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POLITICS OF INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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Dedication

Dedicated to the International Institute for Policy Review &
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Development.

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Introduction

Implications of Insecurity to Economic Development in Africa

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Centrally, the concept of development encompasses economic transformation, growth, and modernization. According to Onyekpe (2004), development is the transformation of the economy, state, and society through the increased capacity to face the challenges of production, expansion, political administration, and governance. Economic development is concerned about improvements of socio-economic well-being that inform the increases in living conditions, improvements in health care, education, and ensuring adequate food, job, security, and reductions in poverty and unemployment (Ezrow, Frantz, and Taylor, 2016). While the links between insecurity and development are complex, there is little doubt that insecurity acts as a development disabler. In the 21st century, violence and insecurity take many forms, from large and small wars to inter-communal political violence, criminal, gang, and economically motivated violence, and inter-personal or gender-based violence. These challenges negatively impact on socio-economic development of society.

For any economy to grow, there must be peace and security. Security is the freedom from danger or threat to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest, and enhance the well-being of its people. Security is freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of a nation and its

ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values as well as freedom from danger to life and property (Oche, 2001). The UNDP report identifies seven elements of human security; economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Like any other form of security, political security seems more significant as it provides coordination for other security elements of a political will.

Political thuggery which leads to conflicts, assassinations, and arson is one of the major development challenges of Nigeria. Political contests are characterized by desperation and a violent struggle for political power among politicians. Reoccurring political violence in Africa could be attributed to the overzealousness and desperation of political gladiators to win elections or remain in office at all costs. These misadventures have often been catastrophic leading to the decimation of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities, and the destruction of properties among others. Also, the high unemployment rate, lack of viable economic opportunities, the challenges of urbanization, poverty, inequality, hunger extremism, bad governance, corruption, among other things further aggravates the problem of insecurity in Africa.

The challenges of insecurity and development remain a front-burner among African states. These challenges are heightened by the lack of capacity of African states and organizations to effectively respond to the challenges of insecurity. Insecurity is one of the major factors that affect the development of the African economy and must be addressed. The Book *Politics of Insecurity and Development in Africa* seeks to examine the impact of previous and ongoing unrest caused by insecurity in Africa and the way forward in achieving future security and development stability.



*Executive
Summary*

Executive Summary

**African Politics:
Identifying Unique Characteristics through
Comparison**

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The year 2005 was named the second Year of Africa, recalling 1960, the Year of Africa in which African nations won their independence one after another. With aid to Africa being a major discussion topic of the Gleneagles Summit and focus of the mid-term evaluation of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) on Africa, international attention has been turned to the serious issues of poverty, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and conflicts faced by Sub-Saharan African nations. From the standpoint of area studies, whose goal is the understanding of others, the increased attention on and increased newspaper and television coverage of Africa is seen as a positive development. However, given the focus of coverage on disasters, it is important to recognize that such narrow coverage can potentially lead to one-dimensional stereotyping of the region. There are 49 independent Sub-Saharan countries (including island nations), each with its own history and characteristics. In order to develop a deeper understanding of Africa as a region, it is important to pay attention to both unique characteristics of individual nations as well as to identify commonalities.

The same can be said for understanding politics in Africa. While donor countries and international development agencies tend, in general, to focus on the “problems” such as deficiencies in governance, dictatorships, corruption,

conflicts, and insecurity of multi-ethnic societies, the political realities of individual African nations, each of which has its own unique characteristics, does not allow us to generalize them with such a stereotypical view. The elimination of such single-sided, generalized evaluation can be said to be the mandate for African political science research. For example, the most important development in African countries in recent years is the democratization in the 1990s, in which military rule or single-party rule has been replaced by multi-party regimes in almost all African nations. While some countries have experienced insecurity during the democratization process (for example, Cote d'Ivoire), there are other countries in which democracy seems to have taken root after experiencing one or more successful free and fair elections (Kenya, Zambia, for example). With regards to civil wars and unrest, again, while there are countries experiencing chronic war (in recent years, Liberia, Burundi, etc.), other countries have experienced a certain degree of success in national reconciliation after the cessation of conflicts (for example Rwanda). These differences only come to light through an area studies approach, whereby the political situations of individual countries are carefully analyzed and compared with those of other countries within the region.

There may be some question here as to whether it is necessary to limit comparisons to other African nations. Naturally, comparison of African countries with non-African countries is an important approach. There is, however, an important methodological reason for limiting the scope of comparison to the region. Although the discipline and theory of political science, including the sub-discipline of comparative political science, has developed rapidly since the end of the Second World War, this theoretical evolution has not incorporated the experiences of new African nations that have gained independence since 1960. This has led to a large disconnect between political theory and the political realities in Africa. Many scholars of African politics face the dilemma of not being able to simply apply accumulated political science theories to analyze African politics. That is to say, while the reality of African politics appears not to fit into the framework of political science theory, at the same time, political science has actively ignored the experience of African politics (an example of this is researchers who take a pessimistic view of Africa based on the "absence" of Western-style democratization and civil society).

The conceptual framework of "African politics" is intended to bridge the gap between political science theory and the reality of African politics and is well-suited for the study of a mid-sized region with shared issues. In comparing the cases of individual African nations, we simultaneously develop regional theories and identify unique characteristics of individual countries. In other words, these investigations capitalize on the ongoing reformulation of regional research and contribute to the eventual unification with existing political science theory. "African politics" serves both a research approach as well as a forum for that discussion.

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<https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Topics/Pol/African/overview.html>

Adapted from: <https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Topics/Pol/African/overview.html>

Executive Summary

**Policy and Institutional Dimensions of Africa's
Political Economy in an Age of Globalization**

By

African Capacity Building Foundation, Zimbabwe

The advent of political independence allowed most Sub-Saharan countries to determine the appropriate mix of policies and institutions that would enable them to achieve rapid socioeconomic development. But experiences across the continent have so far yielded mixed results, and the search for an effective political economy model in the face of a rapidly globalizing world remains an ongoing challenge for most countries. In this study, we ask why some developing countries seem to be growing much faster and have much better socioeconomic performance than others. Indeed, what macroeconomic policies and institutions should Sub-Saharan countries pursue to enable more sustainable, lasting, and inclusive growth while dealing with the challenges that a rapidly changing political and economic world order present? The study's main intention was to generate knowledge to enhance the efficacy of Africa's political economy and development pathways by identifying alternative macroeconomic policy and institutional options that can be deployed to enable deeper socioeconomic transformation. Our first key finding is that to date, only 13 economies in the world may be categorized as living examples of high, sustained growth, realizing a gross domestic product (GDP) of at least 7 percent over 25 post-war years. These are Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand (World Bank 2008). Even though only

one of these is an African country, these cases collectively demonstrate that fast, sustained growth is possible. Though such growth is critical for building a prosperous Africa, crafting new and more robust macroeconomic policy and institutions will require a clear understanding of past strategies that have worked or failed to work in various parts of the world. Indeed, for Sub-Saharan countries, political and economic renaissance is an issue that has preoccupied development theory and practice alike; various options for achieving such a renaissance have either been proposed or tried out in different countries.

Case studies in the paper show that some Sub-Saharan countries have started realizing impressive growth by deploying macroeconomic policies and institutions appropriate to their own context, demonstrating that the continent's economic renaissance is a big possibility. But there are other countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe that continue to lag behind for various reasons, most of which relate to poor governance. In the few African countries where significant economic growth has been recorded, it has also not managed to pull masses of people out of poverty (Edigheji 2005; ACET 2014). For example, knowing that countries such as Nigeria and South Africa have become middle-income economies does not reveal a whole lot about the widespread poverty, unemployment, and deep-seated inequalities endemic in both countries.

So a key question: “What can Africa do to ensure inclusive growth?” This study finds that there is need to revisit macroeconomic policy and institutions in Sub-Saharan countries taking into account the lessons from other regions that have performed well such as Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia experience engenders sharper focus on the role of the “developmental state,” a major ideological rallying point for those who wish to contest the appropriateness of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. In essence, we ask: What is the state's appropriate role in the context of a renewed quest for rapid Sub-Saharan growth? To answer this question, we explore the published literature and several case studies to determine what successful and unsuccessful countries have done. We find that most scholars and practitioners agree that the state should play a big role in development planning since there is a link between national policies and long-term economic growth. Though there are some dissenting views that argue that the link between macroeconomic policy and growth is tenuous and difficult to defend in theory, we take the position that in Sub-Saharan Africa, appropriate policies and institutions are important for growth because they determine a country's economic development direction.

We also identify key variables that Sub-Saharan Africa should consider for further growth. These include paying attention to agricultural production and food security; promoting science, technology, and innovation; creating enabling

environments for foreign direct investment (FDI); improving national governance frameworks; ensuring that any international aid provided is well-targeted and used optimally; and most important of all, ensuring broad-based inclusive economic growth. Due to various dissenting voices from scholars who try to disqualify the causal link between good governance and rapid economic growth, even in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary in Sub-Saharan Africa, we take a firm position on good governance. We emphasize that governance lies at the heart of the Sub-Saharan development challenge. Though the contextual factors that lead to political instability may differ from country to country, the poor governance scourge seems to have cut across most Sub-Saharan countries that experience political instability, directly affecting economic growth. Despite realizing significant national economic growth since the late-1990s, most Sub-Saharan citizens' livelihoods have not been transformed and poverty, unemployment, and inequality remain “wicked” challenges. It appears that inequality is endemic in both well-performing and poorly performing economies. The main message from the paper is that the impressive economic growth in several countries should be made sufficiently inclusive so that many people throughout these countries begin to enjoy the access to basic social and economic services and opportunities that the middle and upper classes in the society take for granted. Almost all the case studies in this paper confirm this development aspect.

From the case studies and the broader literature review, key pointers for capacity building begin to emerge. The main growth drivers and macroeconomic planning priority areas outlined in the paper present preliminary pointers for possible capacity building interventions. To begin with, a transformative agenda centered on economic restructuring supported by manufacturing and industrialization to create more jobs and ensure broad-based inclusive growth is necessary for rapid Sub-Saharan growth. Therefore, any meaningful capacity building interventions would have to begin with questioning how best the tenets of such a paradigm can be disseminated among the Sub-Saharan national leadership structures. The paper articulates several other possible capacity building interventions but we feel that ultimately, a needs assessment should be done in the context of each country to determine its specific capacity needs before any interventions can be crafted and implemented. We are convinced that by deploying well-targeted interventions, macroeconomic policies, and institutions, Africa's transformation is reachable.

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Executive Summary

**The Political Economy of Regional Integration in
Africa: The Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS)**

By

Jean Bossuyt

Maastricht: ECDPM

This study presents a political economy analysis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), focusing in particular on what drives and hampers this regional organisation in preventing and resolving conflicts in West Africa, and in promoting a regional approach to agriculture and food security. The report is part of a broader study that includes the African Union and four other Regional Economic Communities in Africa.

Why a political economy study of ECOWAS?

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 with the formal aim of promoting economic co-operation between 15 countries with different historic trajectories (colonisation, language, and administrative cultures) yet sharing similar socio-economic conditions. During the 1980s the regional body was confronted with a large number of political crises, ranging from civil war to various military or constitutional *coups d'état*. This forced ECOWAS to fully embrace the security agenda as a 'core business'.

The region is widely recognised as a trailblazer, including for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Several crises have been effectively addressed through regional diplomacy and military intervention. Over the years, ECOWAS

has sought to promote an ever-widening regional integration agenda through a wide variety of strategies, action plans and programmes. Initially the regional body functioned through a state-centric, top-down approach to promoting regional integration. From the 1990s onwards, there were deliberate attempts by ECOWAS to also spur regional dynamics 'from below' through close collaboration between institutional actors, civil society and business organisations.

