term follow-ups. In all cases, it would be prudent to allow for the possibility that the prevention strategy might have unwanted crime-increasing side effects. In evaluating the success of prevention strategies, it is important to investigate the boundary conditions under which they work. For instance, a strategy may be effective in one place or at one time but not in other circumstances, perhaps because of societal or contextual variations (e.g., in the prevalence of divorce or drug abuse). It is important to assess the generalizability of prevention effects. A troubling problem in many evaluations is that a crime prevention technique may have a short-term beneficial effect that gradually wears off. It is important to design evaluations to discover why strategies are immediately effective and why effectiveness may then de crease. For example, it may be that offenders gradually work out how to "beat the system." "Booster sessions" may be required to reinforce or reactivate the prevention effect, or prevention strategies might be rotated unpredictably to keep offenders guessing (as Sherman [1990] suggested for police crackdowns). It would be desirable to compare the wide-ranging costs and benefits of each prevention strategy, so convincing to policy makers that the strategy is beneficial and worthwhile.

Problems and Challenges of Crime Prevention in Nigeria

There are a number of problems and challenges to crime prevention in Nigeria beyond the scope of this paper. However, though not exhaustive the issues considered which constitute challenges and problems include costs of crime prevention; problems associated with displacement of crimes to other places or locations, times, forms of crimes, etc in addition to evaluation and implementation problems. In addition, there are benefits or unintended consequences (benefits) that follow in the process of implementing some crime prevention strategies. All these pose problems and challenge the development of a framework for crime prevention strategy in a changing society like Nigeria.

Costs of crime prevention: Welsh and Farrington (2002) have stated that the costs of crime prevention are enormous. It is often difficult to quantity them in monetary terms. These are tangible costs to victims such as replacing stolen goods and repairing damage, while intangible costs include costs such as pain and suffering, costs that are often difficult to quantify. In Nigeria the costs or burden like in other parts of the world are borne by the government or the tax payers' money for activities to run the functions of criminal justice agencies. Expenses/expenditure in terms of running the police, army, prisons and crime prevention activities are in billions of naira.

In addition, there are also costs to offenders, such as those associated to being in prison, or losing a job. Their families, communities are also affected in enumerable ways. In a nut shell the costs of crime prevention is enumerable, it cuts across all the strategies in place to control/prevent crimes in the society. In Nigeria for example the criminal justice system is very costly to maintain, so any reductions in rates of crime and in the numbers of people processed through the courts and prisons are likely to save on policing, prosecution, defence and court costs, and the considerable expenses of running prisons.

Apart from the criminal justice costs of crime, there are many long-term social and economic costs associated with lost productivity, and the social and welfare services incurred by offenders and their families, for example, when breadwinners are imprisoned or children taken into care. The costs of crime also include the costs for victims, in terms of their health and their ability to work or go to school or to care for their own families. Estimates of the costs of

crime for victims and society in terms of health, lost earnings and productivity suggest that these can be even higher than the criminal justice costs.

Finally, all expenditure on protective security such as technological systems, private policing or fencing and barriers must be included in the costs of crime. So, in all strategies the costs are high, but some are higher than in others.

Implementation problems: Any strategy of crime prevention is bound to be faced with implementation problems when they are to be put into practical realities .In the strategies examined in this chapter, situational crime prevention seems to be confronted with much myriad of implementation problems than other measures, as such emphasis would be tailored to identifying some of them with a view to recommend their solutions.

1. One of the implementation problems is that most at times measures have failed due to technical or administrative ineptitude ,this rests purely from those who are responsible for that(Hope and Murphy, 1983).Related to this, Gladstone(1980) concluded that when a scheme to defeat vandalism by replacing broken windows with toughened glass proved too complicated for school maintenance staff to administer, the whole of the objective of crime prevention is defeated as a result of failure to manage the situation (Gladstone, 1980).

2. Secondly, some measures have been too easily defeated by offenders; this is as a result of the tendency for criminals to explore all avenues at their disposal to break the target area (Clarke and Harris, 1992).

3. Another problem is that too much vigilance has sometimes been assumed on the part of guards or ordinary citizens, on their part, security guards rarely monitor CCTV systems as closely as designers expect; while people pay far less attention to the street outside their homes than is sometimes assumed by neighbourhood watch schemes and defensible space designs (Mayhew, 1979).

4. Fourthly, some measures to prevent crimes have occasionally provoked offenders to unacceptable escalation as offenders seek a more sophisticated way of breaking any hard target. This has the result of even precipitating violence thus leading to criminal opportunities.

5. The fifth implementation problem as it relates to situational crime prevention is the possibility that some measures to have facilitated

rather than frustrated crime: An example was Ekblom (1992) that cites the how pickpockets on the London Underground who stationed themselves near signs warning of theft to see which pockets were checked by passengers on reading the signs. By identifying the target pocket through such signs by passengers it has opened up for the increased pickpocket in the area.

6. The sixth implementation problem rests on measures that have been defeated by the carelessness or idleness of potential victims. Residents routinely frustrate entry control systems on apartment buildings by propping open doors to save themselves from answering the door bell. This attitude pose serious problems to the effective implementation of a situational crime prevention strategy hence increase the vulnerability of crime potentialities.

Crime displacement: One of the effects of crime prevention strategies (situational, law enforcement and criminal justice, community and developmental) is the tendency to create a condition for what is referred to as 'crime displacement'. According to Farrington (1995) situational prevention will need to recognize that the value of particular situational measures is highly contingent on the nature of the problem and the circumstances in which it arises. Something that works in one situation will not necessarily work in another. Under the dispositional assumptions of traditional criminological theory, situational variables merely determine the time and place of offending. Manipulating situations would thus simply cause offenders to shift their attention to some other target, time or place, change their tactics or even switch to some other categories of crime (Reppetto, 1976).

Under the rational choice assumptions that now guide thinking about situational prevention, displacement is no longer seen as inevitable, but as contingent upon the offender's judgments about alternative crimes. If these alternatives are not viable, the offender may well settle for smaller criminal rewards or for a lower rate of crime. Few offenders are so driven by need or desire that they have to maintain a certain level of offending whatever the cost. For many, the elimination of easy opportunities for crime may actually encourage them to explore non-criminal alternatives. On the other hand, since crime is the product of purposive and sometimes inventive minds, displacement to other categories of offence would not be unexpected, so long as these new crimes served the same purposes as the ones that were thwarted.

The concept of "displacement" has been conceived to be the usually unintended effect of crime-control programs, by which efforts to prevent one kind of crime sometimes lead would-be offenders to commit a different kind of crime or the same kind of crime at a different time or place. Many evaluations of crime-control innovations conclude, or suggest, that displacement has reduced or eliminated apparent crime-reduction effects of the innovation. Thus, displacement is generally seen as a frustrating side effect. Displacement can, however, be seen as a predictable effect of specific policies and, accordingly, as a manipulative tool of crime control.

When a target of criminal opportunity is blocked, the would-be offender does something else. This alternative may lie within the law. If it does, the result is typically known as "crime abatement" or "desistance." If it lies outside the law, the result is known as "crime displacement." Thus, an individual's shift in intention from burglary to check fraud is defined as crime displacement. Shifting from burglary to mowing (cutting of grass with machine) the lawn is an example of crime abatement. Hakim and Rengert (1981), following and modifying Reppetto (1976), identify five types of crime displacement:

    a. Temporal - doing the intended crime at a different time;
    b. Spatial-doing the intended crime to the intended type of target in another place;
    c. Tactical-doing the intended crime using a different method;
    d. Target-doing the intended type of crime to a different type of target;
    e. Crime type or functional-doing a different type of crime from that the criminal intended. These types of displacement are, in principle, measurable by changes in victimization experience and offender self-report.

A sixth type of displacement, never described as such in the literature, is "substitution" or "perpetrator displacement". Here, a crime opportunity is so compelling that different offenders are always available to commit the crime. The most obvious example of this type of displacement is international drug trafficking. Remarkably high profits appear to produce an inexhaustible supply of willing couriers. The crime is displaced from offender to offender but is committed repeatedly.

Cornish and Clarke (1986:3) refer to the assumption of total displacement as inducing a "paralyzing extreme- case pessimism." Heal and Laycock (1986:123) opine that "there is little point in the policy-maker investing resources and effort into situational (crime) prevention if by doing so he merely shuffles crime from one area to the next but never reduces it. For this reason, the possibility of displacing crime by preventive intervention is a crucial issue for the policy-maker"(Svensson, 1986:122).

Heal and Laycock (1988: 239) note that "the argument most frequently levelled against prevention, particularly 'situational' prevention, is that it will displace crime from one setting to the next, or from one type of crime to another. If this is indeed the case, the limits to prevention are considerable" Trasler (1986). Many studies tend to argue that when measures are put in place to prevent crimes thus leading to displacement, it has not actually helped in preventing crimes, instead has made it possible for the crimes to take place elsewhere, another time, or concentrates on softer targets.

Benefits of Crime Prevention: Diffusion of Benefits
The concept of diffusion of benefits refer to the unintended advantages or benefits that crime prevention strategies bring to individuals, social groups, community or the larger society. As argued and found by scholars even when displacement occurs, it may sometimes be "benign" (Barr and Pease, 1990), such as in the case of preventive measures which bring relief to repeatedly victimized groups although at the cost of an increased risks for others. This observation guided the design of an experiment to reduce burglary in a public housing estate in the North of England (Pease, 1991). Target hardening priority was given to houses that had recently experienced a burglary, with the result that, despite their higher risks, few of these houses experienced a repeat burglary in the follow-up period. Pease also noted that these preventive benefits permeated, through what he called a process of "drip-feed," to other households that were not target-hardened so that the burglary rate for the whole of the study area declined dramatically.

The "drip-feed" effect is, of course, the reverse of displacement in that preventive action led, not to an increase, but to a reduction in crimes not directly addressed by the measures. As Clarke and Weisberg (1994) observe, similar effects have been noted under a variety of other names. For example,

Miethe (1991) has referred to the "free rider" effect when residents benefit from the crime prevention measures taken by their neighbours and Sherman (1990) to the "bonus" effect sometimes observed in police crackdowns when there is a carryover of the preventive effect beyond the period when the crackdown is in force. Scherdin (1986) used the term "halo effect" when reporting that book detection systems prevented thefts, not just of the electronically protected materials, but also of other materials as well (Miethe, 1991; Sherman,1990; Scherdin, 1986; cited in Clarke and Weisberg ,1994).

In his evaluation of a CCTV system installed to reduce auto theft at a university, Poyner (1988) found an equal reduction of crime in the parking lot not covered as the ones that were covered by the cameras. In his study of CCTV on buses, he found that damage and other misbehaviour was reduced, not only on five buses fitted with cameras, but throughout the whole fleet of 80 buses (Poyner, 1988).Clarke and Weisburd (1994) have proposed the term "diffusion of benefits," to these scenarios. They have defined diffusion as:

> …the spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which are directly targeted, the individuals who are the subject of control, the crimes which are the focus of intervention or the time periods in which an intervention is brought'(Clarke and Weisburd, 1994:169).

They have also distinguished between two forms of diffusion which they call deterrence and discouragement. Deterrence was invoked by Scherdin (1986), for example, in explaining why the book detection system she studied also prevented thefts of items that were not electronically tagged, and by Poyner in identifying reasons for the general decline in damage to the fleet when only some of the buses were fitted with CCTV cameras: "The children have learned...that the cameras will enable misbehaving individuals to be picked out and that action will be taken, they appear to believe that most buses have cameras, or at least they are uncertain about which buses have cameras" (Poyner, 1988:50).

For diffusion by "discouragement," the key is not the judgment of risk, but the assessment of effort and reward. For example, one component of the successful action against burglary in the study by Pease was the removal of prepayment meters from many houses on the estate (Pease, 1991). This seems

to have been enough to discourage potential burglars who could no longer be sure of finding a meter containing cash.

Conclusion

In conclusion, of all the strategies of crime prevention that have been enumerated and discussed no one approach or underlying theory of intervention is inherently better than the others. All of them have advantages and disadvantages. All that should be taken into consideration is that some measures work well in certain conditions. There is need to find out which measures work best, in which combination deployed against what kinds of crime and under what conditions. Some social development approaches can be long-term and require commitment and investment continuing over a number of years. Community or locally based approaches can require considerable patience with the difficulties of engaging citizens in positive ways, or maintaining the momentum of projects because they require long period of intervention and commitment from all stakeholders. They are more difficult to evaluate, so clear and rapid results from interventions may be hard to identify. Situational prevention has often been criticized for focusing too much on opportunistic crime and target-hardening techniques or surveillance, (because it can displace crime and disorder to other areas); for encouraging unequal access to security (for example, with the development of private space and gated communities); and for failing to tackle the social or economic causes of crime problems. Some of the recent developments in situational prevention have focused on better use of regulations, such as municipal and local by-laws and their enforcement, and this is seen as a valuable tool that encourages businesses or local residents to change and regulate their own behaviours.

It is the thesis of this chapter that no specific or identified crime prevention approach should be considered superior to the others. Rather, any approach selected should form part of a strategic and balanced plan, and the advantages and disadvantages of each approach in a particular context should be considered. Thus, a project in a city for example, may combine a range of initiatives such as changes to traffic layout, better lighting, employing and training young people to act as guardians and local mediators, providing support to low income families and providing better recreation facilities and opportunities. As earlier cautioned by Tonry and Farrington(1995) that it is

important to investigate to what extent different crime prevention strategies are different in effectiveness with different kinds of offenders, offences, and victims in different places and as well as times. This will guide policy makers, scholars, the general public and anyone interested for an effective crime control prevention strategy so as to achieve crime reduction for the development of society.

Recommendations

1. Due to the challenges that face each of the crime prevention strategies discussed, a combination of two or more of the strategies will help tackle the shortcomings of using only one single method to prevent crime. This is considering the variations that cut across individuals as offenders and victims, as well as between social groups and societies. If one strategy is adopted effort should be made to identify under what condition it is effective or ineffective, for which type of offence. For instance, developmental research is needed to identify protective factors and to determine at what stage it is best to intervene to try to reduce or eliminate a risk factor. For example, it may be better to intervene early, before risk factors or antisocial behaviour are too ingrained or stabilized, but not so early that risk factors are poor predictors of antisocial outcomes.

2. Any theoretical frame of reference on crime prevention should address an identification of the criminal potentials among individuals irrespective of the chosen strategy of crime prevention. This is in addition to opportunities, variations on offences, offenders, places as well as the prevailing rationality in the potential criminals.

3. Since measurement issues pose serious challenge to crime prevention, due to the difficulty to arrive at a measurable indicator /index,(through the use of scientific data) it is recommended that government, and other public organizations should come up with an agreed yardstick or bench-mark to measure crime prevention using the 'before' and 'after' methods with a view to see the impact of post intervention strategy(conduct researches in both cases).In the alternative, victim reported cases can be enhanced and be used as a way to document and develop such measurement index.

4. Difficulties with implementation can be resolved if policy makers are educated on the short-term and long-term benefits of crime

prevention. This because some strategies such as developmental and community can take a long time before results are accomplished or manifests, while law enforcement and criminal justice are costly and complicated. They should be made to understand and appreciate the values of each crime prevention strategy for effective implementation. In addition, individual, community, and civil society groups should support the government and agents of crime prevention for its successful implementation.

5. Costs of crime prevention are enormous but no amount of it can be too much if the rate of crime declines, thus paving the way for development. Money expended in all strategies should be justified devoid of corruption, in courts, police, prisons, remands etc.

6. Strengthening the criminal justice system (through the provisions of equipments ,manpower and other resources) to develop hash penalties so as to deter potential criminals, while blocking all situations that may give opportunities to crime will be better to create an enabling environment for prosperity and development of Nigerian society.

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Hate-Speech and National Security in Nigeria

5

CHAPTER

[1]Joseph Kinuabeye Ukwayi & [2]Bassey E. Anam

[1]Department of Sociology
[2]Institute of Public Policy & Administration
University of Calabar

Introduction

The issues of hate speech and national security have generated substantial interests, particularly regarding its meanings, nature, and dimensions. Yet the two issues have emerged as major challenges in the political system and governance of contemporary Nigeria. Hate-speech is manifested more in stereotyping and abusive denotation of mannerisms of other government, ethnic and religious groups. Ethno-religious intolerance and hate-speech are so pervasive in Nigeria, that it is sometimes difficult to identify or classify, especially when delivered as a form of a comedy routine, in book publications and sometimes also by the media. While it can be argued that there exist stereotypes about every ethnic group that pervades its manifestations between Northern and Southern Nigeria is unequalled. This paper addresses these concerns and identifies ways through which this can be addressed. It advocates the role of media and the Nigerian civil society groups with the responsibility of confronting hate-speech in all its forms and guarantee national unity and development.

Hate speech is any speech that is laced with intentions of hatred, with a view to the hurting, disparaging, bringing down, exposing to risk or danger, any person or group of persons. The concept and interpretation have a wide definition, and the definition varies from country to country, depending on the historical experience of that country. For some countries hate speech is when there is racial discrimination. For others, it stems from tribal discrimination as in the case of Nigeria.

The danger posed by unguided propagation of hate speeches in a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria is real. It is not in doubt that the continuing deployment of inflammatory speeches in the country can lead to a nation-wide crisis, if not a conflagration. These hateful communications are injurious to the polity and the corporate existence of the country. While many scholars and public commentators have condemned this act, perpetrators see it as a tool to destabilize the polity. This paper examines the effect of hate speech on national security in Nigeria. Data are obtained primarily from secondary sources. Content analysis is used to assess extant literature, with specific conclusions drawn and suggestions.

Hate speech on national security in Nigeria: emerging issues and challenges
Freedom of speech is a fundamental ethos of democracy. It is a constitutional legacy that has made Nigeria one of the most vibrant polities such that, even in the throes of crushing colonial domination or military dictatorship, Nigerians and their media are culturally attuned to speaking out against stimuli that promote impunity or limit the rights of the citizenry.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended) guarantees every person freedom of speech. Section 39 (1) states: "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference". Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) clearly states that "the press, radio, television and other agencies of the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this Chapter and uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people" (cited in Ulusoy, 2017).

Against the background of these constitutional provisions, Nigerians have the legal right to express themselves, which may be in support or opposes the activities of government. This liberty seems to justify the actions of the public as expressed in hate speeches on the present administration and ethnic discriminations. As the problem grows, special attention has been drawn to this political and social aberration since the return of President Muhammadu Buhari from his medical leave in London. It has become so worrisome that the Federal Government decided to take an ad-hoc approach to its management. To manage it, Vice President Yemi Osinbajo proclaimed hate speech a crime at a National Security Conference in Aso Villa, Abuja: "The Federal Government has drawn a line on hate speech. Hate speech is a species of terrorism; terrorism, as it is defined popularly, is the unlawful use of violence or intimidation against individuals or groups, especially for political ends" (The Nation, 2017).

In the same report, the Editorial disclosed that soon after this, the Inspector-General of Police quickly ordered his staff across the country to arrest those who perpetrate hate speech, either in the social media or via conventional media platforms. In support of the Vice President, the Sultan of Sokoto added that "none will be allowed to get away with making speeches that can cause sedition or that can cause violence" (Nation, 2017). There is a growing concern over hate speech and its consequence on government and the security of lives and property. Hate speech is obnoxious and a manifestation of primitive behavior in a modern society. Hate speech is an anti-social behavior.

Security means stability and continuity of livelihood, the predictability of relationships, feeling safe and belonging to a social group. Internal security, or IS, which is related to security can be seen as the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other self-governing territories (Baldwin, 1997). Hate speech stirs up strive against members of different groups with a sovereign polity. In recent times, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented plaque of crisis and insecurity, each leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties. Among other factors, hate speech explains the cause of this upsurge and tension.

Insecurity has taken various forms in different parts of the country. In the South-West, armed robbers have taken over, while in the North, cross-border

bandits operate with the ease. However, in the South-South there are rampant cases of kidnapping (Ulusoy, 2017). Also the incessant wave of crime and armed robbery attacks, all point to the fact that insecurity is fast becoming a norm in Nigeria and have somewhat suddenly become attractive to certain individuals in seeking to resolve issues that could have ordinarily been settled through due process. The result of this untold destruction leads to the killing of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities, and destruction of properties among others.

According to Frank (2018), the ethnic agitation across the nation is not healthy to democracy and unity of Nigeria. Recently the AREWA YOUTH made an unhealthy declaration to the Ibos to leave their region in the same country. The inciting statement was made in Kaduna without fear of arrest. Today many Nigerians are apprehensive of what would be the end result of the incitement. Hate speech has caused unrest in Nigeria in recent times. The declaration for the Easterners to leave Northern Nigeria was wrong and was not for peaceful co-existence of the tribes. The declaration of AREWA Youths is unconstitutional. Therefore, the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of such hate speech (Frank, 2018).

Hate speech in other countries have led to violence and death of innocent citizens, and this explains why many liberal democracies from Canada to Denmark, Germany, India, South Africa, and the United States, enacted hate speech or hate crime laws (Okeshola, 2014). The social, economic, and political consequences of hate speech are too obvious for any society with a sense of self-preservation to ignore, especially those with such diverse social, cultural, and religious orientations as Nigeria. For the danger inherent in hate speech, such as is already causing tensions across the country in respect of quit notice and partial withdrawal of quit notice to members of other communities, people mandated to manage public order have good reasons to want to discourage the purveyors of hate speech (Nation, 2017).

Strategies to combat hate speech and national security in Nigeria
Inciting speeches are a threat to the co-operate existence of Nigerian state. The citizens of Nigeria are worried about the way and manner hate speeches are made with impunity without love for another in the country. The major ethnic

groups should desist from making hate speeches capable of causing hatred and unrest in Nigeria. In addressing the challenges of hate speech, note must be taken of the constitutional provision which guarantees the freedom of speech and expression of citizens. However, citizens need to recognize the importance to respect the rights of others in the exercise of their own rights. This provides a restriction on the expressions that are harmful to the government or other ethnic groupings in the country.

There is a need for the principle of proportionality in criminalizing hate speech. There are other offenses in the country's criminal and penal codes that can respond to hate speech more appropriately than terrorism. Sedition and incitement are such crimes. Applying such laws allows for immediate response by government to hate speech (Nation, 2017).

The Editorial added that "If we must create new laws to respond to hate speech as it is done in other democracies, then there is need to be democratic about it by subjecting such decision to due process of lawmaking" (Nation, 2017). As a democratic value, it is unacceptable to treat enactment of the law in the manner of making decrees under non-democratic governments. The matter of free speech as a fundamental human right requires that one must not rush into a situation that can allow any government or its agency to muzzle or muffle free speech under the pretext of fighting hate speech. Before citizens are arrested for hate speech or special courts must create with specific constitutional provision laid out to try and convict offenders. Other than this, the government will be infringing on the right of citizens to expression.

Conclusion

The challenges of insecurity in Nigeria has grown from Incidence of criminality, such as terrorist activities of Boko Haram in the North East, herdsmen killings and destruction of farms, kidnapping, armed robbery and cult-related violence to religious and ethnic conflicts perpetuated by hate speeches. Hate speech is assuming an alarming proportion in the form of "quit notices" issued by a various group demanding that Nigerian of different ethnic backgrounds leave their region. This has far-reaching effects. The emerging menace has the tendency to destabilize the government. Nigerians must be themselves and one indivisible people and must have respect for the government.

From a legal perspective, the Nigerian government must create new laws or interpret existing ones in a way to suggest stifling or criminalizing political dissent or criticism of the party or persons in power. Above all, we believe that, in addition to making a clear law on hate speech, both government and society need to verify the root cause of the rise in expression of prejudice and intolerance in the country, with a view to fighting it (Nation, 2017). The government of Nigeria should protect the right of every Nigerian irrespective of tribe or religion. The media and civil society groups must rise to the challenge of sensitizing Nigerian against hate-speech in all its forms so as to guarantee national unity and development.

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Financial Fraud and the Effect of Insider Abuse in Nigerian Banking Sector

6

CHAPTER

[1]**Ben, Etim Udoh,** [2]**Udo, Emmanuel Samuel,**
[3]**Abner, Ishaku Prince,** [4]**Ibekwe, Uzonna John &**
[5]**Ike Ruby Nneka**
[1,3,4&5]Department of Management,
[2]Department of Banking,
University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus

Introduction

The fundamental intent of the study is to estimate the effect of financial fraud in relation to insider abuse in the Nigerian banking sector. The above intent shoots from assessing the rudimental causes of fraud even in the face of stiff regulation and advance technology. The study by means of Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) adopts secondary data from 2000-2016. The Ordinary Least Square technique signifies the prime technique in relation to an array of other universal/customary and analytical test. The R^2 explains that 76.32% of the variation in fraud in the model study is explained by the principal regressors. Total cases of fraud and amount involved were sustained to have a positive affiliation with the total expected loss while, staff involvement, and totalexpected loss was negative and non-significant. The study established that fraud in relation to insider abuse is not peculiarly Nigerian. The results bare that insider abuses are breed where there is weak and faulty internal control, lack of job security and reward for excellent.

Recommendations are that financial institutions basically banks must review internal control, staff salary cum job security, the quality of staff recruited and the audit system of the bank.

The financial sector in its conglomerate embraces financial (banking) and non-financial (non-banking) sectors in emerging and urbanized economies. Hence, the banking sector in urbanized and emerging economies is flanked by its spirited roles of fund mobilization and allocation from the sufficient units to insufficient units herein referred to as "financial intermediation". The efficiency and effectiveness of the banking sector globally have been acknowledged in the empirical and conventional research literature to be a reagent of growth economically and financially.

Fraud historically dates far back to the creation of mankind, as such its sprouts up straight from the human heart. In the fashionable era, fraud and fraudulent undertakings have assumed an endemic degree, with its effect accredited and acknowledged to be an end product of bank, economic and financial crisis globally. The above is, however, traceable to the Nigeria indigenous banks distress of the 1930s, 1940s, 1952, 1954, 1990s, and the 2008-2010 financial, and global economic crisis. Consequently, fraud upset operational activities of financial and non-financial businesses in developed and emerging economies (Nwankwo, as cited in Uchenna & Agbo 2013). Hence, the United States of America equally play host to her fair share of fraud that is evidence in the report of Wilhem, as cited in Uchenna and Agbo (2013) the valued annual losses in various industries embraces; $67b (Insurance), $150b (Telecommunication), $1.2b (Bank), $40b (money laundering), $5.7b (Internet) and $1b (Credit card). In the Nigerian context according to the Nigerian Deposit insurance corporations (NDIC) annual account about N689.2million was lost in 1998 to fraud, N2730.57million in 1999, N2851.11million in 2000 and N11, 243.98million in 2001, N 2.9billion in 2007, N 17.5 billion in 2008, N 7.5 billion in 2009, N 4.071 billion in 2010, N 28 billion in 2011, N 25 billion in 2014 and N 18 billion in 2015 respectively.

The magnitudes of the losses incur and the operational effect, therefore, stages substantial peril to depositors and investors' confidence. Therefore, financial negligence in the banking industry is squarely the breeding ground for fraud both within and outside the industry embracing institutional (insider abuse)

and environmental factors. Zuraidah, Mohd, and Yusarina (2015 p.108)holds the view, the fundamental intent of fraudsters is that of monetary gains which therefore placed the banking sector at the mercy of fraudulent individuals within and outside the system.

The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a result pigeon-holed bank fraud as a tier one tactical priority (U.S. Department of Justice Report, 2001 as cited in Zuraidah, Mohd and Yusarina (2015 p.108). Owing to the decreasing cases of fraud and the increasing amount involved in fraud the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), in 2014 instituted that, the financial sector in fashionable era are extra vulnerable to fraud even in the face of advanced technology employed to checkmate fraud, which in the reserve makes fraudsters extra versatile in their *modus operandi* to outwit the technology. Nevertheless, KMPG (2009) Beasley (1996) and ACFE (2014) as cited in Zuraidah, Mohd and Yusarina (2015 p.108), established factually, the pitiable state of internal control and the skimpy state of corporate governance equally breed fraud.

Based upon the documented indices the study sort to scrutinize the foundational effect of fraud in relation to insider abuse, even in the face straight regulations and employment of advanced technology. Consequently, fraud is the prime quandary in the industry and no depository is fraud immune in urbanized and emerging economies.

Statement of Problem

Financial fraud globally dates far back to the creation of mankind and in the Nigerian financial world fraud dates far back to 1930 the era of Industrial and Commercial Bank distress. The magnitude of unprincipled financial activities arguably redirects the degree of corruption in Nigeria, which for that cause Transparency International in 2018 rank Nigeria 168[th]most corrupt nation in the world. In 2014 the CBN liquidated 83 microfinance banks squarely because of fraudulent activities and on February 17, 2015, hackers pulled off USD $80 billion from Bank Heist. The ending cases of fraud and the increasing amount involved proportional diminish depositors and investors' confidence in the financial world in emerging and urbanized economies, even in the face of advanced technology to combat fraud. The above therefore bag the question what are the factors responsible for insider abuses?

Objectives of the study

The intent of this study is to scrutinize the effect of insider abuse in Nigeria. In specific the objectives sort to:

1. Ascertain the total amount involved in bank fraud in Nigeria.
2. Identified the categories of staff involved in bank fraud in Nigeria.
3. Ascertain the foundational factors responsible for bank fraud in Nigeria.

Review of Related Literature

Fraud: Financial institutions globally are that the mercy fraudsters by means of financial manipulation owing to her tradable commodities taking on cash and non-cash equivalent. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1984, sharp fraud as falsified transfiguration and tracking down of cash via end to end under fabricated pretence. Eseoghene, (2010) established fraud to be premeditated doing calculated to take on the unjustifiable gain at the detriment of naïve individuals or organisation. In totality, economic and financial fraud is squarely false statement embark upon for financial gain, with after effect on the victim leading to damage or loss. Empirical research document fraud as a function of theft, assets treachery, and proceedings alternation. Nevertheless, Onibudo as cited in Enofe, Abilogun, Omoolo run and Elaiho (2017 p.42) holds the factual view that fraud emanate in the index of three fundamental essentials taking on the connotation "WOE" (will, opportunity, and exit), with the sum of it all instituted in the Donald Cressey's Fraud Triangle of 1950, by means of pressure, opportunity and rationalization. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) Act of 2004 arrests economic and financial crimes to fall within the armpit of "violent, criminal and forbidden undertakings in a fashion that infringes prevailing statute… the above takes in, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and unprofessional conduct, oil bunkering, tax evasion, foreign exchange abuse, intellectual theft, and open market abuse, etc.

Varieties of Financial (Bank) Fraud in Developed and Emerging Economy

Economic, and finance researches pigeon-holed fraud in relation to its dimensions, nature,and forms. The above classification play host to Nwanze, as cited in Owolabi (2010) sorting fraud into, executive fraud and other frauds. Ogundeji, as cited in Owolabi (2010) classified fraud into, executive, foreign exchange and domestic operations, money market and treasury, risk assets,

information technology, financial control, clearing, fund transfer, teller operations and customer services related frauds.

Consequently, fraud in relation to perpetrators is then segmented into two classifications;
1. Institutional: insider abuses that are traceable to the internal financial environment.
2. Environmental: outsider abuses traceable to the external financial environment.

Institutional fraud according to Nwankwo, as cited in Idown and Adedokun (2013) takes on:
1. Management fraud (top, middle and lower)
2. Employee fraud (staffs; skilled, unskilled and semi-skilled)

Management Fraud
Fakunle, as cited in Ajala, Amuda and Arulogun (2013) identified management fraud as a function of records and account manipulation, stereotypically carried out by the top, middle and lower level managers with the prime intent of direct or indirect benefits. The prime victims of such frauds are investors and depositors and the instrument of perpetration is a financial statement.

Employee Fraud
Employee fraud is equally referred to as non-management fraud, perpetrated by the employees embracing skilled, semiskilled and unskilled staffs. The prime instrument of perpetration takes on document falsification, violating an employer's policies, embezzlement. Awe (2005) established the following as employee fraud; fictitious payment of supplies, and wages fraud (payroll fraud).

DMBS with the Highest Fraud Cases from 2014 to 2016

GROUP	2014		2015		2016	
	Amount Involved (₦'M)	% Share	Amount Involved (₦'M)	% Share	Amount Involved (₦'M)	% Share
Top 10 DMBs	21,904.45	85.54	16,261.64	90.23	7,625.90	87.83
Total for all DMBs	25,608.06	100.00	18,022.49	100.00	8,682.66	100.00

Source: NDIC 2016

Insider Abuse and Dealings

Fraud in relation to insider abuses is perpetrated as an end product of the fragile operational management and internal control systems of the financial institution. The OCPS Internal Audit Department report acknowledged fraud as a detrimental act on the bank with direct and indirect benefit enjoyed by perpetrators, which therefore undermines the efficiency of banks along with its fundamental objective of fund mobilization and allocation. In the existing era, the banking system still remains the most regulated sector in both developed and emerging economies.

However, the benefits of the above regulation are evidence in the discoveries and the escalating cases of noxious practices in the system. Taking in cash thefts by staffs, falsifications of customer's signature and cheques, the operation of fictitious account and lending to fictitious customers.

Categories of Staff Involved in Frauds and Forgeries from 2014 to 2016

Status	2014		2015		2016	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Supervisors & Managers	58	12.47	62	14.59	31	13.42
Officers, Accountants & Executive Assistants	176	37.85	119	28.00	98	42.42
Clerks & Cashiers	78	16.77	69	16.24	18	7.79
Messengers, Drivers, Cleaners, Security Guards & Stewards	2	0.43	11	2.59	1	0.43
Temporary Staff	126	27.10	164	38.59	59	25.54
Others	25	5.38	-	-	24	10.39
Total	465	100	425	100	231	100

Source: NDIC 2016

Categories of Staff Involved in Frauds and Forgeries in DMBS in 2016

Source: NDIC 2016

Outsiders Frauds

Outsider frauds are economic and financial unprofessional conduct perpetrated by depositors and non-depositors of the bank to the detriment of the bank. This assembly of fraud take in:

1. Advance Fee Fraud (419) and Forged Cheque, Cheque Kitting and cheque cloning
2. Account Opening Fraud and Counterfeit Financial Securities
3. Money Transfer Fraud, Letter of Credit Fraud, loan fraud and Clearing Fraud
4. Duplicating or skimming card data, copying magnetic stripe information off a card for duplication.

Type and Frequency of Frauds with Actual Losses Sustained in Deposit Money Banks (DMBS) in 2015 -2016

2015			2016	
Nature of Fraud	Frequency	Actual loss Sustained(₦'B)	Frequency	Actual Loss Sustained(₦'B)
ATM/Card-Related Fraud	8039	0.504	11244	0.476
Web-Based (Internet Banking) Fraud	1471	0.857	3689	0.582
Fraudulent Transfers/ Withdrawal of Deposits	1396	0.562	836	0.626
Suppression of Customer Deposits	602	0.218	357	0.224
Fraudulent Conversion Of Cheques	71	0.049	48	0.002
Presentation of Stolen Cheques	132	0.054	17	0.014
Presentation of Forged Cheques	69	0.067	59	0.021
Outright Theft by Staff(cash defalcation)	213	0.146	182	0.179
Unauthorized Credits	143	0.587	172	0.198
Outright Theft by Outsiders/Customers	33	0.021	24	0.021
Foreign Currencies Theft	18	0.033	26	0.033
Diversion of Bank Charges (Commissions & Fees)	92	0.075	83	0.034
Lodgement of stolen Warrants			14	0.034
Total	12,279	3,173	16,751	2,446

Source: NDIC 2016

Effect of Insider Abuse

1. Loss of public confident*cum* financial loss.
2. Bank capital base diminution*cum* banks financial and economic distress.

Remedies for Fraud by Management and Directors

Insider abuses and its control *cum* elimination are accredited to be the sole responsibility of management and not machines since the direct and indirect benefit is squarely that of a human. Empirical and conventional holds the view, insider abuse can be control and prevented in kith and kin to the value and self-worth of staffs recruited inconsonant to the efficiency and stability of internal control system to checkmate gaps and lapse in the institution.

Theoretical Framework

The study embraces the Donald Cressy's Fraud Triangle of 1950, and Ajzen and Fishbein Fraud Reasoned Action of 1975.

Donald Cressy's Fraud Triangle of 1950

American criminologist Donald Cressy in 1950 proposed the Triangle Fraud Model to establish the core ingredient that propels fraud in financial and non-financial institutions as it relates to insider abuses. Nevertheless, the three core essentials that triangularly correlate fraud takes in opportunity, pressure, and rationalization. The triangle model is accredited to be an end product of Sutherland's research herein referred to as the White Collar Crime. Sutherland, pinpoint white collar crime as fraud committed by decent high ranking individuals, in clear terms its management fraud. White collar fraudsters are brainy, opportunists, and educated individuals. Hayward (2007) holds the view; about 78% of financial frauds are committed where opportunity, pressure, and rationalization exist. Berney, (2008) likens the three cores as pinpoint by Cressyes to fire personifying the individual. He explained that for fire to break out oxygen (opportunity), heat (pressure) and fuel (rationalization) must be present which therefore agrees with the Cressys model. Wolf and Hermanson (2004) reviewed the diamond fraud model to include the fourth basic element capacity. He explained that capacity propels fraud more than opportunity.

Ajzen and Fishbein Fraud Reasoned Action of 1975

The Ajzen and Fishbein Fraud Reasoned Action of Model of 1975 are accredited to be a product of social psychology. The model, therefore, illustrated the bond flanked by, belief, attitude, norms, and morals. The model states that, behaviour is a function of attitude, action is an end product of norms and morals, which therefore holds the fact that folks with the wrong

belief, attitude, norms *cum* morals take on the same degree of opportunity to commit fraud, at the detriment of their employers, suppliers and customers, third parties and against government agencies. The above is in agreement with the Differential Opportunity model of Comer 1986 (Owolabi, 2010). Rex and Subramaniam, (2008) instituted that, professionals unanimously concur that fraud and other related unethical undertaking occurs owing to individuals lack ethical logic which therefore agreed with Comer 1986 Concealment Model. Greed is however noted to be one of the prime propellers of fraud.

Fraud Triangle Model   **Diamond Model**

Empirical Framework

Kanu and Okorafor (2013) reviewed the nature, extent and economic impact of financial in financial institutions in Nigeria, especially in deposit money banks. By means of descriptive and inference statistics. Research result bears the presence of a positive significant correlation flanked by bank deposit and fraudulent activities in the banking industry. Sang (2012) empirically studied the prime contributing factors to fraud and its resist or techniques in deposit money banks in Kenya. By means of descriptive research design and inferential statistics embracing questionnaire adoption for data. Research results bear that the internal control inefficiency is an end product of non-adherence control trait and time insufficient inconsonant to various periodic tests. Recommendation is that all-inclusive technique adopted to checkmate fraud must enforce and incompliance to fraud easing methods. Ajala, Amuda, and Arulogun (2013) scrutinize the impact of internal control in relation to checkmating financial deposit money banks in Nigeria. An analyzed by means of product moment correlation coefficient and regression analysis, with data extracted from audited and published financial statements of selected deposit money banks in Nigeria. Findings show that effective and

efficient internal control systems significantly foil and restrain financial frauds in DMBS banks. In conclusion, they hold the view that, corrupt corporate governance is solely responsible for ill-mannered internal control system paving way for fraud to thrive. Zuraidah, Mohd,and Yusarina (2015) probed fraud patterns in deposit money banks along with its precautionary measure in Malaysia. The study areas center on branch managers and assistants' managers in relation to mortgage and hire purchase loans. Findings show that fraud perpetrators understand the procedure involved in loans procurement and duly takes advantage and capitalize on it penetrate to commit fraud. They concluded that it is impossible to achieve zero fraud risk staff's roles should be more visible in combating fraud. Olaoye, Dada, and Adeoya (2014) examine frauds in deposit money banks in relation to Nigeria's experience. The prime focus is to gauge the nature, causes, effects, detection and prevention measure in Nigeria. The study adopted descriptive technique by means of primary data via questionnaires. The recommended that DMBs ought to embrace the following as techniques to checkmate fraud; efficient and effective internal control, satisfactory remuneration and reward for excellence while unremitting and sporadic downscaling of staffs ought to be discouraged.

Methodology
This study takes on ex-post facto research technique as an ideal technique in steering analysis in business and social sciences. Simon and Goes (2013) established ex-post facto design to be a fact with previous deeds with proxies for the variables of interest are not prone to controls or doctored since information's are in public sphere and are certainly verifiable. Secondary data from Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) annual report are exacted from 2000-2016, with the based the year 2000 playing host to the new millennium along with renewed technique and advanced technology with a policy to checkmate insider abuse. The study adopts descriptive statistic and OLS technique. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root test along with an assortment of diagnostic tests carried out on the regression model to ensure the strategic traditions underlying the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) were not desecrated. These tests include White's Heteroskedasticity Test, Ramsey Regression Error Specification Test (RESET), Breusch Godfrey Serial Correlation Tests, Durbin Watson Test and the Cumulative Sum of Squares (CUSUM) recursive estimates tests/graph.

Model Specification

The study adopts the classical Linear Regression Model of Abdul Raheem, Abdul Rasheed, Isiaka Sulu Babaita, Muhammed Abubakar Yinusa (2012) in their study: Fraud and Its Implications for Bank Performance in Nigeria. The model was modified to capture insider abuse, the essential variables are fitted in on the CLRM and log-transformed to ensure linearity and it appears thus:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \dots B_n X_n + u \qquad \text{--------} \qquad e.g. 1$$

$$LOGTEL_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LOGTFC_t + \beta_2 LOGTAI_t + \beta_3 LOGTSI_t + u_t \qquad \text{------} \qquad e.g \ II$$

Where:
TFC = Total Number of Fraud Cases,
TAI= Total Amount Involved,
TEC= Total Expected Loss,
TSI= Staff Involvement,
μ= error term,
B_1, β_2, = coefficients of the parameter estimate or the slopes,
β_0 = Intercept of the regression equation
Apriori expectation: β_1, $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta 3 < 0$

Presentation and Analyses of Data
Data Description
Basic descriptive statistics as they concern the variables under study are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Description of Variables under Study

	LOGTEC	LOGTAI	LOGTFC	LOGTSI
Mean	7.959518	9.575088	7.547954	5.788563
Median	8.064636	9.466532	7.347944	5.948035
Maximum	8.843471	10.88787	9.726213	6.525030
Minimum	6.753438	7.955425	5.998937	4.442651
Std. Dev.	0.671510	0.735083	0.933777	0.596125
Skewness	-0.574369	-0.287844	0.831866	-0.999230
Kurtosis	2.173058	2.959815	3.393129	3.108093
Jarque-Bera	1.419097	0.235897	2.070141	2.837250
Probability	0.491866	0.888742	0.355201	0.242047
Sum	135.3118	162.7765	128.3152	98.40557
Sum Sq. Dev.	7.214813	8.645552	13.95103	5.685846
Observations	17	17	17	17

Source: Authors' Computation

Table 1 above, displays the rudimentary aggregative averages taking on mean, and median. Standard deviation takes on spread and variations. Kurtosis takes on the degree of peakedness while skewness takes on the degree of or departure from symmetry. Jacque Bera Statistics measures normality confirming all observations are platykurtic with their kurtosis less than 2 and the p-values of the JB Statistics is greater than 5%.

Fig.1: Histogram (Polygon) Plot of the Differenced Series
Source: Authors' Computation

Figure 1 above; shows that a total number of fraud cases (TFC) has the highest peak Along with the highest values of observations. The plot also shows that the variables fall with a range. There are no much extreme and low values which make the study of a possible linear association plausible.

Test for Unit Root

A group unit root test was conducted for the variables by means of ADF. The results indicate that the series are co-integrated at I (1) first order difference.

Table 2: Group Unit Root Test

Group unit root test: Summary
Series: LOGTEC, LOGTAI, LOGTFC, LOGTSI
Date: 03/30/18   Time: 14:23
Sample: 2000 2016
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 2
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel

Method	Statistic	Prob.**	Cross-sections	Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)				
Levin, Lin & Chu t*	-9.35535	0.0000	4	56
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)				
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat	-8.36929	0.0000	4	56
ADF - Fisher Chi-square	57.1950	0.0000	4	56
PP - Fisher Chi-square	52.5766	0.0000	4	60

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi

-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.

Table 2 above, takes on the indicators of individual unit root and common unit root tests with the p values (0.00000) are less than 5%, which propellers the rejection of null and acceptance of alternative.

Table 3: Regression Results

	Dependent Variable: LOGTEC Included observations: 17 Option in OLS: White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Errors and Covariance				
Variable	Expectation	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
LOGTAI	+	0.391165	0.139549	2.803078	0.0149
LOGTFC	+	0.149917	0.111195	1.348231	0.2006
LOGTSI	-	0.579906	0.162513	3.568365	0.0034
Other OLS Estimates R^2 = 76.32%, Adjusted R^2= 70.86%, F-Statistic = 13.97320 Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000000 (Dw Stat 1.37)					

Note: The Probability values * means significance at 5% level
Source: Authors Computation

The estimated result in (Table 3) displays the affiliation flanked by financial fraud in relation to insider abuse in Nigeria contained by the model. Positive affiliation exists between ΔTFC, ΔTAI, and ΔTEC. This is consistent with apriori expectation. However, a negative and non-significant bond exists between ΔTSI and ΔTFC. This is a departure from our expected sign and direction. The $R^2$76.32% explains the discrepancy in TEC within the context of this model such is explained by the regressors. The Adjusted $R^2$of 70.86%, instituted goodness of fit in the model. The F-test 13.97230 (0.0000*) confirms that the all-inclusive regression is statistically significant at 5%.The DW statistics which is 1.37approximately 4, by the rule of thumb, rules out the suspicion of AR(1) autocorrelation and substantiates data stability. The Breusch Godfrey LM serial correlation was conducted to confirm for autocorrelation.

The Breusch Godfrey LM serial correlation
Table 4: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:

F-statistic	0.500138	Prob. F(2,11)	0.6196
Obs*R-squared	1.417026	Prob. Chi-Square(2)	0.4924

Source: Authors' Computation

The BG LM serial correlation test result takes in a lag of 2 by the rule of thumb represents one-third of the number of observations indicates that the p-values of the F and Chi-square tests are all greater than 5%. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. This confirms the DW results and absolves the regression results of all forms of spuriousness.

Table 5: Test for Heteroskedasticity

Heteroskedasticity Test: White

F-statistic	0.244981	Prob. F(9,7)	0.9728
Obs*R-squared	4.072004	Prob. Chi-Square(9)	0.9066
Scaled explained SS	2.326341	Prob. Chi-Square(9)	0.9852

Source: Authors' Computation

The White Test for heteroscedasticity result display in the table above rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. That is, therefore, a clear violation of the prime cardinal assumptions of the Linear Regression Model. To remedy such problem, the regression result as reported in Table 5, the white heteroscedasticity-consistentstandard errors and covariance. This gives us a more robust standard error and t-estimates as reported above.

Table 6: Co-integrating Test Result between Financial Fraud and Insider Abuse variables

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigen value	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
None *	0.964317	72.13615	47.85613	0.0001
At most 1	0.643922	22.13993	29.79707	0.2908
At most 2	0.303425	6.650850	15.49471	0.6186
At most 3	0.078553	1.227154	3.841466	0.2680

Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

Table 6 above, displays the Trace statistic, maximal Eigen value statistic and probability indicate the presence of (1) co-integrating equation at 5% significance, which implies that total expected loss is co-integrated with insider abuse. Thus, the results suggest the existence of a stable long-run relationship between financial fraud and insider abuse.

Table 7: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests

Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 03/30/18   Time: 14:17
Sample: 2000 2016
Lags: 2

Null Hypothesis:	Obs	F-Statistic	Prob.
LOGTAI does not Granger Cause LOGTEC	15	0.09428	0.9108
LOGTEC does not Granger Cause LOGTAI		0.78849	0.4809
LOGTFC does not Granger Cause LOGTEC	15	0.08335	0.9207
LOGTEC does not Granger Cause LOGTFC		0.21281	0.8119
LOGTSI does not Granger Cause LOGTEC	15	2.22972	0.1582
LOGTEC does not Granger Cause LOGTSI		1.27720	0.3206
LOGTFC does not Granger Cause LOGTAI	15	0.50473	0.6183
LOGTAI does not Granger Cause LOGTFC		1.11506	0.3655
LOGTSI does not Granger Cause LOGTAI	15	0.22678	0.8011
LOGTAI does not Granger Cause LOGTSI		0.59486	0.5700
LOGTSI does not Granger Cause LOGTFC	15	1.06524	0.3807
LOGTFC does not Granger Cause LOGTSI		0.83449	0.4622

Table 7 above, shows that there is a bi-directional relationship between financial fraud and insider abuse in Nigeria.

Test for Model Stability

To ratify the stability of the model and the nonexistence of wrong functional form and model specification error, Ramsey RESET (Regression Specification Error Test) and the Recursive Estimates Bound Graph was adopted.

Figure 2: Recursive Estimates Bound Graph
Source: Authors' Computation

The recursive graph indicates the red lines of the upper and lower bounds and the blue line indicating the model. This indicates that the model is blue and within bounds. The Ramsey RESET test as shown in Table 8 below, conducted on a lag of 1, shows that there is no model specification error. Indicating that irrelevant variables were not included and essential variables were not omitted.

Table 8: Ramsey RESET Tests Results
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: UNTITLED
Specification: LOGTEC LOGTAI LOGTFC LOGTSI C
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values

	Value	df	Probability
t-statistic	1.497108	12	0.1602
F-statistic	2.241332	(1, 12)	0.1602
Likelihood ratio	2.911110	1	0.0880

Source: Authors' Computation

Summary Recommendation and Conclusion
The study analyses the effect of financial fraud with emphasis on Insider Abuses in the Nigerian banking sector using a dataset covering a 17year period. The OLS technique denotes the prime technique of valuation pooled with an assortment of other universal/customary and diagnostic tests. The

stimulus is to value the fundamental cause of insider abuse even in the face of straight regulations and advance technology employed. The R^2 76.32% explains the discrepancy in TEC within the context of this model such is explained by the regressors. The adjusted R^2 of 70.86%, instituted goodness of fit in the model. Results display the existence of positive affiliation between ΔTFC, ΔTAI, and ΔTEC. Along with a negative and non-significant bond between ΔTSI and ΔTFC. This is consistent with conventional and fraud theory as the number of cases increases so is the amount involved *Ceteris paribus*. Such is evident in the Nigerian context where insider abuse still exists in the face of straight regulations and advance technology. There is, therefore, a strong recommendation and advocacy for an all-inclusive review on the financial institution's internal control system, quality and character of staff recruited, audit reports, job security and reward for excellent must be established in relation to good salary scale.

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Implications of Herdsmen Attacks for Community Development in Nigeria

7

CHAPTER

[1]Bassey E. Anam & [2]Ella John Richard
[1]Institute of Public Policy & Administration,
University of Calabar, CRS
[2]Department of Public Administration,
IBB University, Lapai, Niger State

Introduction

Like the health of any nation, its security cannot be taken for granted. Attacks by herdsmen, without doubt, have become the most potent threat to national security in the last couple of years. What makes the attacks by armed herdsmen very disturbing are, the frequency, the level of destruction and sheer brutality. As at date, there have been wanton killings by herdsmen in Benue, Niger, Taraba, Kaduna and Plateau States that have resulted in massive displacement of people and loss of lives. The attacks are unprecedented when assessed on the basis of the frequency, the casualty, and sheer brutality. The fallout naturally is a huge humanitarian crisis in almost all the states affected. The development in almost all cases is characterized by high casualty rate and massive displacement of communities. The attacks have negative effects on rural community development on affected states. This study examines these effects and further identifies measures of mitigating this national menace. It is qualitative in nature and as such, data obtained from secondary sources are analyzed through qualitative technique. The study recommends the establishment of a regulatory framework in the country that will streamline the activities of herdsmen in the country.

The Nigerian nation is faced with security threats. One of the emerging and perhaps more disturbing is the activity of the Fulani militants. It has become a national and international concern. In June 2016, an attack occurred in Ossissa community in Ndokwa East local government area, Delta state and three more communities (Ugondo, Turan, Gabo Nenzev) in Logo Local Government Area, Benue State, total killings involving no fewer than 60 persons (Omawumi, 2016). On Monday, January 22, 2018, two reports from Adamawa and Ondo States were published. The killings in Benue and Taraba continue unabated. Clashes between herdsmen and farmers in Adamawa, Benue, Taraba, Ondo, and Kaduna have resulted in 168 deaths in January 2018 alone (Amnesty International, 2018).

The consequences of these clashes leave much to be desired. Hundreds of people lost their lives last year. The Amnesty reported added that in 2017, 549 deaths were recorded across 14 states, while thousands were displaced. In 2017, clashes between nomadic herdsmen and local farmers resulted in at least 549 deaths and thousands displaced across Enugu, Benue, Taraba, Zamfara, Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Cross River, Adamawa, Katsina, Delta and Ekiti states (Amnesty International, 2018).