ECOWAS recently celebrated its 40th Anniversary. In reviewing the track record of the organisation, most analyses concur that important achievements were obtained in different domains, including restoring peace, containing conflicts, dealing with rigged elections, facilitating the free movement of people or supporting infrastructure development (trans-coastal and trans-Sahelian roads).

Yet there is also a broad recognition that the initial aspirations have not been met. Overall progress in the actual implementation of ECOWAS policies in core areas such as trade, economic and monetary cooperation, energy and social development has been limited. There are still many obstacles to the free circulation of people (such as the existence of numerous checkpoints, arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of citizens of other countries, migration laws) and goods (including the non-application of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, illegal tariff barriers, and non-tariff barriers). Other urgent crises remain unaddressed. The Sahel is being increasingly destabilised by cross-border crime, drug trafficking, the Tuareg conflict, terrorism and the spread of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The envisaged transition in the Vision 2020 from an '*ECOWAS of States*' to an '*ECOWAS of People*' has still a long way to go, particularly in terms of delivering tangible outcomes for citizens.

However, in assessing the performance of ECOWAS one cannot ignore the particularly harsh political, institutional and socio-economic conditions in which the integration project had to be pursued. The region ranks particularly low regarding all human development indicators. Thirteen ECOWAS countries are classified in the low Human Development category and 60 per cent of the population is estimated to live on less than one dollar a day. This brings along major shortcomings in policy and institutional capacity across the board.

This study of ECOWAS tries to provide insights that explain the implementation gap, as these may help inform, calibrate and target reforms as well as support efforts that are technically desirable and politically feasible. To do so, the study focuses on the key drivers and constraints that shape the ECOWAS agenda and influence implementation by analysing two policy areas: peace and security and food security (focusing on the agricultural sector and agro-food industries and trade). The study uses a political economy framework to answer two core questions: how do key actors and factors affect and shape the agenda setting of ECOWAS? And how do these different actors and factors influence what gets implemented and why?

Key findings of the ECOWAS study

ECOWAS was primarily created to promote economic cooperation within the region. To pursue this aim, it adopted at its inception an intergovernmental approach to governance, based on national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its member states. The regional commitment at that time was essentially that member states would integrate the lofty ambitions of ECOWAS in planning and directing their national (economic) policies. It resulted in a system whereby decision-making power lies exclusively with the Authority of Heads of State and Government and the ECOWAS Secretariat is merely charged with the task of executing the decisions taken by it.

Already in the early 1990s a '*Committee of Eminent Persons*' concluded that effective integration could not be stimulated under these conditions and pleaded for the adoption of a supra-national approach to governance in order to speed up decision-making and enforce compliance. In 2006 the ECOWAS Summit formally decided to carry out institutional reforms to give more teeth to the regional body, including turning the Executive Secretariat into a 'Commission' and further developing formal structures and institutional arrangements (such as the ECOWAS Parliament, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice and a host of dialogue mechanisms with private sector and civil society organisations in various areas). ECOWAS is the only REC that was able to formally establish a Community levy, which helps to increase its legitimacy and scope for autonomous action (though member states do not always live up to their commitments and donor dependency for programmes remains high).

However, the effective and coherent use of this formal architecture has proven to be quite challenging. Decision-making power remains firmly anchored in the

Authority and Council. The Commission can propose initiatives and actions plans, yet there is no shortage of examples where policy developments have been postponed despite their apparent urgency from a regional perspective; where the ratification by member states of protocols and acts incurs major delays; where agreed policies are not translated at national level or implemented in a consistent way at regional level; where decisions of the Court are neglected by member states, and so on. This suggests the ECOWAS Commission has only limited space and power to effectively contribute to the production of regional public goods.

This limited track record in implementing regional decisions, in turn, shows that ownership levels of the whole regional construct are low across the board. This is linked to the pervasive development challenges faced at national level, the limited institutional capacities, the lack of trust among member states and above all to the interests driving elite behaviour. Most of the incentives faced by national politicians are not related to regional integration. They are focused on satisfying short-term clientelist demands at national and sub-national level. The problem is compounded by the still prevailing culture of top-down decision-making – despite the existence of formal mechanisms to involve relevant stakeholders. As a result, it has proven difficult to create sufficient political support for the integration process among domestic constituencies.

This overall political economy reality can be illustrated by the role of ECOWAS in core policy processes such as peace and security or food security. Though primarily a regional body focusing on economic integration, ECOWAS was forced to step into the peace and security realm in order to address wars and conflicts. The proliferation of conflicts in the region is linked to foundational factors such as historical trajectories, colonisation by different European powers, geography and natural endowments or demography. As a result, most countries in the region remain fragile states with limited social cohesion, common sense of identity or shared development vision. Inequalities are growing, increasing the chance of conflicts around access to resources and land. These material conditions explain to a large extent the chronic instability of the region as well as the generally poor levels of governance across the region.

These conditions also help to understand why powerful member states (particularly regional hegemon Nigeria) had a strong incentive to use ECOWAS to prevent the regionalisation of wars and conflicts and related collateral damage (though its leadership has recently been weakened as a consequence of domestic

turmoil). It allowed ECOWAS to display a selective ability for collective action to address political crises in member states (i.e. Ivory Coast, 2010- 2011). In other cases the incentives were not present to generate a timely and relevant political response (i.e. Burkina Faso, 2014) with the resulting loss of credibility in the eyes of citizens. Other case material suggests that pervasive internal governance and managerial and leadership deficiencies all along the decision-making chain hamper the delivery of concrete results (as shown in the peacekeeping operation planned for Mali which could not be effected). The proliferation of actors with their own specific interests and overlapping mandates can make the task of defining coherent regional responses daunting. The difficult relation between ECOWAS and the AU is a case in point, yet similar complications arise from the many external interventions.

The implementation gap is also visible in the area of agricultural development and food security. From 2000 onwards, ECOWAS increased its profile in promoting a regional approach to agriculture and food security, supported at the continental level by the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). The 2008 food crisis provided additional momentum and incentives for accelerating reforms in the region. The ECOWAS Commission has acted as convenor of multi-actor dialogue processes, developed a wide range of policy initiatives and committed significant resources to support the effective domestication of continental and regional agricultural and food security agendas. Yet the ECOWAS Commission has little power and a limited set of incentives to offer for accelerating implementation (for instance, with regard to the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, ETLS). This is linked to various factors such as (i) the primacy of national policy interests and considerations (e.g. for national food sovereignty); (ii) the hugely diverging interests among member states (e.g. Nigeria versus francophone/WAEMU states in the rice sector; and Sahel countries versus coastal countries in the livestock sector); (iii) the deep-rooted regionalization dynamics pushed forward by state and non-state actors (operating through informal channels and networks) that challenge state territorial control and regional policies alike.

Despite strengthening private sector and civil society organisations at regional level, their bargaining power and capacity to act and influence core regional policies in a coherent and effective manner remain limited. This is closely linked to diverging interests between actors artificially classified together as 'the regional

private sector'. Reference can be made to the diverging interests between importers of staple food commodities (notably rice), who constitute powerful oligopolies, have a strong influence on the political elite and extract rents from constrained local production capacities and segmented regional markets; and local producers (farmers and other operators), who are more atomised, further undermining regional-level action to support local and regional agro-food value chain development.

All this is not to say that collective action is not taking place. Yet when it occurs it does not tend to follow formalised rules and procedures. ECOWAS rather seeks to foster compliance in an indirect manner, through soft mechanisms of dialogue and persuasion. The co-existence of ECOWAS with WAEMU is a clear sign that a 'single' regional body may not be the appropriate way forward for West Africa. A multi-layered pattern of regional frameworks allows for more coherent forms of interest articulation (as reflected in the monetary union around the CFA in the francophone member states or the complementary roles played by ECOWAS and WAEMU in agriculture and food security).

Implications

These findings carry important implications for stakeholders interested in closing the implementation gap and building more effective forms of regional cooperation through ECOWAS. Key aspects for consideration relate to the level of ambition of future policies, appropriate sectors or policy areas for action, and selection of partners and stakeholders in programme design and implementation:

1. Several structural factors continue to have a major influence on current dynamics and institutions. These need to be properly recognised and incorporated in the design of realistic support strategies. For instance, the co-existence of ECOWAS and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is an illustration of the various historical trajectories of the countries. Grand schemes aimed at merging the two bodies or working out a rational division of labour are likely to encounter major difficulties. The evolution and relevance of both structures will depend on the policy issue at stake and related capacity of the regional bodies involved to generate collective action.

2. The cases addressed in this study indicate that the set of incentives and capacity for meaningful regional action tend to vary greatly according to sectors and even sub-sectors of intervention. In peace and security, coalitions were

possible between 'willing' member states (generally individual Heads of State) and the Commission. This facilitated application of the existing regional arsenal of norms and tools. In the agricultural domain, the regional trigger proved less powerful to defining a shared vision, providing powerful incentives to member states to implement CAADP/ECOWAS plans or challenging the predominantly national focus on policy-makers. This huge diversity of political economy contexts calls for a much more down-to-earth and tailored approach to promoting regional integration dynamics. It also implies making use of critical junctures while diversifying the possible 'entry points' for regional action (sometimes smaller informal alliances of member states or specialised regional structures are better conducts to get political traction and action).

3. While there is space for multi-actor approaches to regional policy formulation and implementation, there are also constraints hampering the ability of non-state actors to play a positive role as 'norm entrepreneurs' or 'drivers' of regional integration agendas. Beyond major challenges of capacity, organisation and funding, regional networks may end up being 'too close for comfort' (this danger of co-optation stems from the deeper nature of state-society relations in the region, often characterised by dependency and clientelist relationships). Yet one should avoid over-simplifications. 'Regional' actors can be identified in different policy domains that are acting on principles and beliefs about regional identity. With targeted institutional support they could be further enabled to demand specific regional reforms 'from below' through coalitions sharing similar interests.

4. The study shows how ECOWAS is often not performing its role according to a clear set of formal, transparent and institutionalised rules respected by all. The Commission rather follows an *ad hoc* path, looking for windows of opportunities to play the role of an informal broker or foster compliance, in close alliance with 'willing' or 'reformist' states and through *'soft mechanisms'* of dialogue and persuasion. Future institutional support programmes could try to strengthen formal and informal interfaces, dialogue mechanisms and coordination structures with member states as well as with the AU at different levels (as a key condition for more effective collective action). They could also seek to further enable ECOWAS in its role as a credible and accountable broker—equipped with the necessary political intelligence to know when and how it can usefully intervene.

5. The external influence on the regional integration process is huge, firmly engrained in history and reflected in a proliferation of external actors often intervening at cross-purposes. In such a crowded arena, it is not easy for ECOWAS

to carve out its own space and deliver added value (including towards the AU). Despite the existence of own resources, levels of aid dependency are high, particularly for regional programmes. The main challenge for donors is to align much closer to the real political economy dynamics prevailing in a given sector or policy area (linked to power relations, incentives and interests) rather than towards formal players and processes.

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Chapter - 1

Enhancing Nigeria's National Security through State Policing: Lessons from the United States of America

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Abstract

The Neighbourhood Principle presupposes that everyone in the vicinity knows each other and this makes it easier to monitor deviants in the society. Hence, the case for state policing in Nigeria in view of the upward surge in crime wave in this country. Data was obtained from secondary sources which include books, periodicals, journals, newspapers, the internet etc. Data was analyzed using the method of content analysis. The theory of social conflict (Coser, 1956) was adopted as the theoretical framework of the study. Results revealed that the success story of state policing in the United States was as a result certain factors-technology advancement, level of motivation, institutions and infrastructures, psychological and intellectual disposition of officers and even the acceptance of state policing by the society. These are all lacking in Nigeria. Thus, it was suggested in this study that the idea of state policing should be rested for now while the society works on her vital infrastructures, institutions, etc.