Farms are destroyed, crops lost and the incentive to plant anew dwindles with each attack. The cases are endless and leave affects community development, an especially agricultural development which is the mainstay of the rural economy. Several reports have shown that the government is still not doing enough to protect communities from these violent clashes. Worse, the killers are getting away with murder. The Fulani Herdsmen have unabatedly continued to cause havoc, mostly in the middle belt area of the country. The inability of the Nigerian Police and Military to contain them may spell greater doom for lives in susceptible areas. The Nigerian populace believes that President Muhammadu Buhari has deliberately shied away from commenting on the crisis, as it is widely known that he comes from the Fulani ethnic group.

There are several economic consequences to the widespread conflict. The position of this paper is that Nigeria might be reaching that stage when the intractable problem of herdsmen/farmer clashes will evolve into mini-wars between herdsmen and the entire community. It becomes necessary therefore

to examine the trend and consequences of herdsmen clashes on community development in Nigeria, with an aim to identify strategies that may be useful in addressing this menace.

Methodology

The work is a position paper and qualitative in nature. Data are obtained primarily from secondary sources and analyzed through qualitative technique.

Herdsmen attack in Nigeria

According to the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, these Fulani militants are the fourth deadliest militant group in the world with a record killing of 1229 people in 2014. The Fula people also known as Fulani in the Hausa language, are a mass population widely dispersed and culturally diverse in all of Africa, but most predominate in West Africa. The Fulani's generally speak the Fula language (Fiki and Lee, 2005). A significant number of them are nomadic in nature, herding cattle, goats, and sheep across the vast dry grasslands of their environment, keeping isolate from the local farming communities, making them the world's largest pastoral nomadic group. They are massively spread over many countries and are found mainly in West Africa and northern parts of Central Africa, but also in Sudan and Egypt. The main Fulani sub-groups in Nigeria are Fulbe Adamawa, Fulbe Mbororo, Fulbe Sokoto, Fulbe Gombe, and the Fulbe Borgu (Omawumi, 2016).

Iro (1994) paints a picture on the peculiarity of the activities of the herdsmen. He maintained that they move from one place to another in search of pasture. In this process, the herdsmen have reportedly encountered cattle rustlers and made complaints to the relevant authorities who fail to investigate the issue, hence their purported reason for carrying arms about. During their journey, they frequently trespass farmlands owned by locals in their host communities, destroying crops and valuables. Attempts by farmers to prevent them from causing havoc are met with stiff and violent resistance. Most times, the farmers are overpowered, injured and killed, while others are evicted from their homes (Ingawa, Ega, and Erhabor, 1999). Sometimes, the herdsmen are accused of taking these opportunities to steal, rape, raze houses and kill innocent members of the communities they pass through (Iro, 1994).

In a reported presented by Omawumi (2016), below are some of the attacks by Fulani Herdsmen compiled from various news headlines between 2012 and 2016:

a. September 30, 2012: A Fulani herdsman had been accused of murdering one Benjamin Chegue on his farm, the Director of Personnel Management in the Isoko North Local Government Council in Delta State.

b. April 5th, 2014: Assailants opened fire on community leaders and residents that were meeting in Galadima village. At least 200 people were killed and an unknown number were injured in the attack. Sources attributed the attack to Fulani assailants.

c. February 18th, 2016: Five persons were killed by Fulani herdsmen at Okokolo village in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State.

d. March 5th, 2016: About 500 persons were killed by the rampaging herdsmen following a siege on Agatu local government area of Benue state. These communities include; Aila, Akwu, Adagbo, Okokolo, Ugboju, Odugbeho, Ogbaulu, Egba and Obagaji.

e. April 12th, 2016: Fulani herdsmen attacked two villages in Gashaka Local Government Area of Taraba state on and killed 15 people.

f. April 19th, 2016: Twenty-five local government areas in Delta State grounded activities on the Benin-Asaba Expressway. They reported that the herdsmen allegedly killed over 23 persons. Interestingly, the police recovered 20 AK-47 rifles, 70 Dane guns, 30 double-barrel guns and over 1,000 live ammunition, mostly from Fulani herdsmen during this period.

g. April 21st, 2016: Farmers in Lagun, Iyana Offa, Offa, Atagba, Lapata and their surrounding communities in Lagelu Local Council Area of Ibadan, Oyo State, alleged that a group of Fulani armed men attacked their communities at night, injured a guard and carted away valuables.

h. April 25th, 2016: Fulani herdsmen attack seven villages in Nimbo in Uzo- Uwani Local Government Area of Enugu State. About 40 persons were reportedly killed.

i. June 16th, 2016: A 45-year-old renowned farmer was shot by gunmen suspected to be Fulani herdsmen in Ossissa community in Ndokwa east local government area of Delta state.

j. June 20th, 2016: At Least 59 Deaths have been recorded following recent attacks on Benue communities such as Ugondo, Turan, Gabo Nenzev – in the Logo Local Government Area by Suspected Herdsmen

In a study conducted by Bello (2013), some of the major causes of herdsmen-farmers conflicts are enumerated as follows:

1. Destruction of crops by cattle and other property (reservoirs, irrigational facilities, and infrastructure) by the herdsmen themselves are the main direct causes for conflicts cited by the farmers.

2. Burning of rangelands, fadama and blockage of stock routes and water points by crop encroachment are important direct reasons cited by the herdsmen.

3. Increasing rate of cattle theft which, is often accompanied by violence.

4. Antagonistic perceptions and beliefs among farmers and herdsmen could compound conflict situation, especially due to failing institutions and fierce competition for resources. He maintained strongly that the conflicts have demonstrated high potential to exacerbate the insecurity and food crisis particularly in rural communities where most of the conflicts are localized, with reverberating repercussions nationwide.

Implications for Community Development in Nigeria

Community development is a process where community members come together to take collective action and generate solutions to common problems. According to Anam (2016), community wellbeing (economic, social,

environmental and cultural) often evolves from this type of collective action being taken at a grassroots level. Community development seeks to improve quality of life. Effective community development results in mutual benefit and shared responsibility among community members. Such development recognizes:

    i. The connection between social, cultural, environmental and economic matters
    ii. The diversity of interests within a community
    iii. Its relationship to building capacity

Community development helps to build community capacity in order to address issues and take advantage of opportunities, find common ground and balance competing interests. Agriculture is the mainstay of the Nigerian rural economy. The sector contributes largely to the existence and well-being of the rural populace. Development in the rural sector cannot be mentioned without mention of the functionality of the agricultural sector. Incessant herdsmen attacks on farmlands have a direct consequence on agricultural development and food security.

Bello (2013) disclosed that conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have existed since the beginnings of agriculture and increased or decreased in intensity and frequency depending on economic, environmental and other factors. He explained further, "increases in the herd sizes, due to improved conditions of the cattle, compelled the pastoralists to seek for more pastures beyond their limited range". Climate change is identified as one of the greatest threat by putting great pressures on the land and thus provoking conflicts between them. However, improvements in human health and population have enhanced a much greater pressure on land. Since the 1980s therefore, there has been a marked expansion of cultivation of the fadama (riverine and valley-bottom) areas. This means that both the farmers and pastoralists have engaged in fierce struggles for access to such valuable lands which, more often than not, result in increased conflicts and violence (Bello, 2013).

The effects of pastoralist and farmers conflict on community development are enormous. One major concern is the destruction of farmlands in affected areas. This obviously affects farm yield and production capacity. There losses of lives and material resources. This further affects household income and

saving capacity of the rural farmer. During the conflict, families tend to migrate and a few others are displaced. Social peace and cohesion are distorted. All outcomes have negative effects on agricultural production in rural areas and to a large extend community development.

Conclusion and Suggestions for Improvement

The current herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria have raised fundamental national questions for the survival of the Nigerian State. The failure of the state to manage and resolve such conflicts has put a question mark on the suitability or relevance of the federal structure to the Nigerian reality. Scholars have noted that the Nigerian government is paying lip service to the problem of herdsmen attack. The advocacy for "cattle colony" seems unrealistic given its various challenges. To move forward, the paper suggests the following,

1. First, the Nigerian government must make policies that are designed to enhance the Fulani herdsmen by ensuring that they secure rights to land use in order to reduce insecurity and mitigate the spate of conflicts. This will, among other things, bring about peaceful coexistence between the Fulani herdsmen and host communities. This also enhances the security of the cattle, to access grazing space or resources without pouncing on farmers' crops (Bello, 2013).

2. Institutional authorities at the Federal and State level must investigate these attacks and, where these investigations indicate criminal responsibility, prosecute those responsible and bring them to justice.

3. The law on grazing reserve in Nigeria should be amended and improved upon to accommodate emerging challenges. The government, at the Federal, State ND Local level must make herdsmen keep agreeing routes and farmers avoid farming across them with stern government policy and strict compliance.

4. Traditional strategies may be combined with the emerging ones to address the problem of conflict in Nigeria. This relates to how communities create local structures and networks for the purposes of engagement, participation, inclusiveness, mutual partnership and transformation of the environment through equity in resource utilization (Bello, 2013).

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Human Rights Education: an Instrument for Human Security in Nigeria

8

CHAPTER

[1]**Nasiru Abubakar Katami** & [2]**Maryam Khalid**
[1&2]Department of Educational Foundations
Faculty of Education, Sokoto State University

Introduction

This paper examines the role of human rights education as an instrument for human security it x-rays the roles of education in molding the character of individual towards better life as well as the functions of education and the role it plays as a potential instrument for change and human development. It also looks at the synopsis on the needs for human rights education in Nigeria It also examines the curriculum of human rights education and its impact on students and school environment. Finally the paper was concluded by making some recommendations on the strategies for the effective implementation of human rights education.

Nigeria as a Nation is currently at the cross road. There is widespread inter religious crisis, as well as inter and intra-ethnic violence in the country' Among these crises are Niger delta crisis, Indigenous People of Biafra crisis, religious riot in the north ann Boko haram Insurgency in the North East, call for confederacy and secession, suspicion and distrust among the various ethnic groups. Several conscious efforts have been made by the government to maintain peace and stability in Nigeria without much success. For instance, the inauguration of council of inter-religious Harmony by the federal

government. This council is co-headed by the sultan of Sokoto, the president of Christian Association do Nigeria

Various suggestions from well-meaning individuals as being made to ensure Nigeria remains an indivisible entity where every Nigerian will consider himself Nigerian first before seeing himself as a Yoruba, Igbo or Hausa and so on. In other words, a Nigeria in which the national consciousness of her citizens will be high. This may be achieved through education. Education has become an increasingly important means for countries to educate their citizens about their rights such as values and responsibilities

Human Security
Human security can be understood as an academic problem, a political agenda or as a new research category. There is not yet a widely agreed upon definition of human security. Definitions from both the academic community as well as the governmental sources range from narrow concepts focusing on physical integrity or a limited number on threats to be addressed by human security to a broad understanding, which encompasses also psychological and emotional aspects of security and well-being of the individual.

In essences human security is an emerging new concept which is concerned with the security of people and the individual rather than with the security of the territorial state and this shift the focus state security to individual-centered security. Human security addresses various threats to the security, safety, integrity and well-being of human beings. UNDP (1994) defines human security broadly as "safety from chronic such as chronic threats as hunger and repression", protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the pattern of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats exist at all levels of national income and development. In a note shell human security is concerned with "survival, daily life and dignity of human beings" Amartya (2000).

Human Security Network
The human security network start from the presumption that "a human world where people can live in security and dignity, free from poverty and despairs, is still a dream many and should be enjoyed by all. In such a world, every individual would be guaranteed from fear and freedom from want,

with an equal opportunity to fully develop their human potential. Building human security is essential to achieving this goal. In essence, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. Human security has become both a new measure of global security and a new agenda for global action. Safety is the hallmark of freedom from fear, while well-being is the target of freedom want. Human security and human development are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and leading to a conducive environment for each other.

The network also narrows down the UNDP concept to a more policy-oriented and practical concept building on the principles that a commitment to human right and humanitarian law is the foundation for building human security. Human security is advanced in every country by protecting and promoting human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and democratic structures, a culture of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The international organizations created by states to build a just and peaceful world order, above all the United Nations, in its role to maintain international peace and security as stated in the charter, must serve the security needs of the people.

Promoting sustainable human development, through the alleviation of poverty, providing basic social services for all, and perusing the goals of people-oriented development, is necessary for building human security. Innovative international approaches will be needed to address the source of insecurity, remedy the symptoms and prevent the recurrence of threats which affect the daily life of million of people. The emphasis placed on education is borne out of the fact, as stated by Federal Government of Nigeria (2004), that education is considered a potential instrument for change and development. Probably, that is why Iyewarun (1989) asserts that education is an instrument by which young members are   brought up and socialized so as to become useful and active members of the society. How ever, the role of education differs from culture to culture. In support of this view, Metzieobi, and Osakwe (1996) notes that the emphasis placed on the goals of education ranges from culture to culture and society to society. To him, while some people sees education as an instrument for achieving a specific objective. Others see it as a means of training the mind intellect. This view is supported by Ukeje (1996), by stating that some people view education as an instrument for achieving

specific objectives such as socialization and means of social mobility while others see education as a means of inculcating a particular ideology.

From a different perspective, Yusuf (2005) observes that the school should not be used as an instrument for training individuals only; rather it should be directed at training of the mind and the development of the intellect. Nevertheless, it is noted that many educationists and social studies educator such as Metzeobi (2000). Ezegbe, Okilo and Osakwe (1993) are of the opinion that education is an effective instrument for civic responsibility and the school has always been used to perpetuate the tradition of the society. Similarly, Cookey (1970) Opine that the school has always served as a major channel for inculcating in its members independence, self-reliance, responsibility and moral uprightness. Probably that is why Federal Government of Nigeria (2004) has as one of its educational objectives, the inculcation of right type of attitude for survival of individual and the Nigerian society.

In this present situation that Nigerian unity and democracy is under threat, education can be used to foster much needed unity for the survival of the nation. In the 21st century, and the unfortunate inter-ethnic and religious clashes including leadership crises that have become a common occurrence in Nigeria, it becomes imperative to introduce a special type of educational programmed that deals with issues that are related to National consciousness and national unity. Omare (1999) observes that at various times, the need arises for countries to seek solution to pressing problems of national importance, and this has been the position of various countries in search of political stability, unity, peace and progress, and the instrument employed always to achieve unity and national consciousness is education. Hence education for good citizenship in a democratic setting needs experiences in a democratic process and democratic living. (UNESCO, 2005).

Roles of Education
In recent times, much attention has been devoted to the roles the school is expected to play in the training of good citizens in Nigeria. The emphasis placed on education is borne out of the fact, as stated by Federal Government of Nigeria (2004), that education is considered a potent Instrument for change and development. Probably, that is why Iyamu (1999) assert that education is

an instrument by which young members are brought up and socialized so as to become useful and active members of the society. However, the role of education differs from culture to culture. In support of this view, Metzieobi, and Osakwe (1996) notes that the emphasis placed on the goals of education ranges from culture to culture and society to society. To him while some people see education as an instrument for achieving a specific objective, others; see it as a means of training the mind and intellect. Ukeje (1996) supports this view by stating that some people view education as an instrument for achieving a specific objective such as socialization and means of social mobility while others see education as a means of inculcating a particular ideology.

In his own view Yusuf (2005) asserts that the school should not be use as an instrument for training in citizenship only, rather it should be directed as the training of the mind and the development of the intellect.

Article 28 of the convention on the right of the child, establishes the child's right to education. Education empowers the child by developing his or her skills, learning, and other capacities, human dignity, self-esteem and self-confidence. The 1990 world summit for children set a goal: "By the year 2000 universal access to basic education and achievement of primary education by at least 80% of primary school age children". Also in 1990, a world conference on education for all was held in Jauntier, Thailand. The resulting world declaration on Education for all asserts that basic education "is more than end in itself. It is the foundation for life long learning and human development on which countries may build, systematically, further levels and types of education and training. Article 1-4 also states that "every person shall be able to benefit from educational opportunities design to meet his basic learning needs. These needs comprise both essential learning tools and the basic learning content required by human beings to be able to survive, to develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions and to continue learning.

A decade later in 2000, the world Education forum, held in Dakar, set a framework for action, reconfirming international goals and identifying strategies for all aiming them. According to the convention on the rights of the child, children are the right-holders whose right to education should be

realized by the duty-bearers at the national, sub-national, community and house hold levels. In unstable where the duty-bearers have difficulty fulfilling their obligations to respect and realize the child's right, the international humanitarian community often finds education as an excellent delivery point for human security measures to promote empowerment and protection of children living in especially difficult conditions

Curriculum of Human Rights Education

Human rights are the basic freedoms and protections that all people are in titled to. They are rights that we all have whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, sexual orientation or any other status. We all are equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all related to one another, dependent upon one another.

Human rights education is aimed at building an understanding and appreciation for human rights through learning about rights and learning through rights. Human rights education is inextricably linked with the pedagogy of teaching. It require not just imparting knowledge about human rights but also applying a human rights based pedagogy to ensure young people learn in a rights respecting environment that respect their rights and promote the rights of others. The element of human rights education are acquisition of knowledge and skills about human rights, development of respectful values, and attitudes and changed behaviour that neglect human rights of all motivation of social action and empowerment of active citizenship to advance respect for the rights of all.

Positive Impact of Human Rights Curriculum on Students and School Environment

Children attitudes, ideas and characters are formed at a younger age and these are heavily influenced by other environment, including their school education. Human rights education in school is an effective means to assists children to incorporate human rights values into their attitudes and behaviours. Assisting young people to incorporate these values into their daily lives is a concrete way to prevent bullying, discrimination and promote inclusion and respect for diversity. Human rights promote a valuable framework for good interpersonal relations and for making informed and

proportionate decisions. From the play ground to government and public policy, it starts with human rights education in school. In the United kingdom UNICEF has been pioneering a program called the 'Rights Respecting School Awards Program'. The program award schools that incorporate the Convention on the Rights of the Child into their planning, practice and ethos. This include teaching and learning about the convention, creating a rights respecting culture and empowering children to become active citizens. In doing so, it has improved self-esteem behaviour and relationships; reduce bullying and discrimination; increased and engage children in planning and reviewing their own learning. Moreover, it has provided schools with a framework of common values, United Nation (2001).

Based on international human rights instrument, human rights education (HRE) can be defined as education, training and information aimed at building a universal culture of human rights through the sharing knowledge, imparting of skills and moulding of attitudes to prompt action directed at strengthening respect for human rights, fundamental freedom, tolerance, equality and peace among individuals, within societies and among nations. Such education requires the adoption of a human rights based approach to education, which promotes but 'human rights education', ensuring that all the components and processes of education including curricula, materials, methods and training are conducive to learning of human rights and 'human rights in education' ensuring that the human rights of all members of the school community are respected and human rights practiced within the education system, United Nation (2001).

In the school system human rights education is an important component of the right to education, as it enables the education system to fulfill its fundamental aims of promoting the full development of the human personality and appreciation of human dignity of strengthening respect for human rights and of delivering a quality education for all. In this sense human rights education contribute to improving the effectiveness of the education system as a whole, which in turn contribute to a country's economic, social and political development by proving improved quality of learning achievement by promoting child-centred and participatory teaching and learning practices and processes as well as a new role for the teaching profession; increased access to and participation in schooling by creating a human rights-based

learning environment that is inclusive and welcoming and fosters universal values, equal opportunities, respect for diversity and non discrimination; a contribution to social cohesion and conflict prevention by supporting the social and emotional development of the child and by introducing democratic citizenship and values. In support of the above assertion Okilo (1993) stated that citizenship education teaches attitudes and values, and therefore, role playing as a teaching method can help the democratic processes and national consciousness in leadership training programme. The emphasis on the effective domain in human rights education will encourage feelings of patriotism and national consciousness inn individuals.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this paper, it has been emphasized that human rights education should be introduced at all levels of our educational system. It is against this background that the following recommendations on the strategy for the effective implementation of human rights education are made.

1. Human rights education should be introduced at all levels of teachers training institutions. This is because teachers must be prepared and equipped to effect the needed change in the children. Teachers should be trained and this could be done through in-service training.
2. For effective implementation, education should be made free and compulsory at least up to senior secondary school level. This is because students would have acquired good human rights education.
3. Multi-disciplinary techniques should be employed as method of teaching human rights education at higher level of education
4. Researches should be conducted to identify major problems of teaching and o learning as well as support systems that may affect human rights education. To do this, researchers should be encouraged by government to carry out meaningful studies.

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Effectiveness of Healthcare Delivery in Prisons: a Study of Kano Central and Goron Dutse Prisons in Kano State

9
CHAPTER

[1]Kabir Bello, [2]Bello Ibrahim & [3]Ahmad Hassan Ahmad
[1&2]Department of Sociology,
Bayero University Kano, P.M.B 3011, Kano State, Nigeria
[3]Department of Sociology,
Federal University, Kashere, P.M.B 0182, Gombe State, Nigeria

Introduction

The provision of healthcare in prisons is one of the great health concerns in the area of medical criminology because of its link with the rehabilitation and reformation needs of the inmates. Against this background the study examined the effectiveness of health-care delivery in Kano Central and Goron-Dutse prisons in Kano State. It used the standards as clearly spelt out in the revised Nigerian Prisons Standing Order (2011) and the revised United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Offenders, popularly known as the Nelson Mandela Rules for the Treatment of Offenders (2015).Effectiveness is measured as a significant percentage of inmates' ability to get medical attention and treatment as at when due. A total of 350 inmates were proportionately selected using Stratified Sampling technique as suggested by Wiseman's 1999 table of sample size in the two prisons. In addition, both quantitative and qualitative data from convicted prisoners and awaiting trial inmates, healthcare officials and officials of NGOs, FBOs and CBOs involved in healthcare delivery in the prisons. Three major theories were discussed; however the study settled on the Donabedian's

(1966) structure-process-outcome model which served as theoretical frame of analysis due to its aptness Vis-a vis the research. Although, the prison authorities in charge of healthcare reported doing everything possible to provide for the healthcare needs of inmates in the prisons, the findings in retrospect revealed an ineffective healthcare delivery in the prisons. This was buttressed as there were no standard hospitals, no professionals, inadequacy of drugs and referral problems as well as the costs in some instances borne by the inmates themselves. The study recommended more efforts from government, NGOs, FBOs and CBOs on the contribution to make and promote healthcare delivery for inmates in prison and their general welfare.

The primary purpose of prison and other detention centers is not treatment, they are facilities established for correctional purposes: a system designed to punish, restrain people's liberties, reform and rehabilitate. These punishment and liberty restricting elements that are part and parcel of the prison usually come into conflict with the accessibility and well-being elements associated with health care. Prisoners around the world constitute one of the most vulnerable populations. People who spend time in prison will usually return to the wider community and their health care needs both inside and outside of prison is an important issue worthy of consideration, as is the provision of adequate healthcare to meet these needs.

Globally, around 10.2 million people are said to be held in prisons, out of this, 54, 144 are in Nigeria, mostly as pre-trial detainees/remand prisoners or as sentenced prisoners (Walmsley, 2013). This has in many countries led to upsurge in prison overcrowding and is associated with strict nature of sentencing policies in spite of existing restorative justice approaches. Despite the high number of people held in prisons globally, the public health relevance of incarceration is inadequately emphasized. Although Nigeria can be adduced to have achieved certain level of progress in its economic and political sphere of life, the prisons in Nigeria are yet to tap into this progress especially as it affects the health of the inmates. A recurring issue of contention within the contemporary academic circles, sociologists, criminologists, health workers and experts in prison studies, is to ensure an appropriate health care delivery for proper prison administration that will aid the attainment of the purpose of imprisonment. Even though, the (UN Minimum Standard for the Treatment of Offenders) Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) and the Nigerian Prison

Standing Order (2011) were very much explicit on the constituents of an effective healthcare delivery in the prison. These instruments provided guidelines for an all-round provision of standard healthcare to all inmates devoid of preferential considerations from the point of entry to discharge.

Given the above, this paper attempts a discourse on effectiveness of health care delivery in Kano Central and Goron Dutse prison. In this paper, effectiveness is used to refer to, and measured on the basis of the ability of a significant percentage of the inmates to get healthcare (healthcare professionals, drugs and referrals) as at when required. This was done by discussing prison health in Nigeria on the basis of the standards spelt out in the Nelson Mandela Rules and the Nigerian Prisons Standing Order. The paper further suggests ways through which effective health care delivery can be attained in prisons.

Statement of the Problem

The issue of prison healthcare has over the years remained a subject of debate and highlights implications for health and wider social policies as people move inside and outside of prison. In prison where there are, for example, large numbers of people suffering from poor physical and mental health it is inarguably very important that prison health care fully meets the needs of its inhabitants. Prisoners form an integral part of the larger society. Majority of those incarcerated in penal institutions in Africa and especially Nigeria, come from socioeconomically disadvantaged background. They are mostly characterized by poor health status due to unhealthy lifestyles such as alcoholism, smoking, drug abuse etc. Inspite of this heavy health burden, most prisons lack effective healthcare facilities to accommodate the healthcare needs of prison inmates (Ndukwe and Iroko, 2014). Thus, most prisoners return to the larger society at the expiration of their prison term, with serious health threatening conditions in the prison, the health condition of the inmates therefore calls for attention.

Nevertheless, prisoners typically have high and special health and social needs, but the views and experiences of prisoners about effectiveness of healthcare delivery in prisons have not been widely researched especially in Nigeria. Thus, this study aimed at assessing the effectiveness of healthcare delivery in Kano Central and Goron-Dutse prisons within the context of the dynamics of the health care delivery structure in prisons.

Literature Review

The Concept of Health and Healthcare

Prior to the period of the famous physician known as Hippocrates around (5BCE), health was perceived as a divine gift. Hippocrates was said to have pioneered the shift from divine conception of health and advocated for the use of observation as a basis for explaining health and also opined for a focus on environmental sanitation, personal hygiene and in particular balanced diet. This was the wisdom in his popular position that "let food be thy medicine and let thy medicine be food" (Awofeso, 2012).

Various conceptions of health have been advanced after Hippocrates. Popular among these definitions is that put forth by the WHO (1948) that "health is a complete state of physical, mental and social wellbeing, not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". This definition according to Jimoh and Razum (2014) is holistic and covers the major components of health. These for them include;

1. The physical component which is used to refer to the soundness of the body which is the most important determinant of health. Thus, health entails in the orderliness of the individual's biological components which is largely determined by laboratory and clinical examinations.

2. The social component represents the behavioural aspect of human health. In this regard, health entails in establishing a network of social interaction and the ability to meet up with the demands of social roles and expectations. Impliedly, inactivity in the social network represents a form of pathology.

3. The mental component takes account of the psychological and emotional status of an individual, the maladjustment of which constitutes an infraction in health or the manifestation of illness. This implies that an individual's inability to comprehend, manage and make meaning of any situation indicates a poor health status.

Assessing the conception above, Godlee (2011) noted that the definition is absolute and therefore unachievable for most people in the world. He therefore contended that the definition presents an absolute ideal situation by combining the three aspects of human life. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to gain complete contentment in all the aspects. A more sociological conception of health is evident in the work of Talcott Parsons. He

viewed health as "the state of optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance of the roles and tasks for which he has been socialized" (Parsons, 1972). This is more a sociological approach to health, viewing health as a social element. Health in this sense is more inclined towards human capacity to fulfil their obligations, participate in social activities (including work), and fulfil role expectations in the society in the face of structural limitations. This notion takes into consideration both physiological and mental models of health in the sense that the source of a social incapacitation could be from a biological or mental limitation. It does not relegate the biomedical model. Impliedly, the model is complementary to the medical model and implies a central concern in medical sociology.

Dorland (1981) was more explicit in his definition of health as a "state of optimal, physical, mental, and social wellbeing, and not merely absence of disease and infirmity. It is clear from the foregoing that absence of disease and infirmity is a necessary but not sufficient component of health. Poor health status, doubtless, is costly especially that of prison inmates. It generally imposes costs on the society and individuals in terms of reduced ability to enjoy life and earn a living or work effectively. Good health, on the other hand, allows the individual to lead a more fulfilling and productive life. Thus, an effective healthcare, especially in a closed system like the prison should be structured in such a way that it guarantees not just absence of any health threatening condition but also the general wellbeing of inmates.

Effectiveness of Healthcare Delivery in Nigerian Prisons
The Nelson Mandela Rules (2015) which was an integral part of the basis of assessment in this study has clearly defined an effective healthcare delivery in prisons in Rule No. 24 as one in which;

> Prisoners enjoy the same standards of healthcare that are available in the community and have access to necessary healthcare services free of charge without discrimination on the grounds of their legal status and that the healthcare should be organized in close relationship to the general public health administration and in a way that ensures continuity of treatment and care, including for HIV, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases as well as for drug dependence (Nelson Mandela Rules, 2015).

The position above was further echoed in the World Health Organisation's (2016) definition of an effective healthcare as "the extent to which health care services provided to individuals and patient populations improve desired health outcomes. The WHO argued that in order to achieve this, health care must be safe, timely, efficient, equitable and people-centred." Thus, an effective healthcare must take cognizance of the following components;

1. **Safe:** Delivering health care that minimizes risks and harm to service users, including avoiding preventable injuries and reducing medical errors.
2. **Effective:** Providing services based on scientific knowledge and evidence-based guidelines.
3. **Timely:** Reducing delays in providing and receiving health care.
4. **Efficient:** Delivering health care in a manner that maximizes resource use and avoids waste.
5. **Equitable:** Delivering health care that does not differ in quality according to personal characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, geographical location or socioeconomic status.
6. **People-Centred:** Providing care that takes into account the preferences and aspirations of individual service users and the culture of their community.

In line with the forgone therefore, effective healthcare for prisoners is therefore the degree to which prison healthcare services (for individuals and populations) increase the likelihood of timely and appropriate care for the purpose of achieving desired outcomes that are both consistent with professional knowledge and take into account the preferences and aspirations of individual prisoner's healthcare needs. In her own opinion, (Bloom, 2008) observed that the tenets of effective healthcare services to be granted to inmates is defined by the extent to which the government and prison authorities are able to provide within prisons those health services normally provided to the general populace.

Much analysis has been done to understand the extent to which the above conditions are being met by the prison administrations in most countries around the world. In his study on human rights and prison management Coyle (2012) observed that most prisons are incapable to deliver essential health services to inmates. He further argued that in a number of cases

funding to prisons service is often inadequate and of course quite stands low in the many priorities amongst government development projects. The study concluded that no serious healthcare provision to inmates has ever been achieved in prisons whether in developed or developing nations. Coyle's position above was corroborated by Nigel (2007), who identified various prisons in America, Haiti, Russia and Africa, and in Nigeria, where there have been poor responses to inmates health needs.

In the social sequence of events, prison inmates are in most cases from the lower rung of the society, and suffer more from unequal access to effective health care services. This experience also exacerbates existing health problems of inmates (De Viggiani, 2007).In a study of the plight of inmates across two prisons in Ogun state, South-West Nigeria, Ojo and Okunola (2014) reported that inmates face critical problems when it comes to health provision in prisons. Davies (2011) cited a range of physiological challenges that are experienced by inmates in prisons, ranging from respiratory conditions through to cardiovascular and musco-skeletal issues. He argued further that the severe health problems experienced by many such prisoners meant that they had become dependent upon both formal and informal health care provided in prison. Furthermore, upon release, the prisoner might not be so readily welcomed by the family as he brings with him not only his criminal past, but also problems with physical and mental health.

Amnesty International (2008) opined that prisoners deserve attention and special medical healthcare. In a survey of Nigerian prisons, the group reported the deplorable condition of the prisons and the health services. They argued that prisoners' right are flouted and that many prisons in Nigeria are overcrowded lacks basic food, poor sanitation, portable drinking water and health care facilities. It is observed that inmates suffering from tuberculosis and other infectious diseases are not quarantined in special cells as stipulated in the Nelson Mandela Rules 2015 and the Nigerian Prisons Standing Orders 2011.

The finding above was corroborated by Okonkwo and Sani (2015) in their study of available healthcare facilities in penal institutions across Kano. They argued that there is inadequate provision of health care facilities, personnel, health care services, unhealthy environment and lack of health education

program across penal institutions in Kano State. This goes to support the findings of Joseph (2005) who discovered that inmates suffering from tuberculosis are not properly quarantined due to lack of facilities. This generally indicates inadequacy in healthcare services provision in penal institutions.

Essentially, the review above presents strands of issues bordering on the effectiveness of healthcare in prison, health condition of inmates in prisons, and healthcare problems in prisons. However, the literature is largely silent on the factors affecting effective healthcare delivery in the prisons. This gap is important, taking into consideration that it remains one of the key interests of this paper.

Theoretical Framework

In this study, effort is made to review some theoretical positions relevant to the study. These include the functionalist perspective and the structure-process-outcome model. As a mainstream sociological perspective, functionalism according to Wallace and Wolf (1980) entails in "the analysis of social and cultural phenomena in terms of the functions they perform in a socio cultural system". The most important intellectual roots of modern functionalism are the influential sociologists such as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and other anthropologists Radcliffe Brown and Branislaw Malinowski. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Talcott Parsons and his student Robert Merton made a significant level of progress in advancing functionalism. The central concern of functionalism is how to maintain social order, equilibrium, or stability in human society. Thus, the prison as a social system for instance, is expected not only to take custody of offenders for rehabilitation and reformation, but also to ensure that prison inmates have access to the highest attainable and effective healthcare services, the absence of which can adversely affect the very essence of imprisonment.

The functionalist perspective reviewed above; provide important insights for understanding health care delivery particularly in prisons. However, the structure-process-outcome model is adopted as frame of analysis for the fact that it is flexible enough for application in diverse healthcare settings and among various levels within a healthcare delivery system, prison healthcare not an exception.

Structure-Process-Outcome Model

Avedis Donabedian (1980), a physician and health services researcher at the University of Michigan was widely recognized for his "structure-process-outcome" formulation for the measurement of effectiveness. In studying healthcare delivery, the framework developed by Donabedian in 1980 is of utmost relevance to this study. Donabedian's model provides a framework for examining health services and evaluating quality of health care. The model consists of three main perspectives. The first perspective deals with the **"**structure" which entails the assessment of the adequacy of facilities and equipment, administrative process, quality and quantity of health personnel in terms of their professional training and financing. Secondly, there is the analysis of the "process" which includes the appraisal of the adherence to good medical care, clinical history, physical examination, and diagnostic tests, justifications of diagnosis and therapy, technical competence, evidence of preventive management, co-ordination and continuity of care, acceptability of care to the recipient. It basically refers to the ensuing transaction between health care seekers and health care providers throughout the delivery of health care. Lastly, he identified "outcome" as the third perspective and this considers whether a change in a person's current and future health status can be attributed to health care received by patients and populations in general.

Basically, Donabedian provided an extensive definition of the structure-process-outcome model as such;

Structure*:* This is meant to designate the conditions under which care is provided. These include: material resources, such as facilities and equipment**,** human resources, such as the number, variety, and qualifications of professional and support personnel and organizational characteristics, such as the organization of the medical and nursing staffs, the presence of teaching and research functions, kinds of supervision and performance review, methods of paying for care, and so on.

Process*:* This is taken to mean the activities that constitute healthcare including diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, prevention, and patient education usually carried out by professional personnel, but also including other contributions to care, particularly by patients and their families.

Outcomes*:* These are taken to mean changes (desirable or undesirable) in individuals and populations that can be attributed to healthcare. Outcomes include changes in health status, changes in knowledge acquired by patients and family members that may influence future care, changes in the behaviour of patients or family members that may influence future health and satisfaction of patients and their family members with the care received and its outcomes.

The choice of this model as a frame of analysis is premised on some evident advantages and the bearing of the model to objectives and questions raised and answered in this study. Thus, structure, meaning the way a health care system is set up, has an important bearing on how persons in that system behave and, consequently, on the quality of care offered and enjoyed. Process offers current, even immediate, indications of quality while outcome reflect not only what was done for patients but also how skilfully that was done.

In line with the above therefore, the Donabedian model provide a detailed pathway to a better understanding of the problem at hand because it clearly identified the basics of an effective healthcare delivery especially as it concerned a close system like the prison.

Methodology

A total of 355 respondents were sampled from among the inmates in the two prisons. The sample size was derived using a revised Wiseman (1999) table which suggested that in a population of 3000-3499, the sample size should be 341. The study employed stratified sampling technique in drawing respondents among the inmates, where the identified strata of interest (convicted and awaiting trial inmates) and then drew the specific number of subjects from each stratum (awaiting trial and convicted inmates). Given the size of the inmates from the two prisons as at the time of data collection which was 3,172 inmates put together, the respondents were proportionately selected from the two prisons as follows;

P = Population of the study, P1 = Population of first prison, P2 = Population of second prison. Thus, P = P1 + P2 (1732 + 1440 = 3,172). Therefore, the required percentage of respondents from Kano Central prison were computed as follows; 1732 × 100/3172 = 55% and the required percentage of respondents

from Goron Dutse prison were computed as follows; 1440 × 100/3172 = 45%. Therefore, selecting the respondents on proportionate grounding as a result of disparity in the number of inmates in the two prisons under study, 55% (194) of the respondents were drawn from Kano Central prison while 45% (156) other respondents were drawn from Goron Dutse. The use of stratified sampling becomes necessary in order to minimize sampling error.

Distribution of Prisons by the Number of Sampled Respondents

Name of Prisons	Prison Population as at Data Collection	Sampled Respondents	Percentage
Kano Central Prison	1732	194	55
Goron Dutse	1440	156	45
Total	**3172**	**350**	**100.0**

Data Presentation

The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection hence the data presentation and analysis. Thus, the quantitative data is presented in a simple frequency distribution table to show variations in terms of frequency of responses and percentages. More so, the qualitative data elicited is used as a compliment for the quantitative data.

Table 1: Whether Respondents have ever fallen Sick in the Prison

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	280	80.0
No	70	20.0
Total	**350**	**100.0**

Table 1 above shows the distribution of responses elicited on whether respondents have ever fallen sick in the prison. It shows that 80 percent of the respondents reported falling sick in the prison while 20 percent of the respondents reported not falling sick in the prison. This implies that there is a high prevalence of illness in the prison.

Table 2: Whether Respondents Waited Longer Before Getting Medical Attention/Treatment

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	163	58.2
No	117	41.8
Total	**280**	**100.0**

Table 2 above shows the responses elicited on whether the inmates who took ill in the prison waited longer than expected before getting medical treatment. It shows that 58.2 percent of the respondents reported to have waited longer than expected before getting medical attention/treatment while 41.8 percent of the respondents reported to have no experience of waiting long to get medical attention/treatment.

Probing this further during the interview in Kano Central prison, a respondent stated that:

> Our medical team operates three different shifts; morning, afternoon and night. At whatever time of the day an inmate is found to be sick, he/she is promptly attended to. There is however instances in which delay is experienced especially as it concerns arranging transport for the referral of offenders to hospitals outside the prison. (IDI: Healthcare Personnel in Prison, 2017).

Table 3: Length of Period for Which Respondents Waited before Medical Treatment

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
A day	62	22.1
2 days	44	15.7
Uncertain	57	20.4
No response	117	41.8
Total	**280**	**100.0**

Table 3 above shows the distribution of respondents by the length of period they waited before medical attention/treatment. It shows that 22.1 percent reported waiting for a day before getting medical attention, 15.7 percent reported waiting for two days while 57 percent of the respondents were

however uncertain of the length of the period the waited before getting medical attention. Impliedly, there is a problem of access to medical treatment for inmates.

Table 4: Whether Respondents are Satisfied with the Treatment

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	64	22.9
No	216	77.1
Total	**280**	**100.0**

Table 4 above shows the distribution of responses elicited on whether respondents are satisfied with the treatment they received. It shows that majority of the respondents 77.1 percent reported that they were not satisfied with the treatment while 22.9 percent other respondents reported their satisfaction. Impliedly, there is a significant level of deficit in terms of the treatment offered to inmates with healthcare concern.

Table 5: Respondents Reasons for Satisfaction with the Treatment

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Immediate Response	9	14.0
Provision of Required Drugs	25	39.0
Recovery from the condition	10	15.7
Referral to Hospital	20	31.3
Total	**64**	**100.0**

Table 5 above shows the distribution of respondents who reported to have been satisfied with the treatment they received while in prison, on the basis of their reasons. It shows that 39.0% of the respondents cited reasons associated with the provision of required drugs, 31.3% of the respondents reported to have been satisfied with the treatment based on referral to hospital outside the prison, 15.7% of the respondents cited recovery from the condition they suffered as the basis of their satisfaction. However, 14.0% other respondents reported to have enjoyed immediate response for treatment hence their satisfaction. Although the data points to few people who reported satisfaction with the treatment, healthcare provision in the prisons can be said to have some associated problems.

Table 6: Reasons Why Respondents are Not Satisfied with the Treatment

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Delay in Response to Healthcare Needs	21	9.7
Drugs are usually not available	32	14.8
Long waiting time	163	75.5
Total	**216**	**100.0**

Table 6 above shows the distribution of respondents who reported dissatisfaction with the treatment they received. It shows that majority 75.5% of those who reported dissatisfaction with the treatment cited long waiting time as the basis of their dissatisfaction, 14.8% of the respondents reported that drugs are usually not available while 9.7% other respondent reported their dissatisfaction to be associated with delay in response in their healthcare needs.

Table 7: Respondents Description of Relationship with Doctor/Nurse during Treatment

Description	Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Friendly/Accommodative	Yes	280	100.0
	Total	**280**	**100.0**
Hostile	No	280	100.0
	Total	**280**	**100.0**

Table 7 above shows the respondent's description of their relationship with doctors/nurses in the course of their treatment. It shows that the entire respondents who reported having fell sick in the prison and equally received treatment, affirmed to have had a friendly/accommodative relationship with the healthcare officials in the prison.

Table 8: Respondents Description of Healthcare Services in the Prison

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Less effective	59	16.8
Effective	64	18.3
Not Effective	227	64.9
Total	**350**	**100.0**

Table 8 above shows the distribution of responses elicited on the effectiveness of healthcare services in the prison. It shows that over 64 percent of the respondents opined that healthcare services in the prison are not effective, 18.3 percent reported that healthcare services in the prison are effective. More so, 16.8 percent of the respondents were of the view that healthcare delivery in the prison is less effective. This implies a deficit in the way and manner healthcare issues are attended to in the prison. This might not be unconnected with the personal experiences of the inmates in the prison.

Responding to a similar question above during the interview conducted, both respondents in Goron Dutse and Kano Central prison were of the view that:

> Although effort is made in the prison to provide for the healthcare needs of the inmates in the prison, however, one cannot boast of all round effectiveness there are problems of course; particularly in the provision of drugs and other forms of medications. This is why we usually refer inmates with critical conditions to tertiary healthcare institutions outside the prison. (IDI: Prison Healthcare Officials, 2017).

Table 9: Whether Healthcare Services in the Prison are Comparable with those in the Larger Society

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Agree	54	15.4
Disagree	191	54.6
Strongly Disagree	105	30.0
Total	**350**	**100.0**

Table 9 above shows the distribution of responses elicited on whether healthcare services in the prisons are comparable to those in the larger society. It shows that majority of the respondents 54.6 and 30 percent respectively disagree that healthcare services in the prison are comparable to those in the larger society while few other respondents represented by 15.4 percent agreed as such.

Corroborating the quantitative data above, an IDI with a healthcare professional in Kano Central Prison shows;

Although effort is been made to provide our possible best in terms of the healthcare needs of the inmates, however one cannot compare what is obtainable in the prison to the larger society where there are adequate and proper medical services (IDI: Prison Healthcare Professional, 2017).

Major Findings of the Study

Given the definition of effectiveness in this study which refer to and measured on the basis of the ability of a significant percentage of the inmates to get healthcare as at when required, the finding of this study shows that;

1) Healthcare delivery in the prisons is not effective. This is informed by the fact that majority of the inmates reported waiting long to get medical attention and lack of satisfaction with the treatment given.

2) Also, what is obtainable in the prison as far as healthcare cannot be compared to what is obtainable in hospitals outside the prison. This is evident in the preponderance of those who disagreed as such. This invariably translates to a negation of National and International Standards of practice regarding healthcare delivery in prisons.

3) Although the prison authorities in charge of healthcare reported doing everything possible to provide for the healthcare needs of inmates in the prisons, the findings however points to an ineffective healthcare delivery in the prisons. This derived from the responses elicited in terms of rating the healthcare system in the prisons. Majority of the respondents rated healthcare delivery in the prisons as less effective and ineffective respectively.

Discussion of Major Findings of the Study

Implicit in the findings of the study is that there are shortcomings in the way and manner healthcare is provided in Kano Central and Goron Dutse prison. This equates the findings of Lawal (2012) that specifically, in Kano Penal Institutions; there is unavailability of effective healthcare services. This confirms the position of Ekwurukwe (2005) who found that prison healthcare situations are characterised by lack of standard clinics and hospitals, lack of drugs and in most cases lack of unqualified medical personnel to provide for the healthcare needs of inmates.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The main aim of imprisonment is to reform and rehabilitate offenders that are confined to the four walls of the prison. However, the provision of a comprehensive healthcare to the inmates in prison is beyond any reasonable doubt central to an effective reformation. This was clearly recommended in the Nigerian Prison Standing Orders (2011) and the UN Minimum Standard for the Treatment of Offenders as revised in (2015). Accordingly, this paper concludes that:

a) Healthcare delivery in the prisons (Kano Central and Goron Dutse) is below the Minimum Standard for the Treatment of Offenders (2015) and the Nigerian Prisons Standing Orders (2011) and do not augur well with the complex reformation needs of the inmates.

b) It is also apparent that ineffective healthcare delivery in prisons can destroy the very essence for which an individual is sent to prison. Prison populations have a disproportionately high number of inmates suffering from different healthcare problems, many pre-dating prison and others developing or worsening when inside due to poor conditions and lack of a comprehensive and an ineffective healthcare.

Given the conclusion drawn above, the following recommendations are offered for an effective prison healthcare delivery:

a) The federal government of Nigeria, as the custodian and the chief financier of the prisons, through its relevant agencies such as the Nigerian Prison Services and the Federal Ministry of Health, needs to revisit the issue of healthcare delivery in custodial settings. This finds expression in the fact that an effective healthcare delivery in prisons will add much more than value to the rehabilitation and reformation need of the inmates.

b) Specifically, requisite resources for promoting effective healthcare delivery as stated in the UN minimum standard and the Nigerian Prison Standing Orders (2011) should be channelled to the prisons.

c) There is the need to train and retrain healthcare professionals in prisons in accordance with International best practices for healthcare delivery in prisons as enshrined in local, regional and international instruments for the treatment of offenders.

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Expanding the Scope of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Scope and Limitations of ADR in Criminal Cases

10

CHAPTER

[1]**B. M. Magaji** & [2]**A. D Ahmed**
[1]College of Higher Degrees and Research, Faculty of Law, Kampala International University, Uganda, East Africa.
[2]Sept of Legal Studies, Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna, Nigeria

Introduction

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in criminal justice context challenges the traditional understanding of crime as a fight between the state and offender in which the main purpose is to punish the offender. The reception of ADR in the criminal justice context has been viewed with some skepticism. One of the primary questions that have continued to agitate the minds of legal scholars, jurist and even the common man is that the offender under ADR is spared punishment which is the purpose of criminal justice system. This paper posits that ADR can be applied in criminal cases without necessarily shielding the offender from punishment. And in the same view provide restorative justice to the injured party in a criminal matter.

Any society and community is faced with challenges of instability and insecurity as a result of disputes and conflicts. Disputes hinder development and are destructive to lives and property. In order to resolve these disputes, certain mechanisms are introduced. Some are traditional courts mechanisms and the other is ADR which is seen as a method to resolve conflicts promptly and with effective cost as to money and time.

According to Black's Law dictionary, alternative dispute resolution means; a procedure for settling a dispute by means other than litigation, such as arbitration or mediation[1]. This definition is descriptive, in a sense that it describes the ADR on a mechanism other than traditional court system. Some writers[2] define ADR as "is generally used to describe the methods and procedures used to resolve disputes either as alternatives to the traditional disputes resolution mechanism of the court or in some cases as supplementary to such mechanism." Also, Arinbuwa, A.A defines ADR as follows:[3]

Alternative Dispute Resolution refers to a range of mechanism designed to assist disputing parties in resolving their disputes without the need for formal judicial proceedings. They are those mechanisms that are used to resolve disputes faster, fairer and without destroying ongoing relationships. It is clear from the definitions that ADR is a major method of solving the disputes between the parties and outside the court system where the parties themselves are involved directly in the settlement of their disputes and differences. ADR also can supplement the traditional court system with the aim of shortening the court trial processes.

Historical Background

ADR is said to be there since time immemorial. In the Bible and Quran, there are instances where disputes have been resolved intermediaries.[4] The Greek, when realizing that their courts become overcrowded, introduced the position of public arbitrator in 400 BC. India and China have long stories of ADR[5]. In Africa, the traditional methods of conflict resolution were the customary laws of various ethnic groups; amicable means of solving disputes were preferred. Chiefs, elders and family heads and relevant parties seeking peaceful settlement to disputes. Intervention of an elder or a respected member of the society[6].

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[1] Black's Law Dictionary. Eighth Edition "Thomas West" 86

[2] Orojo, J.O and Ajomo, M.A law and practice of Arbitration and conciliation in Nigeria (Lagos Mbeyi and Associates(Nigeria) Limited, 1999), P.4 cited in Madazi, AdamuIzana. The development of Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Multi-Door Court house in Nigeria. A legal appraisal. Rule of Law, Governance Dispute Resolution and Contemporary Legal issues in Nigeria A previewed Juridical Essays honor of His Ex Barr. Eric KelechiIgwe. PhD Pg. 104

[3] Ibid Pg. 104,105

[4] Alternative Dispute Resolution as a tool for conflict Resolution in Africa. Kingsley Kwabena LLM Dissertation P.47

[5] Ibid 47

[6] Ibid 47

[7] Ibid 48

Modern ADR was developed and popularized in the US as a means of resolving issues pertaining to inter-racial dispute.[7] Then the Roscoe Pound Conference in Saint Paul, Minnesota (1976) is a well-known phenomenon in the history of growth of alternative dispute settlement mechanism. The conference served to spark the interest of legal establishment in alternative ways of dispute settlement.[8]

Most Common ADR Methods

The most common ADR methods are: - Negotiation, Mediation/Conciliation and Arbitration.

I. **Negotiation:** This is a direct non-binding procedure involving direct interaction of the disputing parties where a party approaches the other with the offer of a negotiated settlement based on an objective assessment of each other's position[9]. This method of ADR does not involve a third party to facilitate between the two parties. This method presumes that the two parties know each other and have ongoing relation which they want to improve and maintain.

ii. **Mediation/Conciliation:** This is when parties are facilitated to identify issues and reach an agreement to settle their issues. It includes the presence of a third party to assist the parties to reach the settlement of their own. The participants are responsible to reach agreed settlement.

iii. Arbitration

It is a mechanism where the parties in disputes choose one or more person to look into their dispute and determine it after reviewing the evidence and arguments of the parties. An arbitration agreement can be before the occurrence of the dispute when parties agree in a contract that any dispute between them is to be solved by way of arbitration or can be after the occurrence of dispute where parties agree to refer the matter for arbitration. This method of ADR is considered to be somehow costly because it involves payment of the arbitrators if they are more than one.

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[7] Ibid 48
[8] KasimBalarabe. Notes on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Topic one Pg. 29-30
[9] Kasim Ibid Pg. 14

Advantages of ADR

ADR has many advantages that can be summarized as follows:

1. It is cost effective

   Which means it is money saving in a sense that court fees are sometimes much to the extent of making the victory of a party insignificant or exceeding of amount of judgment.[10]

2. ADR is time saving

   It is not taking long as court proceeding. In most cases, the mediator or arbitrator(s) are looking only to the dispute before them unlike courts which are full of back log of cases.

3. Maintains Relations

   The methods of ADR always maintain relations between the parties, when they are negotiating or through mediator or arbitrator because this is the method of their own choice and they are satisfied with it, so it will keep and maintain their relation unlike the courts where there is always one winner and one loser.

4. Deal with Emotion

   It is said that when the parties are negotiating and are given full chance and time through ADR methods to venting emotions in non-threatening environment, this will help them to be satisfied with the outcome.[11]

5. Avoidance of Complicated procedures

   ADR is not following the rigid and complicated procedures of the traditional court system and this will help parties to comfortably settle their disputes in a simple way.

6. Confidentiality

   ADR methods of resolving disputes are not open to the public as in the case with official courts. It can be between the two parties alone "negotiation" or between them and the person(s) they select to mediate or arbitrate between them.

7. Healing Wounds

   In criminal cases, it can help much in healing the wounds of the victim after confronting the offender and the recognition his guilt, this can lead to reconciliation and avoidance of revenge killings in some societies.

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[10] Kasim Ibid Pg.40
[11] Kasim Ibid Pg. 14

Disadvantages of ADR

Any system with advantages has got its disadvantages also. Some of the disadvantages of ADR can be summarized as follows:

1. Lack of legal expertise
2. A court action may still be required
3. No system of precedent

ADR and Criminal Justice System

ADR methods were popularly known in the civil litigation but not in Criminal Justice, because it is usually described as a method of resolving disputes between parties without resorting to court based adjucation and criminal issues are known as matter between offenders and state[12] and as one writer put it that the application of ADR in Criminal Justice System has divided not only jurists and judges but even legislators, because crime as a public law matter is expected to be dealt with by the institutions of the states represented by the police, the court and prisons.[13]

Scope of ADR in Criminal Cases

Application of ADR in Criminal Justice System can be in the following areas:

1. Restorative Justice
2. Compounding Offences
3. Plea Bargaining

1. Restorative Justice

According to Black's Law Dictionary Restorative Justice means; An alternative delinquency sanction that focuses on repairing the harm done, meeting the victim's needs, and holding the offender responsible for his or her actions. Restorative Justice Sanction use a balanced approach, producing the least restrictive disposition while stressing the offender accountability and providing relief to the victim. The offender may be ordered to make restitution, to perform community service, or to make amends in some other way that the court orders.[14]

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[12] The role of ADR process in the Criminal Justice System. A view from Australia. Melissa Lewis and LesmcCrimmon paper presented at the Association of Law Reform Agencies of Eastern and Southern Africa ALRAESA conference at Imperial Beach Hotel, Entebbe Uganda (8 Sep 2005)

[13] C.A. Ogbuabor, Reasonableness as theoretical foundation for alternative dispute resolution in Criminal Justice. Rule of Law, Governance dispute resolution and contemporary legal issues in Nigeria Pg. 4

[14] Black's Law Dictionary. Eight Edition Pg. 1340

It is argued that restorative justice, as opposed to traditional criminal justice system provides crime victims with adequate participation in search for a solution to the aftermath of the crime.[15] The basic premise or plank from which restorative justice operates is that it is retributive justice is flawed in that it is wasteful both in fiscal terms and in terms of human destruction and degradation, serving only to compound rather than solve the problem.[16] The main aim of restorative justice is to resolve criminal disputes or crimes by focusing primarily on repairing the harm that has been done to the highest degree possible other than focusing on the punishment.[17]

Restorative Justice System is widely used in Juvenile Justice System as a method of resolving disputes. In the Child Act 2008 of the Republic of South Sudan, Restorative Justice Processes in accordance with Section 154 of the Act includes:
- A. Family Conference
- B. Victim-Offender Mediation ; and
- C. Any other Restorative Justice processes

The functions of the family conference as pertaining to the child with respect to which the conference has been convened are:
- a. To consider such matters relating to the care and protection of the child as the conference deems appropriate.
- b. To consider the need for care or protection, to make such decision or recommendation and to formulate plans as the conference considered necessary in the best interest of the child;
- c. To review from time to time decision and recommendation made and the plans formulated by that conference and their interpretation.

Victim-offender Mediation
The functions are to:
- a. Enable the victim and the offender to talk about the crime; express their feelings and concerns
- b. Participate directly in developing option for trying to make things right and;

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[15] C.A. Ogbuabor Supra Pg.40
[16] Ibid Pg. 49
[17] Ibid Pg. 50

    c. Give the offender an opportunity to make apologies

The referral to Restorative Justice maybe made by:
    a. Child or his/her parent, guardian or any appropriate adult
    b. Chief
    c. Police
    d. Public Prosecution
    e. Court or Social Workers[18]

2. Compounding Offences

In some jurisdiction[19], there are some offences which are compoundable, where the accused person can enter into direct negotiation or through mediation with the complainant to settle the dispute and compound the offence either at the investigation level or during trial. The compounding offences are provided for by the Law. These offences are generally of private nature and interest between the complainant and the accused person. Clear examples are the offence of criminal breach of trust not by public servant, cheating and defamation. The Law stipulates who is competent to compound the offence and when the offence is compoundable, the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence maybe compounded in like manner.[20]

When the offence is compounded it shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused. It is clear from the above mentioned that, in the compoundable offences, the accused and the complainant or whoever is authorized can use ADR methods of negotiation or mediation to discuss an amicable settlement to the dispute and submit it to the prosecutor or the court as the case maybe for approval and bringing the dispute to an end without the commencement of the normal trial procedures. In other serious offences like murder, ADR in South Sudan Criminal System plays a complementary role. Section 206 of the Penal Code, 2008 stipulates that any person who commits the offence of murder upon conviction be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life, and may also be liable to a fine; provided that, if the nearest relatives of the deceased opt for customary blood compensation, the court may award it in

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[18] Sec(I) 153,155,156 and 157 of Child Act 2008
[19] Sec 45 Code of Criminal Procedure, 2008 Republic of South Sudan.
[20] Ibid Sec 45

lieu of death sentence with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. The situation here is that after the conviction of the accused for committing murder, the family of the convict and that of the deceased "near relatives" can enter into negotiations or mediation so that a blood compensation can be accepted to save the life of the convict and the court is to accept that settlement when reached to avoid the death sentence.

3. Plea Bargain

According to Black's Law Dictionary it is: An accused person's formal admission in court of having committed the charged offence. A guilty plea is part of a plea bargain. It must be made voluntarily, and only after the accused has been informed of and understands his or her rights. A guilty plea ordinarily has the same effect as a guilty verdict and conviction after a trial on the merits.[21] Some writers define the plea bargaining as an agreement in a criminal case between the prosecution and the defense by which the accused changes his plea from not guilty to guilty in return for an offer by the prosecution or when the judge has informally let it be known that he will minimize the sentence if the accused pleads guilty.[22]

In the case of Brady vs. United States (1970) 397 US 742 it was ruled that: it was not unconstitutional to extend a benefit to defendant who in turns extends a benefit to a state.[23] This was reaffirmed in the case of Santo Bello vs. New York 404 US 257 (1971) when the US Supreme Court ruled that the disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the Prosecutor and the Accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining" is an essential component of the administration of Justice. Properly administrated, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full scale trial, the states and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.[24]

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[21] Black's Dictionary, Eight Edition Pg.1189
[22] Md. ZalzirHassain, Synopsis of Criminal litigation. The Northern University Journal of Law, Volume-IV 2013-43 cited in introducing ADR in Criminal Litigaton.
[23] Ibid Pg.4
[24] Cited in Understanding the Imperative of Plea Bargaining in the administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 Eric KelechiIgwe, Rule of Law, Governance Dispute Resolution and Contemporary crimes in Nigeria Pg. 150 (25) Eric Kelechi, Supra Pg. 163

Plea Bargaining is the most important mechanism in Criminal Justice System because it is greatly acknowledges the will and interests of the parties to the dispute and helps in reducing the back log of cases in the courts and helps to avoid the harassment to the parties and the witnesses. It is also a great way of healing the wounds and bad feeling between the complainant and the accused and sometimes their families and communities. Plea Bargaining is to be provided for by the Law and not to be presumed. Plea Bargaining is essentially negotiated between the accused person or his defense and the prosecutor, as the concept is that the commission of an offence is a violation to public interest but this does not necessarily mean the exclusion of the interest of the accused where it is relevant.

Plea Bargaining may also be in respect of a promise to cooperate as a witness for the prosecutor in exchange for reduced charge or a reduced sentence.[25] This situation is always when the offense was committed by more than one accused persons and the prosecutor has no enough evidence to convict them so he may offer to one of them to drop his sentence or give him a lesser sentence if he or she will cooperate and disclose all the facts that can lead to the conviction of the other accused person(s).

Types of Plea Bargaining
Plea Bargaining maybe categorized into the following:
    a) Charge/Court Bargain
    b) Offense Bargain
    c) Fact Bargain
    d) Sentence Bargain

a) Charge/Court Bargain
This is where a person in charge of the offense and the prosecutor may offer to drop some charges if the accused person accepts to plead guilty for another charge which the prosecutor may think is the main and important charge.

b) Offense Bargain
The prosecutor may offer to the accused person to plead guilty for the minor offense and will in turn drop a capital offense. For example from murder to manslaughter.[26]

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[25] The Judicature (Plea Bargain) Rules 2016 Uganda Judiciary Sec 6(1) (6)
[26] Eric Kelechi Supra Pg. 163

c) Fact Bargain

Here the prosecutor may agree with the accused to plead guilty of an offense and in turn will not disclose certain facts to the court such as the previous conviction records which may aggravate his situation.[27]

d) Sentence Bargain

This is where the prosecutor agree with the accused person to reduce the sentence when he/she pleads guilty but in this situation the role of the prosecutor will only be to recommend the court, because it is the court to approve the agreement. This category works only when the court approves the agreement. In the case of Uganda prosecutor vs. Okello Daniel.[28] The State Attorney reported that she had successfully negotiated a plea bargain with the accused and his counsel and the agreement was that the accused is to plead guilty of aggravated defilement c/s 129 (3) and 4 (a) of the Penal Code Act in return of a lenient sentence of 8 years imprisonment. The court after ascertaining that the accused understood the agreement and was voluntarily accepting it and after the court has cautioned him that the sentence maybe more than agreed and the accused pleaded guilty. The court rejected the submitted plea agreement entered into by the accused, his counsel and the state attorney and instead sentenced the accused to a term of imprisonment of 10 years.

Application of ADR in Criminal Justice in Some Jurisdictions

Under this heading we are trying to examine the application of Plea Bargaining in some national and international courts as follows:

Article 159 (2) of the constitution of Kenya states that:[29]

> "In exercising judicial authority the courts and tribunals shall be guided by the following principles:- (a) Alternative forms of disputes resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall be promoted subject to clause [3]

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[27] Ibid Pg. 123

[28] High Court of Arua, Criminal Case No 0100 of 2016. The Republic of Uganda www.ulii.org (accessed 6-3-2018)

[29] Constitution of Kenya,2010 www.KenyaLaw.org (accessed on 11-3-2018)

(3) Traditional dispute resolution mechanism shall not be used in a way that
(a) Contravenes the Bill of Rights;
(b) Repugnant to justice and morality or results in outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality or
(c) is inconsistent with this constitution

In the case of Republic Prosecutor vs. Mohammed Abdow, the accused and others were charged with murder of Osman Ali. The accused was arranged in court and pleaded not guilty. Later on the deceased's family had written to the Director of Public Prosecution requesting that the charge be withdrawn on account of settlement reached between the families of the deceased and that of the accused after they sat and some form compensation has taken place where in camels, goats and other traditional ornaments were paid to the aggrieved family.

That settlement was said to be under Islamic Law and Customs. The DPP then requested the court to have the matter was settled. The High Court Judge ruled that: under the article 157 of the constitution, the Director of Public Prosecution is mandated to exercised state powers of prosecution and in that exercise may discontinue at any stage criminal proceedings against any person. In the unique circumstance of the present application. I am satisfied that the end of justice will be met by allowing rather than disallowing the application. Consequently I discharge the accused.[30] Though this ruling was praised as a good application of Traditional Dispute Resolution in criminal cases,[31] it was seriously critised because, discharging an accused charged with murder after payment of camels and goats is to say the least to trivialize the remedial role of criminal trial by naively painting settlement as a perfect substitute for conviction and tantamount to privatizing public harm at the cost of public justice. Also that the learned judge did not even consider the provision of Article 159 (3) of the constitution of Kenya and the court was questioned of passing a message that you need camels and goats to get away with murder.[32] In another case[33] where the accused was also charged with

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[30] Republic-prosecutor vs. Mohammed Abdow Mohammed HC at Nairobi (Nairobi Law Courts) criminal case86 of 2011 www.Kenyalaw.org (accessed on 5-3-2018)
[31] Francis Kariuki. Applicability of Traditional Dispute Resolution mechanism in criminal cases in Kenya www.Rmco.co.Re (accessed on 5-3-2018)
[32] Apollo Mboya. Principle in out of court settlements abused
[33] Republic-prosecutor vs. Abdulahi Noor Mohammed HC Kenya at Nairobi. Criminal Case No. 90 of 2013www.kenyalaw.org (accessed on 5-3-2018)

murder, the accused seeks to have the court grant him and the deceased family time to reconcile and settle the matter out of court. It was ruled that: the charge against the accused in a felony and as such reconciliation as a form of settling the proceedings is prohibited. So it appeared that courts of Kenya are now of a view that settlement of cases of capital offenses like murder is not allowed.

International Tribunals

We shall comment on the practice of ICTY and ICTR as an example for practical reasons of the scope of this paper.

ICTY

Plea Bargaining was not in the rules of the court before the amendment of the rules No R62-62 to the rules of procedure and evidence. The court was applying the concept of guilty plea rather than plea bargaining whereby the accused in entering the plea voluntarily without any promise something in return. The court was under pressure so it had accepted the plea for the following reasons:[34]

1. The pressure by the UN to the court to accelerate its work
2. The court got acknowledgement of responsibility from perpetrators
3. As time passes, the memories of witnesses dim
4. Guilty plea prompt reconciliation in areas affected by violence and rehabilitation of offenders

In Mr. dja case, the court noted that the ICTY case law has commonly accepted a guilty plea as a circumstance in mitigation of sentence for the following reasons: a guilty plea may demonstrate honesty, helps to establish the truth, may contribute to peace building and reconciliation and saves the Tribunal time and resources of a length trial. Moreover victims and witnesses are relieved from the possible stress of testifying at trial.[35]

ICTR

The guilty plea was not popular in this court for many reasons, among them was the experience in the case of Kambanda who pleaded guilty and

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[34] Ralph Henhan and Mark Drumb Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. www.irep.ntu.ac.uk (accessed on 11-3-2018)
[35] Ibid Pg. 7

cooperated with the prosecutor but was sentenced to life imprisonment, this judgment was said to have played a negative role on the accused persons.[36]

The Appeal Chamber of ICTR in the case of Jean Kambanda vs. The Prosecutor[37] affirmed ruling of ICTY in the ruling of Appeal Chamber in the Drazen Erdomovic case[38] that to accept guilty plea, it must be voluntary in sound state of mind and that the accused understands the nature of the charges against him/her and that it must not be accompanied by words amounting to a defense contradicting an admission of criminal responsibility.

Limitations of ADR in Criminal Cases

As it appears from the cases above there are some limitations to the application of ADR in criminal cases which can be summarized as follows:

1. ADR methods in criminal cases is not applicable to all types of crimes in many jurisdiction.
2. The mechanism of ADR in criminal cases are generally subject to approval of the courts and their discretion which may differ from judge to another.
3. These methods are subject to conceptions of the public which is influenced by political and economic considerations.

Conclusion

As the advantages of ADR in criminal cases are evident in the reduction of back log of cases and bringing healing of crimes wounds and helping in reconciliation of the offender and victims and their families etc. Then we think these methods are to be increased and widen in the Criminal Justice System and to minimize its disadvantages through Law Reform and Court System.

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[36] LevuraBurens. Dam Haag. The Plea Bargaining in International Tribunals www.zis.online.com (accessed on 11-3-2018)
[37] Jean Kambanda vs. The Prosecutor case no ICTR 97-23-A www.cid.unmict.org (accessed on 13-3-2018)
[38] ICTY Appeal Chamber. Case no 11-96-22-A

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Conflict Resolution in International Boundary Disputes: A Study of ICJ Ruling and the Rights of the People of Bakassi Peninsula

11

CHAPTER

[1]**Uchenna Samuel Nzeako**, [2]**Yusufu Ahmed Audu &**
[3]**Tumba Peter Vandi**
[1,2&3]Department of Political Science
Federal University, Dutsin-Ma, Katsina State

Introduction

African countries do not embrace a common past and a common culture; they are indeed the arbitrary creations of colonialists. The way and manner in which European nations descended on Africa during the closing years of the 19th century in their scramble for territories, was bound to leave a heritage of artificially controlled border lines, which now demarcate the emergent African states. (Aghemelo and Ibhasebor 2006) and are sources of several boundary disputes.

The dispute along the Nigeria-Cameroun border was a matter of historic proportions, especially along the Cross River to the Sea section wherein the Bakassi Peninsula lies (Ekpenyong, 1989). The disputed Bakassi Peninsula is an area of some of mangrove swamp and half submerged islands mostly occupied by fishermen settlers (Anene, 1970).

Remarkably, Bakassi Peninsula came under British protection on September 10, 1884. Following the Berlin Conference of 1885, Britain and Germany defined their territorial spheres of influence in Africa on November 15,

1893.When the two instalments of amalgamation were proclaimed in Nigeria in 1906 and 1914; the Bakassi Peninsula was subsumed under the frontiers of Southern Cameroon. Then the London Treaty of March 11, 1913 established clear-cut regulations on navigation on the Cross River. The end of World War I brought Bakassi under British Cameroon. During the interwar years, the Franco British Declaration of July 10, 1919 on Bakassi and what came to be known as British-Cameroon were placed under British mandate and were administered conterminously with Nigeria. In 1946 following the end of World War II, Britain divided Cameroon into Northern Cameroon and Southern Cameroon (Idumange, 2010). While Southern Cameroun fell under the British colony, the Northern Cameroun was administered by France. Upon gaining political independence by Nigeria and Cameroun as well as the discovery of oil and other natural resources in the Bakassi Peninsula, the border conflict between the two countries began to gather fresh momentum.

Successive Nigerian governments had made various efforts in settling the Bakassi disputes but with little or no success recorded. Specifically, after the Maroon Accord reached between the Heads of state, General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon in which Gowon allegedly gave out the territory to Cameroon. General Murtala Mohammed that took over from the Gowon military regime threatened that rather than accept the outrageous agreement, Nigeria would go to war if Cameroonians refused further negotiations (Babatola and Jadesola, 2012). On assumption of office as the military head of state after the bloody coup d'état that led to the assassination of General Murtala in 1976, Olusegun Obasanjo made significant efforts to re-open the border negotiations with the Cameroonian authorities with little or no achievement recorded (Babatola and Jadesola, 2012).

Between May 15, 1981 and 1993, the Peninsula remained a subject of serious dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria with scores of lives lost due to military aggressions and tribal squabbles (Olumide, 2002). As tension continued to mount and many more lives lost as a result of the conflict, the Cameroonian government got tired and, on March 24, 1994, filed a law suit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at Hague, seeking an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian force, which they said were occupying the territory and to restrain Nigeria from laying claim to sovereignty over the peninsula.

The International Court of Justice(ICJ), on 10th October, 2002 ruled, after considering both parties' claims, that the sovereignty over the disputed Bakassi peninsula rest under the jurisdiction of Cameroon and called for the immediate withdrawal of both countries' military presence in and at both side of the peninsula. The Judgment did not automatically end the conflict. Rather, it triggered several protests and reactions from the various segments of the Nigerian public. Mbaga and Njo (2009) confirmed that:

> "On a monthly basis since the ICJ judgment was pronounced, rocket propelled grenades, bullets, ambushes, reactions and counter reactions remain the only resort in an atmosphere of mistrust created by both countries' common desire to benefit from the wealth accruing from natural resources in the area."

As tense and severe as the confrontations, protests, reactions and counter reactions that emanated before and after the ICJ judgment were, it is interesting to know that the tension created by the hostilities that kept reoccurring between the two countries did not degenerate into real war, thanks to the diplomatic/strategic efforts by the United Nations (UN), particularly its erstwhile Secretary General, Kofi Annan who convinced both countries' Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Paul Biya to dialogue. The outcome of the dialogue was the establishment, during a meeting held in Paris on the 15th September, 2002, of the Cameroun-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) as a mechanism for the implementation of the ICJ judgment to facilitate a smooth handover (Beseng, 2009).

Nsom and Sumelong (2009) affirmed accordingly that despite pockets of resistance by unidentified militant groups, the international community, and the initial rejection of the judgment by the Nigerian Senate, complete handover of the Bakassi peninsula to the Cameroonian Government on 14th August 2008 held peacefully. The handover was indeed a moment of celebration for the Cameroonians because their country legally took ownership of the resource-rich peninsula. On the contrary, it was a moment of dissatisfaction and agony for Nigerians, particularly the indigenes of Bakassi who claimed to have ancestral ties to the ceded area. However, it does appear that the causes of the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the sovereignty of Bakassi peninsula are multi-dimensional in nature, transcending socio-economic and political considerations.

Literature Review and Theoretical Guide

A painstaking perusal of cognate literature reveals that scholars have made enormous intellectual discourses on the subject matter. Dispute is unavoidable in all human interactions and relationships, both within and across national boundaries. According to Asobie (1998), international conflicts are contests between or across nation-states. The struggle might be between one or more governments to monopolize the exploitation of resources in disputed territories. It might occur when one state tries to prevent another from obtaining some resources that are vital to its survival. To him, international disputes are struggles between or among social groups or more precisely social classes, clashing cross state boundaries. These social classes usually mobilize and use the various apparatuses of the state both coercive and non-coercive to achieve their ends. And these contests are usually over the control of some productive forces; objects of labour (land, mineral resources, raw materials); instruments of labour (technology, finance, capital), and labour power (trained or specialized human resources).

In his intellectual exposition, Anene (1970) gave a detailed and interesting account of the international boundaries of Nigeria. The work was not only concerned with the foreign acts of partition, but with the impact of colonial boundaries on the peoples in whose history the acts of portion were major intervention. This necessitated a multi-disciplinary inquiry into the ethnicity at the time the boundaries were made, the history of the different peoples, particularity the question of the history of political and economic inter group relationships, the knowledge of these available to the treaty makers, and the consequences of their decisions. Though he recognized that the boundary zones of Nigeria and her neighbours were potential sources of boundary disputes, it did not put forward the criteria which may afford the best guide to a settlement of an unenviable legacy of colonialism.

Rouke (1997) assessed at length the legacy of colonialism in Africa. He points out that the industrialization of the north was one factor that caused the colonization of the south in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He showed that Africa was largely controlled by its indigenous peoples in 1878 but had by 1914 become almost totally subjected and divided into colonies by the European powers. The colonial boundaries had little relationship to the territories occupied by the various indigenous people, grouping nations

together in some cases and dividing them in others. He further points out that within seven decades, virtually all of the colonies recognized their independence, but many of the new countries then (such as Rwanda) had been troubled by the legacy of trying to get two or more states to live peacefully in a single state. Though he did not particularly highlight the Bakassi Peninsula, he however showed the general trend of European colonial imposed boundaries on Africa.

Baye (2010) examines the geopolitics of the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon and outlines socio-economic implications of its peaceful settlement. He observed that the neglect and subsequent discovery of oil deposits subjected the Bakassi peninsula to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military occupation and recourse to the international court of justice (ICJ). He maintains that the ICJ ruling in 2002 in favour of Cameroon, although based on historical evidence, had faced implementation difficulties. Thus according to him, following mediation by the United Nations (UN) Secretary – General, the Green-tree agreement and subsequent instruments, Nigeria completed the withdrawal of her military, policy and administration from the Bakassi Peninsula by 14th August, 2008. Putting aside disruptive activities by social movements, the entire process, he contends, could be viewed as a model in peaceful resolution of border conflicts.

Akanmode (2002) pointed out that the Peninsula which covers a marshy area of about 1,000 square kilometres and located in Cross River State is occupied by a population of Nigerians. He further points out that if a judgment delivered by the ICJ on Thursday October 10, 2002, was anything to go by, the inhabitants of the Peninsula may well be on their way to changing their nationalities from Nigerians to Cameroonians. In addition, he laid emphases on the paradox of the Peninsula. He maintained that the Peninsula is a community that subsists in the midst of plenty of fish and oil deposits –but is ravaged by poverty. He further traced the dispute in the oil rich area between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1993, resulting to loss of lives from military aggressions that have been mostly instigated by Cameroon.

Sango (2002) gave a critical analysis of the reason behind Nigeria and Cameroon dispute over Bakassi. He pointed out that neither Nigerian nor Cameroonian ruling elite showed interest in Bakassi Peninsula until it was

discovered it was oil rich. He insisted that any attempt to force the people of Bakassi to belong to either of the country should be opposed by the labour movement of Nigeria and Cameroon and those they should defend the right to self-determination of the people of the peninsula and this he said should supersede the ICJ judgment. He also traced the dispute over Bakassi to colonial regime in Africa and blamed the inability to redress these colonial arbitraries and injustices after the colonial rule to the selfish interest and lack of vision on the part of the capitalist ruling class of various African countries. He also observed that whether Cameroon or Nigeria gets Bakassi, the proceeds from the oil in Bakassi will benefit only Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and the ruling class. Although, Sango's contributions are very important to this study, especially his highlights on the right of the Bakassi people to self-determination which he argued should supersede the ICJ rulings, but he failed to attribute the court's inability to take into consideration the fact that the ruling was as a result of the politicization of international judicial principles.

Eke (2009) contends that the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi was a carryover effect of the lingering unhealthy relationship between Nigeria and France resulting from the overwhelming influence of France in the sub-region. He observes that Nigeria got her independence in 1960 and became a Republic in 1963 with sovereign authority over her international relations with the world at large. Nigeria, at infancy, was engaged in a civil war with the secessionist Biafra between 1967 and 1970. He further infers that at the end of the civil war, border skirmishes erupted between the Cameroon gendarmes and Nigeria villages in the Bakassi area.

Focusing on what he calls "diplomatic blunder" in handling the Nigeria's foreign policy, Ebeghulem (2008) contends that the diplomatic impact of the Nigeria's foreign policy over Bakassi, and the Nigeria's handling of the Bakassi imbroglio before, during, and after the ICJ judgment had left nothing to desire. His argument centres on the fact that the population of Bakassi is overwhelmingly Nigerians. Its local government functions as part of Cross River State since the inception of the State. The Efik Nigerians had always voted to choose their representatives whenever the civilian governments hold sway since Nigeria's independence in 1960. The residents of Bakassi according to him believe themselves as Nigerians because they had always participated

in all decision-making processes since the nation was born. He recommends that Bakassi people should have therefore, been given the privilege to determine their future instead of being partitioned into Cameroon as implied by the ICJ's ruling.

Rudin (1938), traced the activities of the Germans and British traders in the areas during her colonial days. He observes that the German administrators in the Cameroon attached great importance to the Benue and its tributaries as the best, quickest and most profitable way of gaining access to the hinter land of their colony. He further observes that the attempts at penetrating this hinter land from the Cameroon coast failed disastrously. Hence the Germans through their agent Flegel pretended to regard the entire region north of the latitude of the Cross River rapids as no man's land. Though he was highly critical of the activities of the Germans and the British during the period, he failed to highlight the consequences of their actions on the boundary areas and inter-state relations between the two African states.

In his analysis of the ICJ and its ruling over Bakassi peninsula (Ukhuegbe (2002) noted that the award of Bakassi to Cameroon was a result not of recent European "conspiracy", but one of the 19th century. With much vigour given by his perfect mastery of the historical fact of Nigeria and international law, he debunked the official statement that Cameroon got the assurances of their patrons in Paris that they would see to it that their "boy" at the ICJ, manipulates the law in favour of Cameroon. He also argues that the treaty of 1884 between Britain, kings and Chiefs of old Calabar was treaty of protection and did not give Britain power to transfer Bakassi to Germany and this according to him made the Anglo-German treaty unlawful and void. He pointed that the Berlin Act undermined the treaty of protected territories without the consent of the kings and chiefs. Thus, it was an error for Nigeria to have relied on it to support its case rather than to delegitimize it since Africa was not represented nor participated in the formation of the Act. He further noted that Nigeria's argument does not have the necessary weight for it to be accepted by the ICJ. He actually helped to situate the dispute though partially as more of European politics than a legal phenomenon, but he failed to highlight the implications of the ICJ ruling on Nigerians living in the disputed area.

To Asobie (2005), the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula is the product of a number of contradictions. First, there is a clash between tradition and modernity; second, there is the tension between cartographical fact and cultural reality: the map is in conflict with the people; third, there is a conflict between dictates of abstruse international law and the existential imperatives of struggling humanity; fourth, there is a gap between the demands of raison d'etre and the needs and concerns of citizens.

In his own intellectual extrapolation, Okolie (2004), points out that it was the discovery of large deposits of oil and gas in the disputed territories that intensified the military showdown. He further argues that since conflict is persistent in human interaction, no matter the conflict management strategies, peace and harmonious relationship among states can only be guaranteed in atmosphere of constructive engagement in conflict resolution derived from justice, fairness and truth. He further notes that Anglo-German Treaty of 1913, Yaounde II and Marona Declaration of 1971 and 1975 respectively on which ICJ ruling was hinged on are valid legal instruments and established the right of sovereignty for each of the parties. In his analysis of International Court of Justice ruling, he argues that it is not objective; that the court could not have given a ruling different from the evidence before the court which emanated from the Nigeria government officials. He concluded that permanent peace cannot be guaranteed from such verdict, but through a sustained and constructive engagement by the two countries over demarcation of the boundaries. He however failed to highlight the implications of the ICJ ruling on the inhabitants of neither the Bakassi peninsula nor how to improve their welfare.

Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) in their own contributions see colonialism as the source of boundary dispute among African countries. They posit that the Exchange of Notes of October 1, 1960 between Nigeria and the United Kingdom on treaty obligations and Diplomatic Note No. 570 of 1962 from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Embassy of Cameroon showed that Nigeria acknowledged that Bakassi peninsula belong to Cameroon. They further pointed out that ICJ judgment has social, economic; security and strategic implications for the Nigerian state, which to them do not enhance the interest of the nation. They commended both countries for the mature manner with which they handled the Bakassi issue. In addition, they recommended the

delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two nations in accordance with the 1958 Geneva conventions of the law and sea and Anglo-German agreement. However, they failed to give suggestion on how to put the welfare of the Bakassi people into considerations.

Bakassi Peninsular: An Overview
Bakassi is the peninsular extension of the African territory of Calabar into the Atlantic Ocean. It is currently ruled by Cameroon following the transfer of sovereignty from neighbouring Nigeria as a result of a judgment by the International Court of Justice on 22 November, 2002.The peninsula lies between latitudes 4°25′ and 5°10′N and longitudes 8°20′ and 9°08′E. It consists of a number of low-lying, largely mangrove covered islands covering an area of around 665 km² (257sq m). The population of Bakassi is the subject of some dispute, but is generally put at between 150,000 and 300,000 people. Bakassi is situated at the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea, where the warm east-flowing Guinea Current (called Aya Efiat in Efik) meets the cold north-flowing Benguela Current (called Aya Ubenekang in Efik). These two great ocean currents interact creating huge foamy breakers which constantly advance towards the shore, and building submarine shoals rich in fish, shrimps, and an amazing variety of other marine life forms. This makes the Bakassi area a very fertile fishing ground, comparable only to New found land in North America and Scandinavia in Western Europe. Most of the population makes their living from fishing. The peninsula is commonly described as "oil-rich", though in fact no commercially viable deposits of oil have yet been discovered. However, the area has aroused considerable interest from oil companies in the light of the discovery of rich reserves of high grade crude oil elsewhere in Nigeria. At least eight Multinational Oil Companies have participated in the exploration of the peninsula and its offshore waters.

A kingdom was founded in Bakassi around 1450 by the Efik of coastal south-eastern Nigeria, and was incorporated within the political framework of Calabar Kingdom along with Southern Cameroons. During the European scramble for Africa, Queen Victoria signed a Treaty of Protection with the King and Chiefs of Calabar on 10th September, 1884. This enabled the United Kingdom to exercise control over the entire territory of Calabar, including Bakassi. The territory subsequently became *de facto* part of the Republic of Nigeria, although the border was never permanently delineated.

Interestingly, even after Southern Cameroon voted in 1961 to leave Nigeria and became a part of Cameroon, Bakassi remained under Calabar administration in Nigeria until ICJ judgment of 2002 (Omoigui, 2002). Bakassi people are mainly the Calabar people, the people of Cross River State and Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, including the Efut, Efik, Ibibio, Annang, etc. Bakassi though currently administered by Cameroon after the end of Nigerian occupation yet the current Monarch of Bakassi, Etinyin Etim Okon Edet is a Nigerian (IRIN, 2007).

The Bakassi Peninsula was a disputed piece of territory between Nigeria and Cameroon for decades and the source of several conflicts in 1981 and the early 1990s. The availability of potential oil reserves in the Peninsula intensified tensions between the two countries. The International Court of Justice decided on October 10, 2002 that the Peninsula and territory in the Lake Chad region should be under sovereignty of Cameroon. Nigeria pulled out of the areas and was ceded to Cameroon on August 14th, 2008. Nigeria has given up 32 villages along the 1,700 km border from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea. This border dispute gave rise to various issues such as citizenship of the thousands of Nigerians in Peninsula (Price Felicia 2005).

Nigeria-Cameroon Dispute: An Historical Excursion
The historical root of Nigerian-Cameroon dispute rests on European imperialistic designs of the 19th and 20th centuries, especially, the colonial enterprises of the Germans, the French and the British. According to Anyu (2007) the Bakassi Peninsula conflict is one of Africa's throwbacks to the colonial demarcation of the continent.

By 1884, British interest in the West African Coast had increased tremendously. Earlier in the 1830s in the spirit of the scramble for and partition of Africa, and with the need to establish footholds on her territories, Britain entered into a series of treaties with the Kings and Chiefs of various parts of the Guinea Coast (Eze, 2007). This culminated in June 1884 of the signing of a treaty between the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, placing their territories under the protection of Great Britain. According to Odje (2002), by September of 1884, other Kings and Chiefs of the region including Bakassi, signed similar treaties, acknowledging that their territories were subject to the authority of Old Calabar, hence, were therefore under British Protection. With

these treaties, Britain brought together all these territories including Bakassi under her protectorate and exercised control over the entire territory around Calabar. Within this same period the Germans also in their own imperial quest, proclaimed in June, 1884 a protectorate over the Cameroon region after entering into several treaties with kings and Chiefs of the areas. At the Berlin Conference, under the principle of effective occupation of territories, the Germans notified other European powers of the extent of their Cameroon possessions. This conference also recognized the validity of the British claim to the Bakassi area as the Oil Rivers Protectorate. So that, by 1893, Bakassi was part of the Niger Coast Protectorate, and by 1900 it became part of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Odje 2002).

These events unfolded to reveal certain imperial formal arrangements, consonance with the practice at the time of colonial acquisition, between Britain and Germany, to settle whatever differences they had over the frontiers of their various spheres of influence. These arrangements were to later have profound effect on the status of Bakassi.

The Anglo – German Arrangements
In keeping with the resolutions of the 1884/85 Berlin Conference on effective occupation of territories, both Britain and Germany moved on to reach several agreements in relation to their respective colonial possessions of Nigeria and Cameroon. Eze (2007) states that the first of such agreements designed to settle the line of separation between the activities of both powers in the area was the exchange of notes on April 29 and May 7, 1885. These exchanges culminated in negotiations for the separation and defining of the spheres of action of Great Britain and Germany in those areas where the colonial interests of the two countries might conflict. Further agreements along the line defining boundaries of both powers in Africa, as presented by Nigeria in her Counter-Memorial at the ICJ include: the exchange of notes of July 27 and August 2, 1886, the one of November 15, 1893 supplemented by another agreement on March 19, 1906. It has been observed that in all these cases, as they affect the Nigeria – Cameroon boundary, the Bakassi area was placed within British sphere of influence. Perhaps the most significant of the various agreements between the two powers are the ones of 1913 (The Anglo-German Treaty of 1913). According to Omoigui (2012) the first of these agreements signed in London on March 11, 1913 covered the settlement of the Frontier between the

two Powers from Yola in the North to the Sea as well as the regulation of the navigation on the Cross River. The second was Nugent, representing Britain. It is said that both agreements addressed the precise demarcation of the Anglo-German boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon from Yola to the Cross River' (Nugent 1914). Both agreements of March and April encompass the Treaty of 1913, and were to have direct bearing and impact on the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon. Odje (2002) reveals that these agreements redefined the maritime boundary of Akpayofe River, placing the entire Bakassi Peninsula under German authority. In the same vein, Soremekun (1988) in Babatola (2012) contends that this new instrument of 1913 neutralized the British possession of Bakassi. Similarly, Eze (2008) explains that the 1913 treaty drew from an earlier October 1906 Demarcation Agreement between Britain and Germany which extended the boundary southwards, in the process redrawing the eastern boundary of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in such a way that the boundary between the Protectorate and Cameroon became a line to the West of Bakassi thereby placing the Bakassi Peninsula under German control.

Furthermore, the significance of the various treaties and agreements between the Imperial Powers in relation to the dispute, the most important document that concerns the demarcation of the border between the Cameroons (then Southern Cameroons and Cameroon) and Nigeria is indeed the 1913 Treaty. Muluh Mbuh, says that 'confidential documents made public in London have thrown light on how important an instrument the treaty was, and that not only are the pillars of the treaty the only pillars that completely marked the entire border, but also, the entire confidential documents reveal a high degree of reliability – so much that not even Her Majesty's government dared to temper with the treaties that fixed the pillars' (Muluh Mbuh 2004).

The preceding summary of British and German arrangements remained until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. In 1916, Britain invaded German Cameroon, and at the end of the war, German territories were all shared between Britain and France according to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty of settlement, under the auspices of the Paris Peace Convention, thus, Cameroon became British and French mandate Territory. By 1919, five years after the British proclaimed the colony of Nigeria through the amalgamation of her Southern and Northern Protectorates, a need to redefine her boundaries

this time with the French arose. As such on July 10, 1919 the boundary between British and French was settled by a joint declaration of the British Secretary of State for Colonies, Viscount Milner and the French Minister for the Colonies, Henry Simon. Omoigui (2002) discloses that in this agreement, Bakassi and the rest of what became the British Cameroons were included in the British mandate and administered as part of Nigeria. However, he adds that even though the territory was coterminous with the Colony of Nigeria, it was not actually merged with it, and that the old 1913arrangement was retained, such that in order to codify this further, the British and the French designed another settlement in December 1929, and January 1930.

Again, the events of the Second World War also presented a need for further arrangements. This time, at the end of the war, the French and British League mandates were taken over by a United Nations Trusteeship design in 1946. This new UN arrangement re-ratified the earlier agreed borders as enunciated by hitherto Anglo-German and Anglo-French settlements. In both these cases, maps from that period showed that the Bakassi area was within the British Cameroons and not the Colony of Nigeria (Eze 2007).

A cursory appraisal of the above-discussed settlements from 1884 reveals some legal and pseudo-legal issues worth commenting on. The first is that from the pre-1913 agreements, we can discern that the Bakassi Peninsula was administered as part of British possessions. However, going by the 1913 settlement between Britain and Germany, the area of Bakassi effectively came under German control. Secondly, Germany, as a result of the war of 1914 could not take physical control of the Bakassi territory and as such the 1913 agreement could not be ratified, in the process, allowing the British to add adjoining parts of German territory of Cameroon and administer them as part and parcel of colonial Nigeria up to 1960. This scenario influenced some Nigerian commentators to opine that the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty was not binding on Nigeria (Ate 1992; Akinjide 1994). As a matter of fact, Akinjide who was a one-time Minster of Justice in Nigeria argued that the Anglo-German Treaty was not binding since the Order-in-Council of November 22, 1913, which came into force on January 1, 1914, amalgamating the Northern and Southern Protectorates into a single Protectorate of Nigeria, came into being after the Treaty. Moreover, it was also argued that the Treaty lapsed with the War and that under the terms of the Versailles settlement as provided for in

Article 289, Britain ought to have made effort to revive pre-war bilateral Treaties with Germany, since Britain took no steps to do so then in the terminology of Article 289 it was and remained abrogated, and therefore Cameroon could not succeed to the Treaty (Eze 2007). Some scholars opined that as plausible as these arguments may sound, the fact of the principle of *Uti Possidetis*, in International Law, which relates to the sanctity of colonial boundaries, a principle which the OAU (now AU) Charter adopted in 1963 suggests that Cameroon has a right to succeed to the treaty, especially when considered against the understanding that France replaced Germany as the colonial Over-Lord of the Cameroons, and agreed other settlements with Britain on their common borders after the two wars, up to 1960. These are the 1929-1930 Thomson-Marchland Declaration, to which the UK and France agreed and made detailed delimitations of the interstate border and the1931 Henderson-Fleuriau exchange of diplomatic notes, which made the earlier declaration an international agreement at Law (Sumner 2004). The Cameroonians held that the suggestions that Britain ought to have revived pre-war Treaties with Germany are not tenable, for she actually did arrive at new agreements, but with France instead.

Contending Views on the True Ownership of Bakassi
In the light of the foregoing colonial arrangements, both parties subsequently relied on them to strengthen their respective arguments and claims of ownership to the Peninsula, hinging their positions on their interpretations and understandings of the various agreements, and Treaties between Germany and Britain on one hand, and Britain and France on the other. However Cameroon drew on other post-colonial arrangements she also entered into with Nigeria to buttress her claims. Thus, before the Court, the parties made arguments based on treaties, history, effective and occupation.

In this vein, Nigeria premised her claim to the territory largely on the various Anglo-German correspondences (Exchange of Notes) of the 1880s, as well as the Treaties of protection between the British and the indigenous Kings and Chiefs of the area. Nigeria argued that the legal situation at the time of her independence in 1960 from Britain was such that, she inherited the original title of Bakassi, which was vested in the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and that this title was not affected by the Anglo-German Treaty of March11, 1913. According to Ofonagoro (2013), this view by Nigeria was anchored on the

notion that the 1884 Treaty of Protection between Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar did not entitle the British Monarch to alienate the territory of the Efik (indigenous) Kingdom, without the approval of the Efik King and Chiefs as landowners. Summer (2004) captures Nigeria's four point claim to the title over the peninsula as follows:

1. Long occupation by Nigeria and by Nigerian nationals constituting a historical consolidation of title and conforming to the original title of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar which became vested in Nigeria at the time of independence.
2. Effective administration by Nigeria, acting as Sovereign, and an absence of protest.
3. Manifestations of Sovereignty by Nigeria together with the acquiescence by Cameroon to Nigerian Sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula.
4. Recognition of Nigerian Sovereignty by Cameroon.

On her part, Cameroon predicated her claim mainly on the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 which defined the spheres of control in the area between the two colonial powers. She also based her claims on two arrangements entered into with Nigeria in the 1970s, in the form of the Yaoundé II Declaration of April 4, 1971, and the Maroua Declaration of June 1, 1975 (Ate, 1992). These arrangements demarcated the maritime boundary between the two countries. In this instance, the settlement line was drawn through the Cross River estuary to the West of the peninsula, effectively placing Bakassi on Cameroonian territory.

Ofonagoro (2013) sums up the Cameroonian claim on these grounds:
1. The Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913, relating to the settlement of their Colonial Frontier between Yola and the Sea and the Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River.
2. The Anglo-German Agreement of April 12, 1913 regarding the boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon from Yola to the Sea.
3. The Yaoundé II Declaration of April 4, 1971, following that of Yaoundé I of August 14, 1970.
4. The Lagos Declaration of June 21, 1971.

5. The Kano Declaration of September 1, 1974 delimiting a 4-kilometre buffer corridor, i.e. 2 kilometers on either side of the line joining Fairway landing buoy to buoys No. 1, 2 and 3 of the Calabar Channel.

6. The Maroua Declaration of June 1, 1975, which extends the course of the Boundary from point 12 to point G.

The foregoing represents the general claims that both countries relied on as Cameroon instituted proceedings at the International Court of Justice.

The Case before the International Court of Justice

Matters between Nigeria and Cameron came to a head over the peninsula in 1993 when Nigerian troops entered and occupied the area. Following a series of further border incursions that provoked shootings from both sides in the process resulting in casualties and deaths recorded on each side. Cameroon formally on March 24, 1994 instituted a suit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, at the Hague, seeking an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian troops, which it said were occupying its territory and to restrain Nigeria from laying claim to Sovereignty over the Peninsula (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006).

Nigeria and Cameroon agreed and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in line with the provisions of the Statute of the Court as outlined in Article 36, which states inter-alia in paragraph 2 that 'the states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes…' Before the Court both parties made arguments based on treaties, history, effective control (Sumner 2004). Indeed in their respective final presentations before the Court, Cameroon on her part asked for the following prayers: that the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria was determined by the Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913; that inconsequence, sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula is Cameroonian. Conversely, Nigeria requested the Court to adjudicate and declare that sovereignty over the Peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and that Nigeria's sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with Cameroon.

After a little over eight years of examining the matter, the ICJ delivered judgment on October 10, 2002, deciding that the very important issue of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula rested with Cameroon and not Nigeria. The Court hinged her decision on the same old colonial agreements and settlements between Britain and Germany (Lacey and Banerjee 2002). Consequently, the Court directed Nigeria to withdraw all administrative, police and military personnel unconditionally from Cameroonian territory including the Bakassi Peninsula. It equally requested Cameroon to do likewise along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on areas which pursuant to the judgment were under the sovereignty of Nigeria (Baye 2010). Furthermore, the Court settled the land boundaries between the two countries from Lake Chad in the North to Bakassi in the South. However Bekker (2003) says that the Court could not specify an actual location of their maritime boundary off the Coast of Equatorial Guinea.

Reactions to the ICJ's Judgment
The Court's decision satisfied the prayers of Cameroon for sovereignty over Bakassi, so naturally, it was Nigeria that had a reason to question and raise objections to the judgment. The emergent scenario was one of domestic reluctance from both the government and informed public opinion to accept the decision. The implication of the judgment clearly is that Nigeria had lost the territory completely to Cameroon. Consequently, the immediate reaction was that Nigeria rejected the ruling with a rhetoric that could apparently suggest recourse to war to hold on to the territory (Friends of the Earth 2003). Indeed, in an official government statement days after the judgment, Nigeria according to Llamzon (2007) appeared to accept aspects of the Court's decision it considered favourable, and rejected other parts it felt uncomfortable with. The government of President Obasanjo pleaded Nigeria's constitutional provisions as a federal state as a case for non-compliance. The argument was that since all land and territorial makeup of the country is specified in the constitution, then the federal (central) government alone cannot give up the Bakassi territory without the necessary inputs from the state and national assembly to amend the constitution (Africa News Service 2003). In explaining this position, President Obasanjo says thus 'we want peace, but the interest of Nigeria will not be sacrificed….What may be legally right may not be politically expedient' (Vanguard Nigerian Newspaper 2002).

Clearly, Nigeria's position on the judgment was an ambivalent one of deliberate indifference where she neither wholeheartedly accepted nor rejected the decision of the Court. In the official statement of the government released via the office of the special assistant to the president on National Orientation and Public. Affairs, the summary states as follows: 'Having studied the judgment as entered by the Court, it is apparent that a lot of fundamental facts were not taken into consideration in arriving at their declaration. Most disturbing of these being the difficulties arising from the Orders contained in the judgment, particularly, the Order relating to Nigerian communities in which their ancestral homes were adjudged to be in Cameroonian Territory but which are expected to maintain cultural, trade and religious affiliations with their kith and kin in Nigeria. Nigeria takes cognizance of these serious implications and therefore appeals to all her citizens at home and abroad to remain calm, positive and constructive until we can find a peaceful solution to the boundary issue between Nigeria and Cameroon.

We appreciate and thank the Secretary General of the United Nations for brokering meeting at the highest political level between Nigeria and Cameroon before the judgment was delivered and for offering his good offices to broker a similar meeting now that the judgment has been delivered with a view to effecting reconciliation, normalization of relations and good neighbourliness. Nigeria thanks all leaders of the international community who have expressed concern over the issue and re-assures them that she will spare no efforts to maintain peace between Nigeria and Cameroon and indeed in the entire region. However, Government wishes to assure Nigerians of its constitutional commitment to protect its citizenry. On no account will Nigeria abandon her people and their interests. For Nigeria, it is not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal waters; it is a matter of the welfare and well-being of her people on their land. We assure the people of Bakassi and all other communities similarly affected by the judgment of the International Court of Justice on the support and solidarity of all other Nigerians. Nigeria will do everything possible to maintain peace in Bakassi or any other part of the border with Cameroon and will continue to avail itself of the good office of the Secretary-General of the United Nation and other well-meaning leaders of the International community to achieve peace and to maintain harmony and good neighbourliness'.

This veiled threat to reject the judgment by the government of Nigeria resonated further in some aspects of the population. We could discern that post judgment rhetoric from informed public commentators was troubling and recalcitrant, coupled with internal political pressures on the government not to respect the Court's decision (Asobie 2003). The general picture was one in which such forces called on the government not to consider handing over the territory to Cameroon under any guise, arguing that historical antecedents and long period of occupation warrants Nigeria to hold on to the territory (Okoh 2006).

This recalcitrant position of Nigeria was worrisome when considered against an earlier agreement between the leaders of the two countries before the judgment of October 10, 2002. Llamzon (2007) informs that President Biya of Cameroon reported that he and President Obasanjo had an understanding to accept the judgment of the Court in a meeting with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on September 5 2002. This position is clearly supported by a UN press statement to that effect even though Nigeria denied the existent of any such agreement (UN Press Release 2002). Generally, Cameroon took Nigeria's stance with relative calm, with her minister for communication, Jacques Ndongo calling on his countrymen to absorb the reaction of Nigeria to the ruling with calm, dignity and serenity'(Cameroon Television (CRTV) Online 2002).

On the whole, this was the general scenario following the judgment of the Court on October 2002.Nigeria was expected to comply and quickly set in motion the machinery for ceding the territory to Cameroon as directed by the Court. However, the domestic constrains identified earlier prevented the leadership of the day to act as expected, so that it was left for the international community and other peace loving and well-meaning bodies to broker further interactions and understandings between the two countries over several years to arrive at any meaningful settlement. What we see is that though Nigeria lost her claim to the territory, but statesmanship prevailed to allow for diplomatic means to resolve the deadlock.

Bilateral Arrangements
In resolving the Nigeria- Cameroon boundary dispute, the good office of the UN Secretary-General had been put to use even before the judgment of

October 2002. This was applied further after the judgment to make the parties to agree on an implementation plan that will facilitate an acceptable and amicable settlement. Meanwhile, following Nigeria's ambivalence toward the Court's decision, the international community developed interest in seeing to the compliance of the ICJ's judgment. This display of naked defiance by Nigeria prompted fears from many quarters that enforcing the ruling may present glitches (Anyu 2007). As a result, the United States, France and Britain exerted diplomatic pressures on Nigeria to abide by the ruling of the Court. Britain in particular through her High Commissioner to Nigeria buttressed the fact that 'ICJ judgments are binding and not subject to appeal, so that Nigeria has an obligation under the United Nations Charter to comply with the judgment' (Agence France –Presse 2002). In the same vein, the British Foreign Minister for Africa met with the Nigerian Ambassador to remind him of President Obasanjo's earlier promise to abide by the Court's ruling (Llamzon 2007).

As the years rolled by, the United Nations and its Secretary-General became the pivot around which settlement efforts revolved as well as for the easing of tensions and renewing of brotherly relations between Nigeria and Cameroon. Following the judgment, a series of bilateral meetings brokered by the UN were held between both parties from which both countries requested for a UN Joint Commission to be established to look at all possible implications of the ruling. Under the auspices of the Secretary-General's good office, the first of such achievements was on November 15, 2002 in Geneva when both Presidents in a joint communiqué agreed not only to the setting up of their Mixed Commission, but also 'to consider ways of following up on the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward' (Eze 2007), protect the rights of the people in the affected areas, and propose a workable solution. Again, on January 31, 2004, after a Tripartite Summit in Geneva, both Presidents Biya and Obasanjo, and the Secretary-General issued a joint communiqué, in which they adopted a comprehensive settlement plan up to 2005. This progressive plan also involved the smooth and gradual withdrawal of all civilian, military and police forces from affected areas. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General called on the international community to provide assistance within the purview of preventive diplomacy for the bilateral efforts of the two countries, particularly, funds for boundary demarcation and confidence building measures.

The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

As noted above it is at the behest of the two countries that the Mixed Commission came into being. Chaired by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the Mixed Commission met eighteen times between 2002 and 2007 every two months on an alternating basis in Abuja and Yaounde comprising delegations from both parties and with the following as its mandate: the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries; the withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and transfer of authority in relevant areas along the boundary; the eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi peninsula; the need to protect the rights of the affected populations in both countries; the development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation; and the reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Baye 2010). To achieve this set mandate, the Commission went further to establish sub commissions and working groups made up of experts from both countries and the United Nations covering the following areas of boundary demarcation including maritime; population; civil administration and police forces; as well as complete withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula (Eze 2007).

The first task of the Mixed Commission was the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries from the North to the South. To this end in 2003 it embarked on field visits to the Land boundary, the Lake Chad area, and the Bakassi Peninsula. By January 2004, the working group on the withdrawal of civilian, military and police forces completed its assignment and effected transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area to Cameroon. In this same spirit, the process of disengagement and handover of authority as stipulated in the Court's judgment was implemented with respect to other contested areas of their boundary. Both states, employing a give and take format, traded villages across their long mutual border in 2004, and 2006. Indeed in a public statement through her National Boundary Commission, Nigeria affirmed the resolve by both parties to implement the decision on the Lake Chad Region, the land boundary from the lake to the sea and their maritime boundary. The statement further added that field work on the land boundary, including mapping and identification of pillars in accordance with the decision was also being implemented (Llamzon 2007).