Keywords: *State policing, Federal police, National security, Deviants, Inevitable apparatus.*

Introduction

Provisions in the Nigerian constitution clearly stipulate that the security of lives and property of the nation's populace is a primary responsibility of the government in power. Thus, on voting an administration into power, the onus revolves around such an administration to guarantee and ensure the safety of human lives and property, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation at large. Unfortunately, the situations which play out within Nigeria as a country, over the past years, reveal a state of insecurity that places a question mark on the ability of the state to fulfil this basic responsibility enshrined in the constitution (1999 Constitution). This calls to question the issue of the effectiveness and efficiency of state security apparatus.

Nigeria obtained her independence from the British in 1960. Ever since, the nation had hardly known peace as it has always been involved in social upheavals that threaten her corporate existence. Such upheavals have manifested in the forms of religious riots, indigene/settler conflicts, inter/intra tribal wars, communal clashes, political conflicts, insurgency, militancy, and recently, the issuance of quit orders to one ethnic group or the other. The latest of these crises are the frequent herder/farmer clashes and indeed the invasion of the herdsmen south and eastward which leaves behind a cloud of suspicion and imminent danger across the nation. Ordinarily, one would expect that the security apparatus can contain the situation.

In a paper presentation in Abuja titled, “towards efficient and effective policing in Nigeria, Kasamu (2017), a chief superintendent of police, had the following revelations to make.

The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is the principal law enforcement agency in Nigeria with a staff strength of about 371,800 and plans to increase the force to 650,000. It is a large organisation consisting of 36 state commands grouped into 12 zones and 7 Administrative Organs. The constitution of Nigeria makes provision for a single police force, meaning for now, no other similar security agency is allowed to be established by the Federation or any of the component parts.

Inyang and Abraham (2013), observe that, “the NPF is statutorily therefore, responsible for the “detection and prevention of crime, apprehending and prosecution of offenders, protection of lives and property of citizens, enforcement

and maintenance of law and order”. Lending credence to the statement by Inyang and Abraham (2013), Inyang and Brown (2011), assert that, “these statutory functions have guided policing activity within the country, without regards to any other informal groups”. Considering the spate of insecurity bedeviling the socio-economic development of this country, it then becomes worrisome and clear that the Nigeria Police Force as currently constituted, has failed to live up to its constitutional responsibility. This brings to the fore the issue of alternative policing which may easily be located in the context of 'state policing', an experience that is working out in the United States of America. This paper, therefore, seeks to ascertain the lessons which Nigeria may stand to learn from the US experience of 'state policing'.

Conceptual Clarification

Constitution: Most modern constitutions define the fundamental principles of the state, its structures, processes as well as the basic rights of citizens in a higher law which cannot be changed single-handedly by an ordinary legislative act. It is this higher law that is referred to as a constitution. There is no universally accepted constitution as the nature and content of a constitution differs from one country to another. However, a broad definition of constitution is likely to incorporate a number of features as; it must be binding on all persons in the state including ordinary law-making institutions; rights of citizens, political principles, structure and operation of institutions of government of the state must be incorporated in such a constitution, it must be based on widespread public legitimacy; difficult to change than ordinary laws (e.g. a two thirds majority vote or referendum is needed); meet the internationally recognised criteria for a democratic system, as a minimum, in terms of representation and human rights. Paine (1809) had this to say:

A constitution is a Thing antecedent to Government, and a Government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government but of the people constituting a government. It is the Body of Elements to which you can refer and quote article by article; and which contains the principles upon which the government shall be established, the manner in which it shall be organized, the powers it shall have, the mode of elections, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name such Bodies may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall have; and, in fine, everything that relates to the complete organization of a civil government, and the

principles upon which it shall act, and by which it shall be bound. A constitution, therefore, is to a government what the laws made afterwards by that government, are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it only acts in conformity to the laws made; and the government is in like manner governed by the constitution.

In the words of Machiavelli (1611);

There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating change in a state's constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order and only lukewarm support are forthcoming from those who could prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the existing law on their side, and partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience.

Insecurity: “An approach to the explanation of insecurity should best emanate from the definition of security. Thus, while Albert (2003) views security as, involving the survival of the state and the protection of individuals and groups within the state”, Mcfarlane (1994) defines the term as, “the protection of assets including people against damage, injury or loss from internal and external causes”. Thus, when a person is vulnerable to damage, injury or loss from internal and external forces, such a person is insecure. This again implies that insecurity has to do with a state of fear of the unknown or a state of being unable to protect lives and property.

National Security: In the contemporary world, national security has assumed a new dimension which includes social, economic, cultural, political, environment and even technological factors. Hence, Obasanjo (1999) views national security as, “the aggregate of the security interest of all individuals, communities, ethnic groups and the entire political entity”. His argument is that the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad as well as the elimination of corruption, pursuit of development, progress and the improvement of the welfare and quality of every Nigerian citizen's life, constitute the concern of our national security. For him, national security is:

The aggregation of security interest of the National political entities, human association and ethnic groups, that make up a nation. The security interest includes safety of life and property, economic, psychological, mental well-being and freedom to pursue the attainment of legitimate objectives without hindrance.

Mroz (1991), conceives national security as, “the relative freedom from harmful threats”. According to Babangida (2011), national security is, “the physical protection and defence of our citizens and our territorial integrity and also the promotion of the economic well-being and prosperity of Nigerians in a safe and secure environment that promotes the attainment of our national interests and those of our foreign partners”. The United Nations Development programme (1994; 1996) posit that summarily, national security may be viewed as, “protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards”. Anam (2018) avers that the effects of crime and insecurity are far-reaching. It has weakened the political, social and economic institutions of African countries.

Sovereignty: This is a concept used to explain the inalienable political, legal property of a state which is a necessary and constant attribute. It is a very basic concept of modern international law, which is to say that the notion of “state sovereignty is unimaginable without international law itself. Boutros-Ghali (1994) observed that, “the main demand of the day is to rethink the problems of sovereignty”. A soviet legal scholar Manelis (1966), gave his understanding of the term sovereignty as he writes:

Sovereignty should be considered a social phenomenon which is closely connected with the state, its role in international relations and the regularities of its development. Just as the very international law, sovereignty arose with the emergence of states.

In his “Law Code” dated 1184, (i.e. 12th Century), a famous Armenian social and political elite and lawyer named Gosh (1954), gave his interpretation of the concept of “sovereignty” as follows: “kings are those who sovereignty exercise dominion over their peoples and tribute from other people, or if do not tribute then (at least) are not themselves taxed tribute to others (Kings)”. This by implication suggests that as early as the 12th Century the concept of sovereignty was perceived in terms of supremacy of imperial power within the state and its independence beyond its boundaries.

State Police: Nwolise (2004), was quite precise as he summed up policing as involving, “conflict resolution”. In his contribution, Alemika (1995) writes that, “policing involves coercive and/or ideological regimentation of social life through the activities of police and sundry state intelligence and security forces, and through other measures aimed at deducting and suppressing behaviours, actions and orientations that threaten the prevailing social order”.

The Committee of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology conceives state police as, “a specially organized and highly trained body, acting under state rather than local authority, and constantly employed in the prevention of crime, the apprehension of criminals, and the protection of life and property generally throughout the state and especially in the rural and sparsely settled districts” (Corcoran, 1924:544).

Territorial Integrity: In its condemnation of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the broad support for China over the creation of Manchukuo in Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, the league of Nations was manifesting its intention to uphold territorial integrity and other principles of international law. This stems from the fact that political units have always laid claim to definite territories. The intrusion into these territories is always considered an act of aggression/war and often results to war. Territorial integrity therefore, may be viewed as the principle under international law that prohibits states from the use of force against the “political independence” of another state”. According to Corten (2011), this principle is, “enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and has been recognized as customary international law”.

Empirical Review

Past and current works on Nigeria's National Security and state policing are hereby reviewed in a tabular format as follows:

Table 1.

Surname of Researcher, Year, Title of Study	Scope	Methodology/Findings and Recommendations
Alozie (2019) Critical assessment of the Nigeria Police and National security in Nigeria's Fourth Republic	Nigeria: Nigeria police and National Security.	The paper examined the constitutional role of the police as an important agency of the state that plays a key role in the enhancement of national security. The qualitative approach was carried out with secondary data as well as primary data. The Marxian approach to the theory of post colonial state was employed for analysis. It was found that despite current reforms to rightly reposition and refocus the Nigeria Police Force, some members of the command have continued to indulge in acts that constitute serious threats to the Nigeria national security.
Odeh&Umoh (2015) State Policing and National Security in Nigeria.	Nigeria: State Policing and National Security.	The study observed the efforts of governments to reform and reposition the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). It also noted that all efforts have failed to achieve the desired results. The study employed secondary data and found that the current NPF may never be adequate to curb the menace of insecurity in Nigeria. Hence it recommended the decentralization of the force.
Nwogwugwu and Kupoluyi (2015). Interrogating the Desirability of state policing in Nigeria.	Nigeria: Desirability of state policing.	The study used secondary data in this qualitative study. It observed that decentralization encourages specialization and efficiency. The paper concluded that there is need for state policing in Nigeria.
Haruna (2019). State police and police – operational efficiency: footing for strengthening national security in Nigeria: A scrutiny of OJO in Lagos State.	Nigeria state police, Operational efficiency and national security	The paper assessed the Creation of state police and police operational efficiency as footing for strengthening national security in Nigeria. It applied theoretical and quantitative methods. Data was sourced from secondary material. The quantitative data was obtained through questionnaire administration on 250 residents in OJO Local Government Area. Results showed that most residents favour the introduction of state police. The study recommends the introduction of state police with strict judicial control and deployment of smart security technobgies.
Nwogwugwu and Odedina (2018) Policy framework for community and state policing in combating rising security challenges in Nigeria.	Nigeria: Community and state policing and security challenges	A qualitative research which leveraged on secondary data. The paper argues that the traditional security agencies have failed in combating insecurity challenges in the country. It recommends a new policy framework.

Theoretical Framework (Theory of Social Conflict COSER, 1956)

According to the theory, where relationships are such that people are very deeply involved, there are bound to be feelings of both 'attraction' and 'hostility'. The theory holds that, “the closer the relationship, the more intense the conflict”. Conflict simply presupposes a relationship and social interaction. Realistic conflicts are often accompanied by distorted sentiments. There is a distinction between realistic reasons for engaging in conflict in one hand and the emotional energies involved during the conflict. Often times, there is always the failure to realise that conflict maybe motivated by these two distinct yet intermingled factors: realistic conflict issues and parties affective investment in the conflict. This

is where a police force that is closer (state policing) becomes necessary. Its function as a mediator will be to eliminate non-realistic elements of aggressiveness to enable the parties involved to address their competing claims more realistically.

Methodology

The study is a qualitative investigation into the extent to which state policing can go in enhancing Nigeria's national security by borrowing a leaf from the US success story on state policing. Data was obtained from secondary sources while synthesis was by the mode of content analysis which proceeded in the following sequence.

Research question one (1): Can state police enhance the security situation in Nigeria?

Answer: Relying on secondary data in evaluating the feasibility of state policing in Nigeria, Odeh and Umoh (2015), in their study titled, “state policing and National security in Nigeria, highlighted the urgency in the need for the establishment of a state police that will be capable of tackling the current challenge of gross insecurity in the country. The analysis in the study centred on variables which include – the reorientation of the force, insufficient budgetary allocation and judicious use of security vote, the practice of true federalism, the creation of employment opportunities, etc. In its findings, the study exposed the fact that the current centralised system of administration in the police force has not been able to lead to the curbing of the menace of insecurity in Nigeria. In the views of Okechukwu and Anyadike (2013) insecurity in Nigeria has assumed a magnitude whereby, “most Nigerians now sleep with one eye open as those who are lucky to escape burglars are kept awake all night by booming sounds of gunshots or dins of bomb explosions by those too powerful to be stopped”. In a related development, Nwogwugwu and Adewale (2015), in their study titled, “Interrogating the desirability of state policing in Nigeria” observed that the sustenance of order, security of life, legality, development and democracy may be difficult without policing, such policing must not be limited to the kind of federal policing currently in place in Nigeria. It was the contention of the paper that, “the inefficiency of the policing arising from over centralization and the use of the police by the Federal Government as an instrument of oppression is some of the reasons that give rise to calls for state police”. The paper also made the point that, “since state police is supposed to be a community-based issue, it is difficult to imagine that efficiency would be served in a centralized system of police in a

federal system”. Nwolise (2012), in his support for state policing in Nigeria, asserts that, “the establishment of state police would be an excellent opportunity for Nigerians to recruit committed citizens, who can speak the people's language, understand the people's culture and share their values and aspirations, and therefore have no choice than to be people – friendly” .