On the aspect of joint economic cross-border cooperation, the Mixed Commission monitored the construction of border markets and roads linking the two countries. However, in as much as all appeared smooth sailing and on track, the thorny issue of the oil-rich Bakassi could not be resolved timely and amicably like the other areas. According to Borzello (2004), Nigeria could not respect two disengagement timetables set out by the Commission, as thousands of Nigerians in the Peninsula were disillusioned, unsure of their citizenship with many wanting to remain Nigerians due to their cultural and economic ties with the country. So that by January 2006, the Bakassi Peninsula was still under Nigerian control with Nigeria putting forward arguments that her withdrawal would lead to the breakdown of law and order. Additionally, Nigeria proposed a referendum to decide the sovereignty of the peninsula since the people on the Peninsula prefer to remain in Nigeria (Eboh2005).

This logjam over Bakassi's sovereignty became a source of great concern probably due to its rich hydrocarbon resources. As a matter of fact, strong internal opposition towards relinquishing the area to Cameroon increased in Nigeria. The Tide Online (2006) reported that there were calls on the government of Obasanjo to go to war, with this school of Nigerians arguing that it is against the national interest of the country with regard to security and economic considerations to abide by the Court's decision in its entirety.

Interestingly, anti-war proponents cautioned against the calls for war, pointing out the consequences of such an action on women, children and youths in general (Asobie 2003). Furthermore, they offered that 'the principle of good faith' in international relations demands that Nigeria should adhere to the ICJ's judgment and respect her words of honor embedded in the Diplomatic Notes of 1962 (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006).

This was the general state of events following the work of the Mixed Commission which led to the peaceful settlement of other aspects of the boundaries between the two parties. With sovereignty over Bakassi still unresolved, it took intensive mediation efforts by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to bring the two parties together to set out a comprehensive agreement in consonance with the ICJ's ruling.

The Green Tree Agreement and Final Resolution

Brokered by the UN Secretary General and witnessed by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, this last comprehensive agreement came out of a summit in June 2006 at Green Tree, United States of America. Its task was to work out modalities for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops and transfer authority to Cameroon (Gambari 2007). Under its general terms, Nigerian troops are to withdraw within a time frame of ninety days, while a transition period of two years provided for Cameroonian administration to take over from Nigerians. It also provided for Nigerians living in the Peninsula to remain there under a special arrangement for four years after which Cameroon takes over full control. It became the basis for final resolution of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula and formally put an end to a tricky and tempestuous series of events that had all the hallmarks of potentially degenerating into an all-out war situation. Commenting on the significance of this arrangement, Kofi Annan observes that 'with today's Agreement… a comprehensive resolution of the dispute is within our grasp; the momentum achieved must be sustained'.

This Agreement as the basis for the final resolution of the dispute and the decisive point of compliance to the ICJs ruling of 2002 ensued that by 1 August 2006 according to the BBC, Nigeria began withdrawing her about 3,000 troops from the area in line with the provisions of this settlement to pull out troops within 90 days. This move by Nigeria set the pace for Cameroon to subsequently send in her civil administration and regain the peninsula. However, a face saving measure in the agreement made provision for a time table for complete and final hand over in June 2008, allowing for Nigeria to maintain its presence in 18percent of the area from 2006 to 2008, and on the part of Cameroon, she was to follow a code of conduct for the treatment of the local Nigerian population pending their resettlement.

This fourteen years quest for peaceful resolution of this border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon climaxed on14 August 2008 with the Treaty of Calabar between the two which marked the total pull out of all forms of Nigeria's civilian and police forces from the Bakassi Peninsula as enshrined in the Green Tree settlement.

Nigeria's National Interest and International Law

National interest is a manifestation of the core values, objectives and philosophy underlying the actions of the leaders. Whereas the ground norm provides a veritable basis for the collective actions of leaders, the preferences, predilections and sentiments of leaders. There are two schools of thought on the subject matter of national interest: namely the subjectivist and the objectivists. The objectivists' school argues that "the best interest of a state is a matter of objective reality (Zartman, 1986 in Idumange 2010) which Nigerians deserved for a holistic protection of the state.

According to Aluko (1981) Nigeria's national interest consists of six important elements in order of priority. These include:

1. Self-preservation of the country.
2. Defence and maintenance of the Country's independence.
3. Economic and social wellbeing of the people.
4. Defence, preservation and promotion of democratic values.

5. Enhancement of the country's standing and status in the world.
6. Promotion of world peace.

The first three are core national interest and they are not compromised irrespective of the administration (*Aluko 1981).* The Nigeria and Cameroon dispute is situated within the Nigeria's core national interest and requires a high spirited and bold realist approach in the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary dispute to secure the territory for Nigeria. The Bakassi being one of the local government areas in Cross-Rivers state of Nigeria is one of such core national interest to Nigeria. Therefore the ceding of the Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon is a serious deviation from the core objective national interest of Nigeria, which Nigeria have compromised to apolitical afflicted and weak international law that has no binding and enforcement mechanism.

Considering that international law is weak and there is no world legislature to make international law and no global authority to enforce it, it comes as no surprise that many states regularly flout international law when it runs counter to their national interests. In 1984, for instance, the government of Nicaragua (then ruled by the Soviet- backed Sandinista regime) won a unanimous decision from the International Court of Justice supporting its

contention that the U.S. government's support of anti-Sandinista contra rebels and mining of Nicaraguan Harbors violated international law. But the United States simply ignored the ruling. When Nicaragua took its claim to the UN Security Council, the United Nations vetoed its consideration (Drinan Robert F. 1987). Such disregard for international law reinforces the widespread notion that it rarely works. (Spiegel and Wehling 1999). Therefore, several possibilities were or are on ground for Nigeria reclamation bid on the Peninsula, borrowing a leaf from the United Nation's action. This is necessary as the peninsula is crucial to Nigeria.

Right of Self Determination

Demonstrating the importance of self-determination, the United Nations International Conventions on Political and Civil Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) states in its first and third paragraphs that;

    a. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

    b. The state parties to the present covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and Trust Territories shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the charter of the United Nations.

Self-determination is the principle that entails people controlling their political destiny. It is a right recognized in many antique and modern political treaties, protocols and conventions. Obasi (2007) notes that the underlying principle of self-determination is that,

> "… no one has the right to impose himself on others, or to decide for or dictate to other groups how to live their lives and that the freedoms and liberties which everyone desires for himself or the group he belongs to, he should also be able to concede or extend to others …"

It is regrettable that the judgment of the ICJ did not take this provision which is enshrined in the charter of the UN into consideration before ceding sovereignty of the Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon. The assumption that the Bakassi people who are indigenous to the territory can be transferred

willy-nilly to another sovereign without their consent or even their being consulted is wrong. Even before the development of the current norm of self-determination, notes Sagay (2002), it was recognized that as the object of cession was sovereignty over territory, the population domiciled in the affected territory who were citizens of the ceding state were usually given the option of deciding whether they wanted to retain their citizenship of the ceding state or consented to their citizenship being transferred to a new sovereign. The problems and hardship of the inhabitants of the territory who remain and lose their old citizenship and are handed over to a new sovereign whether they like it or not, necessitated the formation of movements that favoured the claim that no cession should be valid until the inhabitants had by a plebiscite given their consent to the cession.

According to Sagay (2002) in 1954, the United Nations General Assembly expressed the opinion, regarding non-self-governing territories that:

> "… a mission if the General Assembly deems it desirable, should in agreement with the Administering member, visit the non-self-Governing Territory before or during the time when the population is called upon to decide on their future status …"

In line with this, the UN supervised elections or plebiscites in British Togoland territory in 1956, French Togoland in 1958, Northern Cameroons in 1959, Southern Cameroons in1961, Western Samoa in 1962, Rwanda-Burundi, in 1961 and the Papua-New Guinea in1972 (Sagay,2002). In 1993, the people of Eritrea were given the opportunity to decide whether to remain in Ethiopia or to endorse the independent state of Eritrea. So was the case in East Timor as they recently exercised their right of self-determination to disentangle themselves from Indonesia and establish their own independent state. South Sudan also held a referendum to gain independence from Sudan very recently. All these exercises are in line with the UN charter and were supervised by the global body. This goes to underscore the fact that self-determination is an inalienable right of all peoples of the world to determine their political status.

In Bakassi, the various treaties that originated either within or outside, and which were either ratified or not, never took the doctrine of self-determination

into consideration. As a result, these treaties and declarations which transferred this territory to another sovereign cannot but be invalid. To this end, the people of Bakassi, Nigeria and Black race have a duty to appeal to the conscience of the world to afford the indigenous population of Bakassi the opportunity to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination through the mechanism of plebiscite.

As a member and signatory to African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Nigeria should have used the African Union and the African Human and Peoples Rights Commission to press for the conduct of a plebiscite in Bakassi, even without waiting for the UN. The result of such plebiscite would definitely put the UN on its toes and morally pressure her to facilitate a formal and universally acceptable exercise in the territory.

Alternative Policy Options and the Right of Self-Determination
The section explores alternative policy options open to the Nigeria government before and after ICJ ruling retain or reclaim Bakassi Peninsula. These policy options bother on politics and diplomatic manoeuvring; they derive their weight from the wits and intelligence of the policy makers. Some of these options are highlighted and discussed below:

1. **Lobbying:** The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defined lobby as a means to persuade the government or someone with political power that a law or a situation should be changed. In this case, the situation that needs change is the ICJ judgment, which as a matter of fact was against the collective interest of the people of Nigeria. There is a decisive need for Nigeria to articulate her interest and work out formidable modalities of actualizing these interests through a well-coordinated mechanism of persuasion which are centred on carrying the support and sympathy of the international community for her course. Interaction in the international environment is a matter of politics. Hence, lobbying is a political means of achieving goals.

The case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia before the ICJ complaining about the inefficient discharge of duties of South Africa, as the mandatory power for the territory of South West Africa, now Namibia exemplifies this. In its ruling, the court noted that Ethiopia and Liberia had not established any legal interest

in the claim they had brought against South Africa. The ruling is not the issue here but how the ruling came about, seven judges agreed with the claims of Ethiopia while seven judges were against. It was the casting vote of the president that had to decide the matter. It took the president of the court some time in determining how to cast his vote. After much politicking, the president supported the claim against Ethiopia and Liberia thereby aggravating the nefarious activities of South Africa in South West Africa. Just like this case, the Bakassi issue and its judgment cannot but have its political scheming and coloration.

In the face of this, Nigeria should have moved to lobby the permanent members of the Security Council. Since the fundamental rights of its citizens is the issue, Nigeria should have used it as a veritable instrument of foreign policy. With the exception of France, other permanent member of the security council especially our new found friends China and Russia, including US should have been approached with our own side of the story and persuade them to work towards the revision of the judgment in favor of Nigeria.

2. **Propaganda:** The work of propaganda is to promote the point of view of a nation with a view to persuading the audience to imbibe its utility, necessity or its superiority over other competing ideas in an intensive, extensive and sustained manner. The utility of propaganda increases the awareness on a particular issue or notion bringing it closer to the hearts of the audience. In certain cases, propaganda may not contain the actual facts about a situation, but it must be objective in reporting and analysis. The importance of propaganda lies very largely on its ability to recruiting, enlarging and sustaining support and alliance (Obasi 2007). For instance the racist regime of South Africa was brought to its knees in 1994 following mounted propaganda all over the world portraying the ills of the system. The United States used the instrument of propaganda to paint Saddam Hussein black before the international community.

Nigeria should sustain moral pressure on the world's conscience by capturing the attention and sympathy of the world on the deprivation on the right of self-determination of Bakassi indigenes in ICJ proceeding. Nigeria must as a matter of necessity, articulate and serialize an intensive awareness campaign using both foreign and local media to bring to the fore the plight of the people

of Bakassi and the injustice brought about by the judgment of the International Court of Justice.

3. Boycott/Non-Appearance: Accepting to appear before the International Court of Justice on the matter between Cameroon was an error judging by the prevailing political situation in the country at the time. What does a pariah state expect from the ICJ? Justice? Far from that. The ICJ in many instances has experienced the phenomenon of non-appearing defendant. This situation creates the problem of finding all the necessary evidence needed in order to decide a case. Iceland boycotted the proceedings in the fisheries jurisdiction cases and, in five cases since then, the defendants had not appeared (ICJ Reports).

This is a weakness in international legal proceedings and indeed international law, which Nigeria should have very well embraced before the commencement of proceedings. It should be noted that the international court cannot be divorced from international politics and diplomacy. The judges at the ICJ were appointed on their commendation of their home governments and these governments must naturally have a way of reaching out the judges recommended by them. To this end, judges from France, Germany, and Britain cannot support Nigeria in the case based on the fact that they have interest in the matter. France is the colonial master of Cameroon. It has vested interest in Cameroon and also a beneficiary of the oil and gas reserves in the region under dispute. Germany and Britain will always make sure that the Angle-German Treaties must be operative and supersedes any other treaty or declaration. The United States on its own part will not support Nigeria based on the political situation in Nigeria then. Because. Nigeria was a Pariah state, America was certain to oppose anything that Nigeria stood for. Knowing full well that International Court of Justice was headed by a French national and there were judges from Britain and Germany, logic demands that Nigeria should have traded with caution. Considering the composition of ICJ judges, Nigeria should have known that that she would not have received a favourable justice notwithstanding the weight of evidence marshalled by her defence counsel. Based on this fact, Nigeria should have honourably boycotted the proceedings of the ICJ.

4. Non-Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the court is based on the consent of the parties coming before it. This consent may manifest itself either in the form of a *compromise* (special agreement) relating to a specific dispute, or a state may accept the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the court more generally under Article 36 of the statute in one of two ways. First, under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the statute, states may express their consent to the court's jurisdiction by entering into a conventional agreement that contains a *compromissory* clause to the effect that disputes as to the interpretation and application of that agreement are to be adjudicated by the court. Secondly, under Article 36, paragraph 2 – commonly known as the "optional clause of the statute" states may make a unilateral declaration that they recognize as compulsory *ipso facto* the jurisdiction of the court in all legal disputes concerning certain categories of questions mentioned therein. There is also exceptionally the third means of conferring jurisdiction upon the court, namely through the institution of *forum prorogatum.* States may accept the optional clause declaration with conditions or reservations. The ICJ stated in military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua: Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court are facultative, unilateral engagements, which states are absolutely free to make or not to make. In making the Declaration, a state is equally free either to do so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with conditions or reservations … (ICJ Reports, 1984).

In this regard, states condition their optional clause declaration in many ways. Some of the most typical ones according to ICJ Year Book (1987-88) include:

   a. States explicitly refer to reciprocity, i.e. that they accept the jurisdiction of the court only in relation to other states accepting the same obligation.
   b. States limit their consent to jurisdiction such as specifying that the declaration covers only disputes which arose after it was made or only dispute in relation to situations which arose after the date.
   c. States have qualified their optional clause declarations by excluding matters within their domestic jurisdiction.
   d. States have included a condition in their declaration that the court may not have jurisdiction unless all parties to any treaty affected by the decisions are also parties to the case before the court.

e. States have limited their optional clause declaration by stipulating that any other mechanisms of dispute settlement as agreed between the parties will prevail over the general jurisdiction of the court.

f. States exclude some specific issues or categories of issues from the jurisdiction they granted the court in their declarations, such as territorial disputes, maritime disputes, disputes concerning their armed forces, or disputes between members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Based on the foregoing, it was an error for Nigeria to have accepted the jurisdiction of the court. States are entitled to declare in advance that they accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, but only in respect of the other states that accept such jurisdiction in advance. Sagay (2002) noted that Nigeria signed the optional clause long before the case, but Cameroon did not. However, Cameroon rushed to obtain acceptance to the court's jurisdiction opportunistically only in order to bring its claim against Nigeria. Sagay (2002) stated thus: "At that state we could have walked away freely by declining the courts' jurisdiction in relation to Cameroon, which was not a party to the optional clause".

The question is, why did Nigeria not withdraw her acceptance to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, when it had every opportunity to have done so? Was it that our leaders were not abreast with the provisions of the statute of the ICJ or that they deliberately wanted to give away Bakassi as they did? These are pertinent questions which answers will aid policy making and policy implementation in Nigeria, if not for now, at least in the future.

5. **Revision of Judgment:** When a party to a case is dissatisfied over the outcome of a judgment within the court, there is room for the revision of the judgment, but this is not without stringent conditions. Article 61 of the ICJ statute provides that an application for revision of judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such party's ignorance was not due to negligence. (ICJ Year Book 1987-1988).

According to the former Attorney General of Cross River State, the home state of Bakassi:

> "Nigeria may seek a revision of the present judgment based on the availability of new facts such as are being made available to us by various persons, and groups both within and outside Nigeria, which facts cannot be made public at this time …"

The option for the revision of judgment through application is a viable one because it adjuncts the parties to maintain the status quo until a determination of application for review which can take another eight years as the case itself. However Nigerian government did not explore the option and allowed the time to appeal the ICJ judgment to elapse.

6. Recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations:

The security council of the United Nations Organization is the appellate court on cases emanating from the pronouncement of ICJ. Enforcement of any law or obligation as made by the ICJ lies solely in the hands of the Security Council. The charter of the UN gives the Security Council the power to judge the rationality, fairness, correctness and justice of the judgment before taking any power. Nigeria had a duty to use the good offices of the Security Council to appeal the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon by the ICJ.

Theoretical Guide

One of the most widely accepted approaches to explaining and understanding conflict in international relations is realism or the realist theory. Realism prioritizes national interest and security, rather than ideals, social reconstructions, or ethics. Realists believe that nations act only out of self-interest and that their major goal is to advance their own positions of power. Realists believe that political struggle among humans is probably inevitable because people have an inherent dark side. According to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), one of the proponents of realism, human beings possess an inherent urge to dominate, an *animus dominandi.* Hobbes argued in Leviathan published in 1951 that "if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies and…endeavor to destroy or subdue one another." Taking the same point of view, one leading realist scholar, Hans Morgenthau, wrote that an "ubiquity of evil in human

actions" inevitably turns revolutions into dictatorships and love of country into imperialism".

Realist thinkers argued that leaders of nations use their power to advance the interests of their own nations with little regard for morality or friendship. In order to survive, realists believe that leaders must build their power base and avoid feelings of friendship or morality that might make them vulnerable to more ruthless adversaries. They also believe that conflict and war are inevitable. Accordingly, Waltz (1979) state that realists such as Greico contend that the structure of the international system and the relative nature of power compels political leaders to view the world in relative terms.

According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains partners that take advantage over a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result states must give serious attention to the gains of partners (Greico, 1988). Logically, there should be no individual variation in beliefs because the anarchical structure of the international system drives behaviour and this structure is constant across time and space.

Morgenthau (1967), like other realist, argued that"...those that are not happy with the state of power distribution will seek to augment their situation by seeking for change in the status quo so as to force change to maximize their power base." Morgenthau believed that states get involved in power struggles to preserve the status quo, to achieve an expansionist interest or to gain honour or prestige. He added that despite the existence of the League of Nations, the World War II broke out because of the failure of nation states to compromise in the pursuit of their national interests. They believe that sovereign states still pursue their national interests through any means available to them. Murray (1998) argued that, the highest moral duty of the state is to do good for its citizens. Morality does not hold sway in global politics, but power and primus inter pares, if not an outright survival of the fittest.

The propositions arising from the realist theory is suitable in explaining the simultaneous claims of ownership of Bakassi peninsula by the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments. The security-strategic value of the Peninsula was

discovered by the Nigerian government during the Nigerian civil war in 1966, when Cameroon government provisionally authorized the Nigerian federal government to use portions of the Peninsula to block vital supplies to the Biafra army. This partly explains the Nigerian Government's claims over Bakassi peninsula, and the boldness of Nigeria's Federal Directorate of Surveys, backed by legal arguments formulated by the Federal Ministry of Justice, to challenge the validity of the boundary agreements between Nigeria and Cameroon, especially the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty and the Ahidjo-Gowon Agreement of 1975 (Ikome, 2004).

The economic value and strategic position of the Peninsula made the Nigerian governments ignore morality and friendship and forcefully set up her military and police administrations in Bakassi to protect her national interest. In general, the fact that both states then viewed their common border as a strong military division and as a defence line for promoting their exclusive national interests gives credit to the believe by the realists that sovereign states still pursue their national interests through any means available to them.

Nigerians may have possibly owned Bakassi today if they had adhered to the realist concept of international policies. Realism asserts that, power is the primary end of an action, whether in the domestic or international arena. In the domestic arena, politicians do, or should strive to maximize power, whilst on the international stage, nations or states are seen as the primary agent that maximize or ought to maximize their power .Nigerians inhabited the Bakassi peninsula from time immemorial and also possess the required power to sustain it, claim it, and defend it as part of Nigerian territory, but lacked the vision. Selfish politics has made Nigeria to compromise this core national interest to subjective uncertainty by appearing in the International Court of Justice with Cameroon. On the other hand, Cameroon in line with the realist view took advantage of the leadership of ICJ to fight for their national interest in the boundary dispute.

In fact it is the inability of Nigeria to appreciate their core national interest that they accepted to appear in the international court with Cameroon for a subjective uncertainty. States exist because they are strong. To ensure their survival, states must make preservation or improvement of their power, a principal objective of their foreign policy, and since power ultimately is the

ability to wage war, states have always emphasized the building of military establishments as the world became more densely populated, nations encroached upon each other country's geographic location.

Conclusion

The high spate of boundary disputes among Africa states have been associated with the creation of boundaries in Africa disregarding the relationship between territorial boundaries and the anthropogenic homogeneity of the various ethnic groupings by the colonial powers. When Cameroon instituted a case against Nigeria in 1994, Cameroon was inadvertently internationalizing the boundary and territorial dispute with Nigeria. It appears the boundary dispute between the two countries was basically a dispute of right with right; hence a crude piece of ethical analysis should have been involved. Since this was not the case, the question of the precise status accorded self-determination remains a matter of international politics rather than mere legal principle. Although the ICJ ruling was based on facts presented by both parties, the conduct of plebiscite that will take into cognizance the human rights of the Bakassi citizens would have been more effective in the settlement of the dispute.

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Challenges of Buhari's Administration and Its Implication on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria (2015-2017)

12

CHAPTER

[1]Abdullahi Mu'awiyya & [2]Usman, Sayuti

[1&2]Department of Political Science
Federal University Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria

Introduction

The socio-economic development of any society is intemperately depending on the nature, character and pattern of its administrative leadership. Since independence, Nigeria witnessed different administrations or regimes with their concomitant implications on the socio-economic development and well-being of its citizens, despite the abundant human and natural resources in the country. This paper, therefore, examines the challenges of Buhari's administration and its implication on socio-economic development in Nigeria (2015-2017). Data gathered mainly from the secondary sources were analysed using content method of data analysis, and the elite theory was adopted to serve as theoretical foundation for the study. The paper revealed that among the major challenges of leadership bedevilling socio-economic development in Nigeria under the current administration include: insecurity, corruption, non adherence to the rule of law and above all, immunity of prosecuting political office holders, with its attendant consequences such as; pervasive poverty and massive unemployment, lost of lives and properties, high level of crimes among others, which further affects the socio-economic well-being of citizens and the country in general. The

paper concluded that even though the fight against corruption and insecurity are at front burner of Buhari's administration, more pro-active measures need to be put in place in tackling the menace headlong, and issues such as high level of poverty, massive unemployment and problem of immunity clause need to be revisited.

Most if not all African countries are still strangulating to attain a high degree or level in the socio-economic development of their various societies till today. Although, this failure have been always related to the external forces which most a time played insignificant role as the expense of forces or factors within, that are more harmful to the growth and socio-economic development of these countries.

The most prominent among, is the inability of administrative leadership across these countries to tap, initiate and transform the societies in line with the resources (both human & Material) at their disposal within their geographical domain. In other words, the socio-economic development of any society is intemperately depending on the nature, character and pattern of its administration. For instance; Freedom, Christian & Temilola (2015) noted that in terms of resources, Nigeria is endowed with enormous natural and human resources sufficient to place it among the first 20 developed countries of the world. It is also the Africa's largest producer of oil and the sixth largest oil producing country in the world. Yet, these has not been translated or reflected in the socio-economic conditions of the Nigerian citizens.

Since independence to date, Nigeria witnessed fourteen different administrations with their concomitant implications on the structure of socio-economic development and well-being of the citizens across the country, despite its abundant human and natural resources. The return of civil rule in 1999 gave Nigerian citizens a high expectation that the new era of socio-economic development and welfare of citizens has came to stay, but today these expectations were defeated by the high level of poverty, unemployment, corruption, insecurity among others that deteriorated the inferior social, economic and well-being of the common men in the country.

On one hand, the current administration under President Buhari's leadership, during his campaign period vowed to end all the social and economic menaces if elected into office in 2015. On the other hand, many people believed that having assumed office he once occupied as a military officer and for which he contested four times, his administration is expected to urgently tackle several challenges that have besieged Nigeria over the last three decades (Freedom, et.al, 2015). However, things are even getting worse than expected especially considering the massive unemployed youths that are roaming the streets which contributed to the high level of poverty and different sort of crimes across the country.

Therefore, the concern of this paper is to examine the challenges of Buhari's administration and its concomitant implications on the socio-economic development in Nigeria, particularly between 2015 and 2017. Some of the specific questions raised by the study include: what are the challenges making our leaders to perform worse than expected particularly on the issues of citizen's welfare and socio-economic development of the country? Have the challenges of Buhari's Administration differ from the previous administrations since 1999? What are the challenges facing President Buhari's administration? Is there any effort put in place to improve the citizen's welfare and socio-economic development in the country? What are the successes or failure of such effort, if any? Consequently, the paper is divided as follows: introduction which has been covered, conceptual issues, theoretical foundation, challenges of President Buhari's administration since 2015, and its Implications on socio-economic development in Nigeria, conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Issues
Administration
The term administration has been thoroughly defined by different scholars in the field. For instance, in the words of Gladden (1952), Administration means, to care for or look after people, and/or to manage society affairs. For Marx (1959), Administration is a determined action taken in pursuit of a conscious purpose. It is the systematic ordering of affairs and the calculated use of resources aimed towards achieving the societal goals. Administration has also been defined as the organism and use of men and materials to accomplish a purpose (Nigro, 1971). In the same direction, Simon (1947) maintained that

administration is the activities of groups cooperating to accomplish common societal goals. According to Gullick (1937), Administration has to do with getting things done, with the accomplishment of defined objectives. Bercley (1991) conceptualized the term "administration" as a process involving human beings jointly engaged in working towards achieving common goals of the society.

Arising from the foregoing definitions, however, this paper adopts the meaning of the term or concept, looking at it, more, from the perspective of political administration. The term political administration is so crucial that it elicits broader discussions among scholars in the recent times. It hence, stresses the relation between politics and administration. Anderson, (2000), for instance, suggested that the level of politics should concentrate on the general political outlining (agenda setting) and entrust the remaining to the administration. It has been observed that politicians make their decisions on the basis of single cases, which ought to be an administrative matter entirely. For the purpose of clarity, political administration, as it applies to this paper, can be seen as the methodology and vision adopted by various leaders in order to address certain issues or problems, which no doubt, has significant effect on the well-being of people and the overall socio-economic development of the country.

For instance, Nigeria, under the administration of late former President Yar'adua, adopted the vision of 7 Point Agenda, which was replaced with Transformation Agenda by his successor Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, even though the program was not completed. While, the current administration under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari set to eradicate corruption and insecurity in Nigeria, which left the transformation agenda of the former president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan abandoned.

Development
The concept of development is like other concepts in social sciences that cannot be subjected to a single definition. Todaro (1997) argued that development is a multi-dimensional process involving the re-organization and re-orientation of entire economic and social system that involves radical changes in institutional, social, and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes, customs, and even beliefs of people in the society.

Development is therefore, defined as a planned and comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims to continually improve the well-being of the entire individuals of a defined geographical area. The individuals would be actively involved in open, meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits (Fritz, n.d)

On one hand, Gboyega (2003) conceptualized development as an idea that embodies all attempts to improve the conditions of human existence in all ramifications. It implies improvement in material well being of all citizens, not the most powerful and rich alone, in a sustainable way such that today's consumption does not imperil the future, it also demands that poverty and inequality of access to the good things of life be removed or drastically reduced. It seeks to improve personal physical security and livelihoods and expansion of life chances. It is reasonable to know that development is not only an economic exercise, but also involves social, economic and political issues and permeates all aspects of societal life (Lawal & Oluwatoyin, 2011)

On the other hand, Gauba (1981) define development as a process in which a system or institution is transformed into stronger, more organized, more efficient and more effective form and proves to be more satisfying in terms of human wants and aspirations. Therefore, development is primarily a positive phenomenon. It stands for improvement of human life in all spheres. Urien (2014) further observed that development does not only means capital accumulation and economic growth, but the condition which people in a country have adequate food, job and income inequality among them is greatly reduced. This is because the major objective of development is to improve the level standard of people and provide the opportunity to develop their potential.

Therefore, development in this context means the ability of political authority to combined both human and natural resources to improve the quality of people's life through the provisions of security, quality education, adequate health facilities, constant water and electricity supply and all other necessary infrastructural facilities that can provided a conducive atmosphere for the people to build up their abilities within state.

Socio-Economic Development

Socio-economic development generally refers to the sustained or concerted actions of policy makers and communities aimed at promoting the standard of living and economic health of a specific area. Such actions include the development of human capital, critical infrastructure, regional competitiveness, health, safety, literacy and other initiatives (Ukpong & George, 2012).

Olukayode (2014) asserted that socio-economic development is a product of development, thus, can be seen as the processes of both social and economic transformation in a society, which embraces changes taking place in the social sphere mostly of an economic nature. It is made up of processes caused by exogenous and endogenous factors which determine the course and direction of the development. To him, socio-economic development is measured with indicators, such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy, levels of employment and equality in one hand, and on the other hand, changes in less-tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm, and the extent of participation in civil society.

Socio-economic development therefore, refers to the various authoritative efforts, initiatives, policies and programmes aimed at improving the quality of social life and economic well-being of the majority members of the society. Skills acquisition, poverty alleviation programmes, equality, provision of quality education, health facilities, employment and security, constant water and electricity supply, roads, agricultural facilities are the major factors determine the level of socio-economic development of a country.

Theoretical Foundation

To explain and analyze the challenges of Buhari's administration and its concomitant implications on socio-economic development in Nigeria, Elite theory could be more relevant and useful, because of its ability and strength to identify the character of those who actually ruled or administered the society. This theory originates from the writings of Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Robert Michels (1876–1936), and Max Weber (1864–1920). Mosca (1939) for instance, emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities out-organize and outsmart large majorities, adding that "political

classes" (i.e. political elites) usually have "a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority" over those they govern. Pareto (1968), postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals; but in actual societies, elites are those most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections.

Michels (1962), rooted elites (oligarchies) in the need of large organizations for leaders and experts, in order to operate efficiently, as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational functioning that are geared towards the development of organization, power becomes concentrated in their hands. Weber (1978), held that political action is always determined by the principle of small numbers that means the superior political manoeuvrability of small leading groups. In mass states, this element is ineradicable.

However, the term political elite can also be defined as a group of high stratum decision-makers in a concrete political structure which monopolizes political power, influences major social, political and economic policies that are geared towards the socio-economic development and well-being of people in the various structure of society. Thus, the main duty of political elite to the public as a whole is to reconstruct society by attempting to mobilize and tap available resources necessary for the socio-economic development of the state. Yet, the political elite class in Nigeria seems to assumed dimension that is unusual of realistic functions in development context. In other words, the formation and conduct of Nigerian's political elite group have not been translated into a source of socio-economic development in the country. This is in spite of the observation made by Purcell in Ojo (2006), that powerful initiatives from within the political elite groups are critically important for national development.

Presently, the crisis of socio-economic development, induced by the political administrative elite, is the most serious problem facing Nigeria. The country has remained largely underdeveloped despite the presence of huge mineral and human resources. Six decades after the end of foreign domination, Nigeria is still fighting with problems such as high poverty rate, lack of basic

infrastructural facilities in all sectors of the economy, corruption, unemployment, high mortality rate, political crisis and insecurity of lives and property among others.

Challenges of Buhari's Administration (2015-2017)

Since independence, every regime has its own peculiar and inherent challenges regardless of whether it's Military, Interim or civilian administration. However, the re-installation of democracy in 1999 couple with nature of politics in Nigeria gave birth to a new dimension of leadership challenges with its attendant implications on the socio-economic development across the country. Even though, most of the existing challenges are not different from the previous administrations, but the nature, characters, and the personalities involves matters a lot in determining its repercussion on the well-being of people as well as the socio-economic development of the country generally. In a nut shell, this paper identified the following challenges under Buhari's administration from 2015-2017:

a) Insecurity
b) Corruption
c) Non-adherence to rule of law
d) Immunity of prosecuting political office holders
e) Pervasive poverty and massive unemployment

Implications on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria

As a matter of fact, every regime or administration in Nigeria have always accompanied by many challenges that has implications, which can either be positive or negative, progressive or deteriorative on the socio-economic development of citizens. As noted by Lawal & Oluwatoyin (2011) the nature of leadership in Nigeria has not been able to engender any meaningful national development, in spite of her huge resources endowment. This has greatly affected her quest to improved quality of life of her citizens. Poverty, unemployment and starvation still pervade the nook and cranny of the country. Notwithstanding, this section would examine the above outlined challenges of leadership with their associated implications on socio-economic development of the country one after another.

Insecurity

Despite the fact that Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been weakening down by the Nigeria Military Forces and to that extant the Chief of Army Staff, Tukur Buratai, recently further declared the defeat of Boko Haram in the North-eastern country (Nigerian Bulletin, 2016). But, other crimes such as kidnapping, militancy in the Niger-Delta, herdsmen/farmer crisis, Armed robbery, Cultism, Domestic violence, Assassination and hooliganism, rape among others still persists, threatening the lives and properties of people vis-à-vis affecting their social and economic lives across the country.

For instance; Nigerian Bulletin (2016) recorded some of the people that have suffered from the issue of kidnapping, in fact some were even killed since the inception of 2016. Among include; Senator Iyabo Anisulowo in Ogun State, Colonel Sama'ila Inusa who was kidnapped and later killed by his abductors same day in Kaduna state, the Permanent Secretary of Osun State Ministry of Finance, Budget and Economic Planning, Mrs. Adebimpe Ogunlumade, her driver and a Director from the same Ministry Mr. Tajuddeen Badejoko who accompanied her were kidnapped in Kogi state. While, in same state, a female lecturer in the Department of Biological Sciences at the Federal University of Agriculture Makurdi was also abducted and killed after collecting the ransom from her family. Again, kidnappers abducted and killed the newly appointed transition Committee Chairman of Jos East Local Government Area of Plateau State, APC Chieftain in Rivers State, Elyon Ntiro Elijah and Chief Ibibia Walter were reportedly kidnapped few hours to the commencement of the state's re-run elections, Nancy Keme Dickson who is a sister of Bayelsa State Governor, Seriake Dickson was also Kidnapped in December, 2015. Also the Lagos Command of the Nigerian Police recorded 51 and 25 kidnapped cases in 2016 and in 2017 respectively (Vanguard, 2017). Moreover, five (5) members of the Nigeria Medical Association (NMA), Cross River branch were also kidnapped, which drive the Association to called on the state government to declare a state of emergency on security across the state (Vanguard, 2018).

On the other hand, the issue of herdsmen/farmer crisis today has taking a new dimension, threatening the security and also affecting the socio-economic life of people across the country. Despite efforts to ease the crisis by the government, in early 2016 herdsmen militant stormed Agatu local

government area in Benue state killed close to 2,000 people in what many, including the United Nations described as genocide. The most recent and the worst ones among include; the two days co-ordinated attacks by herdsmen on six communities in Benue state namely: Tomatar, Umenge, Akor villages in Guma, Governor Samuel Artom's House town, and Ayilamo, Turan, Ngambe-Tiev in logo local government area of the state that led to the died of over 50 people, many people with varying degree of injuries, scores of houses and properties were a razed and some even fled their houses for fear of being killed. To that extent, Governor Samuel Ortom declared to the public that Benue state had lost over 95 billion naira worth of assets and properties, while close to 3,000 had lost their lives to the crisis (Vanguard, 2018).

Similarly, herdsmen attacked six villages of Tambo, Tambo-Jumo, Luru, Bakule, Jifan and Bakopi in Girei local government area of Adamawa state, 10 people lost their lives, many were injured, house and valuables were also destroyed (Thisday, 2018). To said it all, in the last two years, Fulani herdsmen have killed not less than 5000 people and destroyed un-estimated properties in Benue, Plateau, Niger, Delta, Osun, Ekiti, Kaduna, Taraba and Kogi states (Leadership, 2017).

Armed robbery, cultism, domestic violence, hooliganism and rape are another crimes that generated a lot of insecurity of live and properties viz-a viz affecting their socio-economic life in the country. For instance, in Lagos state alone, the command of the Nigerian Police revealed that 486 robbery suspects and 542 stolen vehicles were arrested, 162 rape cases and 246 persons were murdered during cultist clashes, gangsterism, youth restiveness and street fights which ranked highest in the state between December, 2015 and November 2016, while 179 crime cases were prevented due to swift response of the security operatives (Vanguard, 2016). In Kano state, 40 unknown gunmen stormed the residence of a popular local politician and slaughtered two vigilantes and abducted his two house wives (Nigeria Bulletin, 2016).

Even though, attacks by militant groups in the Niger-Delta Region have virtually halted since November, 2016 but other attacks remain a looming threat to the peace and socio-economic life of people in the region (Cheto, 2017). For instance, it was in record that unknown gunmen killed 14, and injure 12 persons on attack in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni local government area of

Rivers state in the New Year day, while in the same day, attack was also mounted in kaduna state that killed Chief of Numana, in Sanga local government area of Kaduna state, Dr. Gambo Makama and his pregnant wife by unknown gunmen in Southern Kaduna (Vanguard, 2018). Therefore, the issue of insecurity is one of the major challenges of the current administration which if not tackled decisively would continue to have negative effects on the social and economic well-being of the people across the country.

Corruption

Nigeria has been consistently rated among the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International in its Corruption Perception Index. In 2011, Nigeria was ranked 143 out of 183 countries. In 2012, Nigeria was rated 139 out of 176 countries and in 2013, Nigeria was placed at the 144 position out of 177 countries. In 2014, Nigeria was rated 136 out of 174 countries. Although from 2014 to today, Nigeria has not made any improvement and has remained I36 in the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2017).

But, as part of his top priorities, immediately after the inaugural ceremony, President Muhammadu Buhari set up a Presidential Adversary Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) headed by Prof. Itse Sagay and among the mandate of the committee was to formulate a strategy and co-ordinate the anti-corruption war of the administration, ensuring that all sectors of the Nigerian society are involved (Igbuzor, 2016). Due to commitment of the administration in fighting corruption, between 29 May, 2015 and 25 May, 2016 alone, President Buhari recovered N3.4 trillion, including recoveries under interim forfeiture (Cash & Assets) (This day, 2016). And again, through the new Whistle blowing Policy introduced by the Federal Ministry of Finance, about $160m and another N8 billion stolen government funds were recovered within its first two months of operation (Leadership, 2017).

But, the question one may ask at this juncture is that; does that mean that there are no cases of corruption under President Buhari's administration? Some of the prominent politicians, administrators, observers and civil organizations have provided answer to the question. For instance, Omokri argued that from the so-called anti corruption regime of President Muhammadu Buhari, N270 million to allegedly clear grass for IDPs was diverted by the former secretary to the federation Alhaji Babachiri. Buhari's administration budgeted N180

million to facilitate appearances with social media influencers and the same administration sends the EFCC to arrest its political opponents for facilitating their own media associates (This day, 2017).

On the other hand, Onya & Elemanya (2016) point out that the confessional statement made by APC member and Former Chairman of Appropriation Committee representing the people of Kiru-Bebeji Federal Constituency of Kano State, Hon. Abdulmumin in a press conference after being relieved of his position by his colleagues, stated categorically how the "House of Representative hideout a systemic corruption". To further confirm the issue, he listed how they shared the funds by confessed in the following order, even though none of the above accusers were either invited or arrested by the anti-corruption agencies.

Table 1: List of Beneficiaries

N0	Names/portfolios	Amount
1.	Hon Abdulmumini Jubrin	N650 million
2.	Speaker Yakubu Dogara	N1.5 billion
3.	His Deputy Yusuf Lasun	N800 million
4.	House Majority Leader Femi Gbajabiamila	N1.2 billion
5.	Deputy Majority Leader Buba Jubrin	N1.2 billion
6.	House Whip Alhassan Ado Doguwa	N1.2 billion
7.	Deputy House Whip	N700 million
8.	House Minority Leader Leo Ogor	N1.2 billion
9.	Deputy Minority Leader Onyema	N800 million
10.	Minority Whip	N700 million
11.	Deputy Minority Whip	N700 million

Source: Adopted from Onya & Elemanya, 2016, and improved by the Researchers, 2018.

At the states level, the corrupt practices accompanied by the lack of accountability and transparency in spending public funds remain the order of the day particularly among the state governors. The huge amount of money

that goes to the state governments from 2015 to date cannot be accounted for by many among them. It can be recalled that, apart from the monthly allocation to the states that is constant, bailout and London-Paris club Funds were equally shared to state governments across the country, but compare to the issues on ground in many states across the country is really pathetic. As matter of fact, in some states, paying worker's salary alone became headache, not to talk of even infrastructural or socio-economic development and wellbeing of the state's members.

In line with this, Budgit (2017) observed that the allocation, utilization and spending of public funds remain unclear, uncoordinated, and brazen, given most of the state government's inability to acknowledge the presence or wishes of the same Nigerians who voted for them and in whose names these funds are disbursed. It have been recorded that, in March 2017, the Finance Minister said "the initial disbursement of Paris Club fund to the states was subject to an agreement by state governments that 50% of any amount received would be allocated for the payment of salaries and pensions." A few days later, it was reported that seven governors have been linked with the alleged diversion of part of the N 388. 304bn London Paris Club refunds into two accounts opened by the Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF).

To justify the statement above, on 5 April 2017, the Adamawa state government refused a Freedom of Information request from a citizen seeking details on how the first tranche of the Paris Club refunds received were spent. This sentiment was further re-echoed within the same month, by a spokesperson of Delta State Governor Ifeanyi Okowa who said that "the Federal Government had no power to instruct states on how to disburse their Paris London Club refund, as the money belongs to the states, it was not a gift, nor a bailout" (Budgit, 2017).

All these indicated that most of the state governments do not concern much about the welfare and socio-economic well-being of their people, but rather interested in diverting the public funds into their private affairs, particular due to their selfish nature, motivated by corrupt mindsets, lack of accountability and transparency within the system, thereby making life difficult for a common men across the states and the country as a whole.

Non-adherence to Rule of Law

One of the major ingredients of democracy anywhere in the world is its adherence to the rule of law which give both ruler and ruled the opportunity to determine their destiny with the stipulated law of the state. However, since return to civil rule in 1999, there were many break of law particularly by those that occupied or holds the political power. Lawal, Imokhuede & Johnson (2012) observed that the leaders in Nigeria do not show respect to the rule of law, especially, judicial decisions. This hampers the judiciary to effectively discharge its duties. The political executives still undermine the independence of the judiciary through patronage appointments, and judicial administration is characterized by weak enforcement capacity.

Therefore, the respect for rule of law or absence of it under the current administration of President Buhari can be understand from some practical issues since the inception of his administration. For instance, the second arrest of Biafra Radio director, Nnamdi Kanu, and the former National Security Adviser to previous administration, Sambo Dasuki in spite of subsisting bail. The recent raid of the homes of some judges (justices Walter Onnoghen & Sylvanus Ngwuta of the Supreme Court as well as the homes of Justices Adebiyi Ademola, Muazu Pindiga and Nnamdi Dimgba of the Federal High Court) was describes as evidence of absence, or lack of respect for the rule of law and the principles of separation of powers by the present administration thereby only interested in using the apparatus of state to harass the real and perceived enemies (Adeyanju, 2017).

Consequently, it is on record that President Buhari sent the name of the Acting Chairman of the EFCC, Ibrahim Magu, to the Senate for confirmation twice, the first time was in December 2016 and subsequently in March 2017. However, on both occasions, the Senate refused to confirm Magu's appointment, asking the President to appoint someone else which is not done till today, even though the senate's decision was subjected to various interpretation. Again, the administration has also refused to release the leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Sheikh El-Zakzaky, and his wife, despite an order of court. However, many others facing anti-corruption charges have been released on bail based on the conditions imposed by the court, even the Nnamdi Kanu, was also released last year after he fulfilled the bail conditions set particularly in view of President Buhari's stance on the issue (Odude, 2017).

Adeyanju (2017) further pointed out that the rule of law has suffered some setbacks presently, which need to be properly addressed for the entrenchment of sustainable socio-economic development in Nigeria. And more worrisome of this development is the fact that these events are happening when Yemi Osinbajo, a law professor and Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), is the Vice President of the country.

Immunity of Prosecuting Political Office Holders
Another leadership challenge facing the present administration of President Buhari, with its accompanying negative effect on the socio-economic development of this country is the issue of 'immunity clause'. This is despite the widespread anti corruption campaign led by his administration. Consequently, the immunity clause had created an umbrella for some top government officials (e.g state governors) to tamper with their state resources, thereby leading to infrastructural decay and underdevelopment at the state levels (Daily Post, 2016).

Premium Times (2013) noted that the immunity clause in the constitution provides the president, vice president, governors and their deputies, with protection from prosecution of offences they commit while in office which is contrary to the views of an overwhelming majority of Nigerians. For instance, during the House of Representative public sessions on the review of the 1999 constitution in 2013, out of the nation's total 360 federal constituencies polled, 225 voted to support a partial removal of the immunity clause on presidents and governors and their deputies which no doubt represents the interest of many Nigerians. However, in his commitment to fight corruption and to ensure offenders face the full wrath of the law, President Buhari assured Nigerians that no stone will be left unturned in the fight against corruption, not even immunity clause will aid the escape of anyone who is fingered and found guilty by the law, but till today none among the corrupt political officials have neither convicted nor jail. Even the attempt by the President Buhari to freeze the account of the Ekiti State Governor, Ayodele Fayose, was actually shattered by serious arguments as to whether those under the category of sitting Presidents and governors as well as their deputies, can face investigation, which includes freezing of their accounts (The Guardian, 2016).

In line with argument above, Saidu (2015) makes it clearly that one of the weaknesses of Nigeria's constitutions is the provision of immunity clause to political office holders so long as one is occupying political seat of power, that person is too big to go to jail or court until his/her administration is over. And the ongoing tradition now a day is that every political leader will make sure that his/her political friends succeeds him/her in office as a price for political protection of mismanagement and diversion of public funds. This new emerging trend constitutes a serious threat to the promotion of welfare and socio-economic development of the Nigerian citizens as a whole. Therefore, it is a reality that the immunity clause itself, is a gross ambiguity and huge of contradictory, which calls for all hands to be on deck to curb the menace.

Pervasive Poverty and Massive Unemployment

Pervasive poverty and massive unemployment in Nigeria has become the greatest challenges facing the current administration under President Buhari. Although, these problems are not only peculiar to the present administration, because even the previous administration suffers the same problems, but what differs them is the effort made to reduce the repercussions of these challenges. For instance, according to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the unemployment rate in Nigeria increased to 14.2% in the last quarter of 2016 from 10.4% same quarter in 2015. It is the highest unemployment rate since 2009. And it rose from 14.2% to 18.8% in 2017 (Vanguard, 2017).

However, in the late 2016, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) also reported that about 112 million Nigerians (representing 67.1%) of the country's total population of 167 million are living below the poverty level (Vanguard, 2016). As matter of fact, poverty is a product of unemployment and inequality on one hand, and it also a parent of all crime in the society on the other hand. This is what we are witnessing today in Nigeria, because the jobless youths are frustrated and retaliating back to the system that created and rendered them unemployed. In line with this, Jombo (2014) observed the following trend that;

> The Niger Delta youths, the Movement for Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC), and the Boko Haram insurgents comprised the young people of Nigeria without salary-earning jobs. The incidence of suicide bombing, terrorists' attacks, kidnapping,

destruction of lives and properties, armed robbery, vandalization of corporate facilities, (such as the power holding installations and oil pipelines), car-snatching, drug abuse, and other criminal acts are unlawful activities associated with these groups (Jombo, 2014: 33).

Therefore, this indicated a direct relationship between unemployment, poverty and high rate of insecurity of lives and properties in Nigeria, meaning that the increased wave of crimes and violence is as a result of pervasive poverty and massive unemployment among the Nigerian youths. To find solutions to some of these issues, the current administration introduced an unprecedented social investment programme known as N-Power initiative aimed at creating jobs for the youth but, the question one may asked is that can it solve the problems of unemployment across the country where over 100 tertiary institutions are producing more than 200,000 graduates per annum (Freedom, et.al, 2015). What about un-skill citizens that are busy roaming the streets everyday in search of jobs across cities in the country.

Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper established the fact that insecurity, corruption, non-adherence to rule of law, immunity of the political office holders and pervasive poverty and unemployment are part and parcel of the major challenges of the current administration under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari. Although these challenges are not different from those faced by the previous administration, however the way and manner they were handled differs. As a matter of fact, many public office holders today are extra careful to be associated with the issue of corruption, unlike what was obtained in the last administration, this is by no means to say that the scourge (corrupt practices) those not exist among the present sets of political office holders in the country, who hide under the canopy of the so-called immunity clause, in breach of the extant laws of the land (rule of law). On the other hand, the issue of insecurity particularly the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast and the militancy in the Niger-Delta has minimize to the barest minimum, if not defeated. However, other security challenges as mentioned earlier in the paper still persists, which can be trace to pervasive poverty and massive unemployment that lingers among the teeming population of our youths, and by implication, threatening the lives and properties of the mass of the people, vis-à-vis their

social and economic well-being across the country. Even though the fight against corruption and insecurity are at front burner of Buhari's administration, more pro-active measures need to be put in place in tackling the menace headlong, while issues such as high level of poverty, massive unemployment and problem of immunity clause need to be revisited. Consequently, the paper suggested the following recommendations:

1. That the fight against corruption should be comprehensive and holistic regardless of political affiliations, ethno-religious inclinations or any other ties. The officials of anti-craft agencies must to be objective enough and sincere, as well as well equip and independent, to enable them carry out their duty without fear or favour.

2. The security agencies should imbibe the habit of quick response to emergency situations that has to do with crime, particularly by exploiting modern communication gadget and detective device measure to intercept crimes before they occur. And on even where the crime is successfully committed, both the perpetrators and sponsors should be identified and brought to book.

3. Both leaders and the citizens at all level of governance in Nigeria must adhere to the rule of law, this is necessary for the evolution and establishment of a just and egalitarian society.

4. As a matter of fact, the Buhari's administration must do the needful, by sponsoring an executive bill, in respect of amendment of the immunity clause, if the fight against corruption and overcoming the ills of socio-economic development is to be achieved in this country.

5. And lastly, as a matter of emergency, the Buhari's administration must expand and improve upon its social intervention programmes to ensure the creation and provision of jobs to both skills and un-skills citizens of the country. This would go a long way in reducing poverty, and thereby minimising the rate of crime in Nigeria and among Nigerians.

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Africa Political Economy

13

CHAPTER

Ejukonemu Joyce A. M.
School of General Studies
School of General Education Studies
Federal College of Education (Technical) Bichi, Kano.

Introduction

The continent as a whole except for Latin America is said to lend itself to a broadly comparative approach considering the similarities among the different countries that makes up the continent. This can be seen mainly in their cultural patterns, for instance in Africa, the places of birth and burial matter greatly. In agreement to this argument (Chabal 2009) highlighted land, ancestors and belief system as being the core of what he called the constraints of origin which are central to the sense of identity. He further stated that Africa has long been seen as a terrain of choice, where indigenous beliefs would not resist the sweep of monotheistic religion.

In the first post independence decade, Africa as a constituent had very little variant in the political patterns of the north and south of the Sahara but in recent times most of the sub Saharan states in the south have been afflicted by state decline while the north is less affected. Some other distinguishing factors are the Mediterranean orientation, the Middle East connections and the depth of the Arab-Islamic cultural heritage (Young 2012).

Contemporary African societies are becoming more complex and more fragmented. In many colonial and post colonial societies, there are many

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forms of law surviving within a single policy such as customary law, common law and constitutional law. Many of these societies are multicultural. The reverse is the situation in American and Britain which share aspects of a common law tradition, for instance the Supreme Court in the United States plays a dominant role in the public domain and has jealously guarded its authority against alternative and competing traditions.