Research Question Two (2): What lessons does Nigeria have to gain from the experience of United States Policing?

Answer: In an attempt to state the obvious, Odekunle (2004), lists a number of factors that bedevil the efficiency of the Nigeria Police Force. According to him, these factors include – corruption, poor funding, poor gadgets, psychological problem, poor training and retraining, faulty recruitment processes among others. It is believed that the above impediments have contributed immensely to the low rating of the Nigeria Police Force amongst the worst performers in Africa (2018).

Table 2: The Ten Worst Performing African Countries in Policing 2018

S/N	COUNTRY	INDEX SCORE
1	Nigeria	0.26
2	Congo	0.27
3	Kenya	0.3
4	Uganda	0.31
5	Mozambique	0.35
6	Cameroun	0.38
7	Sierra Leone	0.4
8	Ethiopia	0.4
9	Zambia	0.42
10	Madagascar	0.42

Source: International Police Science Association and Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017.

It is heart warming to observe the success story and experience of state policing in countries like Mexico, United States of America, Canada, Germany, India and Spain. These success stories must be attributable to certain features/factors which Nigeria must learn from. Thus the issue of features of the US State policing should be considered.

In summer 2014 and later on, the US State policing experienced series of difficulties which shook the agency to its foundations. The involvement of the

police in the deaths of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York; Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, added to several other controversial police use of force that received both national and international attention, made the force realise that, a controversial use of force by a police officer can jeopardize the stability of police department and its relationships with the community over night. Thus, a number of departments have started to build their use-of-force policies around statements of principle, emphasizing the sanctity of all human lives. In this direction, the Las Vega Metropolitan police Department must be commended for providing the leadership. Generally in the US, there is the growing recognition that officers are given the training that more effectively prepares them for the types of difficult situations they will face in the field. The whole emphasis is on minimizing the use of force which must constitute a vital component of the “culture” of policing. This culture of policing has some other components.

Accountability: To ensure that personnel operate in a fair and legal manner, police departments need systems of accountability. A variety of accountability mechanisms should be in place with mapped out procedures to ensure that mechanisms are in consistent use. Accountability mechanisms comprise supervision practices, disciplinary systems, internal audits and investigations, external oversight/review boards, and citizen complaint processes.

Early Intervention Systems: An Early Intervention System (EIS) refers to a computerized database of individual officer performance indicators which supervisors use to identify officers who may be engaging in improper or illegal conduct such as excessive or unnecessary use of force or abusive behaviour toward members of the community. “Having a robust Early Intervention System (EIS) is recognized as a best practice in policing” (PERF, 2005).

Internal Affairs (IA): This unit investigates complaints and allegations made by members of the community against members of the police team. Such allegations may include misconduct, corruption, inappropriate application of the department's policies and procedures, lack of professionalism, and some other issues.

Citizen Complaint Process: Members of the community should have no difficulty in lodging complaints about any experience with the police. This is to say that the police departments should have an open and accessible complaint process.

Complaint data should be tracked, and police departments should provide a way for complaints to follow up and learn the status and disposition of their complaints. Tracking complaints allows police departments to evaluate what types of complaints are most common and trends to analyze them.

Against the background of features of state policing in the United States, the study by Nwogwugwu and Kupoluyi (2015), presents state policing in line with the conception by committee of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology which models state policing in the quotes of Corcoran (1924) as:

A specially organized and highly trained body, acting under state rather than local authority, and constantly employed in the prevention of crime, the apprehension of criminals, and the protection of life and property generally throughout the state and especially in the rural and sparsely settled districts.

State police was necessitated following the experience of the United States of America in which:

The movement responds primarily to the increasing consciousness on the part of dwellers in rural and suburban districts of a need for a greater degree of police protection. The coming of the automobile and improved highways widened the range of crime and rendered its control more difficult. Local sheriffs and constables are not adequate nor specially fitted for this work. State militia is a clumsy and extremely expensive agency and is not trained for police duty. It is designed primarily as a supplement to the standing army for national defence. It is a movement toward centralization of government for the purpose of economy and efficiency (Corcoran, 1924).

Considering the advocacy for the introduction of state policing in Nigeria, this paper holds the view that, modelling the state police in Nigeria along the lines of the US State policing would ensure that the vices bedeviling the effectiveness of the security agency would be brought under control. This is more so as, “the Nigeria Police Force which is centrally controlled, has over the years metamorphosed to a state where it is allegedly characterised by various social vices such as graft, corruption, robbery and indiscipline (Tunde-Awe, 2005). On the whole, one strong view on the need for state policing in Nigeria was advanced by the ex-governor of Lagos State, Babatunde Fashola who argued that, “every

state that has the power and to give judgment through its state high courts and magistrates and make laws through its state assemblies and legislators must have the concomitant powers to enforce its law and police its state (Onwuzuluigbo, 2012). This is in line with the principle of Federalism on which Nigeria is founded.

Findings

This study revealed the following facts:

1. The centralized system of administration in the Nigeria Police Force has not facilitated the curbing of the menace of insecurity in the country. Insecurity in the country has assumed a magnitude whereby most Nigerians now sleep with one eye open as those who are lucky to escape burglars are kept awake all night by booming sounds of gunshots by those too powerful to be stopped.
2. Adequate policing should not be limited to the kind of Federal Policing currently in place in Nigeria. Thus, the sustenance of order, security of life, legality, development and democracy in Nigeria will be difficult until state policing is introduced.
3. The Federal Government of Nigeria uses the Federal Policing currently in existence, as an instrument of oppression and intimidation against opposition. This is one reason for the advocacy for state policing.
4. The state police is a community based outfit. Thus, its establishment would be an excellent opportunity for Nigerians to recruit committed citizens who speak, understand the people's language, understand their culture, share their values and aspirations, and have no other choice than to be people-friendly.
5. Certain factors are responsible for the inefficiency of the Nigeria Police Force. They include – corruption, poor funding, poor gadgets, psychological problem, poor training and retraining, faulty recruitment processes, etc. These factors have contributed to the rating of the force as one of the least (poor) performing forces in Africa for the year 2018.
6. Some countries have success stories associated with their state policing. They include – the US, Canada, Germany, India and Spain. Their success stories are attributable to certain features/factors which Nigeria should emulate or learn from. Some of the features include – Accountability, Early Intervention System, Internal Affairs (IA), and Citizen Complaint Process.

7. State policing is in tune with true Federalism in which the federating states have their legislatures, high courts and magistrate courts which make and interpret laws at the state level. It therefore, makes a constitutional sense that such states should also have their own police forces.

Conclusion

Nigeria became an independent state on 1st October, 1960. This puts the nation at over fifty-nine years as an independent nation. Again, emerging from a four-regional structure – North West, Mid-West and East, the nation today boasts of a 36 state structure and a Federal Capital Territory. Of great concern is that the population attained an alarming growth rate which is today placed at over one hundred and eighty 180 million. Against the background of the administrative structure and population just given, it is no secret to state that the whole population and structure has no guarantee in terms of security of the sovereignty as well as lives and property of its citizenry. It is therefore, little wonder why the “issue of insecurity” has always occupied the front burner of every segment of the media within and outside the country. This is clear evidence that its security outfit is grossly inefficient and inadequate.

The Nigeria Police Force is a centrally coordinated outfit which is a colossal failure to a point where it is rated among the “worst performing police forces in Africa for the year 2017” (International Police Science Association and Institute for Peace, 2017). The abysmal performance of the force has triggered the call for state policing in Nigeria. Though it may have its disadvantages, many believe it will lead to a lot of improvement in ameliorating the problem of insecurity in the country. This paper pointed out factors like corruption, poor funding, inadequate training, poor recruitment process, etc. as the bane of the current force which could be remedied by adopting the model of state policing of countries like the United States, Canada, India, etc. The factors accountable for the successful state policing in such countries should be adopted in Nigeria if the desired results should be attained while establishing state policing in this country.

Suggestions

The findings of this study have led to a number of suggestions which include:

1. The rising incidence of insecurity which is obvious should be brought to a meaningful check by the introduction of state policing across the states of the Federation. Government at the Federal level should embark on measures to make state policing a reality in the shortest possible time.

2. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provided for only a Federal Police Force should be revisited to provide for state policing with every necessary powers to make it effective and efficient.
3. Both the Federal and state police outfits should be adequately funded and equipped for effectiveness and efficiency.
4. Training and retraining of police personnel at every level should be in line with the background understanding of the sanctity of life as paramount.
5. Countries with success stories on state policing should constitute the model of the Nigerian State Police Departments. The United States is one such country. They have to be understudied to enable Nigeria learn those attributes/factors which account for the success of state policing in their countries.
6. The fight against corruption must be intensified particularly on the Nigeria Police Force since the menace is one reason for its poor showing.

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Chapter - 2

A Preliminary Discourse on Conceptions and some Strategies of Crime Prevention

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Introduction

This paper examines the concept of crime prevention as a strategy of limiting the opportunities of committing crimes in society. It also focused on the four major strategies of crime prevention viz: situational, community, developmental and law enforcement and criminal justice. It argued that no one single strategy is better than another, a better approach is one that has applied a combination of two or more of them in order to tackle the deficiency of the choice of one method that will eventually control and prevent crimes. While situational has short term manifests, the developmental and community may take a longer time. Comparatively, the strategy of law enforcement and criminal justice may be more costly than others. The paper recommends that any strategy of crime should theoretically examine criminal potentialities, opportunities, variation across individual offenders, offences and the societal context.

Conceptual Definition of Crime Prevention

Crime prevention has been defined as the deliberate attempt to tame the occurrence of crimes and the criminals from committing an offence. It aims at crime reduction as well as deterrence. At other times it is conceived to be the strategies adopted by governments (and the general public) to reduce crimes through the enforcement of the law and the maintenance of the criminal justice system. The public health inspired typology, using the terms primary, secondary and tertiary prevention to reflect the stages of (possible) entry into the criminal

justice system, is still commonly used but does not fully reflect the range of issues involved in preventing crime and developing safe communities (UNODC, 2010). Along this line, it has been suggested that it is possible to distinguish the three levels of prevention namely primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention elaborated by (UNODC, 2010) as follows:

1. **Primary prevention:** Focuses on the factors at the individual and family levels that are correlated with criminal participation. At the individual level factors such as attachment and involvement in school-related activities decrease the probability of criminal involvement. Family factors such as consistent parenting skills reduce the individual risk because the greater the number of risk factors present the greater the risk/tendency or vulnerability to criminal involvement. In other words, primary prevention is a type of prevention that is directed at modification of criminogenic conditions in the physical and social environment, it aids the development of programmes or initiatives aimed at those who have never been involved in the criminal justice system, such as programmes to educate or alert the general public or young people about domestic violence or bullying in schools.
2. **Secondary prevention:** On the other hand addresses techniques that focus on at-risk situations such as when youth drop out of school, or joined peers that engage in delinquent activities(as in gang membership). The target areas for secondary prevention are places or areas where the rates of crimes are high, such as in cities or 'hot spots'. In this respect it can be said that secondary prevention is a type of prevention that is directed at early identification and intervention in the lives of individuals or groups in criminogenic circumstances; further to this secondary prevention refers to programmes specifically targeted to children and young people who are identified by the social services, educational or justice systems as being at risk of involvement in crime.
3. **Tertiary prevention:** Is utilized as a reactive strategy of crime prevention. It is used after a crime has occurred and aimed at preventing the continuation of a particular criminal activity or to prevent successive incidents. For instance, after several attacks by insurgents, at police barracks, and some locations, preventive tertiary measures of new security policies were implemented to prevent future attacks in Northern Nigerian States in recent times. To this end, tertiary prevention is directed at the prevention of recidivism or repeat offenses among individuals in a given society. It refers to programmes for those who are in the criminal justice

system and/or returning to the community, with the aim of preventing re-offending (UNODC, 2010).

Andenaes (1958), has also differentiated between general and individual preventions. By general prevention, it refers to the ability of criminal law and its enforcement to make citizens law-abiding. If general prevention were to be 100% effective there would be no crime at all but this is an ideal situation. In addition, general prevention rests on mere frightening or deterrent effect of punishment, the risk of discovery and punishment far outweighing the temptation to commit crime. Punishment may be a psychological coercion directed against the citizens; a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act helps to form or strengthen the public's moral code and thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime. As such, punishment as the key to general prevention has three sorts of general preventive effects:

- (a) It may have deterrent effect
- (b) It may strengthen moral ambitions (moralizing effect)
- (c) It may stimulate habitual law-abiding conduct (Andenaes, 1958).

Individual prevention, on the other hand, refers to the effect of punishment on the punished, where the punished is rendered harmless for good, by means of capital punishment, banishment or temporarily incarcerated. In a more comprehensive definition the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010), defined crime prevention as:

Strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes (UNOIC, 2010).

Major Strategies of Crime Prevention

There are many strategies of crime prevention but for the purpose of this study four broad categories as defined by Clarke (1997) shall be examined namely (a) situational; (b) community; (c) law enforcement and criminal justice; and (d) developmental. It should be borne in mind that these strategies are not mutually exclusive as there are overlapping features among them. In addition, no one strategy is superior than another, except that one strategy will be more apt in one situation than in another and that among all the strategies enough evidence based on available studies have demonstrated the validity in applications (empirical researches) of the situational strategy of crime prevention over others. However, a

combination of the strategies will be more promising in an attempt to develop a more viable and effective preventive mechanisms to tame the tide of crime in the society.

1. Situational Crime Prevention

This strategy is defined as “a preventive approach that relies, not on improving society or its institutions, but simply on reducing opportunities for crime” (Clarke, 1997). Reducing opportunities of crime is achieved through some modifications or manipulations of the environment. The origins of this strategy are based on larger body of opportunity theory, which sees the offender “as heavily influenced by environmental inducements and opportunities and as being highly adoptable to changes in the situation (Clarke, 1997). An exhaustive analysis of the theoretical and principles of strategy is beyond the scope of this chapter, but suffice it to say that such can be found in the writings of many scholars (Clarke, 1997).

Situational crime prevention strategy is one of the most well-focused approaches to crime prevention among scholars. In that, it gained prominence among scholars, and criminal justice agencies, as it proved to be a successful strategy that is helpful in preventing crimes due to its appealing nature. Spagnoletti (2005) identified the objectives of situational crime prevention as increasing the perceived difficulty of crime, increasing the risks; and reducing the rewards.

According to Clarke (1983) it focuses or proceeds from an analysis of the circumstances giving rise to specific kinds of crime, and introduces a discrete managerial and environmental change to reduce the opportunity for those crimes to occur. Situational crime prevention, therefore, focuses on the settings for crime, rather than to detect and sanction offenders. It seeks not to eliminate criminal or delinquent tendencies through improvement of society and or its institutions, but merely to make criminal action less attractive to offenders so that the crime itself is prevented from taking place. As a preventive mechanism for crime, its central preoccupation is not the criminal justice system, but a host of public and private organizations and agencies such as schools, hospital, shops, industrial organization etc, whose services and operations creates different and vast range of crimes (Clarke, 1983).

It can be argued that situational crime prevention strategy has taken criminology to task, as Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) asserted that, the problem of explaining crime has been confused in criminology with explaining the criminal. Most

theories have been concerned with explanation as to why certain individuals or groups are more likely to be exposed to particular psychological or, social influences, inherited characteristics that predispose them to become involved in either delinquency or crime. However, this does not explain the reasons why crime occurs in society; it requires not only the motivated offender but also the opportunity for crime. In addition, it requires what Cohen and Felson (1979) called the availability of a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Criminal dispositions alone cannot explain crime but have to be merged with situational factors favoring crime, which consequently produces the criminal act itself (Ekblom, 1994).

Further to this, scholars added that there was confusion between the problems of controlling crime with that of dealing with the criminal. It was often assumed that the quickest way to reduce crime is to focus on the potential offender or actual offender. There was emphasis on only two forms of control formal and informal social control mechanisms.

Farrington (1997) submitted that in discussing situational crime prevention the following factors must be noted:

- a. It is directed at specific categories of crime clarifications must be made not on broad categories of crime but rather on specifics, for example, robbery and burglary are broad crimes so effort should be made to clarify the specific aspect of each. There is a need for a distinction on the measures aimed at preventing the crime. For instance, between measures targeted at preventing domestic burglaries whose targets are electronic goods with those needed to prevent domestic burglaries targeted at cash or jewellery.
- b. There should be an implicit recognition that a wide range of offenders with a variety of motives to satisfy, and employing different methods may be involved in committing specific offences. All people have some probability of committing crime depending on the situations they find themselves. Therefore, situational crime prevention has no distinction between criminals and others.
- c. The third element in situational crime prevention is that changing the environment is deliberately aimed at affecting the assessment by potential offenders, about the costs and benefits of crime. This determines the likelihood of committing an offense, thus it must be noted that there is rationality and adaptability on the part of offenders in committing crimes that should not be taken for granted.

- d. Potential offenders often make judgments on the moral costs of offending. For example, a person may steal some products from where s/he works, but may not be prepared to abuse an elderly person on the street or in his community. Not all offences are equally reprehensive even among hardened criminals.
- e. Situational crime prevention is general, it cut across all crimes, it is not limited to 'opportunistic', or property offenses; neither for more calculated, or deeply motivated ones. Whether offences fall under the realm of all these factors mentioned, they are all heavily affected by situational contingencies (Tedeschi and Felson, 1994 cited in Clarke, 1997).

Furthermore, situational crime prevention also pays attention to the offender's background and current circumstances in respect of the moods and feelings; moral judgments regarding the act in question; perception of criminal opportunities and ability to take advantage of therein/create them and; assessment of the risk of being caught as well as of the likely consequences. More to this, Clarke (1997) has classified situational crime prevention into sixteen techniques of preventing the occurrence of crime as follows:

- i. **Target hardening:** An obvious, often highly effective way of reducing criminal opportunities is to obstruct the potential vandal or the thief by physical barriers through the use of locks, safes, screens or reinforced materials in a potential target of committing a crime.
- ii. **Access control:** Access control refers to measures intended to exclude potential offenders from places such as offices, factories and apartment blocks. A sophisticated form of access control lies in the use of for example; electronic personal identification numbers (PINs) that are needed to gain access to computer systems and bank accounts. A combination of access controls such as entry phones, fencing around apartment blocks and electronic access to the parking garage, are measures that can achieve a significant reduction in vandalism and theft.
- iii. **Deflecting offenders:** The possibility of chaos or conflict which often produce the tendency to commit crimes can be prevented using the deflection method. For instance, in order to avoid clashes among football fans during matches rival groups of fans can be segregated in the stadium to reduce fighting and their arrival and departure be scheduled to avoid the periods of waiting around that promote trouble (Clarke, 1983). In addition, congestions in motor parks, and shopping stores can reduce the

possibility of pick-pocketing as Poyner (1992) show that thefts from shopping bags at markets in Birmingham, England, were substantially reduced by reducing congestion around the stalls/stores, which increased the difficulty of pick-pocketing and other "stealth" thefts.

- iv. **Controlling facilitators:** Often in order to prevent crimes many attempts are done to control facilitators to crime. Such include guns, glasses, and other instruments that may be used to commit crimes. Many shops and organizations in advanced societies routinely required customers to surrender their weapons on entry because of the risk of drunken gunfights. At some places that sell beer, it was suggested that it should be served in plastic mugs instead of glass so as to prevent their use as weapons. Controls on a range of other crime facilitators have been proposed including checks and credit cards (which facilitate fraud) and telephones (which may facilitate drug dealing, fraud and sexual harassment). To reduce drug dealing, payphones have been removed from places where drug dealers congregate or have been altered to make them more difficult to use for dealing.
- v. **Entry/exit screening:** For Farrington, (1997) entry screening differs from access control in that the purpose is less to exclude potential offenders than to increase the likelihood of detecting those that are not in conformity with entry requirements. These requirements may relate to prohibited goods and objects or to possession of tickets and documents. Exit screens, on the other hand, serve primarily to deter theft by detecting objects that should not be removed from the protected area, such as items not paid for at a shop. Developments in electronics have resulted in the increasing use of these situational techniques in retailing, as evidenced by the spread of merchandise tagging, bar-coding and "electronic point of sales" systems (Hope, 1995).

In addition, the installation of book detection screens, as found in thousands of libraries, reduced thefts of both books and audiovisual materials at one University of Wisconsin library by more than 80 percent. More to this, as an example of the efficacy of these techniques, has been the introduction of baggage and passenger screening at most major airports in the world during the early 1970s. This contributed to a precipitate reduction in the number of airline hijackings from about 70 per year to about 15 (Wilkinson, 1977, 1986; Landes, 1978; Scherdin 1986 cited in Clarke, 1997).

- vi. Formal surveillance:** Formal surveillance is provided by police, security guards and store detectives, whose main function is to furnish a deterrent threat to potential offenders. The surveillance afforded by security personnel may be enhanced by electronic hardware, for example by burglar alarms and closed circuit television (CCTV). Further, when CCTV cameras were installed for the use of security personnel at a university's parking lots, Poyner (1992) found a substantial reduction in car theft. Therefore formal surveillance is a combination of both human and electronic technology for crime prevention.
- vii. Surveillance by employees:** In addition to their primary function, some employees, particularly those dealing with the public, also perform a surveillance role by virtue of their position. These include a variety of "place managers" such as shop assistants, hotel doormen, park keepers, parking lot attendants and train conductors. All these employees assume some responsibility for monitoring conduct in their workplaces. In this strategy there is natural surveillance where householders may trim bushes at the front of their homes and banks may light the interior of their premises at night in attempting to capitalize upon the "natural" surveillance provided by people going about their everyday business. Natural surveillance is a prime objective of improved street lighting and an opportunity to create a defensible space (Mayhew, 1979). At other times there could be what is called an "apartment watch" program which can take care of some residential locations to be covered by the people who are assigned to do the watch.
- viii. Target removal:** In situations where potential offenders have identified a target, the best way to prevent crime from occurring is to remove the target. If money is being deposited in a particular target then the tendency for theft risk is reduced through "target removal." In the case of public payphones that are constructed with glasses that can easily be broken, they can be replaced with booths that are stronger to prevent them from being vandalized because of the large amount of cash found due to the use of coins. Or in the alternative, a phone card can be utilized as a strategy of target removal. A variety of cash reduction measures, including the use of safes with time locks, substantially reduced robberies of betting shops in Australia. Finally, a successful "low tech" application of target removal that consisted of persuading in-patients to surrender their valuables for safekeeping, or not to bring them to the hospital, has been described as a measure for target removal.