The Newly Independent African Countries

The two most important countries in the colonization of Africa are Britain and France; they colonized thirty-eight of the fifty-three African territories. Meaning Africa is a continent made up of Anglophones and Francophone countries. The struggle for independence was forceful with the Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya from 1952-1958, the sporadic guerrilla acting in Cameroon by the Union des Populations du Cameroon (UPC) from 1955 to 1959 and Nigerian pre- independent movement and process from 1954-1960. On the side of the French colonies, the experience was not different there was the Algerian war not also forgetting, the front deliberation nationale (FLN) uprising, 1960 and 1961. It was said that Belgium was influenced by the Algerian struggles and on the economic phase, there was a rapid expansion of the social and other infrastructure characterized by extraordinary expansion in States' revenue: "Belgian, Congo expenditures increased eleven fold from 1939-1950, then tripled in the final colonial decade. In Ghana at about the same period, state expenditures multiplied by ten; in Nigeria, public revenues which was E7million in 1937 increased to E71million in 1957" (Young 2012: 13-14).

Several dates have been noted as African independence, some of which are 6th March 1957 when the colonial Gold Coast became the sovereign State of Ghana. The independence of Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan in 1956 was also chosen by some scholars. I would rather agree that, the more customary baseline for marking the independence era is 1960, when no less than seventeen countries achieved sovereignty (Young 2012).

Counting from 1960, five turbulent decades have followed, with Africa having just a political landscape demonstrating a little change in the set of state actors but a dramatic transformation in their institutional content and social environment (Young 2012). The colonial partition of contemporary territorial

map of Africa operated in interactive competitive manner with the entirety of the continent as its frame (Sanderson 1995).

Africa is said to be a concept, pregnant with the dreams of millions of people, considering Africa as a whole (Mazrui 1963) argues that Africa is at once more than a country and less than one. In the same vein (Young 2012) seeing Africa as one asserted that in the first post independence decades, Africa as a constituent had very little variant in the political patterns of the north and south of the Sahara but in recent times most of the sub Saharan states in the south have been afflicted by state decline while the north is less affected. Some other distinguishing factors are the Mediterranean orientation; the Middle East connections and the depth of the Arab-Islamic cultural heritage. The continent post colonial trajectories have been periodized thus:

The first decolonization and the independence settlement highlight the late (1950s) to the early (1960s). A second phase was the early 1960s with the wave of military coup in 1965-1966 and the hardening of regimes into single party monopolies. A third period marked by a quest for state expansion began in the end of 1960s. This was said to be a period of pervasive presidentialism often textured by personality cults as well as a wave of nationalization, and a comprehensive parastatalization of production process. This period was emphasized as a period when regimes appeared as a comprehensive hegemony referred to bysome as "integral state". The fourth phase is said to be from the late 1970s to the late1980s. This period is referred to as the period when most African States were in a downward spiral in all front, and a facing a wide spread of state crisis. The fifth period bridged the 1980s and the early 1990s, this was the period of the democratic wave overtook the continent excepting Libya, Sudan and Swaziland.

The first to fifth phase exhibited remarkably parallel patterns across the continent while the sixth phrase, which is the period from the early 1990s to the present, displayed a striking divergence in the pathways. On the one hand a number of countries that had sunk into dilapidated condition have recovered dramatically (i.e. Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania) while large zones of interpenetrated civil conflicts have appeared in other places and some others "state failure" has emerged as a conceivable outcome (Sierra Leone Liberia, Congo-Kinshasa for extended period and Somalia throughout

this phase. However it was also stressed that, the periodization does not indicate lack of continuities in the political culture, social differentiation and economic processes (Young 2012).

Assessing the political trajectories of the fifty-three African states as over the course of the post half century, many scholars expected associated mobilization for rapid development after independence (Chabal 2002). However, what is being experienced today is the contrary. The political system of Africa is pivotal to its political economy.

Politic Economy of Africa

Every society, people, nation and continent has its unique history and that history directly impacts on the people and the society. (Richardson 2011). In other word, the unique history of Africa has an impact on its political economy. Some scholars are of the view that, considering the zeal which African leaders put in to gain independence, it will not be out of place to measure the continent's political economy performance by a stable democratic regime and a sustained robust economy. However, although most African states claim to operate a liberal democratic system but in reality, what is actually in practice is a "western democratic blue print that has been adopted to African tradition creating in the process a hybrid political dispensation that is essentially informal, and that strengthens further the centrality of networking (Crawford (1982 and Chabal 2009). So much has been written on African Political Economy; violence, corruption, poverty, dependent economy, violence, poor leadership, crippled economy, a misunderstood Technological Advancement etcetera. I choose to deviate a little by considering the following salient issues as the core of African Political economy.

Globalization

It will be out of place to discuss Africa Political Economy without emphasizing on the dominance of the market over both state and the civil society, considering that African Political Economy is an interaction between free economy and the central point of capitalism. Global economy rather than national economy, exercises greater influence on the economic and social wellbeing of the continent. Africa is an active participant in this Era of economic globalization; this (Evan 2011) suggests that the state loses it

significance and a center of authority through which people can express their preferences. Meaning government focus is on international institution and organization, governance is conducted by a group of formal and informal organizations. (Cox 1995). In the same Vein (Panitch 1995) argues that in contemporary society, the primary function of the state is to organize and fully manage a global order that supports the interests of global capital, not the rights and welfare of citizens. Meaning African political economic institutions emphasize a market-oriented growth. (Camilleri and falk 1992) argues that modernity has built its foundations upon a universal goal of economic growth, reducing all political and economic institution."*This shift to a global economic growth and development iswhat is referred to as global capital accumulation and consumption*" (Evans 2011).

Globalization gave birth to the politics of modernization, this has increased business activities exponentially. A huge percentage of trade in Africa rely for their operation primarily on a communal infrastructure and well-organised, but wholly informal trade and banking mechanisms that depend on innumerable large-scale networks, operating throughout the world. Scholars argue that there is an increased use of "modern equivalents of the tradition"(Chabal 2009:138). A unified sovereign state required a rational system of law based on the authority of secular courts with the backing of the state apparatus. The growing intensity of globalization is more interconnected in the global economic networks. The consequence is that states have to embrace legal pluralism arising from international courts such as of criminal justice and European court of Human Rights (Richardson 2011).

One of the problems of state craft in Africa has been the inability to generate and implement viable and effective policy. With very few exceptions, there is no area of politics, economy and society where Africa could be said to have been successful since independence. According to Tunner (2007:326) Africa is an "enclaved society". The African states was also described as a "*billion suspended in mid-air ….punctured by excessive demands and unable to function*" (Hyden 1983:19). Other Scholars have described the states in Africa as weak (Oluwu and Wunsch 1990; Byart 1993 and Reno 1998). Independence brought about national parties, African leaders and later democratic governance.

Loopsided Democracy

Democracy is a concept that is very popular in the world today. Most governments of today claim to be democratic to the extent that ex-military men pose as born again democrats (Ejukonemu 2005) e.g. President Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari both of Nigeria. It is also said that authoritarian African military administration, who overthrow government at the end of the day when in power claim to be democratic (Omoleke, 1999). Although history has it that in the last 20 years of the 19th century, Britain occupied or annexed Egypt, the Sudan, British East Africa (Kenya and Uganda), British Somaliland, Southern and Northern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe and Zambia), Bechuanaland (Botswana), Orange Free State and the Transvaal (South Africa), Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, British Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nyasaland (Malawi). These countries accounted for more than 30% of Africa's population. However, it is worthy of note that although countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Serra Leone passed through British administration, they found it difficult to adhere to democratic principles even after 40-50 years of independence (Chabal, 2009).

Democratic Theorists are of the view that, democracy as a system of government is a set of institutions that fulfils two basic requirements. One is to have a way of including the opinions of as many people as possible, meaning that the system should have institutionalization of political parties, and organization of free voting in uncorrupted elections at relatively frequent intervals. Two, the system must provide ways of ensuring that those elected by the public do what the electorate wants them to do and they can be replaced when necessary. The process of government in a democracy is said to be a dialogue between rulers and the ruled. Omoleke (2009) asserted that democracy provides a means of achieving whatever ends the people seek to achieve. He also stressed that it must also make it possible for the democratic dialogue to relate the wishes of the people and facilitate decisions that will favor the people now and in the near future. Democracy also stresses the principle of numerical equality; it asserts that the mere fact of free birth is sufficient to constitute a claim to a share in political power (Omoleke, 2009). Democracy is concerned with means as well as ends and majority rule is only one of the means, however most African leaders are not elected properly, the elections that brought them in were rigged, these leaders ostensibly abuse their office and do not have the interest of the citizens in mind.

In analyzing the democratic system in Africa, scholars have also argued that the practice of multi-party system of elections has introduced greater competition between different types of networking. These groups fight over the negotiation of political support for economic advantage. The continent of Africa democratic system is not only violence prone but economically viable. While the politicians are busy investing money, time and energy in the electoral system, the electorate are busy acquiring wealth and property for themselves. Citizens look forward to selling or exchanging their votes for money. Votes are now more valuable than their political rights, in that citizens now negotiate their ballot for economic benefits. Simply put, politics has been commercialized. The commercialization of politics has made the system porous; it has given room for corruption, poor leadership and bad followership.

Features highlighted as conditions for effective democratic government: tolerance of minority views, opportunities for full and free discussion, Scholars have argued can be seen in the western democracies as a result of long training in self-government. These are being attributed to the institutionalization of some complex policies to safeguard individual rights and freedom of opinion and to protect the citizens against injustice from the state. These institutions included organized parties, civil service independent court of law etc. All these are said to represent long experience and high level of educational and social development.

The democratic system in Africa is wrapped up with signs which are against true democracy such as ignorance, injustice and political instability. It is not news that post colonial African states are battling with a high proportion of illiterate citizens who are politically naive and may not be able to discriminate between the possible and the impossible, the responsible and irresponsible. In the same vein, Africa has a high number of citizens who are yet to acquire political and economic freedom, they also have to face all types of oppositions including ethnic and political oppositions.

In concurrent to this argument (Omoleke 2009) opined that these observation is still one of the problems of modern democracy and I make bold to add, it is a huge problem of democracy especially in Africa today. Afolabi (2016) also added by stating that, democracy as epitomized by the United States and

Western Europe seems to be having a difficult time sinking its tentacles in Sub-Saharan African states and the result of this phenomenon on Sub-Saharan African states is an outbreak of conflicts in its various forms, economic stagnation and human flight/brain drain.

Economic Stagnation

The continent has seen stagnation at different levels. This is attributed to several issues such as poor leadership, brain drain, violence and state failure as related to imported policies. The rising and falling nature of the continent economy can also be seen in these dispiriting statistics, Ghana in 1957 was more prosperous than South Korea but by 2000, Korean gross national product (GNP) per capita was twenty times that of Ghana. Nigeria in the same vein as quoted Nigeria Inflation rate at 9% as at May 2015. Also as at 2013, Nigerian population below poverty line was 33.1 %., GDP growth was 6.3% ($2,758) as at 2014 and GDP per capita was $6,184. It is pertinent to note that, Nigeria is the giant of Africa as popularly known. Nigeria is a middle income, mixed economy and emerging market, with expanding financial, service, communications, technology and entertainment sectors. Nigeria was ranked as the 21st largest economy in the world in terms of nominal GDP, and the 20th largest in terms of Purchasing Power Parity. It is the largest economy in Africa; its re-emergent, though currently underperforming, manufacturing sector is the third-largest on the continent, and produces a large proportion of goods and services for the West African sub region (CIA World Facts Book report between 1 April to 15th May, 2016).   Going by the report on the giant of Africa the continent is suffering from economic stagnation and object poverty.

Most governments in Africa are not able to produce the necessary facilities needed to ease the pains of the people such as good roads, hospitals, education and even power. In a recent report it was noted that although affordable and reliable electricity underpins every aspect of social and economic life, Sub-Saharan Africa has an energy crisis that demands urgent political attention. Two in every three Africans, around 621 million in total, have no access to electricity at all(Africa Progress Report 2015). This is just one of the issues limiting the continent. It was also noted that the reason why Africa is poor and likely to remain poor is because the continent loses 192 billion dollars out of Africa each year. Many of Africa's losses directly benefit rich countries. This is

done through policies and practices that drain Africa and keep its people in poverty. These policies and practices include tax dodging, unfair trade policies, the practices of multinational companies, and the brain drain of skilled workers like Medical Doctors, Engineers, Teachers etcetera.

Still on the same issue, there was another report on how development aid to Africa serves as a mere smokescreen to cover up illicit financial flows, unfair trade policies and cost of adapting to climate change that drain the continent of its resources. The same report contrasts both inflows to and outflows from Africa and come up with the view that the continent records an annual net loss of US$ 58.2 billion mostly flowing into the pockets of Western governments or transnational corporations (Health Poverty Action 2014). It was further stressed that this money that Africa loses each year is over one and half times the amount of additional money needed to deliver affordable health care to everyone in the world. It was concluded that if the rest of the world continues to raid Africa at the same rate, over the next 10 years $580 billion will be lost by the African people. Some countries in the continent have made efforts to get out of poverty but for one reason or the other keeps falling back, with poverty most time comes crime and violence, little wonder the continent is bedevilled with sporadic violence.

Sporadic Violence
Violence or the threat to violence is a universal phenomenon, people resort to violence as individuals or as a group. Over the years, violence has been used for several reasons such as for seeking power, to hold power and to prevent loss of power (Anifowose 2011). Many African states have experienced one form of violence and crisis or the other, one time or the other, some mild and some deviating. Also while some Africa countries have had long uninterrupted years of violence, some have had peace in between violence. The colonial vision of Africans is built on the assumption that Africans attach origin to identity precisely tribal identity. This notion has been mismanaged and abused by African leaders and politicians using it to cause violence. It will be good to consider a country like Somalia as an example of the violence state of the continent. Somalia which was said to be a rare African example of a genuine nation-state whose cultural coherence held promise for effective rule has been bedevilled for nearly a third of the post colonial era with civil strife

characterized by pitting sub-clans and warlord factions against one another in an effectively 'stateless Environment. (Young 2012).

In Africa today there is a great religious divide on both sides, while the Muslims are pushing a partisan reformist agenda, the continent with the Pentecostal wave which rejects local beliefs and provides a strong sense of identity for those who feel they have been cast aside. These religious zeal and influence is what Chabal (2009) calls the "politics of being". It has strong political impact; this impact could be seen and felt in Africa especially in Nigeria where in the northern part of the country, the Muslims and Christians are at loggerheads to the extent of killing each other. This bitterness and violent confrontation is said to have started after independence, when competition for resources within an increasingly violent system was bedevilled by rivalry and resentment (Chabal, 2009). Little Wander (Turner 2007 and Turner 2011) in considering the problems posed by the possible development of a weaker state see it as the erosion of citizenship and the growth of parallel communities noting that individuals are the building blocks of politics in Africa as elsewhere.

The idea of citizenship is central to any political discourse about rights, participants and identity, the African state has a form of top-down citizenship, where the rights of those in governance comes first before those of the common citizen. It is said that the decline of public institutions and the weakness of the civil sphere have led to an erosion of a common experience of shared citizenship which could encourage violence. Violence violates the rights of citizens and for human rights to be enforced; there is need for an effective and viable state. The authority and coherence of the state associated with neoliberal globalization and financial deregulation dose undermine the political foundation of a state noting that the enforcement of rights is a necessary condition for political life.

Migration
Although Africa as a continent is blessed with lot of human and natural resources, the issues of brain drain cannot be ignored, the peoples continue to emigrate daily on a scale unprecedented due to lack of economic opportunities and political instability. (Afolabi 2016). Africa's central tradition is built upon trade and movement of people. Africans are known to

move in search of work, goods and land. It is noted that territorial boarders solidified into national frontiers, have not stopped these actions. These borders that should be barriers are seen as areas of opportunities. Although Africa was populated and settled by the movement of groups that sought out land and resources west and southward, this act continued after independence. Aside from this nomadic group, the fact is that post-colonial Africans moved hastily from one place to the other for economic reasons.

In so many countries today in Europe and particularly Africa, anti-immigration policies have made it more difficult for Africans to move from one country to the other in search of better economic conditions (Chabal, 2002 and Chabal 2009). However, the precarious nature of everyday existence in Africa has made migration ever more desirable. Also the nature of the African economy being described as failed, fragile etc. has increased the zeal of immigrants but unfortunately the attitude to immigrants has reduced the success because citizens have to bypass protocol to enter the country of their choice. Immigrants have become more dependent on underground, informal and often criminal networks.

Africans have succeeded in settling in foreign land or other peoples countries even though they are not welcomed. Chabal (2009) described it thus "there are now sizeable African diasporas in many more countries than there were even twenty years ago". He further stressed that if Africans have long been settled in their former colonial metropolis, today they can be found almost everywhere. Africans are found even in countries with no historical link with Africa (i.e. Scandinavia and Eastern Europe).

A huge number of Africans are well settling in America and Europe. They are also found in regions and countries where their culture and climate does not tarry with that of African like Canada and the Asian continents. It is worthy of note here that given the importance of (legal and illicit) trade flows between Africa and Asia, African businessmen and women have been long established in countries like Malaysia and Thailand and are even active in traditionally more closed areas like Singapore and Taiwan. Immigration policies have only increased illegal migration economy but have not reduced the number of immigrantnts abroad. It is said that, this form of activity has favoured the rich and powerful and not the ordinary people. These issues have affected the

continent in several ways and have also contributed to the level of freedom being experienced today in African. (Mohan, 2014).

Conclusion

A high percentage of youth in Africa are under employed and a higher percentage, unemployed. These issues are interconnected thus, imported policies, which are unsuitable for the countries in Africa have led to a loopsided democracy antics. This is mainly because of poor leadership which has generated a deficit in rulership, making the gap between the rulers and the ruled is huge. The gap is seen in the disparity between the life style of those in government, their close associates and other citizens. The life of an average citizen in African is ravaging in poverty. Frustration is responsible for the rate of violence in the continent.

I draw my final remarks from a comment made by Boris Johnson on colonialism. I quote "The continent may be a blot, but it is not a blot upon our conscience. The problem is not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge any more. The best fate for Africa would be if the old colonial powers, or their citizens, scrambled once again in her direction; on the understanding that this time they will not be asked to feel guilty" Boris Johnson writing about colonialism. Going by this statement, Africa should not blame colonialism for her woes but the system of governance and all its related indices. For the past fifty years of independence, very little has been achieved so far. The need to bring in social capital into the broader structural analysis of political economy will go a long way to address some of the issues overwhelming the continent.

It is worthy of note that, African political economies are not always and everywhere in crisis. It is noted that over the past 100years, the countries of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa have been considered successful models of democratic and economic development at different times. (MacLean 2010). These being the case bigger countries like Nigeria and South Africa need to adopt strategies that will affect the system positively. The time to move forward is now. There is no need to continue to cry over spilt milk; African leaders should look inward for policies and programs that would put an end to the numerous crises being experienced in the continent today.

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Community Policing and through Neighborhood Watch: A Strategic Security Development in Lagos State, Nigeria

14

CHAPTER

[1]Fatile, Jacob Olufemi, [2]Bello, Olaide Wasiu & [3]Adejuwon, David Kehinde

[1,2,3,]Department of Public Administration, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria

Introduction

Security plays a crucial role in nation-building. There is no doubt in the fact that when a nation is adequately secured, it is easy for the citizenry to pursuit their socio-economic activities. The paper notes that the increase in crime rates and poor police-public relations in crime prevention and control has led to the dissatisfaction with traditional policing style of enforcement. Community policing is a proactive idea that was introduced to address security challenges. The paper is anchored on partnership theory and participatory theory. It notes that with the increase in the rate of criminal activities in Lagos State regarding kidnapping, armed robbery and cultism which Nigeria police has failed to address. To address the security problem, the government revolved around community policing through a community partnership with Nigeria police. The findings revealed that the partnership has resulted in confrontations, and the study, therefore, recommends that there should be serious retraining towards attitudinal change and professional efficiency among both the formal and informal security organisations.

Community policing is a service oriented style of law enforcement that focuses on order maintenance, crime prevention and fear reduction in the community as opposed to the traditional focus on prosecution of serious street crimes (Albanese, 2001). The movement toward community policing has gained momentum in recent years as police and community leaders search for more effective ways to promote public safety and to enhance the quality of life in their neighborhoods. Community policing has become a popular area of programming for governments, aimed at achieving more responsive and citizen-focused policing. This is because, it is well recognized all over the world that peace and security of life and property are the primary conditions for progress and development of any society (Besley, Persson, & Sturm, 2010).

Security plays a crucial role in nation-building (Abolurin, 2013). There is no doubt in the fact that when a nation is adequately secured, it is easy for the citizenry to pursuit their socio-economic activities without hinders. Security management in recent times has become a topical issue in the contemporary world as a result of threats posted to national peace and security by terrorist acts like Boko Haram, violent crimes, border conflicts, communal conflicts as well as gender-based violence. In response to these varies challenges, security outfits are now established in different countries all over the world including Nigeria.

There are several security challenges which cut across the nooks and crannies of the country. Apart from terrorism in the North-east geo-political zone, most of the highly populated states in the country such as Lagos, Kano, Port-Harcourt and among others, experiencing various degrees of security challenges ranging from kidnapping, armed robbery, banditry, suicide bombing and other forms of criminal activities in the country. Historically from independence to date, Nigeria as a nation has been experiencing series of violent conflicts such as Niger-Delta crisis, Boko-Haram insurgencies, ethno-religious conflicts, farmers-herdsmen conflicts, cultism and other organised crimes (Abolurin, 2013).Therefore, the spate of insecurity in Nigeria is far more than what is obtainable in most developed nations of the world. Abolurin (2013) observed that the state of crime and insecurity in the Nigeria state is so alarming that several thousands of liveshavebeen lost and properties worth several trillion have been destroyed due to perennial violent conflicts in different parts of the country. All these violent conflicts constitute a state of insecurity in the Nigeria state.

In the same vein, Adegoke (2014) asserts that the challenges of insecurity have assumed formidable dimensions are forcing the country's to witness the scandalous loss of their investment, loved ones and absence of safety in most parts of the country. The rate at which innocent blood is wasted on a daily basis and the display of bottled-up frustration by the citizens remains a cause for concern. Uhunmwuangho & Aluforo (2011) argue that the problem of insecurity in the country seems to have grown beyond government capacity. They argued further that the efforts of the government have not yielded enough positive result due to the complexity of the contemporary security challenges like trans-border crime, terrorism, human trafficking, cyber-crime, armed robbery, homicide and others which overwhelms the capability of public security (police). In looking at the causes of this abnormality, Onifade, Imhonopi & Urim (2013) posited that there is a connection between increasing ethnic hate, religious bigotry, political rivalry, and a growing population of disgruntled citizens in the country who feet short-changed and having limited or no access to the common inheritance.

In addition to the above revelations, other scholars such as Odekunle, (2005) pointed out the same factors that are responsible for the spate of insecurity in Nigeria. He argued that the response of the Nigerian state to the crisis of the mass unemployment and state of insecurityhas led to the worsening of the crime situation in Nigeria. Also, poverty, unemployment declining income and low savings, has pushed many retrenched people into a struggle for survival. With the advent of the current democratic system of government, the society is engulfed with new forms of violent crimes and become more insecure with people getting involved in diverse, sophisticated criminal activities (Otto & Ukpere, 2012). This phenomenon has affected the public security and exposed its inability to accomplish the bulk of its constitutional responsibility. To complement the responsibilities of Nigeria Police, the government established other law enforcement agencies such as; Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Economic, Financial and Crime Commission (EFCC); etc., to assist in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.

Also, other Private Security Companies such as; ASE Security Limited, Bemil Nigeria Limited, Cardinal Security Limited and a lots more have been given constitutional approval through the Private Security Act to assist in the

security business, and the NSCDC supervises their activities, that is, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps. In spite of this development, the nation still finds it difficult to integrate the activities of the formal security agencies into the mainstream of policing in Nigeria, even when it is evident that the formal police institutions are not providing the expected result. Therefore, Nigerians including Lagosians are confronting with criminal activities such as kidnapping, terrorism, pipeline vandalisation, oil theft, political assassinations, rapeand more on escalating frequencies. In an attempt to curtail these crimes, officers and men of the Nigeria Police who are at the forefront of performing security responsibility meet their untimely deathatthe hands of perpetrators. This situation has made a mockery of the formal police institutions, and it is worrisome that the country is currently seeking for a lasting solution to the rising security challenges (Inyang & Abraham, 2013).

Therefore, the inability of the Nigeria Police and other related agencies to control the rising spate of crime, and the fact that these institutions are seen as oppressive tools in the hands of people in government, have given room for public distrust and subsequent debates on how to improve safety and security for Nigerians in the country (Inyang & Abraham, 2013).Hence, due to complexity of the contemporary security challenges and incapacitated of security agencies to rescue poor masses from daily killings, attention has been given to informal policing as an alternative to the weak criminal justice system, with regards to low policing and high levels of criminality in the country (Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2005).It is on this premise that this paper intends to examine the impact of community policing (Vigilante groups) on organised crimes (Kidnapping, burglary, banditry, armed robbery and arson) in Lagos State and influence of Lagos State Neighborhood and safety corps on cultism activities in the State.

Methodology

This paper aims at exploring and explaining how community policing can curb security challenges in Lagos State. Based on this, the study is situated within the qualitative paradigm of social research which is deemed appropriate for exploratory and explanatory studies (Azika, 2010). This paper mainly draws its arguments from secondary data such as journals, articles textbooks, and other publications. To improve the validity, the paper

used multiple secondary sources to minimise the risk of error. This was used to analyse written report journal, articles and other relevant sources of data.

Conceptual Review
Community Policing:
The term community policing is derived from two different and interrelated perspectives. According to Soyombo & Adisa (2011) community means a group of people with the same identified levels of social interaction, who live in the same geographical space and share the same feelings and sentiments about the area. While policing means the task of preventing people from offending the law, and ensuring compliance with the law. He further defined policing as a mean of getting members of traditional societies obey the norms of society by appointing community guards whose role is to protect the lives and property of the people who live within the territory. Following from the above, Soyombo (2005), defined community policing as a policing system that rooted in the belief of community participation in crime control to reduce the occurrence of crimes and enhance the apprehension of criminals. Ngwu & Ahuruonye (2017) defined community policing as the service-oriented style of law enforcement that focuses on order maintenance, crime prevention and fear reduction in the community as opposed to the traditional focus on prosecution of serious street crimes. Community policing represents a merger of community-oriented and police-oriented policing.

Neighbourhood Watch/Vigilantism:
Neighbourhood watch/vigilantism in the context of this study is viewed as programmes involving citizens to prevent crime in their neighbourhood or community. This practice encourages citizens' patrol and victim support services. In this regard, a community or street leader is appointed, who in turn reports to the central coordinator. The central coordinator serves as a liaison officer between the outfits and the Divisional Police Officers. These groups are traditionally/communally legitimate force that is not only permitted to apprehend and arrest criminals but execute the commands of justice (Ngwu & Ahuruonye, 2017).

Development
Development is viewed as the "multidimensional concept referring to positive changes which affect the majority and which lie in the social, economic,

political and cultural spheres of societal life" (Sanda, 1992). Development is about the people, beginning from the grassroots where the majority of Nigerians live. Sanda takes development as those changes or progress which brings a better quality of life for the generality of the people in the society. Such desirable and positive changes are observable in all human endeavours with particular reference to the social, economic, political and cultural aspects of life which usher in progress for the overall benefit of the people.

Theoretical Foundation

There are various theories to the study of community policing and security challenges in Lagos State. Therefore, different scholars have come up with different theories in a bid to analyze the subject matter. Some of these theories are gap theory, social contrast theory, functionalism theory, community participation theory and structural functionalism theory. This paper is anchored onpartnership policing theory and partnership theory.

Partnership Policing Theory

Partnerships represent a unique hybrid organism in the world of social interventions. Beyond the difficulty of defining these entities is the problem of adequately conceptualizing them for the benefit of advancing theory, measurement, evaluation, and knowledge utilization. Partnership policing developed during the 1980s when the model of police paternalism that was embedded in community policing, evolved into a new concept of independent agents working together in partnership with formal structures. To the proponents of this theory, partnerships are widely praised as a vehicle for planning and implementing complex, comprehensive community interventions. The underlying theory of action used to justify this approach places a high value on deterring or incapacitating repeat offenders, with law enforcement agencies serving as the primary, and often, only mechanism for change. The theory is based on the assumption that partnerships are better suited than individual agencies to identify and accurately define the target problems of greatest concern in a given community. They are more likely to include diverse perspectives and theories about crime. Also, partnerships are better suited to developing creative targeted interventions because they include a diverse group of individuals representing a diverse group of organizations with different philosophies of intervention.

The partnership approach to policing emphasises that relations between the police and public should be consultative, and extend into the process of planning. Furthermore, the community and its leaders must be involved in determining the policing needs of the locale, the style of police work that would be effective and appropriate, as well as desirable or undesirable forms of police intervention (Normandeau & Leighton, 1990). This theory advocates for the creation of 'partnerships'— a group of organizations that can bring distinctive but complementary skills and resources to the table and can produce coordinated and targeted responses to public safety problems (Rosenbaum, 2003).The theory suggests that partnerships can result in many different intervention strategies and multiple definitions of "comprehensive." Furthermore, this framework suggests that partnership effectiveness will be determined by the interaction effects generated from various combinations of domains, causal mechanism, targets, and partnership services. Critics have argued that the theory of partnerships should go beyond group dynamics and group processes to delineate the various strategic intervention approaches employed by the group.

Participatory Theory
Participation has become the dominant approach in all development initiatives, and is recognized by the World Bank, by acknowledging that a meaningful social change in any development initiative cannot be achieved only by external experts involving in development processes irrespective of whether development is taking place in developed or developing countries (World Bank, 1996). Participatory theory of community policing which strives to create opportunities for all members of a society to make meaningful contributions to decision-making, and seeks to broaden the range of people who have access to such opportunities. Ramaswamy (2004) argued that if individuals have an opportunity to directly participate in decision making at the local level, they can achieve real control over the course of their everyday life.

The Participatory Theory which gained popularity during the past few decades is mainly associated with the names of scholars like Jean Jacques Rousseau, Carole Pateman, C.B. Macpherson and N. Poulantaz. Participatory theorists try to assimilate and realize the ideals of direct democracy – responsive and active citizenry, participation and equality in the modern

complex world of nation-states. Participatory approach to CP has the advantage of demonstrating that "no citizen is a master of another" and that, in society, "all of us are equally dependent on our fellow citizens". Jean Jacques Rousseau suggested that participation in decision –making increases feeling among individual citizens that they belong in their community. This feeling of cooperation and consensus is the building block of community policing.

The participatory theory is based on five principles which can be found in the context of community policing. These according to Adam & Andre (2016) include:

a) Democratization of parliaments, bureaucracies and political parties to make them more open and accountable. Community policing also rests on the belief that solutions to contemporary community problems demand freeing both people and the police to explore ways to address neighborhood concerns.

b) Direct participation of citizens in the regulation of the key institutions of society. The concept of Community policing also considers crime control and public order management as truly participative functions, with the total involvement of the community.

c) Maintenance of an open institutional system to ensure the possibility of experimentation with political forms. The new policing philosophy has also been preceded by lot of experimentation and innovation in order to provide a more scientific basis to the concept.

d) Decentralization of powers to ensure participation of people in the formulation of policies from bottom to top. Community policing also emphasizes on a decentralized personalized police service with the inclusion of private citizens.

e) Accountability of political leaders and administrators to the people whom they represent. CP also ensures greater police accountability to the public.

Despite the ambitious direction in which participatory approach strengthen community´s and citizens participation in development processes, the approach still faces operational challenges, for example "a potential pitfall of joint decision-making in a group of stakeholders representing diverse social positions and technical backgrounds is the power imbalance among actors

that threatens the integrity of a participatory strategy" (Inagaki 2007). Despite the approach potential shortcomings there is clear evidence that participatory approach has gained the mainstream status in community policing, is also significant today because it allows people and communities to define and become subjects of their own development rather than becoming objects of technologically processes involved in development (Thomas, 1994).

Historiography and Philosophy of Community Policing
The advent of modern policing began with the formation of the London metropolitan police in 1828/9 by Sir Robert Peel (Linda & Karen, 2002). The primary aim of setting up the Metropolitan Police in London was to promote a healthier police-public relation in London. In later years, as a result of colonial rule, the same professional policing was introduced into African colonies to have a formal or uniformed police in charge of national security for governments (Bohn & Haley, 2005). National security has since been the prerogative of the law enforcement agents, especially the police which is the most visible to the citizenry all over the world. The conventional policing system of modern society has, through the effective and efficient functioning of civil servants, worked very well in many advanced countries in restoring public order and preventing criminals from carting away public goods (Soyombo & Adisa, 2011). Therefore, the philosophical rationale for the existence of the police is the need to promote institutional mechanisms for the enforcement of laws and orders that are designed to regulate conflicts and enhance the total well-being of members of society (Alemika, 1993).While this policing system worked well for several decades in countries like America and Britain, virtually nobody thought that there would be any need to return to the traditional policing system found in most of the African countries before colonialism.

According to Arisukwu (2017), during the colonial rule, the focus of the police then was mainly to maintain and enforce colonial laws which were anti-people. The police, therefore, paid little or no attention to service to the people within the community during the colonial era and in some instances up till now. This act resulted in distrust and the unfriendly relationship between public and the police. Alemika, (2003), argued that the police-citizen relationship in Nigeria is characterized by deep suspicion and violence due to militaristic and unfriendly training orientations of the police and their

brutality to the people which resulted into unfriendly relationship and lack of trust on the part of people they were meant to serve.

Kasali& Odetola (2017) opined that since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the relationship between police and civil community in Nigeria viz-viz in Lagos State has been considered by many as unfriendly such that the men and officers of the Nigeria police are perceived by the public as those without any sense of responsibility, integrity and commitment to duties. Alemika (2003) on his part perceived the public police as stooges of the state whose loyalties lie with the political elites and their cronies. Mammus (2010) corroborated the foregoing, observing that:

> The police in their routine work tend to protect the powerful. Police are visible in the group during ceremonial occasions when they cordon off important personalities from the common folk; they are assigned to guard the homes of the powerfulpersonalities, government buildings, and act as bodyguards for important officials. Police are concentrated in urban areas and within urban areas concentrate on patrolling Government Residential Areas (GRAs) – the home of indigenous and expatriate elites … such practices teach the rank and file who needs protection and who does not, who is entitled to services and whose demand can be rejected.

Also, they have always been accused of endemic corruption, human rights abuse, lawlessness, and above all, exhibiting hatred towards the common men (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000). Kasali& Odetola (2016) concluded that lack of partnership between police and community said to be one of the major factors responsible for the inability of the police in Nigeria, to address the growing security challenges bedeviling Nigeria such as incessant armed robbery, ethnic and religious violence, political assassinations, arson, kidnapping, among others. To address the problem above, since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999, some reforms have been undertaken by state governments in the country including Lagos State which culminating into the introduction of community policing in 2004 as the proactive way of addressing security challenges in the country. One cannot but agree that the adoption of community policing as a security strategy and philosophy to address security

challenges requires a change in the attitude, tactics and orientation of police personnel to policing to achieve the desired goals of this emergent security approach(Arase & Iwuofor, 2007).

To buttress the foregoing point, Soyombo & Adisa (2011) opined that community policing is a philosophy, which is based on the assumption that changes today will make communities safer and more attractive tomorrow through shared goals. To this end, it is no exaggeration to assert that the importance of community policing cannot be over-emphasized in the management of security in Lagos State especially as it brings the police and community closer and offers a myriad of other benefits. The truth is that the idea of community policing arose from the need for professional police to change their attitudes towards the public, device new efficient ways of combating crimes, relinquish parts of their bureaucratic responsibilities to the community, and adopt proactive measures, rather than reactive in getting criminals arrested.

Arase & Iwuofor (2007) writes that the evolution of the community policing in Nigeria is an initiative of the federal government. He writes further that the machinery for community policing in Nigeria had since been planted during the tenure of Mr. Etim Inyang as Inspector General of Police., but was officially introduced in April 2004, under Mr. Tafa Balogun a former Inspector General of Police. By December 2006, the institutional frameworks for the practicability of community policing as the pilot study was put in place in six states of the federation, such as Benue, Enugu, Jigawa, Kano, Ogun and Ondo (Dickson, 2007).By 2007, the number of states with the practicability of community policing was increased from 6 to 18 with the addition of 12 states. Other states included Lagos, FCT (Abuja), Cross River, Kaduna, Anambra, Edo, Bauchi, Kogi, Oyo, Imo, Katsina and Borno. Conclusively, the practice of community policing is increasingly gaining global recognition due to the dissatisfaction of people towards police attitudes to crime control and aftermath implications of this inefficiency to the people. According to Bohn & Haley (2005).

> With community policing, citizens share responsibility for the community safety. Citizens and police work together to identify problems, propose solutions, implement action, and evaluate the results in the community. In community

policing, the police must share powers with residents of a community, and critical decisions need to be made at the neighbourhood level, not at a downtown police headquarters. Such decentralisation of authority means that credit for bringing about a safer and more secure community must be shared with the people of the community, a tall order for any group of professionals to accept.

Indeed, this approach advocates for a paradigm shift rather than leaving entirely the job of policing to state and police, people are more than ever tasked to play a lot of complementary roles in the security affairs of their communities. Therefore, it is not the function of the state (or government) to determine security imperatives for the people, but it is the people who should have the final say in deciding their security. It is against this background that many governments of the world have begun to adopt community policing for effective security management.

Features of Community Policing in Nigeria
The characteristics of community policing can be classified into the following interrelated components, such as community partnership, problem –solving, promotion of public confidence in the police and the rule of law, structure, accountability, management, visibility and accessibility, information etc.

Community partnership: Establishing and maintaining mutual trust between citizens of a community and the police is the primary goal of the community policing to address security breaches in the community; police needs to establish cooperation with the community members and encourage members of the community to come forward with crime-fighting information. Police authorities must be ready to share part of their responsibilities with people in the community where they work. Through it is a difficult task, the purpose of this is to repose in the public confidence in unravelling causes of crimes in their society. Community partnership has the propensity of reducing the energy the police would expend in tracking down criminals in the neighbourhood because it allows the community to give the police useful information for crime prevention and control (Soyombo, 2006).

Structure: In term of structure, Cordner (2007) argued that the police institutions should be structured in such a way that it would help in facilitating the implementation of the philosophical, strategic and tactical dimensions of community policing. Community policing deserves reasonable structures and training to support the concept (Skogan, 2006). In community policing, according to Mastrofski (2006), the issue of the mission statement is very essential, as it will afford the police opportunities to determine the broad goals of community policing and enable the police to determine those practices that will aid in the achievement of the goals. The neighbourhood patrol officers who are supported by the police organisation will assist community members to mobilise support and resources to solve problems and enhance their quality of life.

Information is vital to the success of community policing, as security personnel requires reliable information systems to assist the community in addressing their problems (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). In addressing community problems through community policing strategy, requires information systems that will aid the identification and analysis of problems faced by the community, including the use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Community policing, therefore, demands that police needs to reform their relationship with local communities and change their attitudes and behaviours toward citizens in the cause of their duties. To foster police-community cooperation in tackling community problems, police agencies must first elicit community input. This can be achieved through various methods, such as door-to-door visits conducted by police officers, mail-out surveys, and residential block meetings. The gathering of this information helps the police identify and prioritize community problems. In their attempts to reduce crime and disorder, the police need the assistance of community members by encouraging citizens to reliable information of suspicious behaviour in the community. One of the high-points of community policing is the usual effort to improve the frequency and the quality of interactions between individual police officers and members of the public (Kasali & Odetola, 2017).

Community policing also has to be problem-solving. Indeed, problem-solving is an interactive process that involved police and communities, identifying crime activities in and around the community, and developing appropriate

solutions once and for all (Soyombo & Adisa, 2011). The closeness of members of the community to police authorities afford them the opportunities for giving authentic information on how to track down criminals and get them punished by the state.. Problem-solving is germane to community policing and should not be limited to arrest alone but also finding lasting solutions to a problem that already been identified by the collaborative efforts of the police and the public. Police and the community should be empowered to adopt problem-solving techniques and take every opportunity to address the conditions that cause security breaches (Cordner, 2007).

Forms of Community Policing in Nigeria

Forms of community policing can take different perspectives. Soyombo & Adisa (2011) categorised the community policing into two: the first is Neighborhood Watch Scheme, and the second is Foot and Mounted Patrol. In term of neighbourhood watch scheme, Soyombo & Adisa argues that community members who are not in professional practice expected to volunteer to the public by safeguarding their community from hoodlums. A good example is the vigilante groups in Lagos State and other parts of the country. However, lack of proper orientation and training often cause distrust and misunderstanding between professional police officers and local people recruited to perform parts of police functions. The foot and mounted patrol, on the other hand, is a strategy put in place by the police authority to get in close contact with the community, thereby becoming more visible to the public. Foot patrol officers go from one beat to the other, from street to street on routine checks. Both foot patrol and mounted police officers have the likelihood of responding to crimes more quickly than other categories of police on duty depending on the availability of weapons and required tactics by the officers on the ground.

Nature and Types of Community Policing in Lagos State

For over three decades since the establishment of the Nigeria Police Force and its related agencies, insecurity has remained a significant problem that Nigeria is facing. The police authorities have developed policy issues over the years with the intention of reforming the police force for better performance, but the implementation of such policies thereof has always been the problem. This laxity together with apparent inefficiency of the formal police force to tackle emerging security challenges in the country has led to invitations from

different quarters especially the state governments for a change in the current police methods of operations, with options including dissolution of police powers from the central government to accommodate regional and state levels; community policing; and incorporation of informal police institutions into mainstream policing for effective police system in the country. Despite these demands, there are fears attached to each option. For advocates of state or regional police, there are fears and scepticism from opposing a group that such system can be used as an instrument of coercion against the opposition by the ruling class (Nimbe & Bayo, 2011).

Alternatively, many have argued that community policing which demands effective police-public partnership in crime prevention is the best form of policing. This advocacy surprisingly also emerge from the police personnel themselves. From the outcome of a research carried out by the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation) in partnership with the police authority in fourteen states within the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, it was discovered that if community policing strategy is adopted, it could assist to eradicate most of the challenges attributed to the traditional reactive police culture (Pam Sha, 2005). Despite this discovery, the low publicity was given to this project, and the laxity exhibited towards its full implementation by the police authority together with other factors pose a threat to its success. The manifestation of this and escalation of crime rates in nook and cranny of the country, ranging from kidnapping, armed robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, etcetera, called for states adoption of alternative security measures in their respective states (Soyombo, 2009).

As a response to the security challenges in the country, many communities and neighbourhoods, governments, have made increasing recourse, to formal and informal security providers, such as community policing, Community Based Security/Neighbourhood Watch/Vigilante group structures to improve their safety and security conditions (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005). Some of the states in Nigeria, particularly, Enugu State openly endorsed armed vigilante groups as part of their campaign against crime (Akinyele, 2008). Recently, the Plateau state government encouraged various communities in the state to organise Neighbourhood watch/vigilante groups in the light of the frequent invasion of these communities by extremists.

Also, in Lagos State due to increasing in the incidence of armed robbery and violent crimes such as car snatching; cultism; kidnapping; transportation union unrest; religious, ethnic, and political riots; the menace of area boys/girls and other miscreants; and other installations. To ensuring the security of lives and properties of about 18 million people as well as the development of Lagos megacity, three forms of informal security groups with distinct structures and modus operandi are identifiable. These are (a) state organized such as Rapid Response Squad (RRS), (b) those that are collective initiatives of the community members through their leaders such as Oodua people's congress, Agbekoya vigilante groups association and Onyabo vigilante groups association, and (c) those that are engaged by individual house owners and/or residents. It is against this backdrop that the delivery of safety and security is considered a justifiable public service to be provided by the joint efforts of the communities and state (Lubuva, 2004). To complement the above security measures and actualization of the objective mentioned above in the state, the present democratic government, embarked on the establishment of the State Security Trust Fund (SSTF), in partnership with the informal security sector, evolving of a comprehensive security strategy called the "Safe City Project."

In addition to the above security measure in Lagos State, the present government established Lagos Neighborhood Safety Corps to enhance security all over the State and ensure continuing security and justice sector reforms in the state. In his address, the executive governor stated that:

> The Nigerian Police have been very supportive of our administration in the last two years in fighting crime in the State. However, we have identified that due to our huge population and unique challenges the Police needs our support to complement their efforts especially in areas of community policing. On August 15, 2016, I assented to the law that created the Neighbourhood Safety Corps. The Corps is designed to provide a second layer of policing to ensure our State and communities are more secure (Vanguard, 2017).

In fact, neighbourhood safety corps is expected to assist and complement the Police by providing useful intelligence for crime prevention and to facilitate

the arrest of perpetrators of criminal activities in our communities. To actualise the objectives, the corps has been trained and equipped with the requisite knowledge and skills to complement the good work of the Nigerian Police. In addition to the induction on orthodox community policing techniques, the corps has been trained in the following skills; mediating disputes and the art of negotiating for peaceful resolution; balancing the communal interest in resolving conflicts and, proactive policing engagement instead of reactive policing.

Nature of Current Security Challenges in Lagos State
Due to increase in Lagos population as well as the continuous influx to Lagos, the state is faced with a myriad of security problems threatening its megacity development plan. Some of these will be discussed as follows:

Kidnapping: Kidnapping is one of the notorious and high flying crimes nearly in most of the states in Nigeria. The new wave of kidnapping is believed to be one of the outcomes of persistent crises in the Niger Delta. Militants were said to be using kidnapping to demand ransom from oil workers, but today bandits have extended it to top businessmen and women, including politicians. Kidnapping is indeed, a serious threat to national development in contemporary Nigeria (Vanguard, 2017). The problem has been extended beyond the Niger Delta region as cases of kidnapping are increasingly reported in other parts of the country including Lagos State. Kidnapping activity in Lagos is growing fast like grasses on the riverside that have water in abundance. This has come to the extent of kidnapping the country's kids to be released on ransom. According to Benson (2017) secondary schools located around waterway are now the easy target of the dare-devil kidnapper. Benson identified that over 21 secondary school students had been kidnapped within Lagos axis so far. Apart from rampant kidnapping in the schools, in August 2011, Mrs. Kusamotu Thomas was abducted, in October, the same year Dr Godwin Eze was rescued by Lagos State Police Command from kidnapper's den. Another incident of kidnapping was reported on the 9th of April, 2015, when a newly employed housemaid kidnapped three children around Lawanson in Lagos State 24hrs after she was employed and released them after the payment of N15 million ransoms (Vanguard, 2015).

Armed robbery attacks on major cities: Armed bandits are increasingly taking over major cities in Nigeria, such as Lagos, Port Harcourt including the major high ways that are used for cross – country businesses and transportation. The situation in contemporary Nigeria is that travellers will have to travel with bulletproof clothing or sleep with both eyes opened, as surprise attacks could come at any point. The incidences of armed robbery have become a daily routine in many parts of the state. Apart from public institutions such as banks that are the major targets, highways across the country are also targeted as commuters are routinely attacked and dispossessed of their valuables (Mac-Leva, 2016).

Cultism: The evolution of cultism in Nigeria can be traceable to the activities of seven students from the University College Ibadan who formed Pirates Confraternity. The confraternity was formed as a result of the domination of poor students by the wealthy students who were associated with colonial powers. Those who are poor were struggling in every manner to be accepted by the more advantaged students, prompting them to form the confraternity. Membership was open to any promising male students regardless of their tribes. From the 1980s to date, there has been a proliferation of cult groups in over three hundred institutions of higher education in the country. Cultism activities have extended off the campus, and their activities have undermined the overall development of the country. In recent times, various cultism activities resurface in suburbs of Ikorodu in Lagos State and their activities have resulted into sudden death of their members, confrontation of two or more different groups and immoral activities among them (Mac-Leva, 2016).

Causes of Insecurity in Lagos State
This section discussed the causes of insecurity in Lagos State. Crime and violence are life-changing events that are often facilitated by the convergence of several factors. These include institutional problem, corruption, unemployment, ethno-religious conflicts and illiteracy.

Inequalities and unfairness in Socio-economic Distribution: The high level of inequality and unfairness regarding government development policies, political offices and marginalisation of the people by a section, has resulted into grievance, disaffection and resentment by a large number of people. A large number of the Nigeria population is frustrated and have lost hope,

especially the youths, and have now emerged to express their grievances about the pervasive state of inequality. For example, the case in the Niger Delta where the Avengers, Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders have been blowing up installations thereby reduces the exploration and production of oil to the abysmal level. The activities of these militants by implications were responsible for the epileptic power supply in the country as well as the inability of state governors to pay workers' salaries due to the low revenue generated in the oil sector as a result of the attack on pipelines (Soyombo, 2005).

Unemployment: Unemployment is a hot issue in Nigeria, and many people are frustrated with widespread joblessness. Unemployment in Nigeria is like a disease that the cure is not yet discovered. As a result of the high level of unemployment and poverty among Nigerians, especially the youths, the state is adversely attracted to violent crime. Failure of successive administrations in Nigeria to address challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities is one of the major causes of insecurity in the country (Soyombo, 2009).

Corruption: Corruption is the causes of many problems in Nigeria and a largest single obstacle to development. Widespread corruption in the Nigeria police force is fuelling abuses against citizens and undermining the rule of law in Nigeria on a daily basis. Innocent Nigerians are accosted by armed police officers who demand bribes and commit human rights abuses against them as a means of extorting money. These abuses vary from arrest, unlawful detention, threats and acts of violence, including sexual assault, torture, and even extrajudicial killings. Police routinely extort money from victims of crimes to initiate investigations and demand bribes from suspects to drop investigations. Corruption in the police is so endemic that it has eroded public trust and confidence they have in the police. To achieve any success in combating corruption in the Nigerian police, one has to take a holistic approach and most importantly understanding the growth and existence of corruption within the police. The Transparency International places Nigeria on the top of the list for most corrupt countries in the world! (Soyombo, 2006).

Community Policing and Security Challenges in Lagos State: Empirical Review

In Nigeria, the notion of community policing was agitated for to address the challenges confronting the nations as a result of the high crime rate. The incidence of crime in Nigeria has been on the rapid increase, reaching a pathological stage (Odekunle, 2005). In an attempt to address the growing problem of insecurity and criminality in Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo in April 2004, initiated Community policing in collaboration with police authorities under the tutelage of former Inspector General of Police, Mr Tafa Balogun. To experiment the idea, six states were initially selected for pilot study before later increased to 18 states. The experimentation study covered the issues of quality service delivery, partnership, accountability, empowerment and problem solving (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). The finding of pilot study revealed that if community policing strategy is adopted, it could assist to eradicate most of the challenges attributed to the traditional reactive police culture (Pam Sha, 2005).

There is no doubt that for over three decades since the establishment of the Nigeria Police Force and its related agencies, insecurity has remained a significant problem that Nigeria is facing. The police authorities have failed to deliver the country from various security challenges. This laxity together with inefficiency of the formal police force to tackle security challenges in the country has led to invitations from different quarters for a change in the current police methods of operations, with options including dissolution of centralized police controls from the central government to accommodate regional and state levels; community policing; and incorporation of informal police institutions into mainstream policing for effective police system in the country (Iyang & Abraham, 2013). For the advocates of state or regional police, the critics argued that such idea will give the ruling class especially the state governors an undue advantage to harass and victimize the public and his political opponents (Nimbe & Bayo, 2011).

In term of community policing, many have argued that community policing which demands effective police-public partnership in crime prevention is the best form of policing. This advocacy surprisingly also emerge from the police personnel themselves. This argument was justified with the outcome of research carried out between March 2001 and December 2003 by the Centre for

Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation) in partnership with the Nigeria Police (NP) in fourteen states selected from the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. At the end of the research, it was discovered that if community policing strategy is adopted, it could assist to eradicate most of the challenges attributed to the traditional reactive police culture (Pam Sha, 2005). In relating the above argument with the efficacy of various forms of community policing in Nigeria, vis-a-vis in Lagos State various arguments have been put forward in this regard.

With the introduction of community policing in the country, Nigeria has witnessed the proliferation of private security companies, and the upsurge of informal policing that is vigilantism (ethnic and religious) in the past few years. This uprising is attributed to the state of insecurity and the inability of the Nigeria Police and other related government security agencies to curtail the security situation in the country. According to Abrahamsen & Williams (2005), the private security companies rendered their services to people who can pay for them, particularly the multinationals, banks and few government institutions, while the poor masses are left on their own to cater for their security. To cater for the security interest of the masses in the state, the Lagos State government approved the establishment of informal security groups with distinct structures and modus operandi is identifiable. These are (a) state organized such as Rapid Response Squad (RRS), (b) those that are collective initiatives of the community members through their leaders such as Oodua people's congress, Agbekoya vigilante groups association and Onyabo vigilante groups association, and (c) those that are engaged by individual house owners and/or residents such as registered private security organization and socio-cultural vigilante group; this led to the establishment of various vigilante groups and Lagos Neighborhood Safety Corps (Ngwu & Ahumuonye, 2017).

As argued by Ajao (2017) the activities of police, Oodua people's congress and Lagos Neighborhood Safety Corps (LNSC) foiled some attacks by suspected militants and kidnappers since the abduction of six Lagos State Model College, Igbonla pupils. Israel Ajao, a retired Deputy Inspector General of Police who is also serving as chairman of (LNSC) said that the combined efforts of police, vigilante groups with LNSC have been yielding positive results in combating criminal activities in Lagos State. He said that security

agencies in the state are working together to curtail the menace of the criminals in the state. Ajao further stated that there was a plan by his agency to place boxes at various localities for people to volunteer information on criminals.

In another development, the combined efforts of police and residents of Ikorodu through the formation or establishment of Oyanbo vigilante group (O V G) to the problem of dreaded Badoo cult groups in Ikorodu. According to the report from New Telegraph, (2017), the OVG was set up after a marathon all-night meeting held by the police, OPC and local vigilante to work out ways of curtailing the activities of the Badoo groups. The Oyanbo being a local vigilante group with the backing of the formal police swung into action with the arrest of some suspects in the sprawling town. On the same day, the composition of the vigilante group consists of Oyanbo vigilante group, Oodua people's congress faction led by Gani Adams and community lynched at least four members of the dreaded Badoo cult group at Igbo- Oluwo estate along Ikorodu –Mile 12 expressway, while some members of the group escaped by the skin of their teeth. The finding from the New Telegraph reveals that the combined efforts of the RRS, Mobile Policemen, OVG, OPC and LNSC embarked on 24hrs patrolling of the major hot spots where killings had taken place.

Vanguard (2017) reported that no less than 100 suspected members of the dreaded Badoo boys were arrested during a joint raid on the group's hideouts by the operatives of the Rapid Response Squad (RRS), of the Lagos State Police Command, Anti-Robbery Operatives, members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), and members of the vigilante groups in Ikorodu. The areas raided include Ibeshe, Itanaga, Ijede, Ipakodo, Igbogbo/Bayeku and Imota among others. The arrested Badoo boys confessed that over 30 persons among them, family members, including toddlers, have had life snuffed out of them.

Iyang & Abraham (2013) argued that OPC was initially established to work towards the unity, progress, protection, and autonomy of all descendants of Oduduwa, but from 1999 they later changed their objective from seeking self-determination for the Yoruba people to crime-fighting activities and the settlement of personal disputes. But in recent times due to increase in ethnoreligious issues in the society, the OPC has gone beyond vigilante

activities and has been involved in scores of armed attacks and mass murders against other ethnic groups living in southwest Nigeria, particularly in Lagos. This situation is blamed on the lack of supervision over their activities by the government approved security agencies.

Ogbonnikan (2018) argued that despite the seemingly supportive success achieved by vigilante groups in fighting against criminality such as kidnapping and cultism in Lagos State, the pattern of administering justice by the Vigilante Boys was an issue of major concern to various human right groups who quickly called for the abolishment of the group. It was clear that the Vigilante Boys in their attempt to salvage the system from the hands of hoodlums arrested suspected criminals arbitrarily, with little or no evidence, torture and summarily executed most of them in secretly. Similarly, like the OPC, the activities of Vigilante Boys lacked supervision by government security agencies, and this was responsible for their jungle justice approach. This situation has constantly resultedina confrontation between the formal security institutions particularly the Nigeria Police and Vigilante groups. Several clashes between these institutions have been reported, thereby endangering the lives of people they were commissioned to protect. This situation has intensified interest by concerned citizens and various organizations particularly the human rights group for the regulation or outright abolition of vigilante activities in Nigeria. Fasole (2003) justified his argument with the positive impact of the vigilante group in term of crime control in Aba and Onitsha, but the implication effects of vigilante activities in Aba and Onitsha resulted in high rate of criminal activities in Edo, Delta and Rivers states suggesting the relocation of criminals.

Ifeanyi (2005)view that the success of community policing in bringing residents and the police together in a mutual problem-solving relationship exist in theoretical term but the practical term, it has failed to reduce the crime rates and encourage residents participation regarding some neighbourhood groups. Rather it only increased public awareness of crime and engendered symbiotic relationship between residents and the police. Concerning the excessiveness and shortcomings of informal security organisations identified above, Inyang & Abraham (2013) argued that community policing has been very useful in crime reduction and control in several countries including the US, Israel, UK, Canada, South Africa, Japan, to mention a few. In many states

in Nigeria, the capacity of the police to maintain law and order has continued to be undermined by the rapidly growing incidence of violent crimes. The rates of bank robbery, cultism and kidnapping have drastically increased in many parts of Nigeria, and formal security institutions have failed to address the problems. Therefore, there is a need for community –police joint efforts which must be on the principle of trusteeship and anchor on guiding rules and regulations.

Challenges Confronting the Implementation of Community Policing in Nigeria

Despite numerous efforts by various security agencies to curtail the level of crime in Nigeria, crime and social disorder persist in the country. Thousands of lives and millions of naira worth of property are being lost as a result of one crime or the other. Some believed that the inability of the security agencies to curb excessive security challenges in the country is as a result of so many social and technical constraints, among which are lack of equipment and sour relationship between police and public (Dawn Newspaper, 2011).

Corruption: Corruption is the causes of many problems in Nigeria and a most substantial single obstacle to development. Wide spread corruption in the Nigeria police force is fuelling abuses against citizens and undermining the rule of law in Nigeria on a daily basis. Innocent Nigerians are accosted by armed police officers who demand bribes and commit human rights abuses against them as a means of extorting money. These abuses vary from arrest, unlawful detention, threats and acts of violence, including sexual assault, torture, and even extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Police routinely extort money from victims of crimes to initiate investigations and demand bribes from suspects to drop investigations. Corruption in the police is so endemic that it has eroded public trust and confidence they have in the police. To achieve any success in combating corruption in the Nigerian police, one has to take a holistic approach and most importantly understanding the growth and existence of corruption within the police.   The Transparency International places Nigeria on the top of the list for most corrupt countries in the world! (Soyombo, 2006).

Institutional constraints: The state of insecurity in Nigeria can be linked to the incapacity of government to deliver public services and to provide basic needs

for the masses include arbitrariness in exercising its power, corruption, perversion of justice, and delays in the administration of justice. Other factors are inadequate workforce, insufficient education and training, inadequate equipment, and poor conditions of service of the average policeman. The long-term failure of the Nigerian authorities to address police bribery, extortion, and wholesale embezzlement threatens the basic rights of all Nigerians (Soyombo, 2009).

Mammus (2010) stressed further that the major challenge of policing is the manpower shortage, inadequate funding, inadequate logistic support and infrastructure, lack of serviceable information and technological equipment to cover all the areas of the State are responsible for the current state of the police in Nigeria. He argued further that the police area most visible agent of government and citizens assess the government through their contact with the police force. Therefore, the growth, action and behaviour of the police as an institution reflect the intention of political leaders towards police development in the country.

The problem of Integrity of Police Officers and Community Members: In this context, the question is about the integrity of the Nigeria Police which has been subverted as a result of police immoral behaviours and characters (Soyombo & Adisa 2011). Dickson (2007) argued that the challenges confronting community policing in Nigeria cannot be blamed entirely on the above mentioned alone, he stresses that other factors are also responsible for the inability of the nation's police to meet the desired goals of community policing in the management of security. These may include inadequate support from the members of the public, lack of job satisfaction resulting from the absence of good welfare packages, motivations and incentives, as well as lack of will on the part of the political elite to provide sufficient support to the implementation of community policing program in the country.

Community Policing and Combating Security Challenges in Lagos State
There are ways of making community policing workable in Nigeria particularly in Lagos State. Some of these factors are inherent in our society while some are borrowed from the Western words.

Re-introduction of the traditional African values and beliefs: In many African traditional societies, communal co-existence is believed to be playing an important role in internationalization, conformity to norms and discipline of members. That is, there is a need for domestication or Africanization of modern community policing with involvements of traditional institutions and beliefs for clarity purpose (Soyombo & Adisa, 2011).

Consideration of multi-ethnic and linguistic nature of Nigerian communities: The operations of community policing in America is different from its operations in Nigeria. America is a developed state and has been able to overcome the peculiarities of ethnicity, multilingualism and secularization, while Nigeria particularly Lagos State is still grappling with these challenges. The Nigeria Police must, therefore, consider the role of ethnicity, religion, politics and civil society relations in making the project a reality.(Soyombo, 2005).

Public Enlightenment Campaign: Public enlightenment campaign is the key to successful community policing project. Lagos being most populous states in Nigeria is blessed with people of different socio-cultural background. Dealing with such people, police authority must be ready to intensity advocacy on the significance of community policing to national security and individual liberty (Kasali & Odetola, 2016).

Concluding Remarks
Community policing is a philosophy that appeals to the ethos of democracy, equity, and justice. The success of community policing has been limited by police cultural values that do not fully align with the values that underlie the community policing philosophy (Adam& Andre, 2016). The global trends of security challengeshave made it expedient for countries to rethink and tinker with their policing strategies based on their peculiar realities. Although these preferences go by different appellations such as partnership, networking, collective, problem-solving, intelligence-led or community policing, they all acknowledge that rather than being the monopoly of the formal or public policy, policing function is more effective when it is carried out as a collective responsibility of all critical stakeholders including members of the public. In Lagos state, the involvement of community crime control groups in crime control has been adjudged as quite helpful in fighting crime and criminality in

the state. Furthermore, due to the nature of their operations and familiarisation with traditional beliefs, they enjoy tremendous public trust because of their deep cultural roots, closeness and accessibility to the people. For the state to move to the next level in policing its environment, all tiers of government including traditional institutions must be ready to work together with the public and civil society groups in line with the democratic project in the state. The paper concludes that the establishment of Lagos Neighborhood Safety Crops and involvements of various local vigilante groups by state with the backing of formal security organisation will not only address security challenges in Lagos State but will bring Nigeria Police closer to the people. Also, the issues of kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism and other criminal activities will be addressed.

Based on the foregoing, the following suggestions are made for the effective and efficient operation of the community policing in addressing security challenges in Lagos State:
The possibility of integrating existing informal policing structure into the community policing project should be explored at the minimum to enhance support and co-operation. This may entail minimum training for the informal policing structures and supervision of their activities by the police with the support of the community. There should be decentralisation of police authority with the state enjoys a certain level of security autonomy and federal decision prevails in case of conflicts of interest between federal and states on security matters. There should be regular training for the police personnel and vigilante groups about behaviours and process or procedures involved in community policing matters. More concrete steps should be taken to enhance police-community relationship beyond the trite slogan of "The Police is your friend".

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Revised
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The Cost of Cybercrime: An Overview

15

CHAPTER

[1]**Ahmed Sa'adu Tahir,**
[2]**Muawiyah Mohammed Dadi & [3]Isa Buba**
Department of Crime Prevention, Management and
Control, Adamawa State Polytechnic Yola,
Adamawa State, Nigeria.

Background of the Study

Crime is a socially correlated phenomenon. No matter how much we try, we cannot experience a society without cybercrime. In actual sense, when we are not yet able to control the crime rate to the desirable minimum in the real world, how would it be possible to curb the same in the virtual world, as the same is comparatively more unreal, everlasting and legally less controllable. However, Marshall (1980) suggests that crimeless society is a myth and crime cannot be segregated from a society, thus the nature of crime depend upon the nature of the society. Complexity of the society determines the complexity of the crime that revolves around it. To understand the crime in a society, it is essential and crucial to verify all the factors which influence and contribute to crime. The socio-economic and political structure of the society needs to understand the crime and the recourse that may curb the same. In addition, Ajeet (2014) argues that the advancement of technology has produced new socio-economic and political problems in the society and instead of helping the state in controlling the problem it has created new complex situation which is difficult to apply current law to face the situation. Thus, the global dimension of cybercrime

made it difficult to handle and dealt with, this also provided the scope for criminals to commit their crime with least chance of detection. The cyberspace has provided a boom to the deviant behavior in the society. Similarly, Glen and Roland (2009) maintained that the concept of cybercrime has gained speed and we are facing great threat of its impact on world society. The human society becomes vulnerable to cybercrime due to more dependence on technology. Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting individuals, business and government. The cost of such attacks can be highly both direct, and –via potential reputational damage and weaken competitiveness- indirectly. Some governments are taking steps to bolster legislative cyber-security measures, but this continues to prove controversial in some areas, with opener fearing an erosion of civil liberties.

Objective of the Study
The objective of the study is to x-ray and examine the cost of cybercrime

Literature Review
Conceptualization of the Concepts Crime, Cybercrime
Crime
Marshal (1998) defined crime in a more complex way "an offence which goes beyond the personal and into the public sphere, breaking prohibitory rules or laws, to which legitimate punishments or sanctions are attached, and which requires the intervention of a public authority". The Oxford English Dictionary defined crime simply as: "An action or omission which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law".

Cybercrime
Debarati and Jaishankar (2011) define cybercrimes as "offences that are committed against individuals or groups of individuals with a criminal motive to intentionally harm the reputation of the victim or cause physical or mental harm, or loss, to the victim directly or indirectly, using modern telecommunication networks such as internet (chat rooms, emails notice boards and groups) and mobile phones (SMS/MMS)". The Oxford Dictionary defined the term cybercrime as "criminal activities carried out by means of computers or the internet". Similarly, the United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crimes defines cybercrimes as "computer crime that involve activities that are traditional in nature such as

theft, fraud, forgery and mischief, all of which are generally subject everywhere to criminal sanctions". The computer has also created a host of potentially new misuse or abuses that may, or should be criminal as well. Furthermore, according to Thomas and Loader cited in Ndubueze (2017) cybercrimes refers to "computer- mediated activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted through global electronic network".

However, Viswanathan (2001) has given three definitions as follows:
1. Any illegal action in which a computer is the tool or objects of crime i.e., any crime, the means or purpose of which is to influence the function of a computer
2. Any incident associated with computer technology in which a victim suffered or could have suffered loss and a perpetrator, by intention, made or could have made a gain
3. Computer abuse is considered as any illegal, unethical or unauthorized behaviour relating to the automatic processing and transmission of data

Brief History of Cybercrime
It can be said that cybercrime has had a short but highly eventful history. There are different views regarding the actual status of existence of this new variety of crime actually. Some say that when the computer came with the invention of the first abacus some people used calculating machines for wrong purposes, hence it can be said that cybercrime per se has been around ever. Actually, the history of cybercrime firstly started with the hackers who try to break into computer networks just only for the thrill of accessing high level security networks or to gain sensitive or secured information or any secret for the personal benefits or for revenge (United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime (2004).

Factors Responsible for the Emergence of Cybercrime
Halt (2012); United Nation Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime (2004) stated that human beings are vulnerable to unlawful acts which are crimes and therefore, rules of law are required to protect them against such acts. Applying the same analogy to cyberspace, the computer system despite being hi- tech devices, are extremely vulnerable.

This technology can easily be used to dupe or exploit a person on his computer by illegal or unauthorized access. The damage so cause to the victim may be direct or indirect result of abuse of computer systems. In the absence of any fool proof mechanism to protect and safe guard innocent computer users against cyber criminality, the cyber criminals indulge in criminal activities through networks unabated without any fear of being apprehended and tried for the offence committed by them. The following are the factors responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes.

Huge Data Storage Capacity

Huge data storage capacity is the first reason which is responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes. The computer has huge capacity storage to store huge amount of data on a small space. A small micro-CD-ROM will always remain safe and not destroyed even if the power is turned off. A cybercriminal can intentionally get the large scale of secret or official data from the other person personal computer within a few minutes. This leads to increasing cybercrimes.

Computer System Complexity

Is the second factor responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes because the computers work through operating systems which are composed of millions of codes. Due to the fallible nature of human's mind, there is always a chance for lapse at any stage of processing. The cybercriminals are always ready to take undue advantage of these chances of lapse and get access into the computer system. These types of criminals are known as hackers on the cyberspace who try to exploit the weaknesses in existing operating systems and security devices.

Negligence of Network User

Is the third reason which is responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes because negligence is closely related to human conduct. There is always probability that there may be negligence on the part of network user while he is trying to protect the computer system. This negligence leads to a deviance for the cybercriminals to gain unauthorized or illegal access or control over the computers and commit crimes.

Evidence Unavailability or Loss

Is the fourth reason which is responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes. Now the digital computer processing and network technology has replaced the traditional methods for producing, storing, transmitting and disseminating information or records. Due to the emerging nature of cybercrimes the issue raised before the law enforcement and investigating agencies is for procuring and preserving evidence against the cybercriminals. As compared to traditional offences, it is very difficult to collect sufficient evidence of cybercrime for finding guilty of the cybercrime beyond doubt. Due to the anonymity, providing by internet, the cybercriminals are encouraged to indulge in criminal activity without leaving any evidence and if in some cases the evidence is left it is hardly possible to convince the police for registering a case against that criminal.

Wider Access to Information

Is the fifth reason which is responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes. Computer is an electronic device which performs function through complex technology rather than manual actions of human beings. The wider access to information resources is the greatest advantage of computer networking in the cyber age. More and more organizations are resorting to networks for providing easily accessible information to their employer, consumers and parties with which they deal. In the present information age this is the reason why networking and cyber activities are increasing day by day. Due to the information dissemination through World Wide Web, new resources have been created for faster and cost-effective access to information through the world. This facility leads to involve in crime commission on the cyberspace.

Jurisdiction Certainty

Is the last factor which is responsible for the emergence of cybercrimes cut across the territorial borders which undermine the feasibility and legitimacy of applying domestic laws which are normally based on geographic or territorial jurisdiction. Cybercrimes are committed through cyberspace network inter connectivity and therefore, they do not recognize geographical limitations because they are transnational in nature. There has been no uniformity in law of procedure among the different countries for dealing with cybercriminals. Sometimes the issue rose that a particular cyber activity is recognize as a crime in one country where the it is committed but it is not so in

the country in which the criminal or victim resides due to this lapse the criminal easily escapes from the charge under cyber law. The law enforcing authorities found it very difficult to deal with cybercrimes in the absence of a single international recognized code of law and procedure governing cybercrimes Halt (2012); United Nation Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime (2004).

Distinction between Cybercrime and Traditional Crime

Cybercrimes, uniquely different from traditional crimes, are often harder to detect and prosecute. The Swedish Emergency Management Report (2008) observes that criminal activity on the internet has become progressively more sophisticated. Perpetrators carryout cybercrimes through small, targeted internet attacks, as well as launching significant attacks using large networks of commercially leased, hijacked computers. Moreover, Glen and Ronald (2009) conclude that cybercrimes are wider spread than traditional crimes and are increasing at faster rate. Similarly, Yar (2006) maintained that cybercrime does greater damage to society than traditional crime and is more difficult to investigate. Cybercrime encompasses any criminal act dealing with computer network. Additionally, cybercrime also includes traditional crimes conducted through the internet for example; hate crimes, telemarketing and internet fraud, identity theft, and credit card account thefts are considered to be cybercrimes when the illegal activities are committed through the use of computer and the internet. The hackers in cybercrime are professional thieves, criminal gangs, disgruntled employees, professional competition, activists, disillusioned youth and state adversaries as compare to traditional crimes. However, Brenner, (2004) argues that difference between cybercrime and crime in the physical space is based on the evidence of the offences. In the traditional crimes the criminals after or during the commission of crime usually leave any proof of that crime like finger prints or other physical proof. But in cybercrimes the cybercriminals commit their crime through internet and there are very less chances of leaving any physical proof. According to forensic investigators usually having the experience of difficulty in gathering evidence for the conviction of cybercriminals because after the commission of crime they change their identities or doing the crime on the basis of fake identities. He further maintained that these two terms can be differentiated on the basis of the use of force. In the traditional crimes many of the crimes like rape, murder, and burglary etc. involve the use of excessive force which leads

to physical injury on the suffered person, but as compared to cybercrimes there is no requirement of using any type of force because in this type of crimes the criminals only use the identities of other person for the purpose of stealing any secret information.

Generations of Cybercrime

David (2010) argued that the following are the generations of cybercrime:

1. Telephony-based offending: The use of telephony technology to commit crime
2. Mainframe computer- assisted offending: Low- level cybercrime involving the use of main frame computers and their operating systems to assist traditional forms of offending such as theft of funds or information
3. Network- based offending: Offending across the computer networks, such as hacking and cracking activities
4. Automated global offending**:** Crimes wholly mediated by technology, being truly distributed and automated, such the dissemination of spam using botnets. Crimes enabled through mobile and wireless networks and the cloud (David 2010)

The Department of Justice for Computer Crime categorizes the use of computer in cybercrime into three ways as follows:

1. The computer as a weapon- using a computer as a tool to commit "conventional crime" in the physical world such as illegal gambling or fraud
2. The computer as a target- attacking the other computers (spreading viruses is an example)
3. The computer as an accessory- using computer a "fancy file cabinet" used to store an ornament like illegal information

Characteristics of Cybercrime

Talat (2011); Viswanathan (2009); Brenner (2001) suggests that the characteristic of cybercrime may include the following:

1. People with specialized knowledge: Cybercrimes can only be committed through technology, thus to commit this kind of crime one has to be very skilled in the interne and computers to commit such a crime. The people who have committed cybercrime are well educated

and have deep understanding of the usability of internet, and that is made work of police machinery very difficult to tackle the perpetrators of cybercrime

2. Geographical challenge: In cyberspace the geographical boundaries reduced to zero. A cybercriminal in no time sitting in any part of the world commit crime in other corner of world. For example, a hacker sitting in India hack in the system placed in United States

3. Virtual world: The act of cybercrime takes place in the cyber space and the criminal who is committing this act is physically outside the cyber space. Every activity of the criminal while committing that crime is done over the virtual world

4. Collection of evidence: It is very difficult to collect evidence of cybercrime and prove them in court of law due to the nature of cybercrime. The criminal in cybercrime involve jurisdiction of several countries while committing the cybercrime at the same time he is sitting some place safe where he is not traceable

5. Magnitude of crime unimaginable: The cybercrime has the potential of causing injury and loss of life to an extent which cannot be imagined. The offences like cyber terrorism, cyber pornography etc. has wide reach and it can destroy the websites, steal data of the companies in no time Talat, (2011); Viswanathan, (2009)

Classification of Cybercrime

Ajeet (2014); Glen and Ronald (2009); Yar (2006) have identified the classification of cybercrimes as follows:

1. Cybercrime against individuals: The term crime against individual refers to those criminal offences which are committed against the will of an individual. Cybercrimes against individuals include such types of crime like transmission of child pornography, harassment of any one with the use of a computer such as email, cyber defamation, hacking, email spoofing internet relay chat (IRC) crime, net extortion, malicious code, trafficking, distribution, posting, phishing, credit card fraud and dissemination of obscene material including software piracy

2. Cybercrime against property: The second category of cybercrime is that of cybercrime against individual types of property. As there is rapid growth in the international trade where businesses and

consumers are increasingly using computer to create, transmit and to store information in the electronic form instead of traditional paper documents. There are certain offences which affects person's property. These cybercrimes are known as cybercrime against property. These types of cybercrimes include computer vandalism, (obliteration of others' property), intellectual property crimes, threatening, salami attacks. This kind of crime is normally prevalent in the financial institutions or for the purpose of committing financial crimes. An important feature of this type of offence is that the amendment is so small that it would normally go unobserved

3. Cybercrime against organization: There are certain offences done by group of person intending to threaten the international government or firm, company, group of individuals by using internet facilities. These cybercrimes are known as cybercrime against the organization. As compare to other two categories, cyber terrorism is referred as crime against a government. Cybercrime against government include cyber-attack on the government website, military website or cyber terrorism etc. These crimes are committed for the purpose of spreading terror among people of a particular country by circulating false information. This category can cause panic amongst the civilian population if successful. In this category of cybercrime, cybercriminals hack company websites, government firm, and military websites to circulate propaganda. The perpetrators can be un friendly government of other nations or terrorist outfits. This includes cyber terrorism, possession of unauthorized information, distribution of pirated software, cyber vandalism, virus, cyber thefts, net trespass, intellectual property related crimes etc.

4. Cybercrime against society: Those cybercrimes which affects the society interest at large are known as cybercrime against the society. These unlawful acts are done with the intention of causing to the cyber space which will automatically affect the large number of people. These include online gambling, financial cybercrime, cyber trafficking, cyber forgery, cyber pornography, cyber terrorism etc. Ajeet 2014); Glen and Ronald (2009); Yar (2006).

5. Cost of cybercrime: Detica Report (2011); Economic Intelligent Unit Report (2018) considers six matrixes for measuring the cost of cybercrimes they include:

Direct loss is the value of losses, damage, or other suffering felt by the victims as consequence of cybercrime. Examples include money withdrawn from victim accounts; time and effort to reset account credential after compromise (for both banks and consumers); and loss attention and bandwidth cause by spam messages.

Indirect loss is the value of the losses and opportunity cost imposed on society by the fact that a certain type of cybercrime is carried out. Indirect costs generally cannot be attributed to individual perpetrators or victims. Examples include loss of trust in online banking, leading to reduced revenues from transaction fees and higher cost of maintaining branch staff, sales foregone by online retailers when their fraud engines cause them to decline shopping baskets, reduced uptake by citizens of electronic services whether from companies or government, cancelled operations due to online medical services being unavailable, and efforts to clean up machine with botnet malware.

Defence costs are the measure prevention efforts. They include security products such as spam filters and antivirus, security services provided to individuals such as awareness raising, security services provided to industry, such as website 'taken down' services, fraud detection and recovery efforts, law enforcement, and opportunity cost such as the inconvenience of missing messages.

Cost in anticipation of cybercrime which include individual and organizational security measures (such as installing physical and virtual protection such as antiviral software). Insurance costs and costs associated with gaining compliance to required IT standard (for example the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, PCI DSS).

Cost as consequence of cybercrime which take into account direct losses to individuals and companies (including business continuity and disaster recovery response cost), and indirect losses arising from reduced commercial exploitation of IP and opportunity costs through weakened competitiveness.

Cost in response to cybercrime, such as compensation payments to victims of identity theft, regulatory fines from industry bodies and indirect costs

associated with legal or forensic issues.

Indirect costs associated with cybercrime, which include such factors as reputation damage to organizations, loss of confidence in cyber transactions by individuals and businesses, reduced public sector revenues and the expansion of the underground economy Detica Report, (2011); Economic Intelligent Unit (2018).

In a similar study Accenture Security (2019) Report indicated three costs of cybercrime:

1. Cost of information loss or theft. The loss or theft of sensitive and confidential information as a result of cyber-attack, such information includes trade secret, intellectual properties, (including source code), customers' information and employee records. This cost category also includes the cost of data breach, notification in the event that personal information is wrongly acquired
2. Cost of business disruption: is economic impact of downtime or unplanned outages that prevent the organization from meeting its data processing requirement
3. Cost of equipment damage: the cost to remediate equipment and other IT assets as a result of cyber-attack to information organization and critical infrastructure (Accenture Security, 2019).

However, Saini et al (2012) argues that the disruption of international markets could be one of the big impacts of cybercrime and remain a serious concern. The modern economy spans multiple countries and time zones. Such interdependence of the world's economy system means that a disruption in one region of the world will have ripple effects in other regions. Hence any disruption of these systems would send shock waves outside of the market which is the source of the problem. However, they further maintained that productivity is also at risk. Attacks from worm, viruses etc. take productive time away from user. Machines could perform slowly; servers might be in accessible; network might be jammed and so on. Such instances of attacks affect the overall productivity of the user and the organization. It has customer service impacts

Theoretical Framework

There are several theories that attempt to explain the phenomenon of revenge porno. A combination of the routine activity theory and space transition theory would provide a frame work within which to explain the phenomenon of online revenge porn in Nigeria.

The Routine Activity Theory (RAT) of Cohen and Felson (1979) has been applied in the explanation of crime and deviance in the cyberspace. Using a sample of 132 countries, Kigerl (2012) determine the characteristics that predicts whether a nation is high in either spamming activity or phishing activity. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) examine whether RAT provides analytical framework for cybercrimes. Their analyses indicate that some Routine Activity Theory elements are more relevant to some cybercrime than the others. However, Cohen and Felson (1979) concluded that the volume and distribution of predatory crime (violent crimes against a person and crime in which an offender attempts to steals an object directly) are closely related to the interaction of three variables:

1. Availability of suitable targets such as homes containing easily salable goods
2. The absence of capable guardians such as police, homeowners, neighbors, friends and relatives.
3. The presence of motivated offenders such as large number of unemployed teenagers, drug addicts.

The presence of each of these components increases the likelihood that a predatory crime will take place Siegel (2006). Furthermore, LaGrange (1999) argue that targets are more likely to be victimized if the engage in risky behaviors, are poorly guarded, and are exposed to a large group of motivated offenders such as substance abusing young men, unemployed teenagers.

Although the Routine Activity Theory is relevant in the explanation of cybercrimes especially revenge porn, scholars have identified some gaps in the theory. For example, Vito and Holmes (1994) argued that the explanation of the routine activity theory is not well enough and maintain that to be able to explain the full range of victimization, RAT needs to be modified. Concepts like exposure, guardianship, and proximity when it comes to victimization intimates need to be seen not as aspects of routine activities, but as

environmental factors that facilitate or obstruct the victimization of individuals. Similarly, Reid (2015) observed that despite the fact that RAT has not been sufficiently tested, the findings of available researches are consistent with the theory.

In relation to revenge porn, some people are more likely at risk of falling victim of revenge porn because of pattern of their online activities. Similarly, the Space Transition Theory (STT) of Jaishankar (2008) which is the first cybercrime specific theory has also been employed by scholars and researchers to explain the phenomenon of crime and deviance in the cyberspace. For example, Ndubueze (2016b) employs the Space Transition Theory the causation of deviance and crime in the cyberspace, Tade (2013) employs the Space Transition Theory (STT) of cybercrime to explain the 'yahoo plus' phenomenon in Nigeria. They conclude that STT propositions do not applied to all categories of cybercrime.

However, the main assumptions of the Space Transition Theory of cybercrime include:

1. Those who have suppressed criminal tendencies in the physical space are more likely to commit in the cyberspace, which ordinarily they would be reluctant to commit because of their status or position.
2. Certain attributes of cyberspace such as identity, flexibility, dissociative, anonymity and lax deterrence facilitate the commission of crime.
3. Offenders may import their criminal behavior in cyberspace to the physical space and may export same to the cyberspace.
4. The irregular appearance of offenders in the cyberspace coupled with changing spatiotemporal attribute of the cyberspace makes escape pretty easy.
5. (a) Strangers may congregate in the cyberspace to execute crime in the physical space.
6. (b) Friends in the physical space may corroborate in the physical space to commit crime in the cyberspace.
7. People who live in closed society are more likely to commit cybercrime than those who live in open society.
8. The inconsistency between norms and values of the physical space with those of cyberspace may facilitate cybercrime.

Moreover, the major strength of Space Transition Theory of cybercrime is that it is the only theory that is exclusively oriented to cybercrime. While it is major weakness is that it cannot be used to explain traditional crime and as such it lacks broad application. Despite the weakness of the Space Transition Theory of cybercrime it still remains relevant to the understanding of crime and deviance in the cyberspace and it is to date the only cybercrime exclusive oriented theory.

Methodology
Much work has been done in general area of cybercrime. This work is particularly on the cost of cybercrime, the study relies extensively on the secondary source of data such as the internet, text books, hand books, journals, manuals and reports.

Conclusion
The concept of cybercrime is very different from the traditional crime. Also due to the growth of internet technology, this crime has gained serious and unfettered attention as compared to the traditional crime. The modern technologies that are proliferating towards the use of internet activity results in creating exploitation, vulnerability making a suitable way for transferring confidential data to commit an offence through illegal activity. Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting individuals, business and government. The cost of such attacks can be highly both direct, and –via potential reputational damage and weaken competitiveness- indirectly.

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Causes and Policy Prevention of Fraud in Nigeria

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CHAPTER

**[1]Okafor Onwuagana Chukwuma &
[2]Isibor Areghan**
[1]Baze University, Nigeria
[2]Covenant University, Nigeria

Abstract

This qualitative study investigated the causes of bank fraud in Nigeria. The issue of bank fraud has its negative effect on the economy as it causes bank panic and bank runs. The researcher examined several literatures and pointed out several causes of bank fraud in the Nigerian banking industry like lack of experienced and adequate personnel and absence of good internal control methods. Finally, recommendations like sound employment policies and regular balancing of accounts, were listed as solutions to prevent the occurrence of bank frauds among Nigerian banks.

Keywords: *Bank fraud, Internal control, Causes of bank fraud, Prevention of bank fraud*

Introduction

The Oxford Dictionary of current English (2020) defined fraud as deceitfulness, criminal deception and use of false representations. Hur-Yagba (2015) opined that there is a general consensus among criminologists that fraud is caused by three elements called: Will, Opportunity, Exit (WOE), that is, the will to commit frauds by the individual, the opportunity to execute the fraud and the exit which is the escape from sanctions against successful or attempted fraud or deviant behavior. Lockett and Harrell (2003) argued that no matter what one does in life, if one has a positive attitude, one would always be 100 percent in all human endeavors. This is even evident in the numerical value of the word "Attitude". We can check this by assigning value to each letter; A=1... Z=26 isn't Attitude =100.

Lockett and Harrell (2003) study were from established psychological and behavioural research, for gaining control of our career. Also, Lockett and Harrell (2003) posited that attitude tend to vary in strength - some being much stronger or weaker than others. The importance of determining the strength of an attitude lies in the fact that strong attitudes are presumed to be more difficult to change. People tend to hold attitudes only toward objects that exist in their psychological world. The tripartite models of attitudes – the affective, behavioral tendency and the cognitive components have implication for attitude change. The cognitive component refers to one's knowledge or beliefs about the attitudinal object, the affective component relates to a person's feelings about the object while the behavioral tendency component relates to the predisposition to act in a certain manner toward the object of attitude. These variables have strong implications on Nigerian attitude to fraud. Chizea (2013) explained fraud as any premeditated act of criminal deceit, trickery or falsification by a person or group of persons with the intention of altering facts in order to obtain undue personal monetary advantage. He mentioned the following as typical manifestation of fraud: cash thefts from the tills of bank by staff, forgeries of a customer's signature, use of forged cheque to withdraw money from his account with the bank, unauthorized and illegal transfer of fund from a customer's account, opening and operating of fictitious (ghost) account for illegal transactions, lending to fictitious borrowers through fictitious account opened at a branch, suppression of cheque by disloyal staff, payment against unclear effects, granting loans without adequate information and security from borrowers or lenders. The list is endless.

In his contribution, Kolawole (2017) attributed cases of frauds in the banking system to unskilled employee who are not professionals; our legal system that prolong cases of fraud for too long making room for undue interference. Atijosan (2014) also stated that frauds could be carried out through addition of fictitious transactions, altering transactions through wrong posting of accounts and deleting transactions by omitting specific accounts. Archibong (2015) noted that the long-term survival and growth of any organization depends on how the issue of fraud and fraudulent practices in any organization is handled. Ojo (1997) stated that the current economic downturn, unstable political environment and fragile financial outlook in Nigeria require adequate preventive and control tools to manage the banks and other institutions and enterprises.

The notable efforts made by the relevant authorities to strengthen bank regulatory framework are:

(i) The Accounting Standards for Banks and Non-banks financial institutions (Part 1) issued by the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB)

(ii) The Prudential guidelines for licensed banks issued by the Banking Supervision Department of the CBN on 7th November, 1990

(iii) The adoption of international agreement on bank's capital adequacy or Basle Accord on capital adequacy (Kolawole, 2017). These measures were meant to stem the tide of bank failures by establishing standard policies to regulate banking business. Accountants, bank professionals through the audit and inspection unit could assist in putting in place and ensuring compliance with the required internal control systems and procedures to tackle the problem of frauds and related financial malpractices. Section 32 of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act No.22 of 1988 (as amended) stipulated "any licensed bank or such other financial institution which insures its deposits with the corporation shall be required to provide fidelity bond coverage". The fidelity insurance policy covers frauds and forgeries committed by staff of insured banks. The insurance policy is intended to reduce the adverse effect of insider frauds and forgeries on the banks. Therefore, it is expected that all insured banks be expected to take up fidelity insurance cover and renew it on annual basis.

Okoye, Erin, Ahmed, and Isibor (2017) and Okoye, Olokoyo, Okoh, Ezeji, and Uzohue (2020) opined computers are used to perpetrate fraud and it is sometimes referred to as computer fraud. Computer fraud entails input manipulation, operations manipulation, and file manipulation, program manipulation. Bank frauds have assumed various dimensions. Employees sometimes who are reflection of the larger society assist in consummating bank frauds. Some of the causes of fraud are discussed below. By NDIC analysis, seven commonest types of fraud and forgeries cases are presentation of forged cheque, granting of unauthorized loans, posting of fictitious credits, suppression of cash/cheques, fraudulent transfer and withdrawals, outright theft and loss of money to armed robbers.

Conceptual Framework
Growth of Bank Frauds
Table 1 below shows the status and number of banks staff involved in frauds and forgeries for the past five years. For instance, a total of 331 staff of banks were reported to be involved in frauds and forgeries in 2016, a decrease of 14.19% when compared with the previous year's figure of 378. Of the total, core operations of staff such as supervisors, officers, accountants, managers, executive assistants, clerks and cashiers totaled 258, thus accounting for about 77.93 %, a decrease of 13.85% points relative to the 2005 level. By implication, there was a drop in terms of the absolute number of staff that perpetrated fraud in 2016, as well as, the core bank staff that engaged in fraudulent activities during the year when compared with those of 2015. Table 2 shows banks response to NDIC fidelity insurance cover of special mention is the total number of fraud cases reported which has been on the increase.

Table 1: Bank's Staff Involved in Frauds and Forgeries (Extract)

Rank	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Supervisors And Managers	16	18.80	25	23.58	157	40.99	169	44.70	118	35.64
Officers Accountant and Executive Assistance	48	56.50	41	38.68	129	33.68	124	32.80	90	27.19
Clerks and Cashiers	13	15.30	25	23.58	61	15.93	54	14.28	50	15.10
Typists, Technicians and Stenographers	-	-	-	-	18	4.70	16	4.23	16	4.83
Messengers, Drivers, Cleaners, Security, Guards and Stewards	4	4.70	7	6.60	15	3.92	12	3.17	7	2.11
Temporary Staff	4	4.70	8	7.55	3	0.78	3	0.79	50	15.10
Uncategorised Staff	-	4.70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	85	100	106	100	383	100	378	100	331	100

Source: NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (Various issues)

Table 2: Banks Response to NDIC Fidelity Insurance Covers (Extract)

Year	Total No of Fraud Cases	Total Amount Involved (N'000)	Actual Expected Loss (N'000)	Proportion of Total Expected Loss to Amount Involved (%)	No of Insured Banks with Adequate Cover. (C/M)
2004	170	3399.39	950.65	27.97	25
2005	147	1,011.36	229.13	22.66	23
2006	606	1,600.68	375.243	23.44	18
2007	487	3777.89	227.44	6.02	15
2008	573	3197.91	692.25	21.66	15
2009	195	73944.28	2730.06	36.87	15
2010	403	2851.11	1094.55	37.9	16
2011	943	11,243.94	906.3	8.06	18
2012	796	12,919.55	1,299.69	10.06	18
2013	850	9,838	854.46	9.13	18
2014	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2015	1,229	10,606.18	5,602.05	39.17	20
2016	1,193	4,832.17	2,768.67	57.29	20

Source: NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts

Types of Fraud

1. Forged/stolen cheques
2. Presentation of cleared cheques
3. Clearing frauds
4. Fraudulent withdrawals

5. Suppression of customers' cash deposits
6. Lodgments of stolen dividend warrants
7. Credit Card frauds
8. Computer frauds
9. Operation fraud
10. Foreign Exchange frauds
11. Unauthorized overdraft
12. Inflation of invoices
13. Forgery of official documents
14. Misrepresentation of facts
15. Unofficial borrowing/I.O.U
16. Failure to comply with laid down procedures
17. Fictitious/Ghost borrowing
18. Deliberate premature draw-down procedures
19. Overvaluation of collateral
20. Lending against uncleared effects

Causes and Prevention of Frauds
Some of the causes and prevention of fraud are discussed below:
1. **Lack of Experienced and Adequate Personnel:** In view of rapid expansion in the banking industry in the mid '80's, provision was not made to train bankers to fill the missing gaps. This led to the dilution of standards and professionalism was thrown to the wind. Honesty and integrity, which are the hallmark of banking, took a secondary position. This is reflected in the lack of competent hands among the management cadres of liquidated and distress bank. The CBN and the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria should assist to bridge the gap by assisting to train the required personnel for the banking industry.
2. **Internal Audit and Control:** There is absence of internal auditing procedures to ensure compliance with standards. This has contributed to bank loses as a result of inefficiencies, inaccuracies, irregularities and willful manipulations (Ikpefan, 2003). There is the need to ensure that there exists an independent and competent internal audit or inspection unit. Systems of control must be put in place to safeguard assets, accuracy and reliability of the records. The need for an independent and competent internal audit or inspection unit becomes

very relevant (Olokoyo, Isibor, Okoye, Evbuomwan, Adegboye, and Agbogun (2020).

3. **Inadequate Book Keeping/Accounting Procedure:** Improper bookkeeping record gives rise to an unhealthy meddlesomeness. This has led some accountant and auditors comprising 'doctoring' or window dressing financial statements to present a rather distorting or misleading state of affairs of enterprises being serviced by colluding with bank management. There should be strong accounting controls and security measures, which are subject to periodic re-assessment for the continued good health of the organization. The supervisory control arm of the CBN should be strengthened to check inconsistent accounting policies and practices in banks (Okoye, Evbuomwan, Achugamonu and Isibor (2016). This would in the long run pave way for comparison of bank performance.

4. **Poor Credit Administration:** This is the bane of many Nigerian banks. Many loans granted are not properly appraised. And this has resulted in an increase in volume of non-performing assets or bad debts putting many banks in precarious financial situations. Cases abound of unauthorized lending and lending to ghost borrowers. The Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree No. 18 1994 should be encouraged and strengthened while the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) should operate as an independent unit of the government to enable it deal with cases of Advance Fee Fraud '419" whose transaction sometimes pass-through bank (Onyeagocha, S.U.O (2012).

5. **Inadequate Job Rotation/ Segregation of Duties:** Where a staff stays too long on one schedule, it provides an opportunity to commit and cover frauds. Also, where schedules meant for different individuals are cumulated in one person, it gives an opportunity to also commit fraud. Bank management should avoid an individual with too much jobs by employing individuals to fill the gap.

6. **Ineffective Bank Management:** Some of the top management staff lacks knowledge of principles and practice of management such as planning, control, directing, coordination and supervision. Thus, they exhibit poor judgment and promote fraudulent behavior. Bank management requires training, retraining and re-orientation on values.

7. **Poor Knowledge of the Job:** Some bank employees exhibit lack of knowledge of their duties and responsibilities and therefore easily fall prey to fraudsters. There is need for training and retraining of employees.

8. **Clearing Fraud:** All parties in the clearing system such as drawer, presenting/collecting bank, paying/drawee bank must comply to clearing guidelines. Clearing fraud is an unlawful conferment of financial or monetary benefit upon any person through the clearing system to which that person otherwise would not be entitled. These include presentation of spurious instruments on other banks that is fake or forged cheque; drawing instruments on unfounded accounts by a bank and/ or with the connivance of customers of the banks; issuance of bank drafts, manager cheque and bankers' payments to other banks. When there are insufficient funds in the bank account to accommodate the instrument; and wrong presentation of instruments of high value on other banks with fraudulent intent. To minimize the incidence of clearing fraud, there should be an enabling environment for employees to work. This implies clean environment, centralize waste disposal, good equipments such as good photocopies, air conditioners in good working order and adequate, employment of high caliber staff/officials assigned clearing duties with good track records, motivation of staff to avoid temptation, accountability of lines of authority must be clear and supervision and control are very essential in a clearing environment.

9. **Society Expectation:** The unquestioning attitude towards who are involve in frauds/sudden wealth especially from bank staff that eagerly yearn to meet rising society expectation. There is the need by the larger society to change their value system by questioning source of all wealth. This measure would require government support.

10. **Delay Justice:** The lack of adequate capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute reported cases of fraud by the law enforcement agents. The judiciary is often slow in dispensing cases of fraud and the non-disclosure of frauds and lack of cooperation from the affected institutions because of the adverse publicity it brings to them encouraged bank employees to engage in frauds.

11. **Other Miscellaneous Issues:** The list of frauds and forgeries in the banking industry is by no means exhaustive in this paper. However, it

is pertinent to mention that bank staff need to comply with operational guidelines, code of conduct, while management need to be security conscious to protect their assets. Banks must render statements Account to their customers in order to resolve differences that are fraud suspect. Special Squad at the state and federal intelligence division of the Nigerian police should be trained and retrained to deal with cases of fraud. Staff dismissed in banks on account of fraud should be circularized to other banks to prevent re-employment. All bankers irrespective of their status should be registered with the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria so that the institute can watch over their activities and can summon anyone to the disciplinary committee on account of fraud.

Recommended Fraud Prevention Measures

The fraud prevention measures can itemize as follows:
1. Management Supervision
2. Regular Balancing of accounts
3. Allocation of staff duties ensuring checks and balances in operation
4. Internal Audit (Periodic Inspection)
5. Dual control over assets and other Security documents
6. Regular rotation of jobs/staff
7. Manual of instruction
8. A sound employment policy
9. Proper training of bank staff
10. The checking of cashiers
11. Internal disciplinary action
12. Lending limits
13. Prosecution of fraudsters by law enforcement agents
14. Preparation of monthly returns to Head Office
15. Societal re-orientation/moral re-awakening
16. Positive reward for blowing the whistle on potential fraudsters
17. Regular/up-to-date training and retraining of all staffs
18. Trusting facts rather than trusting colleagues
19. Appropriate reward system

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Community Policing and Crime Prevention: The Kanifing Municipality of the Gambia Experience

17

CHAPTER

[1]Bakary Dibba & [2]Ayo Adesopo

[1]Department of Management Sciences,
School of Business and Public Administration,
University of The Gambia, Gambia
[2]Department of Public Administration,
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

Abstract

This study identified the Community Policing (CP) strategies being used in Kanifing Municipality of The Gambia and assessed their effectiveness in the Municipality. Furthermore, it investigated the main challenges facing Community Policing in preventing crime. Both primary and secondary data were used for this study. Primary data were collected using questionnaire, in-depth interview and Participant Observation. The Gambia Police Force, Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and Child Protection Alliance (CPA) were the target institutions for the study. The whole members of staff (12) of CPA, all Alkalolus (16), fifty-seven (57) members of WDC, and twenty percent of GPF (146) in the area were sampled for the study. Questionnaire was administered on GPF, WDCs and CPA while interviews were conducted with the Alkalolu and DPOs in the area. Two hundred

and fifteen (215) copies of questionnaire were administered and 189 copies were retrieved. The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods such as frequency distribution and percentages. The results of the study showed that majority of the respondents affirmed that the highlighted strategies are frequently and most frequently used in the study area. Secondly, majority of the respondents also affirmed that CP was effective in crime prevention to some extent. Lastly, majority of the respondents affirmed the highlighted challenges as impeding the effectiveness of the CP. The study concluded that CP has been effective to some extent in the area with some attendant challenges impeding its effectiveness.

Keywords: *Bank fraud, Internal control, Causes of bank fraud, Prevention of bank fraud*

Background Information

The Gambia is the smallest country on the African mainland with the population of 1.9 million inhabitants with average annual growth rate of 3.2 per cent (GBoS, 2015). It is surrounded by Senegal, except for a 60 km Atlantic Ocean front (Hughes and Perfect, 2008). Although small in size, The Gambia harbors a wealth of terrestrial, coastal, marine and wetland habitats and species of local, national, regional and global significance, making Gambia an attractive tourist destination and a hub for trade in the region. Security is no doubt basic and fundamental to the existence of mankind. It is also an essential component of developmental process as various studies have established a link between urbanization and increased crime rate and social disorder (Fabiyi, 2006; Bamidele, 2017). This has been traced to continuous influx of people, especially the youth, to urban centres either in search of greener pastures or access to basic social amenities for good living, among others. The influx has put pressure on both the welfare facilities and social services, including policing, and which has caught the Police institution napping and defensive as reflected in its inability to reduce crimes and criminality to a tolerable limit in most countries of the world, The Gambia inclusive. The Gambia inherited most of its governing institutions from the British, including the Police institution. Till date, the Police institution operates the same modified version of the British system. The Gambia Police Force (GPF), as it is

called, is a centralized organization headed by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and which headquarters is in the capital city of Banjul. It is a major agent which responsibility is to ensure social order and enforcement of law in The Gambia as defined and empowered by the Police Force Act 1953 (Cap 18:01) and backed by section 178 of the Constitution. The Act is one of the most significant laws governing the GPF, including the several aspects of its administrative control. The Act is clear on the functions of the police organization which are mainly to detect and prevent crime and criminality, to apprehend and prosecute offenders, and to maintain public order and the safety of persons and properties. There also exists the National Police Council (NPC) that is saddled with the responsibility of advising the President on policy matters relating to policing and this is also in accordance with the 1997 Constitution. The Chief of Police officers is the IGP and assisted by the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police and the occupiers of the two offices are appointees of the President such appointments are made in consultation with the NPC.

For effective policing, the GPF is divided into nine police administrative boroughs strategically located in and coincide with the administrative headquarters of the various local government area councils: Banjul police HQ, Serekunda (now called Kanifing Municipality, being the biggest city in the country), Brikama, Mansakonko, Janjanburay, Basse, Kuntaur, Kerewan, and Kanifing Police Intervention Unit (PIU), which is a paramilitary armed unit of the Force. It has been difficult for the Force to achieve its goals and objectives due to a number of factors ranging from lack of logistic, poor condition of service, poor road infrastructure, weak and non-vigilant informants, poor access to information, weak cultural and religious ties, disloyal officers, urbanization resulting from high rural-urban migration, increasing number of liquor houses and joints, population explosion, to lack of collaborative effort among government, community and the police and a host of others as found out in earlier studies. The idea of Community Policing (CP) was conceived to improve the performance of the Police. Community policing as a new concept of modern policing and is relatively new to the Gambia Police but a highly acclaimed idea. It was however understood to be an administrative arrangement that embraces police-community network in crime fighting with a view to allaying the poor response to crime-related problems that encompasses array of activities. This is with the realization of the fact that

oftentimes, the crime-fighting is beyond the scope of Police institution to independently handle (Kapperler and Gainer, 2005; Braga and Weisburd, 2010; Skogan, 2008). By this, some certain police functions are informally devolved to the communities and is perhaps the best example of what can be understood in the Gambian context as CP in practice. This was officially launched on the 3rd September, 2005 and came into full operation 1st January, 2006 with a pilot project in Banjul, Farafenni and Basse. It was however first tested under a project named Community-Based Policing and Restorative Justice in The Gambia through a grant provided by Canadian International Development Agency. This has marked a new direction for policing having spread throughout The Gambia and it has since that 2006 grown rapidly as an alternative policing strategy in the fight against crime that relied on collaboration between the police and community at an informal level. The reasons been that most of the crimes committed are local and as a result community involvement seems to be critical in reducing the act of committing such crimes. Concerns have been raised about the poor implementation of community policing initiatives especially the strategies designed for it, the inconsistences in the implementation, and community-police relationship that is often suspicious, among others, as manifested in Kanifing Municipality under study. The need then arises to research into the strategies being used, how effective the strategies have been and the challenges hindering their effectiveness.

Conceptual Review
Community Policing
CP has been defined in various senses as common to other societal issues. The predominant of these is the definition of CP from the point of view of partnership and meeting with the public, sensitivity to community security expectations, joint remedial approach to identify the best means of achieving security that meets these yearnings, and deployment of community members to actualizing it (Okeshola and Mudiare, 2013; Graboaky, 2009; Bayley, 2006). In the words of Friedmann (1992), CP is a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime-causing condition. By this, CP involves the collaboration and participation of the targeted stakeholders in the security of the society in order

to find an enduring remedy to the security problems. The origin of the idea of CP is often traced back to the United States of America which grew as a fallout of an overall failure of the Police to fight crime, maintain order and deliver a service to the people and which Carter (2000) described as a reaction to the perception that in policing, nothing works. It has been further described as Sir Robert Peel's seventh principle of policing, which is mainly to work assiduously to fulfil the long-standing tradition that the police and the public are interchangeable, that is 'the police are the public and that the public are the police'. In other words, the police are primarily members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen, in the interests of community welfare and existence (Wong, 2008).