- ix. Identifying property:** Writing one's name in a book is a simple form of property marking - a space is provided in a book for that purpose. The most developed programs of identifying property relate to vehicles. Registration of motor vehicles was required in most countries of the world and is one form of preventing theft. This is because of their unique identification number and often at times a 'checking' on registration update and show of "proof of ownership" has protected many automobiles from theft.
- x. Reducing temptation:** In order to reduce the temptations to commit crimes, certain aspects that predispose crimes have to be avoided. In certain city streets, it is unwise to wear gold chains or leave cars parked which are attractive to "joy riders" (Clarke and Harris, 1992b). It has also been found in extensive experimental research that the mere presence of a weapon, such as a gun, can induce aggressive responses in some people this is known as the "weapons effect". Another example of reducing temptation is "rapid repair" on the grounds that leaving damaged items un-repaired invites further attacks.
- xi. Denying benefits:** Related to reducing temptation, but conceptually distinct is denying the benefits of crime to offenders. The recent development of security-coded car radios that require a thief to know the radio's PIN before it can be used in another vehicle constitutes an excellent example of this principle so as to reduce the rewards of burglary.
- xii. Rule setting:** All organizations find it necessary to have rules about conduct in their fields of governance. For example, most businesses regulate employees' telephone use and all retail establishments require their employees to follow strict cash handling and stock control procedures. Organizations such as hospitals, schools, parks, transportation systems, hotels and restaurants must, in addition, regulate the conduct of the clientele they serve. Any ambiguity in these regulations will be exploited where it is to the advantage of the individual. One important strand of situational prevention, therefore, is rule setting - the introduction of new rules or procedures (and the clarification of those in place), which are intended to remove any ambiguity concerning the acceptability of conduct. Once all such is done there is the possibility that the rules are obeyed and less tendency to break them or commit offence.
- xiii. Stimulating conscience:** This situational technique can be distinguished from society's more general informal social control by its focus on specific forms of crime occurring in discrete, highly limited settings. Rather than

attempting to bring about lasting changes in generalized attitudes to law-breaking, these measures serve simply to stimulate feelings of conscience at the point of contemplating the commission of a specific kind of offence. For example, a department store may decide to place a sign at store entrances that announce that “shoplifting is stealing” or places where it is proclaimed that “smoking here is illegal, selfish and rude.” All these strategies help to informally control the behaviour of potential crime violators and help to prevent the occurrence offences.

xiv. Controlling disinhibitors: Crime is not only facilitated by tools such as weapons, but also by psychological disinhibitors, which include: (i) alcohol and drugs, which undermine the usual social or moral inhibitions, or impair perception and cognition so that offenders are less aware of breaking the law (ii) propaganda, which can be directed at the dehumanization of target groups and can provide the moral certainties and justifications that ordinary people need to commit atrocities and war crimes; and (iii) television violence, which like propaganda, might reduce or break down those inhibitions against being violent that parents and other socializing agencies have been building up in boys.

xv. Facilitating compliance: When Lombroso suggested in the 19th century that people should be locked up for publicly urinating in the streets, his pupil Ferri suggested an alternative more in keeping with the spirit of this book - the provision of public urinals. Ferri's suggestion constitutes an example of facilitating compliance, the sixteenth opportunity-reducing technique. This has wide application such as improved checkout procedures in libraries, which remove delay and thus excuses for failing to comply with rules for book borrowing. Though reductions in crime may be considerable (often more than 50 percent), situational measures usually ameliorate, not eliminate a problem (Clarke, 1997).

2. Community Crime Prevention

The second crime prevention strategy is community crime prevention. Hope (1995) has defined community crime prevention as the actions intended to change the social conditions that are believed to sustain crime in residential communities. It concentrates on the ability of local social institutions to reduce crime in residential areas. In societies there are diverse groupings and organizations in the form of families, friendship networks, and clubs, associations that bring people together within communities, these are what make up the social structure of communities.

As such, there has been a continuous and consistent pattern of chronological research suggesting that community structure itself shapes local rates of crime—that community crime rates may be the result of something more than the mere aggregation of individual propensities for criminality or victimization (Sampson 1987a; Bursik and Grasmik, 1993).

Along this line, Bursik and Grasmick (1993) have noted the importance of horizontal and vertical dimensions of social relations in communities and both are crucial elements for crime prevention in communities. For horizontal, it refers to the social relations among individuals and groups sharing a common residential space. In this situation, there exist complex expressions of affection, loyalty, reciprocity or dominance among residents, whether demonstrated through informal or formal activities. In the 'vertical' it is a type dimension of social relations that connect local institutions to sources of power and resources in the wider society, of which the locality is acknowledged to be a part. In essence, while the mechanism for maintaining local order may be expressed primarily through the horizontal dimension, the strength of this expression and its effectiveness in controlling crime derives, in large part, from the vertical connections that residents of localities have to extra communal resources. Many approaches to crime prevention have either neglected to address sufficiently the vertical dimension of community power (or powerlessness) or have met with failure or resistance. The paradox of community crime prevention thus stems from the problem of trying to build community institutions that control crime in the face of powerlessness to withstand the pressures toward crime in the community, whose source or the forces that sustain them, derive from the wider social structure (Hope, 1995).

Community crime prevention is thought to be some combination of situational and development crime prevention. There is little agreement in the academic literature on the definition of community prevention and the types of programmes that fall within it (Bennet, 1990). However, Hope (1995), maintained that local social situations as those in families, associations, youth clubs, etc are usually the medium by which these programmes are delivered to tackle crime problems. More to this, Hope (1998) identified six general categories of community crime prevention programmes that are not mutually exclusive.

- I. **Community organization:** This is done through the establishment of community-based associations to foster desirable socialization and integrate young people into the wider community, for instance, in

recreational activities or services where the young are taught aspects of community life;

- ii. **Community defense:** Through increasing the perceived risks of offending, by establishing voluntary neighborhood watch, such as vigilante group;
- iii. **Order maintenance:** By tackling the physical and personal disorder or petty crimes in the community it may be by disallowing people to be engaged in activities like public drinking, smoking, deflating etc. By so doing it has the effect of order maintenance in the community;
- iv. **Risk based:** This can be done by targeting scientifically identified risk factors for delinquency and other anti-social behaviours at the levels of both the individual and the community;
- v. **Community Development:** This is the rebuilding of the social, physical and economic fabric of neighborhoods. It involves a framework of decentralization of housing management and services;
- vi. **Structural change:** This strategy is complex and unlikely to be driven by local action due to its enormity; it involves alteration of the macro level social and economic policies (governmental action, addressing employment, poverty education income, etc).

One of the utility and or justification with which the community crime prevention strategy heavily depended is the emphasis it places on the community crime prevention paradigms. This is especially associated with the consequences of the demographic and economic expansion of cities. The three paradigms are:

- a. *Community Organizing*, mostly associated with the treatment of the urban condition put forward by the Chicago school of sociology; in the works of Shaw and Mc Kay (1969);
- b. *Tenant Involvement* though associated with the former, but its emphasis owes its response to the problems associated with the growth of public housing;
- c. *Resource Mobilization* a model that came to be embodied with changes in the USA in the 1960s associated with the “war on poverty”.

Community crime prevention includes efforts to control crime by altering building and neighbourhood design to increase natural surveillance and guardianship, by improving the physical appearance of areas, by organizing community residents to take preventive actions and to solicit additional political and material resources, and by organizing self-conscious community crime prevention strategies such as recreational programs for children.

This strategy of crime prevention is also called *locally-based crime prevention*, instead of targeting individuals; it targets areas where the risks of becoming involved in crime or being victimized are high. This includes areas with high levels of deprivation, both in terms of infrastructure, services and wealth, or lack of community cohesion. This can include slums and informal settlements, or inner-city or suburban housing projects, often areas with a concentration of economic and social problems. Such programmes work to increase the sense of safety and security of the residents of particular communities, to respond to community concerns and crime problems affecting the population and to increase the services and social capital or social cohesion in the community. “Social capital” generally refers to the network of social relationships, trust and shared values, community involvement or a sense of civic identity that exist in a neighbourhood (UNODC, 2010).

In summary, community crime prevention often involves the active participation of local residents and organizations in those communities and neighbourhoods. They may be involved in identifying local priorities as well as implementing responses. The term “community” can refer to small neighbourhoods, areas within a city, or small villages or towns, or in some cases groups of citizens with particular concerns. Collectively they come together to change the prevailing activities that happen in their community, crime inclusive.

3. Criminal Justice Crime Prevention

The third crime prevention strategy is known as criminal justice and law enforcement. It is a strategy of crime prevention that rests on the assumption that one of the primary reasons why criminal laws are enacted and enforced is to prevent crimes escalating in the society. This is why criminal punishment follows for violations of the laws/rules of the state. Crimes in this respect are considered to represent a manifestation of the moral failure from the part of lawbreakers (wrongdoers) and the only appropriate way to handle the situation is to enforce the law, sanction the offenders, or condemn them as a broad based state policy for crime prevention (Farrington, 1995). However, criminologists have argued from a number of perspectives that the criminal justice system has not been particularly successful in pointing to innovative or effective crime control strategies (Clarke 1983; Felson 1994). Police patrols are not ineffectual, but in the context of limited resources, their scope for increased efficacy is bounded; similarly, sentencing options, including the increased use of imprisonment, have a general deterrent

effect to an extent, but within the limits of what is acceptable in society, the deterrent effects have probably been reached (Clarke 1983; Felson 1994).

The strategy of enactment and enforcement of law directly or indirectly affect the behavior to protect citizens from crime prevention. It made possible that potential offenders are deterred by fear of sanctions such as incarcerations and other punitive measures. As a conventional method, this strategy also utilizes incapacitation, rehabilitation and indirectly through the effects of socialization, as such crimes can be prevented through revisions of criminal codes to suit changing circumstances. It has been argued that changes in criminal laws can prevent crimes in some indirect ways also. For instance, people refrain from activities because they are illegal. The existence of law that are part of the normative prescriptions within which individuals' values and beliefs take shape, tend to affect the tendency to violate laws or not. Many people refrain from violent or property crimes because they have been socialized to believe that those actions are wrong (morally).

As for the direct effects of enforcement and criminal law, it has been agreed among scholars that they act as a preventive mechanism for crimes because deterrence or general prevention is seen to be the primary purpose for maintenance of criminal punishment (Von Hirsch; 1976; Moris 1974; Farrington, 1995). To sum up, it was Wilson (1983) that explicated the crime control perspective of the criminal justice. Criminals for him, lack inhibition against misconduct, value the excitement and thrills of breaking the law, have a low stake in conformity and are willing to take greater chances than average person. If they could be convinced that their actions will bring punishment, only the totally irrational would be willing to engage in crime. Therefore, restraining offenders and preventing their future misdeeds, he argued is a much more practical goal of the criminal justice system than trying to eradicate the root causes of crime such as poverty, poor schools, family breakdown etc.

For him, crime rates trend upward, when criminals do not sufficiently fear apprehension and punishment. As such, if the efficiency of the system could be increased and the criminal law could be toughened, crime rates would eventually decline. Though crime control may be expensive, reducing the pains of criminal activity is well worth the price. In addition, the focus of justice should be on the victim not the criminal, so that innocent people can be protected from the ravages of crime. This objective can be achieved through more effective police protection,

tough sentences, and the construction of prisons designed to safely incapacitate hardened criminals. If punishment was both certain and severe, few will be tempted to break the law as the perspective frowns at any legal technicality that may help the guilty go free and tie the hands of justice (Senna and Segal, 2001).

4. Developmental or Social Development

In other words, this strategy is referred to as crime prevention through social development it includes a range of social, educational, health and training programmes, such as those that target at-risk children or families when the children are very young, to provide them with support and child-rearing skills. Some early intervention programmes are also referred to as developmental crime prevention since they try to intervene to develop resilience and social skills among children and their families. Programmes may also target groups of children in areas where children and young people are at particular risks, such as street children or children living in informal settlements or disadvantaged areas. Other examples include education projects in schools, or recreation and skills training projects for children and young people in the community, also in an attempt to increase awareness and resilience as they grow up and develop (UNOIC, 2010).