According to Barlow and Barlow (1999), there are two conventional approaches to defining CP; as a philosophy, or as a strategy. The philosophical approach describes CP as 'a new philosophy, which is all about the establishment of partnership between the people and the police in addressing contemporary challenges to security, such as social and physical disorder, crime and fear towards achieving quality of life (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1998) (cited in Yero, *et al*, 2012). As a strategy, CP is said to be associated with police-public relations, team policing, foot-patrol and crime prevention. This approach is employed basically to enhance human relations; enable a community-sensitive and user-friendly police service; consult on the needs of the communities and issues that affect them most; respect for human rights, cultural sensitivity and tolerance; continuous positive contact with community members; discretion on the part of police officers when they enforce the law; and the establishment of mechanisms to enhance the accountability and transparency of the police (Cordner, 2005). According to Casey (2010), both the philosophy of policing and an operational strategy are predicated on the basic notion that policing should have a closer connection with the public it serves as the militarized model of policing is increasingly becoming old-fashioned.

From the forgoing, it is clear that there are two common external elements of CP and these are public involvement and community partnership; and partnership with government and other agencies. The first element emphasises the co-operation among the police and the other members of the community including individual citizens, groups, business associations,

legislative bodies or other local agencies, civil society organisations and community development offices. These institutions must all be involved in identifying and solving all sorts of community problems (Lab , 2004). The second element is about the importance of the partnership between the police and government and other agencies in responding to and addressing crime and social disorder issues in CP. That is, in order to succeed, the police must establish partnerships with other government departments, citizens, community leaders, business owners, schools, non-Government organizations, other service providers and other criminal justice agencies. They must all be considered equal partners working together in order to improve the quality of life in the community (SADSS, 1998).

Friedmann (1992) succinctly gives a vivid description of CP in 10 points stating as follows: CP is both a philosophy and strategy; it requires implementation by all police personnel; it requires a new type of police officers; the community policing officers (CPO); the CPO should work with volunteers; it brings a different and closer kind of relationship between the Police and members of the public; it adds a proactive (prevention of crime) dimension to police work; it is targeted towards protecting the most vulnerable segment in the society; it seeks to balance human skills with technological innovations; it must be implemented and integrated force-wide; and it emphasizes decentralization. The rationale most often cited for embracing a community policing approach is its operational effectiveness and particularly its implementation that is known to have supported the growth of community trust in policing and the legitimacy of police as a body, local-level accountability, reduction not only in crime itself but also the fear of crime, and improved citizens' perception of their security and safety. In the same vein, according to Hillier (2008), most Sociologists see community participation in policing as a solution to crime and other deviant behaviors as the community members become active defenders of their space against crime. By this, community participation is seen as an essential component of all prevention efforts as the relationship that is built between the police and citizen helps in their collaboration to successfully prevent or at least reduce crime rate to the barest minimum. Whisenand and Ferquson (2002) summarized the benefits to include reduction in crime rates, a better flow of information between the police and community; and better implementation of crime prevention and crime control activities because both parties are working together towards a

shared goal. Mayhill (2007) highlighted four of such benefits that it improves police-community relationships and community perception of police; it changes police officers' attitudes, motivation and behaviour as the positive relationship and cooperation leads to great job satisfaction for police officers and by extension increases their sacrifice to curb crime; it increases community capability to deal with issues as participants are empowered such that they develop positive attitude towards resolving community-related issues themselves; and it increases community perception towards safety and reduces fear of crime. Other benefits can be seen in the fact that CP engages all stakeholders to enable them take ownership of the initiative as means of fighting against crime and criminal activities, create an avenue for timely reporting of such cases in the neighbourhood.

Crime and Crime Prevention
The word crime has been defined in different senses. However, it simply means an act committed in violation of some sections of the law of the State. By this, the offender is liable to punishment under the relevant law immediately such an act is specifically declared as a crime by the State. In the words of Adler, *et al* (1994), it as any conduct by human beings which violates a criminal law and therefore leads to punishment. In the same vein, Siegel (2005) defined it as a violation of societal rules of behaviors as interpreted and expressed by a criminal legal code created by people holding social and political powers.

Crime prevention generally means preventing and reducing the rate of criminal activity to reduce the damage caused by such an act. It is said to have included those activities that deter/prevent or reduce the occurrence of criminal activity. Hughes (1998) described crime prevention as entailing any actions designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime. In the same vein, UN (2002) defined it as comprising strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including the fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes. In essence, crime prevention entails any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime (Lab, 2004). In the international fora, the term crime prevention has also been used in different contexts such as safety and security, crime reduction and community safety. The term community safety is used to refer to the broader range of issues that must be tackled to promote safer cities

or communities, and with outcomes that bring benefits beyond an absence of crime as highlighted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. In ensuring crime prevention and community safety, however, active participation of local residents and organization in those communities and neighborhoods is said to be critical, especially in identification of local priorities.

Crime prevention can take different forms and UN (2010) identified four of such. These are:

(i) **Crime Prevention through Social Development:** The emphasis here is on the children and youth and it takes the form of social, educational, health and (vocational) training programmes being implemented to target at-risk children or families when the children are very young, to provide them with supports and child-rearing skills. These programmes assist in developing resilience and social skills among children and their families (UN, 2010).

(ii) **Community or locally-based crime prevention:** The emphasis goes beyond individuals but rather areas where the risks of becoming involved in crime or being victimized are high. That is, areas with high level of deprivation, both in terms of infrastructure, services and wealth, or lack of community cohesion. Examples include slums and informal settlements, or inner-city or suburban housing projects, often areas with a concentration of economic and social problems. Programmes are designed and implemented to increase the sense of safety and security for the residents of particular communities, to respond to community concerns and crime problems affecting the population and to increase the services and social capitals or cohesion in the community (ibid).

(iii) **Situational crime prevention:** This covers approaches that aim to reduce the opportunities for people to commit crimes, to increase the risks and costs of being caught and to minimize the benefits. The major example cited is the design of public spaces or housing to make it more difficult for people to break into. This may include the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) to protect car parks, increase the surveillance of the public spaces, etc.

(iv) **Reintegration Programmes:** Crime prevention through reintegration involves the design and implementation of programmes that work

with children, young people or adults already involved in the criminal justice system, including those in custody and returning to the community. This can be by providing them with life and job skills, training, education, alternative life styles and role models, good supports and housing in the community (UN, 2010).

Theoretical Framework: The Social Bond Theory
This study is anchored on social bond theory. Social bond theory was originally propounded by Travis Hirschi. According to Hirschi (1969), "we are moral beings to the extent we are social beings." The social bond essentially refers to the connection between the individual and society. This theory is rooted and derived from the General Theory of Crime. The basic difference between the General Theory of Crime and Hirschi's Social Bond Theory is the focus on peers and peer groups of individuals. Social Bond Theory has long been widely accepted among many sociologists for a variety of reasons. Hirschi (1969) bases his theory on the means that social bonds do exist and when a bond is weakened or broken then unusual behaviour for that individual may occur. That is, deviance occurs when the social bond is weak or lacking. According to Akers (1997), social bond theory is one of the dominant perspectives on deviant behaviour and is probably the most frequently tested and discussed of all of the sociological theories of deviance. The emphasis is primarily on mechanisms of informal social control, that is, the bonds that control individual's societal behavior, which are mainly social conventions rather than formally adopted laws.

The theory has been gaining popularity for years. It evolved from many previous contributions. The ability to deviate from the normative behaviour is considered universal by control theory. Most people do not indulge in deviant behaviour because of their bond to society. The social bond was conceptualized by Hirschi through the following four elements:
  i. Attachment of the individual to others (caring about others, their opinion and expectation),
  ii. Commitment to conventional line of action (the rational component including risk, energy and self-investment in conventional behaviour),
  iii. Involvement (time engrossed in conventional activities), and belief in legitimate order (attribution of moral validity to social norms).

The first element of the social bond is "attachment", which refers to the individual's sensitivity to other people's opinions and Agnew and Petersen (1989) described itas "the amount of affection and respect that the individual has for others such as parents and teachers." Individuals are unlikely to participate in delinquent behaviour if sensitive to the feelings and norms of role models (Thornberry, *et al*, 1991). An individual who lacks attachment is free to commit deviant behaviour because he or she feels no remorse at acting contrary to other people's wishes. As Hirschi (1969) explained, "to lack attachment to others is to be free from moral restraints is to use lack of attachment to explain the guiltlessness of the psychopath, the fact that he apparently has no conscience or superego." Attachment to peers, however, can be problematic. A strong attachment to delinquent peers seems to increase the likelihood of engagement in delinquent behaviours (Wright and Clluen, 2000).

The element of commitment can be defined as the individual's investment or stakes in conventional society. It refers to the commodities that a person spends time and energy in acquiring and that he or she will likely lose by engaging in delinquent behaviour, such as an education, employment, or a good reputation. Commitment includes material goals or possessions that could be lost if the person engages in delinquent behaviour (Krohn and Massey, 1980). Commitment involves rational thought (Hirschi, 1969). The person must calculate the value of his or her conventional stakes in society and the risk of losing them before committing delinquent behaviour. The individual may be mistaken in his or her estimation of the risk of getting caught and punished. The individual may also be unaware of factors that would increase his or her chances of getting caught. Therefore, engaging in delinquent behaviours may result from a lack of commitment or a mistake in calculation.

Involvement is the third element which Hirschi (1969) described as the most obviously relevant to delinquent behaviour. According to social bond theory, individuals who spend their time in conventional pursuits simply do not have enough time available to engage in deviant behaviour. This element is said to be relating to the adage "idle hands are the devil's workshop." The last element pertains to the extent to which the person feels that he or she should obey society's rules. It is "the individual's commitment to the central value

system of the society" (Agnew and Petersen, 1989). Belief assumes that there is a common value system and according to Krohn and Massey (1980), individuals who do not possess a strong belief in the conventional value system are more likely to engage in delinquent behaviour. The relevance of the theory to the study of community policing and crime prevention is enormous. Basically, community policing is geared towards helping the community to be fully participatory in crime prevention within the neighborhood leading to crime reduction in the Municipality. The idea of Hirschi's theory of social bond is applicable in the implementation of community policing and crime prevention considering the elements of care about others, their opinion and expectation, investment in conventional society, involvement in conventional pursuit, and belief in the conventional value system. Hirschi believed that if the social bond is not nurtured among the people, what follows is the individual deviant behaviour and /or violation of the law which affects the society in general.

Methodology
Area of Study
Kanifing Municipality Council came into been through an Act of Parliament under the Local Government Act 1991. The council is headed by a Lord Mayor through universal adult suffrage. The Municipality is currently divided into five Constituencies each headed by a National Assembly Member (NAM). For local governance purposes, the Municipality is divided into nineteen Wards, each headed by an elected Ward Councilor and sixteen Alkalolus respectively. Kanifing Municipality, covering a land area of 75.5Km square, is located between the Island of Kombo St Mary on which Banjul, the capital city, is located and West Coast Region, the nearest Local Government Administrative area, stretching for a distance of a little over 15 Km. The Municipality is bounded on the east by a long stretch of uninterrupted mangrove swamps, which extends into the West Coast Region. According to the 2016 National Population and Housing Census Provisional Report, Kanifing Municipality has a total population of 383,517 and a Population and Housing Census of 69,890 respectively. Based on the information gathered during a pre-field visit, crime rate in Kanifing Region for 2019 stands at 1,668 ranging from house breaking and stealing, stealing from a person, rape, murder etc. Reason for this could be based on rural-urban migration, population density, lack of parental care especially school age children among others.

The research will be centered on community policing and crime prevention in the Kanifing Municipality. The target bodies are The Gambia Police Force, Ward Development Committees (WDCs) in Kanifing Municipality and Child Protection Alliance (CPA) to represent the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the area.

Population of the Study

The population of study comprise all categories of the Police Officers in the four (4) police division and headquarters in the Kanifing Municipality; total number of the executive members each of the nineteen (19) Ward Development Committees (WDCs); members of Child Protection Alliance (CPA) (a major example of Civil Society Organisation); and Alkalouls within the Municipality. They were targeted due to their critical positions and roles in community policing in the area. Based on the information gathered during a pre-field visit, the total population of the study was 927 and the breakdown is as presented in table 1 below.

Table 1: Table showing population distribution of respondents

S/N	Target Organisation/Group	Population
1.	Gambia Police Force (Kanifing Municipality)	728
2.	Nineteen (19) WDCs (9 Executive committee members only)	171
3.	Child Protection Alliance (CPA)	12
4.	Alkalolu in Kanifing Municipality	16
	Total	927

Table 2: Table showing study population and sample size

S/N	Organisation/ Group	Population	Sample Size
	Gambia Police Force (Kanifing Municipality)	(728)	(146)
	i. Kairaba Division	173	35
	ii. Serekunda	254	51
	iii. Bundung	196	39
	iv. Tallinding	82	16
	v. Headquarters (Officers)	23	05
	Ward Development Committees (19)	57	57
	Child Protection Alliance	12	12
	Alkalolus in Kanifing Municipality	16	16
	TOTAL	927	231

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Types and Sources of Data Collection

Both primary and secondary data were used for the study. Primary data were collected using three (3) instruments. These are questionnaire, in-depth interview and participant observation. The questionnaire comprised both close and open-ended questions so as to enable the respondents express their opinions on issues bothering community policing. Administration of questionnaire was done with the assistance of research assistants. The administration of questionnaire to GPF was based on accidental sampling technique whereby the number of GPF who were conveniently or readily available to provide the required information were targeted until the expected number/sample size was covered. The sample size for the GPF was 146. In addition, a total of 57 and 12 copies of the questionnaire were also administered to WDCs and CPA respectively, all totaling 215 copies. To complement the data collected through questionnaire' in-depth interviews were conducted to collect qualitative data. These were conducted on the Divisional Police Officers (DPOs), the Regional Commissioner of Police (RCP), Unit heads of Police in the area, and Community leaders represented by the Alkalolus (16 in number). The third instrument used for collecting primary data was participant observation which involved taking active part in and observing the activities of the police unit working with the other stakeholders in community policing. This instrument gave the lead author the opportunity to observe and monitor the activities as many times as possible and immediate records of observations taken to be able to have great accuracy and validity in description and interpretation of behavioural data. Data were also collected from secondary sources such as text books, academic journals, internet materials, unpublished research theses, police/government publications and so on.

Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussions

This section focuses on the presentation of the results and the discussion of the findings of the study.

Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Questionnaire Administration and Retrieval Rate

Table 3 shows the copies of questionnaire that were administered and the retrieval rate. A total of 215 copies of questionnaire were administered to GPF, WDC, and CPA to gather the necessary data for the study. There was a

positive response rate of 128 (representing 87.7 percent) from GPF, 51 (representing 89.5 percent) from WDCs and 10 (representing 83.3 percent) from CPA. The respondents were given a maximum of 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire and in-depth interviews were also conducted with the aim of achieving high response rate.

Table 3: Table showing questionnaire administration and retrieval rate

Institutions	Total Respondents	No of Questionnaires distributed	No of Questionnaires Retrieved	Response rate
GPF	146	146	128	87.7 %
WDC	57	57	51	89.5 %
CPA	12	12	10	83.3 %
Total	**215**	**215**	**189**	**87.9%**

Source: Field work (2020)

Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Group
Table 4 shows frequency distribution of respondents by group. A total of 67.7 percent of the respondents were GPF, 27.0 percent of the respondents were WDC, and 5.3 percent of the respondents were CPA. This reflects the pattern of the sample sizes of the groups.

Table 4: Table showing frequency distribution of respondents by group

Group	Frequency	Percentage
GPF	128	67.7
WDC	51	27.0
CPA	10	5.3
Total	**189**	**100.0**

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Occupation
Table 5 shows frequency distribution of respondents by occupation. A total of 87.3 percent of the respondents were public servants, 3.2 percent were Businessmen, and 9.5 percent of them came under other occupations.

Table 5: Table showing frequency distribution of respondents by Occupations

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Public Servant	165	87.3
Businessman	6	3.2
Others	18	9.5
Total	**189**	**100.0**

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Gender

The study found that majority (78.3%) of the respondents as shown in table6 were male whereas 21.7 percent of the respondents were female. This is an indication that both genders were involved in this study and thus the finding of the study did not suffer from gender inequality.

Table 6: Table showing frequency distribution of respondents by gender

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	148	78.3
Female	41	21.7
Total	**189**	**100.0**

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Age

Regarding age of the respondents, Table 7 shows that 20.1 percent of the respondents who participated in the study were in the age group of 15-30 years, 78.8 percent were in the age group of 31-55 years, and 0.5 percent were in the age group of 56-70. One (1) of the respondents failed to respond.

Table 7: Tale showing frequency distribution of respondents by Age

Age	Frequency	Percentage
15-30	38	20.1
31-55	149	78.8
56-70	1	0.5
No response	1	0.5
Total	**189**	**100.0**

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status
It is shown in Table 8 that73.0 percent of the respondents were married, 23.8 percent were single, and 2.1 percent were divorced. Two (2) of the respondents failed to respond.

Table 8: Table showing frequency distribution of respondents by marital status

Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage
Married	138	73.0
Single	45	23.8
Divorce	4	2.1
No response	2	1.1
Total	**189**	**100.0**

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Frequency Distribution of Respondent by Educational Qualification
Table 9 shows that 34.4 percent of the respondents held Diploma / HND, 14.8 percent of respondents held BSc / BA, 50.8 percent of the respondents held Others Certificate. This analysis in shows that the respondents are educated and that their level of education ranges for Diploma/ HND, BSc / BA, and others (WASSCE or Secondary Four).

Table 9: Table showing frequency distribution of respondents by educational qualification

Qualification	Frequency	Percentage
Diploma / HND	65	34.4
BSc / BA	28	14.8
Others	96	50.8
Total	189	100.0

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Data Presentation
Community Policing Strategies
The study shows the data from the field in identifying the Community Policing strategies being used in the Municipality. As presented in Table 10,

the study shows that 136 respondents (71.9%) affirmed that creation of team of officers to carry out community policing in designated neighbourhood is most frequently and frequently used, while 42 respondents (22.2%) were not sure and 11 respondents (5.8%) said it is rarely and never used. On the use of strategy involving partnership with the local residents and organisations in the community in order to combat crime, 120 respondents (63.5%) affirmed that it is the most frequently and frequently used, while 31 respondents (16.4%) not sure and 38 respondents (20.1%) believed it is rarely and never used. With respect to the involvement of stakeholders in crime prevention, a total number of 120 respondents (63.5%) affirmed that it is most frequently and frequently used, while 41 respondents (21.7%) not sure, whereas 28 respondents (14.8%) said it is rarely and never used. Respondents were also asked question on use of voluntary participation and unidentified informant from the society to overcome criminal activities. Majority (115) of the respondents (60.9%) affirmed that it is most frequently and frequently used, while 42 respondents (22.2%) not sure and 32 respondents (16.9%) believed it is rarely and never used.

The study also shows that 118 respondents (62.4%) believed weekly plan of activity designed to reduce crime in the neighbourhood is most frequently and frequently used, while 30 respondents (15.9%) not sure and 38 respondents (20.1%) said it is rarely and never used. As per foot or bicycle patrol within the neighbourhood to reduce crime, majority (132) of the respondents (69.8%) believed it is most frequently and frequently used, whereas 23 respondents (12. 2%) not sure and 34 respondents (18%) said it is rarely and never used.

Equal distribution of meagre resources within the Municipality as a strategy to counter criminal activity, 81 respondents (42.8%) expressed it as most frequently and frequently used, while 56 respondents (29.6%) not sure and 51 respondents (27%) said it is rarely and never used. The research shows that 95 respondents (50.2%) identified with the use of community-relations training for police officers as something that is most frequently and frequently used, whereas 50 respondents (26.5%) not sure and 44 respondents (23.3%) were of the opinion that it is rarely and never used. As per the use of resident contact increase positive police-citizen contacts, 95 respondents (50.3 %) affirmed it is most frequently and frequently used, while 49 respondents (25.9%) not sure and 45 respondents (23.8%) said it is rarely and never used. Example of such

contacts include door-to-door survey, on the street and recreation programmes. Neighbourhood organisation meetings as one of the strategies, 87 respondents (46%) believed it is most frequently and frequently used, while 37 respondents (19.2%) not sure and 65 respondents (34.4%) said it is rarely and never used.

The study shows that 101 respondents (53.5%) affirmed that crime prevention education is most frequently and frequently used, whereas 38 respondents (20.1%) not sure and 50 respondents (26.5%) believed it is rarely and never used. Findings show that 86 respondents (45.5%) said that household security inspections were most frequently and frequently used, while 55 respondents (29.1%) not sure and 48 respondents (25.3%) said it is rarely and never used. The total number of 122 respondents (64.6%) also affirmed that enforcement-oriented interventions were most frequently and frequently used, while 18 respondents (9.5%) not sure and 49 respondents (26%) said it is rarely and never used. Table 10 shows the overall means score of the respondents on the intervening variables and indicated that 108.31 (representing 57.99 percent) affirmed that the highlighted CP strategies are most frequently and frequently, while 39.38 (representing 20.81 percent) not sure and 41 (representing 21.69 percent) believed they are rarely and never used in Kanifing Municipality.

Table 10: Table showing community policing strategies

S/N	Description	Most Frequently used (5)		Frequently used (4)		Not Sure (3)		Rarely used (2)		Never used (1)	
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
1.	Creating team of officers to carry out CP in designed neighbourhood.	46	24.3	90	47.6	42	22.2	10	5.3	1	0.5
2.	Partnership with local residents and organisations in the community in a bit to combat crime.	54	28.6	66	34.9	31	16.4	24	12.7	14	7.4
3.	Involvement of stakeholders in Kanifing Municipality in crime prevention.	41	21.7	79	41.8	41	21.7	24	12.7	4	2.1
4.	Voluntary participation and unidentified informant from the society to overcome criminal activities.	30	15.9	85	45	42	22.2	24	12.7	8	4.2
5.	Weekly plan of activity designed to reduce crime in the neighbourhood.	34	18	84	44.4	30	15.9	17	9	21	11.1
6.	Foot or bicycle patrol within the neighbourhood to reduce crime.	55	29.1	77	40.7	23	12.2	26	13.8	8	4.2
7.	Equal distribution of mega resources within the Municipality to counter criminal activity.	39	20.6	42	22.2	56	29.6	27	14.3	24	12.7
8.	Community-relations training for police officers.	22	11.6	73	38.6	50	26.5	38	20.1	6	3.2
9.	Resident contact Increased positive police-citizen contacts (one-on-one), eg. Door-to-door survey, on the street, recreation programmes.	38	20.1	57	30.2	49	25.9	22	11.6	23	12.2
10.	Neighbourhood organisation meetings	15	7.9	72	38.1	37	19.2	45	23.8	20	10.6
11.	Crime-prevention education for citizens	47	24.9	54	28,6	38	20.1	40	21.2	10	5.3
12.	Household security inspections	35	18.5	51	27	55	29.1	12	6.3	36	19
13.	Enforcement-oriented interventions (crack downs, hot spot patrol)	48	25.4	74	39.2	18	9.5	33	17.5	16	8.5
	MEAN SCORE	38.77	20.51	69.54	37.48	39.38	20.81	26.31	13.92	14.69	7.769

Source: Field work (2020)

Figure 1: Figure showing the community policing strategies

Source: Drawn from table 10

Effectiveness of Community Policing

Table 11 shows the respondents' views on the effectiveness of CP in Kanifing Municipality. Majority (137) of the respondents (72.5%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 19 respondents (10.1%) undecided and 33 respondents (17.4%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that CP reduces crime in the Municipality. According to the study, 160 respondents (84.6%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 23 respondents (12.2%) undecided and 6 respondents (3.1%) disagreed

and strongly disagreed that communities build confidence in working with the police. A total of 138 respondents (73%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 41 respondents (21.7%) undecided and 10 respondents (5.3%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that CP enhances participation of all in the neighbourhood. The study also reveals that 154 respondents (81.4%) strongly agreed and agreed, whereas 19 respondents (10.1%) undecided and 16 respondents (8.5%) disagreed that CP decreases citizens' fear of crime and improves the quality of life of the community. According to the study, 157 respondents (83.1%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 27 respondents (14.3%) undecided and 5 respondents (2.6%) disagreed that community policing enhances sharing of valid information from the community. A total number of 157 respondents (83%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 26 respondents (13.8%) undecided and 6 respondents (3.1%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that CP enhances long term commitments from everyone in the community. As the CP ability to create an atmosphere of reduction of crime despite the population of the municipality, 136 respondents (71.9%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 35 respondents (18.5%) undecided and 18 respondents (9.5%) disagreed with this assertion. In response to whether Community-police patrols are effective in prevention of crime in Kanifing Municipality, 150 respondents (79.3%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 30 respondents (15.9%) disagreed and 9 respondents (4.8%) did not respond.

Table 11 shows the overall means score of the responses to the intervening variables and indicated that 148.63(representing 78.6 percent) strongly agreed and agreed, while 51.48 (representing 45.84 percent) undecided and 77.93 (representing 69.62 percent) disagreed and strongly disagreed that Community Policing is effective in Kanifing Municipality to some extent.

Table 11: Table showing the effectiveness of community policing

S/N	Description	Strongly Agree (5)		Agree (4)		Undecided (3)		Disagree (2)		Strongly Disagree (1)	
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
1.	It reduces crime in the Municipality.	47	24.9	90	47.6	19	10.1	28	14.8	5	2.6
2.	Communities build confidence in working with the police.	73	38.6	87	46	23	12.2	5	2.6	1	0.5
3.	It enhance participation of all in neighbourhood	36	19	102	54	41	21.7	6	3.2	4	2.1
4.	It decreases citizens' fear of crime and improves the quality of life of the community.	63	33.3	91	48.1	19	10.1	16	8.5		
5.	It enhances shearing of valid information from the community.	79	41.8	78	41.3	27	14.3	5	2.6		
6.	It enhances long-term commitments from everyone in the community.	69	36.5	88	46.5	26	13.8	5	2.6	1	0.5
7.	It creates an atmosphere of reduction of crime despite the population of the municipality.	59	31.2	77	40.7	35	18.5	18	9.5		
8.	Community-police patrols are effective in prevention crime in Karifing Municipality	77	40.7	73	38.6			30	15.9		
	MEAN SCORE	62.88	33.25	85.75	45.35	51.48	45.84	41.14	36.79	36.79	32.83

Source: Field Work (2020)

Figure 2: Showing the effectiveness of community policing

Source: Drawn from table 11

Challenges Impeding the Effectiveness of Community Policing

Table 12 presents the respondents' views on the challenges impeding the effectiveness of community policing in The Gambia but with specific reference to Kanifing Municipality. The study shows that168 respondents (88.9 %) strongly agreed and agreed, 11 respondents (5.8 %) undecided and 10 respondents (5.2%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that lack of resources, including funding for structures and activities of CP affect its implementation. As per the lack of logistic and poor road network affecting the awareness campaign of CP in Kanifing, 156 respondents (82.6%) strongly agreed and agreed, 13 respondents (6.8%) undecided and 20 respondents (10.6%) disagreed and strongly disagreed. Findings reveal that majority (157)

of the respondents (83%) strongly agreed and agreed, 17 respondents (9.0%) undecided and 15 respondents (7.9%) disagreed with the fact that weak and non-vigilant informants affects information flow of criminal activities in the neighbourhood.

Also, majority (148) of the respondents (78.3%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 16 respondents (8.5%) undecided and 25 respondents (13.3%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with the fact that informants' fear of being attacked if they share information with the Police as a challenge. On the lack of collaborative effort among government and communities hindering CP approach, 143 respondents (75.7%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 18 respondents (9.5%) undecided and 28 respondents (14.8%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with this fact. The total number of 131 respondents (69.3%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 30 respondents (15.9%) undecided and 28 respondents (14.8%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that disloyalty of officers within the Police affects the operations of CP.

Majority (159) of the respondents (84.1%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 16 respondents (8.5%) undecided and 14 respondents (7.4%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that inadequate information about community policing within the Municipality affects its effectiveness. The study reveals that majority (150) of the respondents (79.3%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 21 respondents (11.1%) undecided, and 18 respondents (9.5%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that rural-urban migration that leads to increase in crime within the municipality was a challenge. The total number of 144 respondents (76.2%) strongly agreed and agreed, 32 respondents (16.9%) undecided and 13 respondents (6.9%) disagreed and strongly disagreed to the fact that civil society organisations are not fully incorporated in the implementation of CP and therefore a challenge. The research shows that 156 respondents (82.6%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 22 respondents (11.6%) undecided and 11 respondents (5.8%) disagreed and strongly disagreed that lack of human resources affects CP operations in Kanifing. On the public perception about police in general as a challenge, 165 respondents (87.3%) strongly agreed and agreed, while 12 respondents (6.3%) undecided and 12 respondents (6.3%) disagreed with the assertion. The study shows that 170 respondents (89.9 %) strongly agreed and agreed, while 15 respondents (9.4%) undecided and 4 respondents (2.1%) disagreed that absence of legal framework for CP was a

challenge. Finally, the study shows that the overall means score as shown in Table 12, shows that 129.79 (representing 81.44 percent) strongly agreed and agreed, while 56.79 (representing 30.42 percent) undecided and 72.92 (representing 46.3 percent)disagreed and strongly disagreed that these challenges were impeding the effectiveness of Community policing in Kanifing.

Table 12: Table showing challenges impeding the effectiveness of community policing

S/N	Description	Strongly Agree (5)	Agree (4)	Undecided (3)	Disagree (2)	Strongly Disagree (1)
		%	%	%	%	%
1.	Lack of resources, including funding for structures and activities of CP affect its implementation.	61.9	27.0	5.8	2.6	2.6
2.	Lack of logistic and poor road network affect the awareness campaign of CP in Kanifing.	42.9	39.7	6.8	10.6	
3.	Weak and non-vigilant informants affect information flow of criminal activities in the neighbourhood.	37	46	9	7.9	
4.	Informant developed fear of being attacked if they share information with the police.	48.7	29.6	8.5	8.5	4.8
5.	Lack of collaborative effort among government and communities' hinder CP approach.	42.9	32.8	9.5	11.1	3.7
6.	Disloyalty of officers within the police affects the operations of CP	33.3	36	15.9	9.5	5.3
7.	Inadequate information about community policing within the Municipality deter its progress.	41.3	42.8	8.5	5.3	2.1
8.	Rural-urban migration leads to increase in crime within the municipality.	48.1	31.2	11.1	7.4	2.1
9.	Civil society organisations are not fully incorporated in the implementation of CP	47.6	28.6	16.9	6.9	
10.	Lack of human resources affects CP operations in Kanifing.	50.3	32.3	11.6	2.1	3.7
11.	Public perception about police in general hinders CP.	37	50.3	6.3	6.3	
12.	Absence of legal framework for CP.	47.6	42.3	7.9	2.1	
	MEAN SCORE	44.88	36.56	30.42	24.49	21.81

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Figure 3: Figure showing the challenges impeding the effectiveness of community policing

Discussion of Findings

From the data presented, it is clear that the community policing was introduced to reduce or prevent crime in The Gambia. This is in line with Police Force Act 1953 (Cap 18:01) backed by section 178 of the Constitution. The Act is one of the most significant pieces of law governing the Gambia Police Force (GPF) which describes several aspects of its administrative control. Community policing as a new development in modern policing and relatively new to the Gambia Police Force but a highly acclaimed idea which benefits have not been fully tapped.

Whisenand and Ferquson (2002) affirmed in their study that community and police work together, based on the principles of community policing and the

benefits of such a partnership include reduction in crime rates; a better flow of information between the police and community; and better implementation of crime prevention and crime control activities because both parties are working together towards a shared goal.

On this issue, the interviewees in the two institutions stated that CP was introduced by the Gambia Police Force and as clearly stated by one of them:

> *CP was introduced by Canadian International Development Agency grant, in 2005 and became effective in 2006 under a project called Community-Based Policing and Restorative Justice in The Gambia. It was more effective than now.*

During the course of the study, it was established that there were factors influencing community policing in the Kanifing Municipality. These include to reduce crime and fear of crime; and increase community participation in combating crime and some others.

The findings revealed that lack of awareness of CP is one of the major factors hindering   community involvement and effective collaboration in reducing crime and this was traced to poor sensitization of the residents. To support this view, some of the interviewees recognized the fact that the achievement of the reduction in crime rate through CP has been at the low ebb because of the low level of education and awareness among the residents and as a result people have not seen security as something of general concern but rather an individual matter. The need for rigorous mass sensitization was suggested by some of the respondents interviewed. Some also further suggested adequate involvement of the Alkalolus. In the work of Lab (2004), it was made clear that community policing requires co-operation among the police and the members of the community including individual citizens, business associations, legislative bodies or other local agencies, civil society organisations and community development offices especially in identifying and solving all sorts of community problems. This finding corroborates the findings of some other scholars. For instance, Friedmann (1992) placed emphasis on the importance of community resources for a change in crime-causing condition that will assist in achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy.

The findings further revealed that the use of community policing approach in the Kanifing municipality was described as not encouraging and one of the respondents interviewed linked the situation to lack of effective collaboration between the Police and the stakeholders in the community and that it has been the reason why CP unit of the Police Force has not been active. For instance, findings revealed that the neighbourhood crime watch has not been clear to the members of the community, thus, their participation in sharing information with the Police is weak. This has remained the situation until recently when a group of youth volunteered to serve as watch for their communities and report any case to the Police when necessary. Another interviewee recognized that fat that it is actually the duty of the Gambia Police Force to nurture effective CP in the municipality bearing in mind that it is a growing metropolis and criminal activities are bound to be rising and that most times, crimes committed can be handled outside the police structure if CP is made active. The findings further revealed that the impact of CP has not been that felt because the Force lacks capacity for effective implementation. This is in terms of human, financial and material resources, and logistics, among others. Considering the growing population of the municipality, all these were described as being essential for CP to make any impact.

Summary of Findings
The overarching objective of this study was to examine effect of community policing on crime reduction in The Gambia with a case study of Kanifing Municipality (KM). The specific objectives of the study were to examine the reasons for introducing Community Policing in tackling crime; identify the strategies being used in Kanifing Municipality of The Gambia; assess their effectiveness in community safety and crime reduction in the area; and lastly investigate the challenges impeding the effectiveness of Community Policing in the area of study. The study was conducted within Kanifing Municipality and specifically focused on both formal and informal structures. The first is the government structure, which in this case is The Gambia Police Force (GPF) and the second is the informal structure represented by WDCs, CPA, and Aklalolus in the area of study. The two structures are critical stakeholders in a relationship to carry out CP in order to prevent crime and ensure safety in general. Since the population of the target groups might be too large for effective conduct of research, various methods were used for sampling in order to have a sample size of a manageable volume.

Questionnaire was administered   to the sampled respondents from the GPF, WDCs, and CPA and this informed quantitative datasets. Also, key interviews were conducted with Alkalolus and Divisional Police Officers in the study area. One research assumption was formulated and tested which was rejected because it was found out that Community Policies was effective to an extent in combating crime in the area. The results of the study showed that significant number of the respondents attested to the reason why CP was introduced which include: to reduce domestic crimes in the communities, reduce fear of crime in the neighbourhood, help to build confidence between the Police and the Communities and create mutual benefits, provide sense of security in the minds of people, create awareness in the community and their responsibility to fight against crime within the neighbourhood, engage all stakeholders to take ownership of initiative as a means of addressing crimes, create avenue for timely reporting of cases of crime, and have community representatives that will work closely with the police to contain certain issues before getting to court, among others.

The results of the study also showed that significant   number of the respondents affirmed that the highlighted CP strategies are most frequently used in the study area and such strategies include creation of team of officers to carry out CP in designated neighbourhood, partnership with local residents and organisation in the community, involvement of stakeholders in the area in crime prevention, voluntary participation and unidentified informant from the society, weekly plan of activities designed to reduce crime, patrol within the neighbourhood, equal distribution of meager resources within the Municipality, Community relations training for Police officers, residents contact to increase police-citizen contacts, neighbourhood organisation meetings, crime prevention education for citizens, household security inspection, and enforcement oriented interventions, among others.

In assessing the effectiveness of CP in the study area, results showed that majority of the respondents believed it was effective having built confidence in working with the Police, enhanced participation of all in the neighbourhood, decreased citizens' fear of crime and improved the quality of life, enhanced sharing of valid information, enhanced long term commitments from everyone in the community, and such others.

Lastly, results showed that respondents were able to affirmed a number of challenges impeding the effectiveness CP which include lack of resources (including funding), lack of logistics and poor road network which affect campaign, weak and non-vigilant informant which affects information flow, informants' fear of being attacked, lack of collaborative efforts among the government and communities, disloyal officer with the Police Force, inadequate information about CP, rural-urban migration, civil society organisations not fully incorporated, absence of legal framework and public perception about Police.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings, the following are recommended for policy consideration:

1. The strength in CP lies in the ability to establish long lasting relationships with the residents of a community as they know their community best. The police have to work to continue to build a healthy reputation and trust as well as gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public to foster the establishment of vigorous collaboration between the force and the community in matters relating to community policing.

2. In order for the GPF to achieve its objectives of ensuring law and order while respecting the rights of individuals at the same time, community policing must be regarded as an opportunity for the government structure. Thus, policemen should be oriented to deliver good community police relation for a successful service delivery at all times.

3. Government, through the GPF, must put in place necessary logistics that will support a successful CP. These include human, and material resources required for operation and sustaining it.

4. For regular information flow the force must put in place a system that will protect the informants as they are occupying critical position in giving information relating to criminal activities in the neighbourhood.

5. Adequate funding is critical and must not be treated as one of such government programmes that are not adequately funded. Any government that fails to secure her citizens is not fit to continue to exist.

6. There is need for aggressive campaign and education to make residents to be aware of CP especially on the aims and objectives, the need for residents' cooperation and collaboration in information

sharing, and so on, especially with the consistent increase in the population as a result of rural-urban migration in search of greener pastures. This may require the involvement of the civil society organisations.

7. There is need for government to formalise the CP activities by providing legal framework that protects the CP operations.

8. The requisite knowledge and skill need of the community police officers must be provided by organizing regular training and refresher courses for police officers especially on police-citizens relations. The Police Training School can as well design modules for CP and should consider attaching some level of importance to the training ontechniques for identifying, solving and reporting crimes, among others.

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Modelling Peace Accounting on National Security and Development in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis

18

CHAPTER

[1]Mahmoud Ibrahim, [2]Abdulkadir Abubakar & [3]Wasilu Suleiman

[1&2]Department of Accounting,
[3]Department of Business Administration,
Faculty of Management Sciences,
Bauchi State University, Gadau

Abstract

Peace accounting has, in recent times, raised a great deal of concern due, largely, to massive insecurity, political instability and slow and economic development in the domestic and global arena. Governments have in response to rising cases of insecurity and political instability with financial challenges taken both pro-active and reactive measures to achieve stability in Nigeria. That, the only way to mitigate the agency problem and information asymmetry are through transparency by government to citizens. Therefore, this paper examined the nexus between peace accounting and national security and development in Nigeria. The objective was to develop peace accounting model with national security and development. The cost of ensuring national security is very high, but measuring this cost has challenges. One way of recording and ascertaining the financial resources expended on national

security is by Peace Accounting. Peace Accounting is an innovative idea that is taking a firm root in Nigeria and the world over. Peace accounting deals with ascertaining and reporting the financial resources accompanying domestic violence such as insecurity, political violence, insurgency, militancy, economic predicament, corruption and all other costs associated with national security. Global Peace Index is the dependent variable while Expenditure on Internal Security, Gross Fixed Capital Formation Cost of Peace Keeping are the independents. Secondary data were obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and the International Monetary Fund Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics from 1999–2021. Multi-variate regression technique was utilized in analyzing the data and analysis performed by E-views. The study found that expenditure on internal security, cost of peace keeping and gross fixed capital formation and gross domestic product are dynamics of peace accounting and statistically positively significant. In view of the above findings, it was concluded that peace accounting is very important as mechanism of national security and development in Nigeria. It is therefore, recommended among others that Nigeria should develop peace accounting standards and engage academic and professional accountants that can help develop peace accounting models in order to ascertain and measure the cost of peace. The government should develop strategies to reduce insecurity in order to enhance economic growth and sustainable development.

Keywords: *Economic growth, Global peace index, Expenditure on internal security, Gross fixed capital formation, Cost of peace keeping, Development.*

Introduction

Peace accounting is a tropical issue in accounting, finance, and law. It has a very strong nexus with political stability, security and economic development. It also provides a basic foundation of security funding especially, in developing countries like Nigeria with so many challenges. It also provides among others the only way to mitigate the agency problems is

through transparency. Data from United Nations Development Program (UNDP),2022 ranked Nigeria among the low human capital countries. This study identified insecurity as a measure cause of Nigerians poor national development profile. The findings of the paper and recommendations will reduce the ranking in order to achieve accelerated national development. These security challenges Stella, (2022) have threatened both economic prosperity and peaceful coexistence. Okoro and Ameachi, (2016) and Ogar, Eyo, and Arikpo, (2019) observed that achieving peace has thus remained a challenging task for past and successive government due to the enormous financial and material resources channeled to regions faced with security trials. For instance, recent violence in Enugu (involving farmers and pastoralists) have ravaged local communities by radically plummeting both security and economic activities (Mercy, 2014), violence in Niger Delta region and terror sets (Boko Haram) in Northern region Fidelis and Egbere, (2013) Abubakar, (2015) and more recently the Avengers group bombing of Chevron refinery in South-South (Warri, Delta State) has significantly challenged national security.

According to Gumus, and Mammadov, (2019) and Ekiran, (2020) that governance, national security and development variables has generated many studies of different spaces and time coverages that have produced mixed results. Some of the studies are country- specific while others are cross-country. Authors like Fashagba and Oshewolo (2014) and Cletu (2014) worked on the relationship between governance and security in Africa. The nature of governance and security for all countries in Africa cannot be the same and the application of the outcomes form such studies to solve the challenges of one country in the continent may not be appropriate. This study therefore adopts country- specific analysis rather than cross- country analysis, by choosing one single country (Nigeria) with an attempt to make more in- depth investigation that produces valid inferences for robust and unbiased prediction for peace, economic growth and good governance in the country. The authors are propelled by the virginity of this area to undertake an empirical study on the subject of peace accounting and its relationship with security and national development. The study will help to provide basis information that will mitigate agency problems between the government and citizens especially nowadays when no one can predict the security of himself or anybody or any part of the country at anytime and anywhere. Despite the huge amount of

funds spend on the security in the nation, still there is a very minimal or decimal achievement as cried by (World Bank, 2022). All the tiers of Nigerian governments local, state and federal not less than 55% of the entire budgets as spent on the security. This accounted for low capital investments and projects in order to provide the enabling environment for private sector to develop in order to achieve the sustainable developments goals so that the country can attract both local and foreign investment. This will help in reducing poverty, unemployment and security challenges.

In view of the above, this paper examines the relationships between peace accounting and security and national economic development in Nigeria. The main objective is to analyze the expenditure on Nigerian security from 1999-2021. Stella (2022), that this period had experienced a lot of security challenges in Nigeria from Plateau State ethnics and religious crisis, Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Banditry and Kidnapping, End Sars protest. IPOB crisis, farmers and pastoralists, etc. It will help to develop an accounting model of financial reporting on security expenditure and its linkage with economic growth and development. This is important for policymaking by the government as observed by Abubakar (2015), is very paramount in pursuance of a country's policy objectives. The cost of ensuring national security is very high, but measuring this cost has received little attention. One way of recording and ascertaining the financial resources expended on national security is through "Peace Accounting". According to Jurgen and Paul (2010), accounting approach analyzes the total value of assets destruction (i.e., Physical, human and social capitals) and the economic approach as opined by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2012), reflects on the macroeconomic costs and benefits of war (i.e., Amount of money spent on domestic investment now gross capital formation). Notwithstanding the huge number of resources spent in restoring peace, economic growth has been hindered by discouraging private investments, trade, production and destruction of productive assets. Global Peace Index is the dependent variable while Expenditure on Internal Security, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Cost of Peace Keeping and economic growth are the independents. This study included four independent variables which an improvement on the work of Okoro and Ameachi, (2016) who used three and excluded economic growth, and Ekiran, (2020) did not include both economic growth and Cost of Peace Keeping. Abubakar (2015), only carried out qualitative approach using questionnaires and which is too inadequate for

an important area like this study. This study operationalized empirically and peace accounting model development which is a major contribution in accounting, development literature and methodology.

Literature Review
The Concept of Peace Accounting
Peace accounting Okoro and Ameachi, (2016), can be seen as the process of recording, analyzing and providing of information that relates to cost of curtailing violence or cost associated with peace-keeping. This information is so important that it solves the agency problem that may erupt between the government and the citizens. Stiglitz, Bilmes (2012) assert that the only way to mitigate the agency problem is through transparency. Peace-accounting brings about information that may instill transparency that can be passed from the principal (citizens) and its agent (government). Two methodologies to peace-accounting have been distinguished in the academic literature: economic and accounting models. Jurgen, Paul (2010) posits that accounting model to peace-accounting evaluates the total value of damaged assets which may include physical, human and social capitals during a fiscal period while the economic approach as opined by Stiglitz, Bilmes (2012), mirrors on the macroeconomic implication resulting from the amount of money spent on domestic investment as a result of war. Therefore, that both methodologies are not superficial but in reality, peace-accounting should not only take into cognizance the total value of damaged goods but also domestic investments that result from peace-keeping. Utilizing and combining both methodologies in a unified model will give a better or more realistic picture on the cost of peace-accounting and its implication on national security and development in Nigeria. This paper examined peace accounting model in relation to political stability, security and economic development proxied by economic growth, expenditure on internal security, gross fixed capital formation, cost of peace keeping and development.

The Concept of Nigerian Security and Economic Development
Stella, (2022), achieving national security in Nigeria has been a challenging task for governments, notably, since the inception of democracy. The nation has experienced a decade of violence and insecurity in the south-east, south-south and northern regions. And now everywhere presently, the insecurity or violence in the country has full-fledged trend that successive governments are

battling. Insecurity symbolizes the manifestation of threats to citizens which indicates a direct defilement of security.

Peace Accounting and Nigerian Security and Economic Development
The inter-relationships that exist among good governance, public finance, national security and economic growth in Nigeria call for proper accountability, transparency and strong control mechanisms. Good governance as the panacea for enduring national security and sustainable economic growth and development in the country depend on the integrity of its accounting system and financial reporting frame work. Accounting is an information architecture. Therefore, positive accounting and normative accounting theories are utilized to explain and gauge the relationship between peace accounting modelling and security and national development. In order to achieve the model development, the following conceptual framework was developed as shown below in figure1.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Accounting Theory on Peace Accounting and Nigerian Security and Economic Development.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Source: Researchers' Conceptual Framework of Accounting Theory on Peace Accounting and Nigerian Security and Economic Development

In order to operationalize the model to carry an empirical study on modelling peace accounting on security and development in Nigeria the following conceptual framework was developed as unification of figure 1 as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Unified Conceptual Framework of Accounting Theory on Peace Accounting and Nigerian Security and Economic Development

Source: Researchers' Conceptual Framework of Accounting Theory on Peace Accounting and Nigerian Security and Economic Development.

Expenditure on Internal Security and Global Peace Index

There are some studies such as Fidelis and Egbere, (2013), Jurgen and Paul (2010), Abubakar, (2015) Stiglitz and Bilmes, (2012), Justino, (2012), Hoeffler and Fearson, (2015), Mercy, (2014), World Bank, (2022) and IMF, (2022) have dealt with militancy, peace keeping mission, estimating cost of wars, inequality and benefits of peace and cost of conflicts without no empirical evidence on cost of peace accounting and national security in Nigeria. Expanding the frontier of these studies, Fidelis, Egbere (2013) study utilized Gross Domestic Product and cost of peace-keeping in analyzing the effect of the cost of militancy and unrest or peace accounting on the productivity of private organizations in Nigeria. Ordinary least square estimation method was employed and the analysis of the study suggests that peacekeeping cost,

especially with private organizations has a negative significant influence on the level of productivity and economic growth in Nigeria. Accordingly, Ekiran, (2020) found a positive relationship. This study predicts a positive relationship because the more expenditure in internal security the more peace will be achieved which will enhance economic growth and development.

Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Global Peace Index
 According to Justino (2012) who theoretically described how the correlation between economic marginalization, disparity, conflict and violence influence the goal of instituting shared societies. Accordingly, in a similar study Efeurhobo and Fredrick, (2021) both identified two institutional frameworks for understanding the correlation between conflict and shared societies. The studies concluded that, the change triggered by armed conflict on social relations, norms of trust and collaboration; and control exerted by informal intermediaries, informal service providers and informal systems of governance regulated habitually by non-state armed players emerging from the course of violence. These forms of institutional frameworks are fundamental to understanding how nations can limit the use of violence towards ensuring national security, economic and development. The study predicts a positive relationship between Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Global Peace Index

Cost of Peace Keeping and Global Peace Index
 The findings of the studies of Hoeffler and Fearson (2015) and Efeurhobo and Fredrick, (2021) who investigated the benefits and costs of the conflict and violence targets for the post-2015 development agenda found that peace keeping expenditure help to increase global peace. Therefore, several forms of violence that may threaten national security, costs and GDP were identified to include collective violence ($167.19) as a cost in percent of world GDP 19% interpersonal violence ($1,245.27: 1.44%), homicides ($700.5: 0.82%), child abuse ($3,594: 4.21%), reported child sexual violence ($36.8: 0.043%), intimate partner violence ($4,423: 5.18%) and reported sexual violence against women ($66.7: 0.078%). Accordingly, a positive relationship between Cost of Peace Keeping and Global Peace Index.

Economic Growth and Global Peace Index
World Bank, (2022), and IMF, (2022), shows that cost in security if well invested could improve global peace index. This will attract both local and foreign investment as well as political stability and development. Earlier, Jurgen and Paul (2010) and Efeurhobo and Fredrick, (2021) believed that if Africa continent must account for the cost of violence, then it has enormously negative effect on their economies in the form of resources misallocation, severe opportunity costs of non-realized GDP and trillion dollars resulting in business opportunities may be lost. According to Abubakar (2015) descriptively explored the cost and benefits of Nigeria's peace mission in Sierra Leone and found several benefits and implication of peace accounting costs. First, Nigerian's intervention in the peace mission led to a fall of the GDP from 8.2% in 1991 to only 1 % in 1994 which precipitated a decline in the Nigerian economy. Thus, the cost of peace accounting made the Nigerian economy to become volatile. Second, peace accounting cost in Nigeria came with benefits such as re-establishing the nation as the giant of Africa, international laurels won, solidification of the bilateral affiliation between Nigeria and Sierra Leone, expansion of trade relations and improved economic investments in Sierra Leone. The study also found that the cost of peace accounting outweighed the benefits. In view of the above a positive relation Economic Growth and Global Peace Index.

Theoretical Framework
This study adopted the Stakeholders theory, and Decision usefulness theory, Positive accounting theory and Normative for situating the study.

Stakeholder's Theory
This theory considers all those who had one input or the other towards achieving organization goals and objectives. These groups are all interested in the overall performance of the business and in its financial reports to ensure proper accountability and profitability. Many users, especially external, use annual reports to make investment and other decisions. Investors, creditors, lenders have to assess the earnings prospects of companies by examining the implications of the different accounting procedure (Jawahar, 2017). All the users are interested to know the effect of alternative reporting methods, on their decisions (welfare). For example, corporate executives want to know how straight-line method of depreciation affects their welfare vis-a-vis

accelerated depreciation. Similarly, if a company is concerned about the market value of its shares, the accounting methods effects on share prices are to be analyzed.

Decision Usefulness Theory
The decision-usefulness theory emphasizes the relevance of the information communicated to decision making and on the individual and group behavior caused by the communication of information. Accounting is assumed to be action-oriented, its purpose is to influence action, that is, behavior; directly through the informational content of the message conveyed and indirectly through the behavior of preparers of accounting reports. The focus is on the relevance of information being communicated to decision makers and the behavior of different individuals or groups as a result of the presentation of accounting information.

 In the study of Patton and Littleton (1940), they gave user need even more prominent attention, including them in their statement of the purpose of accounting. The purpose of accounting is to furnish financial data concerning a business enterprise compiled and presented to meet the needs of management, investors and public. The most important users of accounting reports presented to those outside the firm are generally considered to include investors, creditors, customers, and government authorities' usefulness. However, decision usefulness can also take into consideration the effect of external reports on the decisions of management and the feedback effect on the actions of accountants and auditors.