Most recently, attention has been given to developmental prevention. Developmentalists typically researchers in psychology, education, psychiatry, medicine, and public health have not traditionally been much interested in crime but have nonetheless documented that risk factors that are predictive of delinquency and crime are also predictive of many other forms of antisocial behaviour. Consequently, reducing these risk factors or increasing protective factors could have wide-ranging and cost-effective benefits. Crime prevention from a developmental perspective is largely based on the idea that criminal activity is determined by behavioural and attitudinal patterns that have been learned during an individual's development. The developmental perspective can be long-term for example when early childhood behaviour is linked to adult criminal behaviour or short-term-for example, when behaviours learned in a treatment situation are linked to a six-month follow-up of recidivism. In both cases, the assumption is that earlier experience determines later behaviour.

In addition, most theories of human development have addressed the issue of criminal behaviour. Analytical, behavioural, and sociological theories have concluded that the differences in criminal behaviour could be explained by differences in earlier experiences (e.g., Eysenck, 1964; Feldman 1969; Sutherland

and Cressey, 1978). That was why Tonry and Farrington (1995) opined that developmental prevention is type of intervention designed to prevent the development of criminal potential in individuals, especially those targeting risk and protective factors discovered in studies of human development. However, developmental theories suggest that not only are some individuals more prone than others to commit crimes, given the same situation, but they are also more prone than others to place themselves in situations that favour criminal activity (delinquent peer association; see Cairns et al. 1989; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Thus, individuals create their own environment, and the forces behind this phenomenon can be found in their genetic and ontogenetic history (see, e.g., Scarr and McCartney 1983; Rowe, 1994).

According to Tremblay and Craig (1995) longitudinal studies of children's development in industrialized countries led to the identification of three broad categories of risk and protective factors: individual characteristics, family characteristics, and environmental characteristics. Further to this, among individual characteristics, those that have been found to be most strongly associated with later delinquent behaviour are childhood disruptive behaviour (opposition, aggression, and hyperactivity) and cognitive deficits (low IQ, inattentiveness, poor school performance). Among family characteristics, parental deviance, parental rejection, parental discord, ineffective discipline, and poor supervision appear to be the key risk factors. Among environmental characteristics, the key factors appear to be poor, disorganized neighbourhoods, where criminality is higher, schools are less well organized, and association with deviant peers is more likely.

Summary and Conclusion

The paper is an attempt made to conceptualize and examined four major strategies of crime prevention. It encapsulates that crime prevention is a deliberate strategy of halting the occurrence of crimes, so as to serve as a deterrence on others and reduce crimes. It further saw a distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary preventions. As for primary prevention, the focus is on the individual and family factors responsible for criminal participation, such as involvement and attachment. However, at secondary where the rates of crimes are high, the focuses are on risk factors such as peer influence, urban environment which increases the criminogenic potentialities. Whereas at tertiary prevention strategy, issues related to reactive measures are emphasized. Those reactive measures occur after the crimes have been committed, for instance, robberies, attacks by insurgents,

kidnappings, cattle rustling. This strategy is aimed at the development of new security policies to prevent future occurrences. The paper, in addition to these conceptual clarifications also highlighted four major strategies of crime prevention as situational, community, criminal justice/law enforcement, and developmental/social development. It saw situational as a strategy of making it difficult or impossible for the potential criminal to commit crime.

Measures like target hardening, surveillance, deflection, access control and exit screening, many others are enforced. The community strategy, on the other hand, concentrates on actions intended to reduce crimes in the community through community organization, defence (vigilante), order maintenance, risk-based factors, and community development. Criminal justice strategy in retrospect is aimed at enforcement of the law to violators, through the mechanism of punishment, sanction or condemn, so as to serve as a deterrence on potential law-breakers. Finally, at the developmental level, crime prevention concentrates on social development. This is a strategy that targets at-risk children and young ones or families. This is through early interventions on skills by provision of support which may include street children and disadvantaged young ones in areas such as streets and displaced environments (for example IDPs). On the whole, it is the submission of this paper that no one of the four strategies examined is strong and capable enough to prevent crimes. Therefore, for any successful crime prevention to succeed a combination of two or more depending on the nature and typology of crime is required or even the application of all so as to have a more desirable outcome in our society.

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Chapter - 3

Minority Revolts and Uprising in the Niger Delta

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Abstract

The study examined the origin of minority revolts and uprising in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in order to ascertain the factors responsible and the actors involved. The study observed that the foundation for revolts and uprising in the Niger Delta region were laid by the colonial masters during the pre-colonial and colonial era. The study relied on secondary sources of data and the basic human needs theory as its theoretical framework. The data obtained were analysed qualitatively. Findings from the study revealed that unequal level of trade, alienation, marginalization of the aborigines etc. accounts for minority revolts and uprising in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region. However, sustainable peace and development could return to the Niger Delta if conscious effort is made to review all existing development policies and programmes in the regions with a view to charting a new course for the people of the region. Policies and laws that will aid and accelerate development in the Niger Delta should also be given accelerated hearing and treated as an issue of national importance.

Keywords: *Minority revolts, Uprising, Niger Delta Region, Policies and programmes.*

Introduction

It is on record that conflicts such as the invasion of the Benin Empire, the Akassa raid etc. took place during the pre-colonial and colonial era hence, indicating that uprising and revolts in the Niger Delta has a long history. During the period, economic control of the resources in the area was a major source of disagreement. The situation continued even after independence in 1960 with the multinational oil companies dominating the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. Refusal to adhere to the demand of groups and organizations in the Niger Delta no doubt led to increased distrust between the Niger Delta people, the oil companies and the federal government thus, leading to constant protests and demonstrations including destruction of properties and oil installation facilities in the Niger Delta region. Minority revolts and uprising in the Niger Delta took a new dimension from 1999 – 2006 when arms struggle was introduced as part of the struggle in 1999 via the famous Kaiama Declaration. The consequent militarization of the Niger Delta further led to the proliferation of militant groups and camps across the Niger Delta. The nature of the Niger Delta conflict and the factors responsible for minority revolts and uprising in the oil-rich region forms the major thrust of this paper.

Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis

In every investigation, theory and methodology play a major role in driving the process of any research to its logical conclusion. Thus, the need for an analytical framework in an investigation was re-enforced by Lieber (1992) who contents that behind every concept or an analysis, there is a theory or view point, which make it possible for the presentation and interpretation of facts. Clearly therefore, for there to be reliability in an investigation, there is a need for scholars and researchers to come out with models, or the formulation of theories, for empirical theory seeks to create knowledge that is impersonal, retraceable and cumulative (Lieber, 1992).

It is in the light of this that this study adopted the basic human needs theory in order to examine the subject-matter. Basic human needs scholars argued that certain basic human needs are fundamental and essential to the wellbeing of the individual and when these needs are not available, the human mind and body will not be at peace. The basic human needs theory posits that the absence of basic human needs such as shelter, water, food clothing, medical etc. can influence the conduct, attitude and character of the deprived individual towards crime and anti-

social behaviour which can affect the society negatively. Burton (1997) also argued that when people are deprived or excluded from the decision making process in any society, unending conflict will be the order of the day hence, he cautioned that the basic and essential needs of individuals be identified and given top priority in the decision making process. According to Burton (1997) individuals are prepared to go to any height to defy governments, institutions and authorities in order to actualize their needs. The need for security, identity, recognition and self-actualization are crucial to the understanding of destructive social conflicts hence, failure by states and societies to recognise and satisfy such needs account for most community based conflicts in Africa today. This theory is relevant to the study because prolonged neglect and alienation of the people by the oil multinational companies and the federal government accounts for the conflict and revolts in the Niger Delta. Policy measures that should address the basic needs of the people have also failed to address the fundamental problems facing the people. The basic human needs theory as applied in this study clearly argued that understanding the basic needs and real causes of any conflict helps the state and the society to address or minimise such conflict with ease hence, it is imperative for conflict scholars to examine the fundamental drives of any conflict before making efforts to resolve them. Proponents of the basic human needs theory include: Burton (1997), Maslow (1943), Galtung (1969) and Six (1990).

Conceptual Analysis

This section of the study examined the views and opinions of scholars and researchers on the subject-matter. Nigeria's Niger Delta crisis can be linked to the pre-colonial and colonial era when legitimate trade replaced slave trade. It will be recalled that the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference which partitioned and bastardized African boundaries and territories in favour of colonial interest led to the influx of British Naval gun boats and merchants into the pre-colonial marginalization through trade and missionary activities and the signing of treaties which in turn compelled Niger Delta chiefs to transfer trade and the resources in the hinterland to the British colonial masters/agents. Failure or refusal to sign trade treaties led to the annexation of Lagos in 1861, dethronement and imposition of warrant chiefs in different part of the Niger Delta as well as other parts of the nation (Preboye, 2005, 116). From when oil was discovered in 1956 at Oloibiri community in Ogbia local government area of Bayelsa state, the level of alienation of the Niger Delta people and other minorities in Nigeria became intensified and more sophisticated. IKporukpo (2011) captured the plight of the Niger Delta people when he stated thus:

The Ogoni are embattled and imperilled since oil was discovered in the area in 1958, they have been the victims of deadly ecological war in which no blood is spilled, no bones are broken and no one is maimed. But people die all the time. Men, women and children are at risk, plant, wildlife and fish are destroyed, the air and water are poisoned and finally the land dies. Today, Ogoni has been reduced to a waste land (cited in Sarowiwa 1995, 131).

While explaining the reasons for continuous agitation and protests in the Niger Delta Etekepe (2007) argued that certain policies of the Nigerian government has been a calculated attempt to perpetually undermine the Niger Delta and other minorities in Nigeria. According to him, even when federal development agencies and boards are set up for the Niger Delta, loyalists for destabilization (non-Niger Deltans) are appointed at the management level. He argued further that constituting development agencies/boards with members from non-oil producing communities/states as members was detrimental as such members or group will always work against the interest of the Niger Delta region and people. This development is no doubt responsible for the in-fighting and frequent dissolution of boards like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). On the need to review and re-examine the laws and policies that constitute hindrance to minority ethnic groups in Nigeria, Prince Tony Momoh, stated that the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and the Land Use Act will make it difficult for the Niger Delta people to manage their resources. In a publication captioned “No justice no peace in the Niger Delta” published in the Newswatch Magazine of August 4th 2008, Prince Tony Momoh proposed that laws that denied the general population of the control of their resources ought to be investigated or revoked in order to reduce the hardship faced by the Niger Delta people.

Arugu (2013) however contended that multinational oil companies have contributed to the growth and development of less developed countries but that their unethical practices designed for exploitation and profit maximization have also injured the economy of developing countries. Arugu (2013) listed the following as unethical practices carried out by multinational oil companies against their host communities: Gas flaring, environmental pollution, refusal to transfer technology/expertise, recapitalization through over invoicing, under invoicing, tax evasion and intrusion and interference in local politics etc.

Analysis Showing the Reasons for Minority Revolts and Uprising in the Niger Delta

In spite of international and local legislations on gas flaring, multinational oil companies in Nigeria have failed to adhere to laid down rules and regulations on gas flaring hence, life expectancy and fertility is slow in the Niger Delta region. The data on gas flaring below clearly shows that the activities of multinational oil companies have further impoverished the people of Niger Delta who are often undercompensated whenever oil spills and pollution occur in the region.

Table 1: Flaring of Natural Gas in Major Oil Producing Countries (% of Gross Production in 1991)

Country	% Flared
USA	0.6
Holland	0.0
Britain	4.3
Ex-USSR**	1.5
Mexico	5.1
OPEC Countries	
Nigeria	76.0
Libya	21.0
Saudi Arabia	20.0
Iran	19.0
Algeria	4.0
OPEC TOTAL	18.0
World Total	4.8

Source: Adapted from *Defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta* (vo. 1) World Bank Report, 1995:59).