Since accounting is considered to be a behavioral process, this theory applies behavioral science to accounting. Due to this, decision-usefulness theory is sometimes referred to as behavioral theory also. In the broader perspective, decision usefulness studies analyses behavior of users of a behavioral theory attempts to measure, and evaluate the economic, psychological and sociological effects of alternative accounting procedures and modes of financial reporting. According to Chambers (1955),"the objective of accounting is to provide financial information about the economic affairs of an entity to interested parties for use in making decisions". To be useful in making decisions, financial information must possess certain normative qualities such as relevance, reliability, objectivity, verifiability, freedom from bias, accuracy, comparability, understandability, timeliness and economy. It

must also provide for the development of the theory on the basis of knowledge of decision processes of investors, tax authority, negotiating regulating agencies and other external users of accounting as well as managers.

Positive Accounting Theory

The basic message in positive theory of accounting is that most accounting theories are unscientific because they are normative and should be replaced by positive theories that explain actual accounting practices in terms of management's voluntary choice of accounting procedures and how the regulated standards have changed over time. It attempts to set forth and explain what and how financial information is presented and communicated to users of accounting data. Positive theory yields no prescriptions and norms for accounting practices. It is concerned with explaining accounting practice. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) asserted that, "The objective of positive accounting theory is to explain and predict accounting practice. Explanation means providing reasons for observed practice. For example, positive accounting theory seeks to explain why firms continue to use historical cost accounting and why certain firms switch between a numbers of accounting techniques.

Prediction of accounting practice means that the theory predicts unobserved phenomena." Unobserved phenomena are not necessarily future phenomena; they include phenomena that have occurred, but on which systematic evidence has not been collected. For example, positive theory research seeks to obtain empirical evidence about the attributes of firms that continue to use the same accounting techniques from year to year versus the attributes of firms that continually switch accounting techniques. We might also be interested in predicting the reaction of firms to a proposed accounting standard, together with an explanation of why firms would lobby for and against such a standard, even though the standard has already been released. Testing these theories provides evidence that can be used to predict the impact of accounting regulations before they are implemented.

Normative Accounting Theory

The 1950s and 1960s are described as the 'golden age' of normative accounting research. During this period, accounting researchers became more concerned with policy recommendations and with what should be done, rather than with

analyzing and explaining what currently accepted practice was. Normative theories in this period concentrated either on deriving the 'true income' (profit) for an accounting period or on discussing the type of accounting, information which would be useful in making economic decisions. Normative accounting theory attempts to prescribe what data ought to be communicated and how they ought to be presented; that is, they attempt to explain 'what should be' rather than 'what is.' Financial accounting theory is predominantly normative (prescriptive). Most users are concerned with what the contents of published financial statements should be; that is, how firms should account (Jawahar, 2017). Government regulations relating to accounting and reporting has acted as a major force in creating a demand for normative accounting theories employing public interest arguments, that is, for theories purporting to demonstrate that certain accounting procedures should be used, because they lead to better decisions by investors, more efficient capital market, etc. Further, the demand is not for one (normative) theory, but rather for diverse prescriptions and suggestions.

In the study by Scott (2004) and Hodgson (2006), it says whether or not normative theories have good predictive abilities depend on the extent to which individuals actually make decisions as those theories prescribe. Certainly, some normative theories have predictive ability; we do observe individuals diversifying their portfolio investments. However, we can still have a good normative theory even though it may not make good predictions. One reason is that it may take time for people to figure out theory. Individuals may not follow a normative theory because they do not understand it, because they prefer some other theory or simply because of inertia. But, if a normative theory is a good one, we should see it being increasingly adopted over time as people learn about it. However, unlike a positive theory, predictive ability is not the main criterion by which a normative theory should be judged. It is difficult to say which methodology positive or normative should be used in the formulation and construction of accounting theory. It is argued that, given the complex nature of accounting, accounting environment, issues and constraints, both methodologies may be needed for the formulation of an accounting theory. Positive theory may be used in justifying some accounting practices. At the same time, normative theory may be useful in determining the suitability of some accounting practices which ought to be followed in terms of normative theories (Jawahar, 2017).

Methodology

This study is quantitative and has a positivism paradigm. Secondary data were obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and the International Monetary Fund Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics from 1999–2021. Multi-variate regression technique was utilized in analyzing the data and analysis performed by E-views. In reality, measuring the cost of peace-accounting ought not to be streamlined to just gauging the domestic investments resulting from peace-keeping but also to cost of peace-keeping as well as assets damaged as a result of violence. Besides, gauging the cost of peace-accounting will yield a more realistic results by combining both the accounting and economic approaches. The study proposed a model to peace-accounting and unified model of accounting and economic assessment of peace-accounting. The functional relationship as regards the economic perspective to peace accounting encapsulated the contributions and works of Jurgen and Paul, (2010) Hoeffler and Fearson, (2015) Okoro and Ameachi, (2016), Osho and Adebambo, (2018), Ekiran, (2020), Efeurhobo and Fredrick, (2021), World Bank, (2022) and IMF, (2022) accordingly. Thus,

$$GPI = f(GFCF, EXIS, COPK, GDPI), \underline{\hspace{4cm}}(1)$$

Transforming equation (1) into a linear form gives :

$$GPI_{it} = \beta_o + \beta_1 GFCF_{it} + \beta_2 EXIS_{it} + \beta_3 COPK_{it} + \beta_4 GDPI_{it} + E_{it} \underline{\hspace{2cm}} (2)$$

In equation (2), the variables have different units of measurement, so it is therefore necessary to transform equation (2) in order to harmonize the measurement unit uniformly by taking there natural logarithm. Hence; it gives the following equation (3)

$$lnGPI_{it} = \beta_o + ln\beta_1 GFCF_{it} + ln\beta_2 EXIS_{it} + ln\beta_3 COPK_{it} + ln\beta_4 GDPI_{it} + E_{it} \underline{\hspace{2cm}}(3)$$

So accordingly, equation (3) is adopted as the model of the study of the nexus between peace accounting and economic development in Nigeria for the period 1999-2021.

Where *GPI* is the dependent variable, *GFCF*, *EXIS* and *COPK* are the independent variables during a fiscal period. Definition of variables:

lnGPI	Natural logarithm of Global Peace Index,
lnEXIS	Natural logarithm of Expenditure on Internal Security,
lnGFCF	Natural logarithm of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Gross of depreciation of assets- investments replacing scrapped capital),

*ln*COPK	Natural logarithm of Cost of Peace Keeping,
*ln*GDPI	Natural logarithm of gross domestic product index.
it	Time series,
ε	error term,
$\beta_o, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4$	Regression coefficients.

Empirical Result and Discussions

The following is the empirical results of the study:

Table 1: Unit Root Test: GPI

GPI = (*ln* of GPI)
Null Hypothesis: D(GPI) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic	-5.535411	0.0046
Test critical values: 1% level	-5.323636	
5% level	-4.004321	
10% level	-3.620635	

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Source: E-Veiw Results

Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test: GFCF

GFCF = *ln* of GFCF
Null Hypothesis: D(GFCF) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic	-3.412363	0.0002
Test critical values: 1% level	-3.256456	
5% level	-3.235665	
10% level	-2.912985	

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Source: E-Veiw Results

Table 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test: EXIS

EXIS = *ln* of EXIS

Null Hypothesis: D(EXIS) has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic	-3.857312	0.0032
Test critical values: 1% level	-4.273073	
5% level	-3.122696	
10% level	-2.736576	

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Source: E-Veiw Results

Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test: COPK

COPK = *ln* of COPK

Null Hypothesis: D(COPK) has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic	-3.269506	0.0041
Test critical values: 1% level	-4.199956	
5% level	-3.189352	
10% level	-2.619985	

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Source: E-Veiw Results

Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test: GDPI

GDPI = *ln* of GDPI

Null Hypothesis: D(GDPI) has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic	-4.589572	0.0013
Test critical values: 1% level	-4.301083	
5% level	-3.162676	
10% level	-2.947989	

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Source: E-Veiw Results.

The result for all the variables shows evidence of stationarity at 5 per cent level of significance, hence a rejection of the null hypothesis. This suggests a high degree of reliability of estimates derived from the data.

Table 6: Regression Result

Dependent Variable: GPI
Method: Least Squares Date: 11/08/22
Time: 11:25am

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-statistic	Prob.
C	2.987482	11.77667	0.342418	0.0072
LGFCF	0.896465	0.657623	-3.256456	0.0002
LEXIS	0.503823	2.399852	-4.273073	0.0032
LCOPK	0.137336	0.401565	-4.199956	0.0041
LGDPI	0.1436432	0.797877	-4.301083	0.0013

Sample: 1999-2021

R-squared	0.964214	Mean dependent var	2.991389
Adjusted R-squared	0.953688	S.D. dependent var	0.796456
S.E. of regression	0.810044	Akaike GDPI criterion	2.691333
Sum squared resid	4.015049	Schwarz criterion	2.990041
Ln likelihood	-9.910281	Hannan-Quinn criterion.	2.610733
F-statistic	10.01078	Durbin-Watson stat	1.708525
Prob(F-statistic)	0.004794		

Source: E-Veiw Results.

This result conforms to a priori expectation and implies that the level of COPK supports enhanced. GDPI. The R-squared value (96 per cent) and Adjusted R-squared (95per cent) show that global peace index proxied by GFCF, EXIS and COPK as well as GDPI explain the performance of security and development to a positively significant as indicated by the p-values at 1%. The Durbin-Watson statistic (1.708525) shows no auto-correlation. All other econometric values Akaike GDPI criterion, Schwarz criterion and Hannan-Quinn criterion show that the model is stable and robust for policy recommendations. The F-statistic 10 and F-significance at 1% show that the independent variables are well selected, combined and utilized to explain the dependent variable. The adjusted R square of 95% explained the relationship between the dependent

and independent variables the remaining 5% are explained by other factors which further research can include them.
In view of the above equation (3) becomes:

$$GPI = 2.987482 + 0.896465\,GFCF + 0.503823EXIS + 0.137336COPK + 0.1436432\,GDPI _____ (4)$$

Therefore, equation (4) is the model that represent peace accounting nexus with security and national development as a framework for financial reporting and budget discipline in order to achieve millennium development goal in Nigeria. This study's findings is supported the work of Abubakar, (2015), Okoro and Ameachi, (2016),Gumus, and Mammadov, (2019), Ogar, Eyo, and Arikpo, (2019), Ekiran, (2020), Stella, (2022) accordingly. It is also in line with the findings of Fidelis and Egbere, (2013), Jurgen and Paul (2010), Stiglitz and Bilmes, (2012), Justino, (2012), Hoeffler and Fearson, (2015), Mercy, (2014) with a different methodology.

Conclusion
In view of the above findings, the study concluded that peace accounting model is necessary to be implemented in order to provide accountability, transparency and compliance with financial reporting in public sector GFCF, EXIS, COPK and GDPI are very important determinants of Nigerian peace. The above variables used in this study will help to improve political stability, security and economic development. This will ensure sustainable development and the security challenges in the country.

These security challenges have triggered enormous resource commitment by the government in a bid to ensuring peaceful coexistence. Inspite of this, the country is still ranked 181st as the most peaceful country in the world. In Nigeria, we have not been able to gauge the resources spent on domestic violence and this has however given birth to the novel concept of "Peace Accounting" which is taking a firm root in Nigeria. In this study, certain parameters such as cost of peace keeping, expenditure on internal security and gross fixed capital formation were examined in order to see their implication on national security (proxied by Global Peace Index). The study revealed that Expenditure on Internal Security (*EXIS*), Cost of Peace Keeping (*COPK*) and

Gross Fixed Capital Formation (*GFCF*) and Gross Domestic Product (GDPI) are dynamics of Cost Peace Accounting. In addition, all the independent variables are positively significant at 1%. The model is well fitted. This showed that the variables were well selected, combined and utilized together. The results are robust for policy recommendation and implementations.

Policy Recommendations

Based on this study findings and conclusions the following policy recommendation are proposed in order to improve security and national development and growth in Nigeria:

1. Professionals or experts should be engaged so that they can help to develop peace accounting models aimed at measuring the cost of peace with strong internal control mechanisms and streamline it with financial reporting framework and regulatory provisions.

2. Special attention should be paid to expenditure on internal security, motivating, training and revamping of security personnel continuously and provision of modern equipment.

3. Gross fixed capital formation should be strengthened so as to allow for national progress and economic empowerment for the teaming population of youths.

4. Government should tackle the security challenges in all regions of the country by enhance welfare package to security personnel, community policing, purging of security outfits of undesirable elements, revamping judiciary to strengthen the criminal justice system.

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Theories and Fundamental Principles of Public Administration

19
CHAPTER

Venerable Egesi Jonathan Chidomere

School of General Studies,Imo State Polytechnic, Omuma

Owerri Nigeria

Introduction

It has to be stated that public Administration as a branch of political science has come of age. It has effort fully contributed in the provision of various theories that have provided lasting solutions to various administrative problems facing man in the 21st century society. And again, the rudimentary or fundamentals of public administration which is primarily concerned with the problem solving of various challenges or problems bedeviling the human society. It is commendable and not out of place to establish that since the turn of the 21st century, the problems of mankind has doubled if not tripled so to speak. This singular act has made the hands of political scientists and public administrators to be full as while they make untiring efforts to solve problem, they end up getting more problems in the process. This in any way is not condemnable as human beings by their nature are dynamic and changes over time especially as the mingle with one another and interact with people from other backgrounds and environments with varying orientations, views, nomenclature and opinions. Therefore, this work is an effort at appraising the efforts of public administration of the contemporary times in proffering lasting solutions to the myriads of problem scattered all of the place, which range from the challenge of health, need satisfaction, unemployment, and service provisions and work conditions among an unending list. What must

be mentioned is the fact that all human problems can be managed under public administration but remains a daunting task.

Definition of Concepts

Some terms or concepts enshrined in the topic under study needs to be defined no matter how concise it may be to enable people have a deeper and better understanding of them as we process in this analysis. Such words include: Theory, fundamental, public and administration.

1. **Theory:** According to the Wikipedia online dictionary, a theory is a rational type of abstract thinking phenomenon or the results of such thinking. Process of contemplative and rational thinking associated with such processes as observational study or research. In a sense it is considered as an idea used to account for a situation or justify a course of action.
2. **Fundamental:** This implies basic, important, necessary and infact expedient
3. **Public Administration:** Employee for working in the public service. As a field of inquiry with a diverse scope whose fundamental goal is to advance management and policies.
4. **Public Policy Doctrine:** This simply implies to evolve, becoming more clearly defined and more deeply embedded in the legal system. The fundamental policy in the operation of a legal system in that ignorantia.
5. **Public Sector Ethics:** The public sector is a broad topic that is usually considered a branch of political ethics in the public sector, ethics addresses the fundamental premise.

Theories of Public Administration

It has been discovered over the years that this branch of political science known and considered as public administration has a broad spectrum. This comprises but not limited to the following; Public choice theory, public policy, behavioural public administration, conspiracy theory, public administration journal, H. George Fredrickson theory, Bureaucracy theory of public administration, big pharma conspiracy theory, public works theory to mention just a few.Efforts will be made to take a holistic look at some of the afore mentioned theories to examine their relationships, approach and applications to the practise of public administration in recent times. Having

listed the various theories of public administration, may we in clear terms examine a few of those theories.

Public Choice Theory

The public choice theory as a paradigm is primarily and basically concerned with what the decision, choice and interest and opinion of the people is over particular issue or issues. It is necessary to concretize that public choice theory is interested in the over rule of the general interest of the people when it come to given issues. That invariably implies that the interest of the masses matters most other than the interest of a few individuals, Jackson (2018) Another thing that must be mentioned remains evident during elections as the choice of the general public over rules or over rides the interest of the minority few individuals. On other hand, Stanley (2019) argues that in recent times many countries of the world have embraced Democracy and that the will of the majority over rules but due solely to corruption and poor attitude of our political leader, the interest and desires of the majority is being over ruled if not trampled upon and even with reckless abandon.

The Behavioural Theory

The behavioural theory can be taken for one of the main stream theories of public administration. This study is timely because basically man is the key element or instrument of study and concern when it come to the society. It will be unimaginable to have a society without man in the society. That is simply to say that without man the space considered as or taken for the society will not be meaningful if it exists at all.

The gamut of the behaviourist or behavioural theory hinge on the fact that the members of a particular society is administered based on their distinctive unique values, behaviours, language, culture and attitudes. That is simply to say that an attempt to impose the values, behaviours, language and culture of a particular people on a different set of people for the achievement of what is considered as administrative convenience or effective administration will end up worsening the situation other than providing an enabling environment to achieving effective public administration. To Okonkwo (2021), public administration is not achieved in the open space or vacuum rather, it is achieved among various groups of people. There are usually certain attributes specifically and uniquely associated with certain people. Okonkwo (2021)

further argues that public administration is one basic need of man in the political terrain. On the other hand, Sampson (2019) argues that every aspect of human life is about administration. Since public administration in a sense entails the act and process of ensuring the smooth and effective practice of ensuring everything is implemented effectively for the general good of everybody. It has been observed that effective administration engenders peace, ensure equity, justice and fair play.

Organizational Theory

Organizational theory involves studying organizations to identify the key factors that allow them to maximize their efficiency and then packaging these factors into ideas and strategies that can be reproduced by practicing public administration professionals to impact policy making as well as other tasks. This process involves engaging in theory-based training that explores the many tested methods of public administration and is typically classified into these four groups.

Classical Theory

This concept implements a highly bureaucratic, scientific approach to the management of an organization and has effectively served as the building block for many of today's most prominent organizational theories. Many organizations favoured this approach during the industrial Revolutions, and it continued being adopted throughout the 20th century. This rigid form of organization administration is commonly associated with the term micro management and is gradually being phased out of use due to the negative consequences of stripping employees of their autonomy.

Neo-Classical Theory

This theoretical concept equally regarded as the Human relations theory builds on the concepts of classical theory for operations, but extends itself to encompass the human element. Rather than focusing on employees as units that produce consistent outputs, the neo-classical theory considers the uniqueness and varying traits of different people and focuses on more creative ways to manage and motivate them. It will be necessary to develop effective approaches to interpersonal interaction and collaboration is also a key focal point here.

Contingency Theory

This theory emerged in response to the rapid growth and evolution of industries, increasing competition and the constant change and volatility of the environment that came with it. Perhaps most characteristic of the technology industry, the contingency theory focuses on the flexibility of an organization and its ability to respond and adapt to changes quickly. Similar to the Neo-classical theory, the effectiveness of the contingency theory approach falls on management to properly utilize the human element. Managers must have skills in conflict resolution, the ability to help others understand the fluctuations of the organizational environment and be able to promote reactive, collective decisions in order for the organization to thrive.

Modern Systems Theory

This theory is rooted in the idea that all organizations must be constantly prepared to adapt to change. The modern systems theory encourages change by highlighting the need for organizations to capitalize on the recent emergence and development of robust data collection and processing systems. A primary characteristic of this theoretical approach is the shift away from viewing the organizations as an entity with separate departments with separate goals and functions. Changes in one division can affect the organization as a whole and those effectively using this approach can monitor and quantify these impacts or changes using data models.

Public Needs

Public administration entities hold the responsibility of providing communities with access to basic necessities such as shelter, education and public utilities and must operate efficiently in order to fulfil this role successfully and sustain highly functional societies. To achieve these goals, professionals in this industry are tasked with closely interacting with community members on a consistent basis in order to understand their concerns and collaborate on formulating solutions. Additionally, when larger issues or situations occur, such as violence, natural disasters or other threats.

Social Change

All societies are constantly in motion and therefore they are continually undergoing an array of unexpected changes. As public administrators are tasked with the critical responsibility `of acting as leaders during times of

sudden change or confusion, a key factor for any public official is an understanding of societal changes on all levels, globally, nationally and locally. This knowledge allows public officials to connect with their communities in ways that help the public to understand how changes will impact specifically so that they can begin to prepare for said changes. It is expedient that in this treatise, the concepts of fundamentals, principles and elements may be used interchangeably and synonymously. Below therefore we shall examine a few principles of public administration.

Principle 1: The Government Has Developed and Enacted an Effective Public Administration Reform Agenda Which Addresses Key Challenges
1. There is a coherent vision of public administration reform shared by the key stakeholders, including the challenges, objectives and key steps required for improvement
2. Public administration reform is identified among the priorities in all key medium term planning documents
3. The scope of public administration reform planning documents is complete and covers all necessary reform areas, reforms in different areas are clearly linked
4. The objectives and steps identified in planning documents is complete and covers all necessary reform areas: reform in different areas is clearly linked

Principle 2: Public Administration Reform is Purposely Implemented: Reform Outcome Targets are Set and Regularly Monitored
1. Reform objectives and targets are set in planning documents
2. Functioning central steering and strategy review processes are in place
3. Civil society and the business community are involved in the monitoring and review process and enabled to provide input on implementation performance and reform challenges

Principle 3: Financial Sustainability of Public Administration Reform is Ensured
1. The actions or reform measures established in the planning documents contain information on the human and financial resources required to implement them.
2. To ensure the reform is sustainable, the cost appraisal of reform

measures defines the share and source of donor assistance and expected financing from Government revenues.

3. Financial estimates of costs of any reforms requiring European union assistance are in line with the instrument for pre-accession Assistance programme budget for the public administration reform sector among other principles.

Conclusion

It has to be concretely established that various scholar from different nomenclature have attempted an explanation of what the concept of public administration stands for, as well as different theories having been examined. Equally the principles hitherto considered as fundamentals or elements were discussed. Thereafter, conclusion was drawn.

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CHAPTER

[1]Umar Elems Mahmud,
[2]Yusuf Abdullahi Ogwuzebe &
[3]Bage Yahaya Ahmad
Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria

Abstract

Democracy and sovereignty are allotropes of political independence. Central in sovereignty is the right of an independent nation to form or join any association, provided that such association is not repugnant to internationally acceptable norms. The major objective of this commentary is to examine the locus standi, rationale and sagacity of Russia's military invasion of Ukraine, which commenced on February 24, 2022, for reason of the latter country's wish to join NATO; and to prognosticate the implications for the brazen violation of Ukraine's national sovereignty; besides the huge threat which the action portends to world peace and order.

Keywords: *Sovereignty, Democracy, Independence, Invasion, NATO.*

Introduction

In political affairs, whether domestic or international, the modern state is the fundamental institution of existence, recognition, and relations. Implicitly, 'de jure state' is fundamentally characterized by legitimacy and sovereignty: the authority to control internal and external affairs of the state, in contradistinction to 'de facto state', usually not recognized by the international community. Stoke (2006) noted that without international recognition, 'de facto state', can be conquered or rolled back into a state with formal sovereignty. In this regard, the state of Tamil Ealan, which controlled the ethnic territories in the north and east parts of Sri-Lanka, was defeated by Sri-Lanka's national military forces between 2007 and 2009. In the same vein, the 'Republic of Biafra', a Nigerian splinter defacto state, was redirected and reintegrated into Nigeria in 1970, after it controlled the southeast territory of the country from 1967. Of all the attributes of a modern state: a defined territory, population, government, legitimacy, monopoly of ultimate sanction, coercion, compulsion and permanence, sovereignty is the most essential; because it confers state authority, independence and autonomy.

In trite political science parlance, sovereignty is the supreme power of a state over its affairs, irrespective of the configuration of the state or location. Locke (1632-1704), Rousseau (1712-1778) Friedrich (1963), Appadorai (2004) and Laski (2008) offered varied but reconcilable explanations of the concept of sovereignty. When coalesced however, the representative position canvassed by all is that sovereignty is the ability of a state to effectively control the behaviour of its population, at least in the sense of establishing law and order (Siaroff, 2013 in Habu 2018). This position suggests that a sovereign state has supreme power within its jurisdictional territory to the exclusive freedom from the control of any other state or authority. This concept of internal sovereignty is however variable when extended to external connotation. In the latter parlance, Siaroff (2013 in Habu (2018) noted that every sovereign state has the right of maintaining a formal relationship of equality with other states. In this regard, Siaroff, 2013 in Habu (2018) conceded to every sovereign state "the right to enter into an international agreement with other states on trade, military, scientific, social, and educational matters".

A strict observation of the foregoing tenets of sovereignty has however, been relatively difficult to sustain in the conduct of international relations. In this

regard, nations have violated the high degree of restraints demanded in the conduct of international relations with sister nations. Thus, occasional deployment of coercion, military intimidation, adverse economic measures, and other sanctions which breach diplomatic decorum have been experienced in international relations, particularly where and when the power equation is unequal. The incidents of outright military attack in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine, with the unilateral military invasion of Ukraine by Russia from February 24, 2022, is the latest in the annals of international hostilities. The development is confounding when viewed against the backdrop of the demand by Russia for Ukraine to abandon the exercise of the privilege to join a legal organization, by virtue of independence and sovereignty. To minimize aimed conflicts, several international institutions have been established: the United Nations (UN), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) and several other diplomatic avenues designed to foster world peace through more palatable mechanisms, including intervention, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, international conventions, international customs and general principles of international engagements recognized in the civilized world.

Irrespective of the preferred diplomatic options of conflict resolution, however, it is known that nations bicker even over unimportant issues. Occasionally also, nations deploy 'extra judicial' and 'extra-diplomatic' approaches in conflict resolution, particularly where a strong- weaker relationship exists. Nations resorting to unilateral aggression, usually viewed as "deploying terrorism" by the victim nations are often unmindful of the wider dimensions which such wanton actions may assume, through overt or covert international sympathetic alliances. In this regard, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), War of Australian Succession (2704-1748), Seven Years War (1756-1763), War of French Revolution and Napoleonic War (1792-1815), the Crimean War (1853-1856), Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), World War I (1914-1918), World War II (1939-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam War (1959-1975), and the Parsian Gulf Wars (1991-2003) (Alan, Lazzara and Jamssen, 2008) are instructive. Against the backdrop of political history, when juxtaposed with advancements in international relations, Russia's invasion of Ukraine since 24th February, 2022 presented with considerable astonishment, the myriad of opportunities and international institutional framework for a more amicable

resolution notwithstanding. Irrespective of the vexed issue at stake, a military assault by one country on another may, in contemporary world affairs and thinking, is rudely astounding and weird. This commentary is therefore, initiated to examine the place of Russia's invasion, in relation to the existential threat or violation of the sovereignty of Ukraine as an independent country.

Statement of the Problem

As a wardo, President Putin had ignored the hypoallergenic or hypochondriac nature of Ukraine's association or contemplation to join NATO. While conceding the argument that Ukraine's membership of NATO might be a harbinger of doom for Russia, through Ukraine's strategic military empowerment of the West, the resort to military invasion vis-a-vis, diplomacy had been widely decreed. Inspite of the centrality of sovereignty as a cardinal "immunity" conferred on every independent country, the spate of public international criticism against the use of force in international relations, and the immensity of the implications of the wanton invasion of Ukraine, there is a dearth of explicatory commentaries in reaction to public condemnation of the orchestrated attempt at immolating Ukrainean leadership and polity by Russia. This deficit or lacuna is the central problem of this commentary.

Research Questions

Arising from the objectives, the salient questions addressed included:

1) whether Ukraine as a sovereign independent state was entitled to enlist in or join any internationally acceptable organization, such as UN and NATO, among others;
2) whether the consent, concurrence or approval of Russia, or any other country was required in deciding whether or not to join any organization as described in (1);
3) whether Russia acted rightfully and in conformity with established protocol for engaging in international dispute resolution, pursuant to UN'S contemporary standards, when it unilaterally invaded Ukraine from 24 February, 2022, which invasion Russia had continued; and
4) whether the Russia -Ukraine war has implications for world peace, order and continued development of and sovereignty and democracy at large.

Objectives of the Commentary

Flowing from the foregoing background, the major objective of this submission is to analyze the rationale for, and implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine since March 2022. The specific objectives however include, to:

1. examine Russia's argument for the invasion;
2. examine Russia's disregard for contemporary and more acceptable standard of engagements in international dispute resolutions; and
3. attempt a prognostication of the implications of the invasion for efforts at entrenching global democracy.

Conceptual Clarifications and Review of Literature
Conceptual Clarifications

Several concepts have been employed in this discourse, salient among which include "Putism", terrorism, political independence, sovereignty and international conflict resolution. As an analytical jargon, "Putism" refers to the action of Russia's inordinate and wanton invasion of Ukraine under the directive and direction of Vladimir Putin as President. The unilateral nature of the invasion capitalized on the perceived weaker position of Ukraine, particularly in the light of the inexplicable and inexcusable provocation. The bizarre or weird nature of Russia's action informed many countries and global view that, indeed, "Putism" is tantamount to international terrorism. Because of its trite usage, terrorism has been variedly defined. For brevity however, the definitions provided by the United States (US) Department of Defense and the United Nations Organizations (UN) are reproduced. To the U.S, terrorism is: the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments of societies, in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.

Similarly, the U.S. Department of States defined terrorism as "premeditated politically- motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Habu, 2018). In their view, the UN (1992) provided a definition of terrorism, to wit: An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-cladestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. Implicit in

the definitions, it may be discernable that the strategy of terrorists is violence, aimed at drawing the attention of the local populace, government and the world to their cause. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when viewed against the definitions, suffices it to be described as terrorist, because it lends itself to the suspicion or conclusion that the invaders may be pursuing extreme goals, even beyond Ukraine. Political independence is the legitimacy of a state to exercise authority within its confines, with the expectation of total compliance with or obedience to all legally or constitutionally-given state directives by all citizens, directives by all citizens, provided that such directives bear rightness or moral goodness; and provided that such independence confers on the political state power of autonomy or self-government, without external superintendence (Oluchi, 2007). Put otherwise, political independence refers to freedom from control by other countries, irrespective of circumstances that may place the one country at a disadvantage in relations to the other. In the context, Ukraine is a sovereign country.

As a corollary to political independence, sovereignty refers to the absolute authority which an independent state exercises over its affairs, with assurance of freedom from all external authority, except those subordinations which the state accepts out of volition. Held (2008) described sovereignty thus: classic sovereignty highlights a world in which states are nominally free and equal, enjoy supreme authority over all subjects and objects within a given territory, from separate and discrete political orders with their own interests, recognize no temporal authority superior to themselves and engage in diplomatic initiatives. International conflicts often assume large dimensions and can be harbingers of large-scale destruction. Such conflicts are initially between two countries; but may escalate when alignments and alliances creep into the scenario, in response to diverse interest-related considerations. Major conflicts between nation -states had at different periods cut across continents of the world: Arab- Israeli, USSR - USA, Morocco – Saharawi Republic, Indo-Pakistani, the two World Wars, and in very recent times, the instant Russia - Ukraine. Conflicts are of major concern and have commanded huge global attention over time. In order to achieve greater world peace, conflict resolution mechanism have progressed beyond the erstwhile outmoded approaches characterized by aggression, self-help, restoration, reprisal, direct interference or intervention and self-defense, to modern approaches: good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlements and diplomatic round

tables, among others. For effective dispute management and resolution therefore, many international organizations have been formed, with the United Nations Organization as the most prominent and all-embracing. Other organizations with limited regional, economic, political, security or defense and social spheres cut across the globe, with African Union (AU), Arab-League, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and NATO typifying examples of the typologies.

Review of Literature

The outbreak of the First World War (WW) in 1914 drew global attention to the need to found an international organization dedicated to the pursuit of cooperation and understanding in matters of world peace, particularly for exploring amicable resolution of conflicts among nations, in order to prevent escalation and recurrence. Such organization was formed at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 under the auspices of President W. mWilson of USA. The new international peace machinery was incorporated as a covenant in the Paris Peace Treaty. Several peace -seeking treaties were subsequently signed: the Locamo Pact, in which Germany was accorded a place as a "big power in the League of Nations and the Council" (Rao, 2013, p.188) and Kellogg- Brian Pact of 1928, signed in Paris, in which Aristide Brian proposed to all nations to make a pledge to renounce the use of war as an instrument of national policy. The signing of the pact was of considerable importance to world peace, given that in Europe, as it was elsewhere, the rulers left ugly experiences: Czar Nicholas 1(1825-1855) of Russia displayed the worst kind of tyranny in the history of Russia, leading ultimately to the staging of a revolt by supporters of Constantine in 1825, in what was to be referred to as the "democratic conspiracy ". Nicholas's unfriendly policy also led to the Polish Revolt in 1863 and the loss of Hungarian freedom, among other consequences. Czar Alexander (1881-1894) ascended the throne in 1881 upon the assassination of the father, Alexander. The new regime was similarly characterized by very unpopular policies. The Czar "set in motion the tyranny of the worst kind" (Rao, 2013, p.114) on the foreign scene, Russia's imperialism led to severe prosecution of the Jews under Alexander, a policy actively supported and patronized during the regime of Czar Nicholas, who was highly antipathetic. Unfortunately, Russia's ambition to capture the East in the expansion bid suffered a setback. The temptation to capitalize on the weakness of China to covert the provinces of Manchuria and Korea resulted in a confrontation with

Japan. Britain's recognition and support, expressed in a treaty with Japan in 1902, designed an effective mechanism for checking Russia's expansionist ambition.

The major objective of the dispute between Russia and Japan was Port Arthur. Russia, with the tacit connivance of France and Germany, denied Japan access to the Port from China (Rao, 2013). Japan was also astonished by Russia's military influence in Manchuria and Korea; and demanded Russia's withdrawal of troops from the provinces. With no acceptable reason by Russia for refusing or failing to heed to the warning, Japan declared a war in 1904. Unexpectedly, Russia, with all the immensity of influence and land mass, suffered a humiliating defeat by tiny Japan. The situation provoked indignant Russians who blamed the Czar for bringing the country to such ridicule. In the protest, Priest Gapon and many of the protesters were massacred in 1914. A civil war in which Russia was engaged from 1918 to 1921 left the country in total ruins. Vladimir Lenin who succeeded Nicholas introduced reforms to reposition Russia. Unfortunately, the reforms were controversial, although improvements in agricultural and industrial outputs were recorded. The regime of Lenin saw unification of Russia and neighboring states in the alliance to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922. Lenin died in 1924. Josef Stalin became leader of Russia after a protracted power struggle Under Stalin, Russia engaged in various confrontations leading to the murder of an estimated 20-30 million citizens (Rao, 2013). Stalin's unpopular economic reforms which anchored on collectism of agriculture, requested small holder- farmers to give up their lands, machinery and livestock to collective farms, managed by large groups of families. The ruler's series of five-year plans and programmes substantially increased industrial capacity, in excess of fifty percent between 1928 and 1937 (Jenkins, 2006).

As a policy, agricultural collectism was unpopular and strongly resisted by farmers who rather killed their animals than surrender them under any policy that was to create a class of oligarchs. The forceful confiscation of grains and killing of livestock led to a terrible famine in which over six million citizens were reported to have died between 1932 and 1933. Several millions who resisted collectivism or who were considered as opponents of the government were arrested and sent to death camps ("gulags") in Siberia. To demonstrate the dislike for the USSR, Hitler of Germany, who had indicated a preference

for alliance with Russia at the brink of war with Europe in 1939, made a turnabout and attacked USSR in 1914. The casualty figure was reported to be a high of 27 million, although USSR refused to surrender (Jenkins, 2006). Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Stalin who died in 1953. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's murderous style. Nikita's war-like attitude almost precipitated nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. By this, USSR had allegedly placed nuclear missiles on the Island of Cuba, within striking distance of USA. Although Khrushchev put up a defence to the effect that the action became necessary to protect Cuba from a possible invasion, opponents believed that the action was to retaliate USA's earlier decision when the country installed nuclear missiles in Turkey, West Germany and Italy, at some distances from where it was possible to easily launch the missiles against USSR. However, through diplomatic negotiations, the dispute was resolved.

Leonid Brezhnev succeeded Kruschcher in 1964, after a protracted power tussle. The new leader wasted USSR's economy on sustaining the Cold War, with the dire consequences of stagnation, compounded by a drastic curtailment of human rights, reminiscent of the Czarist era. Mikhail Gorbachev who succeeded Brezhnev in 1985 pursued policies anchored on openness called 'glasmost' and restructuring, or 'perestroika'. Cardinal among the reforms were the formation of a new Parliament in 1988, with most of the members directly elected by the people. The development gave the assurance of the resurgence of political franchise and freedom. In 1991, the USSR collapsed; and Boris Yeltsin became President of Russia Republic, one of the amalgamating states of USSR. The development implied that Gorbachev of "USSR" had no country to rule since, in any case, no country existed as USSR, after the demise of the amalgamated Soviet Union. Consequently, Gorbachev resigned in December 1991, while Yeltsin became President of Russia Federation, the largest component of the former USSR. Yeltsin pursued economic reforms anchored on economic transition to a market-driven private sector system, powered by privatization of public enterprises. The new policy precipitated problems which traversed inflation, corruption, organized crime and homelessness, because a few individuals became very wealthy through acquisition of the privatized public assets. The emergent Russia Federation continued with international disputes and armed conflicts. The Federation engaged in aggressive fighting with Chechnya Republic in the Caucasus region. Chechnya was alleged by Russia to supply the violent gangs

terrorizing Russia, in addition to the responsibility for the bombings in Moscow. Russia, in engaging Chechnya, was unmindful of the strategic location: oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea travelled to Russia through Chechnya. In sum, over 25,000 people died in the Russian -Chechnyan confrontation.

By 1999, the reign of Yeltsin had waned; and later in the year, the President resigned, to pave way for assumption of office by Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister, as President in 2010. Putin, like many of the predecessors, had been largely war-like, expansionist and imperialistic. In 2014, President Putin foraged into Syria and the Middle East, after the invasion of the Crimea during President Obama of USA. The ambition to recreate the boundaries of the defunct Soviet Union and conflate the emergent States into modern day Russia Republic was the driving motive behind Putin's conduct, indeed reminiscent of the wandering Almoravids. Putin had regretted the dismemberment of the defunct USSR and exhibited a tendency to reverse the situation to status quo. Given such inordinate intention and ambition, to accomplish the mission was a task that must be done, the manner of approach notwithstanding. The approach could be undemocratic, anti- sovereign, genocidal, irresponsible, or criminal, etc. As a subtle counter, Joe Biden of USA and Putin had at different times held talks, further to similar talks earlier held between the foreign secretaries of the countries. The objective of the talk was to dissuade Russia and Putin from acting extra-judicially in the dispute. Often, Putin gave assurance of no intention to invade Ukraine. The assurance however, became astonishing, with the recognition of two Russian –speaking eastern provinces of Ukraine as republics by Russian Parliament (Duma). From all indication, as aptly noted by the West, continued attempts by Ukraine to assert authority over the secessionist provinces would receive Russia's opposition. To be sure, the essence of the foregoing comparative leadership and personality analyses is to expound the war-like nature and character of Russian leaders, as key determinants of domestic and foreign policies.

Theoretical Framework
On Russia's invasion of Ukraine, several views are held in the analyses, salient of which are: that the invaders are on an inordinately ambitious mission of territorial or imperialist expansion; and that Russia was on a mission of self-preservation and existence, arising from the imminence of the danger which

the consummation of the inchoate alliance between NATO and Ukraine (the West) might portend. Viewed from the first perspective, the Doctrine of Imperialism may provide a useful theoretical basis of analysis. On the second view about Russia's invasion, self-preservation and interest in international relations and foreign policy analysis is considered as theoretically plausible and relevant. The pitfall in the employment of imperialism however, is the common focus and probably emphasis on economic interest as a motive for territorial expansion. Assuming, without conceding, that although most struggles and cooperations are largely motivated ultimately by economic ends, it is surmised that in the Russo-Ukrainean war, self-preservation was the critical consideration. However, this paper is of the view that nothing legitimised the use of force or coercion arising from the refusal of a sovereign country to obey a "command", "order", "dictate", compulsion, or even request from another country. In so far as the essence of sovereignty may be applicable, The Gambia, with a relatively tiny land mass and acutely low population, enjoys equal status with massive and highly populated Russia, in international politics. In the light of the foregoing, this analysis is theoretically underpinned by the Doctrine of Sovereignty. Sovereignty, as earlier conceptually examined, is the preserve of an independent state to act legitimately, without fear of disobedience or a counter-action by citizens within the territorial boundary of the state. A salient or essential attribute or ingredient of sovereignty is the freedom of an independent state, which enjoys a sovereign status, from external interference, including control, undue influence, undue pressure, aggression, harassment, or any form of intimidation, unless by virtue of a voluntary association, which terms knowingly and acceptably, curtail or breach any freedom of the sovereign state. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when examined within the context of the concept of sovereignty, negates all expectations and explains the utility of the doctrine to analysis.

Methodology

In the dialectics of the Russia-Ukraine war, the research design is a survey, with substantial reliance on historical and current positions, expositions and data obtained from text, media reports and comments. Given the nature of the examination, the analytical approach is largely expostulatory, expository and explicatory.

Russia's Evasion of Ukraine: The Prelude

Over a long period, particularly since Ukraine indicated the intention to join NATO, palpable tension had mounted in the relations of Russia with Ukraine. The crux of the matter is the probable outcome of Russia's position on the disposition of Ukraine's intention to align with the West, through membership of NATO, both "enemies" of Russia. Historically, Russia and Ukraine were the major components of USSR, before the dismemberment of the Union into fifteen independent Republics in 1991, following the collapse of communism in the East. Like Russia, Ukraine possesses nuclear weapons which it accepted to relinquish in 1991, after obtaining international guarantee that such gesture will not jeopardize the security of the country. However, due to corrupt leadership, Ukraine's economy was badly managed, with the rulers transferring the nation's wealth to the hands of a few oligarchic economic suckers, through a privatization policy considered to have been prompted by the West. Russia had also suffered such economic misadventure and misfortune. During the reign of Boris Yeltsin as President, in order to rebound for accelerated development, Ukraine considered two imperative alliances: economic alignment with the European Union (EU) and security cooperation with NATO, which alliances were totally abhorrent to Russia. To be sure, the intention of a defence alliance with NATO, to Russia, was the greatest sin Ukraine would have contemplated, because Ukraine's membership of NATO would expose Russia to the prying eyes of the West, led by the USA. The plan, if actualized, would weaken the position of Russia in the age-long clandestine 'enmity' shrouded in the endless Cold War between Russia and the West (USA).

In a swift reaction, Putin reiterated that Russia intended to pursue a policy aimed at protecting all Russians, by taking adequate measures to safeguard their interest, even when such measures were extra-territorial. In any case, Ukraine's intention to enlist in NATO was not novel in the history of international cooperation. Sister nations including Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had enlisted in NATO for reasons of 'preservation of national sovereignty' (Osuntokun, 2022). These states share common borders with Russia to the south and Belarus to the east. The obvious implication is that with membership of NATO by the nations' physical presence, the entire sphere of NATO had moved closer to Russia, through the eastern flank, along Belarus, post USSR's collapse. The intention of Georgia to join NATO

exacerbated fears entertained by the Kremlin, to the effect that Russia will be encircled by the Western military alliance. Alarmed by the development, Putin was reported to have said, in a broadcast on BBC, that Russia and Ukraine were same: same people, created with the same blood, and who, therefore, shared the same history. It is however, not clear whether Putin imputed that by virtue of historical and ideological ties, Ukraine was not entitled to exist as an autonomous or independent country. Nevertheless, Ukraine's sovereignty must be guaranteed, for USA to enjoy the benefits of the alliance. For this reason, USA had remained very supportive of Ukraine's freedom, with the proposition that the USA-Ukraine alliance was for geo-strategic reasons, beyond military cooperation.

Notwithstanding the freedom conferred on Ukraine by virtue of independence and sovereignty, Russia had placed the country on the watch-list effectively since 2014, with the ultimate goal to achieve a total disintegration. Russia had in furtherance of the goal earlier instigated a revolt by two eastern provinces of Ukraine. The result led to a referendum in the Crimea on the Black Sea whereof the Region requested to be accepted by Russia as part of Russia's Federation. Expectedly, predator-Russia accepted the request, prompting Putin to visit the Region shortly after the hurried-referendum. To buttress the deal, Russia built a bridge linking the Crimean Peninsula with Russia. Not done, Russia intervened in Georgia and Maldiova, in order to protect Russian minorities in the countries. Russia acted as far as stationing Russian troops in the countries. Beyond the ordinary, Putin furthermore demanded that NATO should desist from stationing short range missiles in states of the former Warsaw Pact, including Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia. The list of prohibitions also included former members of Soviet Union as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia who are members of NATO. Very weird of the demands, Putin wanted a written guarantee that Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO. Putin's argument was that NATO was formed to resist the spread of communism; and that the continued existence of NATO had become time and purpose-barred, with the demise of communism and collapse of the Soviet Union. To Putin therefore, the continued eastward expansion of NATO towards Russia was suspect and existentially dangerous to the country. As far as Putin was concerned, halting all moves by Ukraine to join NATO was a *sine qua non* to Russia's safety. Russia's quest for territorial expansion gained further impetus under President Putin, when Russia made

foray into the Middle East and Africa. Putin had also challenged western and American interest in China. To the contrary, the West was of the view that to tame Putin's inexorable aggression, the country must be stopped, particularly against the backdrop that previous concessions failed to produce the desired results, with regard to world peace. NATO on its own, will neither be cowed nor receive peremptory orders from Russia in the conduct of its lawful and acceptable affairs. NATO did not challenge Russia in 2014 when the country annexed Ukraine. Why should Russia therefore meddle in NATO's affair? Relatedly, although the West was ready to put Ukraine's admission into NATO in abeyance until democratic rule was concretized in Ukraine, it was unacceptable to the West, contrary to Putin's demand, to commit such position into a legally binding written form with the wrangling, a confrontation was predictable.

The Invasion
The situation in Ukraine remained confounding until 14 February, 2022 when Russia, against repeated assurance of no aggression by President Putin, invaded Ukraine through air assaults. The attacks had continued, with heavy casualties on both sides, although the figures against Ukraine have been much higher.

Within the first month of the hostilities, huge refugee problems had developed, prompting neighbouring Poland, Bulgaria and other nearby eastern countries to "forcefully" accommodate fleeing civilians. The entire situation had remained very dicey, particularly for Ukraine, with President Zolodymir Zelensky predicting a third world war, if the situation escalated; and if the on- going peace talk to achieve cease-fire failed. As it is, most countries of the world have condemned Russia and Putin's unilateral invasion of Ukraine, using various adjectives to describe the unacceptable action. China and Belarus have however been reported as being open in support of Russia. Several countries have also extended moral support or solidarity to Ukraine. Many too had provided logistic and financial support; but none had been reported to provide direct military offensive, although President Zelensky preferred assistance in the area of military personnel and weapons. Even the persistent request for the West and NATO to declare a 'no fly-zone-over Ukraine had been declined, in order not to escalate the situation. Because an analysis of the military operations is outside the remit of the paper, details of

such progress have been deliberately omitted; however, the implications of the war have been succinctly discussed, to provide a bird's – eye-view of the wider expectations of the outcome of the hostilities.

Synthesis

The doctrine of sphere of influence upon which ground Russia invaded Ukraine has been viewed by many world leaders as a mere smokescreen. What may be conceded as the plausible reason is Russia's fear of the possibility of the West's expanded sphere of influence with Ukrainian membership of NATO. If the unexpected happened, the territorial influence of the West would be extended and Russia's proximity via Ukraine would be considerably facilitated. The ultimate implication of the proximity of the two cold-war-antagonists would be Russia's exposure to the prying eyes of USA and the larger West. The West would be better positioned to plant Russia-targeted missiles from nearby Ukraine. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it may be conceded that Russia's action is a preemptive measure, necessary for self defence and existence, particularly when viewed against the backdrop of the economic and military advantages Ukraine's membership of EU and NATO would confer; and given that the alliance would strengthen USA's military position. Very important also, the character of leaders is a fundamental consideration in the approach to dispute resolution. In a similar situation over Cuba, Russia and USA resolved the tension through diplomatic means during the regime of Krushchev, in contradistinction to preference for war by Putin. Ukraine, the larger world and leaders view Russia's invasion as an affront on sovereignty. The central argument is that Ukraine is an independent country. By virtue of independence, Ukraine is naturally endowed with the privilege of sovereignty which confers freedom of association and membership of any regional or global organization, provided that such organization is not condemnable. Thus, opponents of Russian invasion believe that more modern and peaceful mechanisms abound, beyond the military option. It is in alignment with this position that the central thesis of this paper is anchored on the doctrine of sovereignty: Ukraine's freedom and liberty to join or aspire to join any internationally lawful and acceptable organization, without first seeking and obtaining the consent of any country, Russia inclusive, irrespective of extant or current relationship. Granted that there is need for nations to prioritize self-interest in the conduct of foreign policy, it is instructive that where a country holds a view or position contrary to that of a

sister nation, the desire by the aggrieved country to influence a shift in the position of the other country may be better achieved through negotiation at round-table than through violence. This approach is well entrenched in contemporary international conventions and protocols. Russia's basis for attacking Ukraine, and every action taken in furtherance of the basis, are therefore preposterous and smacks of affront on national sovereignty, conceptually and practically.

Some Implications of Russo-Ukrainian War

The wanton invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the resultant international hostilities have been described by many countries across the globe as the worst singular indiscretion of any country against contemporary world peace and order. Because the war remained raging, it may suffice to suggest that the consequences may be, in the meantime, indeterminable or determinable or indeterminate eventually. Therefore, only a bird's-eye-view prognosis had been attempted. Practically, the invasion has drastically eroded the continued development of national sovereignty; besides effectively rubbishing democracy, as the most cherished system of government in contemporary global politics. It is an infringement on the inalienable right and privilege to which Ukraine is entitled as an independent country.

The action of Russia has re-activated and exacerbated the dormant Cold War, the shambolic management of which can precipitate a third world war. Ultimately, the invasion is a major threat to world peace, security and order. Already, NATO had been reported as 'activating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence elements, amid fear that Russia could launch a biological strike on Ukraine (Yishau, 2022). The war had begun to take a toll on world economies, through negative developments in world trade, financial markets, production, consumption and payment systems, among others. Countries which depend on oil and gas products supplied by Russia are having a rethink of alternative sources, whether or not the sources may be less efficient. The same may be true for exporting nations. Ostensibly therefore, world trade will suffer deceleration or reverses across geographical zones.

Markets are similarly crashing, with world stock indices stumbling. The London FTSE was 251 points lower at 6998, giving a 3.5% decline. Dax index in Frankurt dropped than 4%; while the Italian index went down by 6.2%, the

lowest in a year. EURO SFOXX 600 index and USA's Standard and Poors 500 both fell by at least 10%. Asian markets were unimmuned, given the crash in India's Sensex, Japan's Nikkei 225 and Hong Kongs Hang Seng, which fell by 850 and 700 points respectively, as at March 2022 (Adebowale, 2002). The avalanche of refugees, who had migrated to neighboring Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, etc, is a sore source of huge humanitarian problem. The anticipated internecine wars that may be precipitated will compound the internal problems of the host countries. Very serious too, is the decimation of human lives and existence. Both sides of the feuding countries had reported heavy casualties, while the end figure might be indeterminate.

The expectation is that even if the hostilities aborted earlier than anticipated, post-war reconstruction will be humongous for both countries; while the economies will experience lagged recoveries and growth. In sum, the implications of the Russo- Ukrainian war are so many, diverse and severe that it may, at any stage, be difficult to casually determine the magnitude and cost of the wanton destruction.

Conclusion

Russia's invasion of Ukraine had been globally condemned, except for allies as China, Belarus and a few subterranean conspirators or pro-Russian sympathizers. The unilateral invasion is undemocratic, anti-sovereign and a smokescreen to get at the West under the subsisting age-long Cold War. Although sympathetic countries had intensified moral and logistic supports to Ukraine, much more will be required, to strengthen the defense line of Ukraine. Ukraine had repeatedly called for additional support from all nations, particularly the West. Such support would preferably be in the form of military arsenals, personnel, logistics, additional wanton sanctions and humanitarian assistance. Whether as a lunch pad or a sacrificial lamb, Ukraine is down with a syndrome and requires all support that can strengthen the country's chances of survival and defence against the onslaught by Russia.

Way Forward

The West, actively led and coordinated by USA, Britain and NATO allies should urgently rally all possible and available resources in aid and support of Ukraine. The allies should also urgently deploy the most appropriate strategies capable of, and suitable, for resolving the dispute within the shortest

possible period. Because it is abhorrent to employ military confrontation in contemporary dispute resolution at any level, the option of a reprisal by the West and allied nations should be hardly considered. Instead, effective diplomatic engagement capable of yielding the desired results should weigh most among the available options. When therefore, it is probable that mere sanctioning may be inefficacious, it would amount to wanton pride or ego for the West to watch helplessly and hopelessly, while Ukraine undergoes rapid decimation by Russia. Accordingly, therefore, it may be advisable for the West and NATO to up negotiations with Russia and concede further grounds, in order to strike a balance of peace-possibilities expeditiously. The cost of the war to all nations will be inestimable, because of the incalculable damage. Even NATO's effort and all the protective goals and objectives would have amounted to zero, if peace is not achieved within a reasonable period; or if peace is achieved at outrageous cost to both sides. It would be more devastating if Ukraine is, at last, beaten to outright surrender.

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