Table 2: Perceived causes of oil spills in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria

Sample Location	Sample Size	Percentage Response			
		No. of Spills	Oil companies carelessness	Sabotage	Both
Ogboloma (Elelebou)	30	0.0	86.7	3.3	10.0
Oporoma	30	0.0	76.7	0.0	23.0
Okwuzi	30	3.3	93.3	0.0	3.3
Afam-Ukwu	31	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Obri kom	34	0.0	91.2	2.9	5.9
Aggregate for East	155	0.6	89.7	1.3	8.4
Afiesere	40	2.5	35.0	7.5	55.0
Olomoro	38	0.0	36.8	13.2	50.0
Oweh	42	0.0	19.0	0.0	81.0
Ozoro	41	0.0	26.8	14.6	58.5
Uzere	45	0.0	60.0	11.1	28.9
Aggregate for West	206	0.5	35.9	9.2	54.4
All locations	361	0.6	59.0	5.8	34.6

Source: C. O. Ikporukpo (1995, 28)

The exploitation of mineral resources in the Niger Delta region coupled with under assessment and under payment of compensation benefits by multinational oil companies and their Nigerian collaborators no doubt contributed to high level of poverty in the Niger Delta as reflected in the table below.

Table 3: The Niger Delta human poverty index 2005

S/N	State	Probability Birth of Not Surviving to age 40	Adult Literacy Rate	Un-weighted Average	HP I – 1
1	Abia	26	26	34	29.169
2	Akwa Ibom	27	28	35.5	30.649
3	Bayelsa	30	31	39	33.826
4	Cross River	26	28	33	29.3
5	Delta	20	18	27	22.355
6	Edo	22	18	28	23.399
7	Imo	25	29	32	28.949
8	Ondo	30	31	42.5	35.442
9	Rivers	24	24	30.5	26.53
10	Niger Delta	25.556	25.889	33.4	28.847

Source: Vanguard, August 26, 2007: 4 oil exploration actions and their impact on the Niger Delta environment

The data on table 4 below also shows that minority revolts and militia uprising in the Niger Delta occur frequently before the proclamation of the presidential amnesty policy by the federal government of Nigeria in June 2009.

Table 4: List of Militant Camps and Commanders in the Niger Delta Region as At 30th June 2009

S/N	Name of camp	Location	Stats of Camp	Leader(s)
1	Olugbobiri	Southern Ijaw (SILGA Bayelsa State)	Major	Joshua Mckiver
2	Korokorosei	SILGA Bayelsa State	Major	Africa Owei
3	Okiegbene/Ebrigbene (Ikebiri I and II)	SILGA Bayelsa State	Major	
4	Robert Creek	Nembe, Bayelsa State	Major	
5	Cowthorne Channel	Nembe, Bayelsa State	Major	
6	Camps	Warri South Delta State	Major	Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo) and Henry Okah
7	Okerenkoko	Warri , Delta State	Major	
8	Opuraza	Warri, Delta State	Major	
9	Azuzuama	SILGA Bayelsa State	Major	Jackson
10	Gbekenegbene	SILGA Bayelsa State	Minor	Not available
11	Ezetu	SILGA Bayelsa State	Minor	Victor Ben Ebikabowei (Boyloaf)
12	Agge	SILGA Bayelsa State	Minor	
13	Kurutiye, Forupa and Okubie	SILGA Bayelsa State	Minor	Not available
14	Ken Camp	Odi, Bayelsa State	Minor	Ken
15	Egbema camp	Warri, Delta State	Minor	Kem Agbakara
16	Ubefan	Warri, Delta State	Minor	John Togo
17	Berger Camp	Warri, Delta State	Minor	Inilo Sinite
18	Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (UNFVF)	Akuku-Tori, Rivers State	Major	Alhaji Asari Dokubo
19	Niger Delta Volunteer Movement (NDVM)	Okirika, Rivers State	Major	Tom Ateke
20	Borokiri (Icelanders/Outlaw cult)	Borokiri, Port Harcourt, Rivers State	Minor	Soboma George
21	Yeghe	Bori, Ogoni, Rivers State	Minor	Solomon Ndigbara (Osama Bin Laden)

Source: Adapted from Etekpe, 2009.

Affirming the fact that prolonged neglect and marginalization of the Niger Delta people in the decision making process in Nigeria is responsible for the crisis in the region, Ibeanu (2008) captured the Niger Delta contradiction inside the setting of prosperity and burden clarifying how the abundance of a district has in comprehensively turned the instrument of abuse and neediness. According to him, the result of government inaction is youth anxiety, militancy, hostage taking, pipeline vandalism, oil burglary and different types of culpability and brutal showdown. The failure of the Nigerian state to address veritable requests of the general population in the range fortified a long time of conflicts and showdowns between a few youth gatherings and security agencies and also oil multinational oil companies. Also commenting on the economic impact of minority revolts and uprising in the Niger Delta, Ibeanu (2008) and Okonta (2005) stated thus: amidst 1999-2005, the nation (referring to Nigeria) witnessed high level losses in oil earnings due to agitations by citizens of Niger Delta and this affected the nation negatively. Table 5 below clearly shows that economic factors and the struggle for the control of trade in the Niger Delta hinterland was the major underlying factor responsible for minority revolts and uprising in pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence era in the Niger Delta region.

Table 5: Showing the nature of pre-colonial interaction between early Niger Delta leaders and the British colonial government/agents

S/N	Early Niger Delta Leaders	Nature/Purpose of interaction and the Colonial Agent Involved	End Result of the Interaction/ Transaction
1.	King Jaja of Opobo	Control of trade in the hinterland (Acting British Consul Harry Johnson).	Deportation, exile and the eventual death of king Jaja in the hands of his abductors.
2.	Nana Olomu of Itsekiri Kingdom	Control of trade in the Benin River (British Government).	Deportation and exile of Nana Olomu.
3.	King William Dappa Pepple of Bonny	Control of hinterland trade (British Merchants and British Consul Bee-Croft).	Deportation, exile and replacement with Prince Dappo Pepple (British Puppet) which marked the collapse of Bonny Monarchy.
4.	King Archibong of Old Calabar	Control of trade in the Qua-Ibo River (British Consul Bee-Croft).	Led to the death of King Archibong in 1852 and also marked the beginning of direct British control with British Consul Bee-Croft presiding over the election of a new king.
5.	Oba Ovonramwen of Benin Kingdom	Pursuance of British economic interest in the Benin and Ethiope River (Gallwey, British Vice Consul for the Benin-Ethiope River) and Acting Consul Phillip.	Arrest and detention of the Oba including the invasion and destruction of Benin Kingdom in 1897. The event also led to the bastardization of Benin culture and tradition and the massive looting of artifacts bronze plaques and other ornaments by the British invaders.
6.	King Koko of Brass	Introduction of harsh and unfriendly trade policies that excluded king Koko and the Akassa people by the Royal Niger Company and the British Government.	Let to the famous Akassa Raid of 29 th January, 1895 when the indigenous Akassa people shut down operations at the Royal Niger Company due to discriminatory trade policies which excluded the natives.

Source: Kalama 2015 (Fieldwork).

Conclusion

The study examined minority revolts and uprising in the Niger Delta with a view to ascertaining the impact of such revolts on the nation's economy and development. To thoroughly interrogate the subject-matter, the study adopted secondary sources of data and the basic human needs theory as the theoretical

framework for the study. Since the study adopted the descriptive method, analysis was also done qualitatively. The study observed that minority revolts and uprising started during the pre-colonial and colonial era as a result of decades of marginalization and alienation of the Niger Delta people in the political and economic affairs of Nigeria. This development continued beyond the post-independence era and became more intensified from 1999-2008 hence, prompting the Nigerian government to adopt different approaches in dealing with the Niger Delta question. The study also revealed that the nonchalant attitude of oil multinational companies and the federal government no doubt helped to escalate the conflict in the Niger Delta region. Poor implementation of government policies and programmes has made conflict in the Niger Delta a tradition despite the ongoing government amnesty programme and the existence of development agencies and boards such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The Fact that the Niger Delta region is strategic to the survival, growth and economic development of Nigeria, there is every need to continue the dialogue on the need for peace and political stability in Nigeria.

Recommendations

The following recommendations will no doubt help to promote peace and sustainable development in the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general:

1. Charity they say begins at home hence; political leaders in the Niger Delta from councillor, chairmen, state legislators, national legislators etc. should be held accountable and made to give account of their stewardship during and after their tenure. Such appraisals will compel leaders to be on their toes and be development conscious.
2. Community based conflict resolution frameworks should be encouraged to ensure sustainable peace and development in the region. In this way, the people especially community leaders and chiefs will be integrated in the entire process. The current system where development and peace proposals are imposed on the people from Abuja should be discarded.
3. It is imperative and fundamental that all previous Niger Delta committee/commission reports be collated and analysed with a view to implementing them without delay hence, the petroleum industry bill and other important development oriented bills pending in the national assembly should also be given accelerated hearing in order to give minorities in Nigeria a sense of belonging.
4. There is urgent need to also review and re-evaluate the ongoing federal government amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region to ensure that

the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) exercise truly transform and rehabilitate ex-combatants and agitators back to the civil society as productive and resourceful citizens.

5. It is imperative to also demilitarize the Niger Delta region by withdrawing all military task forces from the Niger Delta region. It is on record that Operation Delta Safe and Operation Crocodile Smile are currently operating in the Niger Delta region, causing more violence and human rights abuses in the region daily. Such actions will set a new agenda for peace in the region based on non-violent principles.
6. All outdated policies and laws that encourage inequality and retrogression in Nigeria should be repealed or discarded without further delay. In the same vein, multinational oil companies who fail to perform their social corporate responsibilities should be sanctioned and their oil prospecting license revoked.
7. The issue of environmental justice for communities in the Niger Delta should be given top priority while the clean-up of Ogoni land and other impacted communities should be done as directed by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report.

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Chapter - 4

**Impact of Job Insecurity on the Ability of
Employees to Meet Set Targets in Polaris Bank Plc,
Gwagwalada, Abuja**

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Abstract

This study examined the effects of job insecurity on the ability of employees to meet set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja. The study investigated how fear of unexpected sack, perceived powerlessness about employees' job and fear of early retirement affect the ability of employees to meet set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja. The survey research design was used in the study and data was collected from primary source with the use of questionnaire. The Ordinary Least Square regression technique was the statistical tool used to test the hypotheses of the study. The findings of the study revealed that there is a significant positive relationship between job insecurity and the ability of employees to meet set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja. The study recommends that the management of the bank should ensure that employees are not treated as mere 'use and dump slaves' but as dignified workforce with feelings and emotions. The study concludes that fear of unexpected sack; perceived powerlessness about employees' job has a positive significant effect on the ability of employees to meet set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja.

Keywords: *Job Insecurity, Perceived Powerlessness, Demotion, Early Retirement, Quantitative Job Insecurity*

Introduction

Businesses around the world today are struggling with how to cope with rapid changes which affect global competitiveness of many firms. These changes create uncertainties which could pose a threat to the performance of employees (Sverke, 2016). These changes do not only create uncertainties but also create a sense of powerlessness, a lack of assurance and fear as regards employees' job retention. Job insecurity therefore, can be seen as employee's perception that his or her job is uncertain and may come to an end sooner than expected. Today, in most countries of the world, workforce expansion or contraction is determined by business opportunities and market conditions. Consequently, these circumstances weaken the employer-employee relationship and suggest an alternative solution to induct contractual and outsourced employees. Hence, in order to bring reduction in cost and increasing competitiveness, most industrialized countries are involved in the practice of restructuring, layoffs, and right sizing (Cascio, 2015). This adopted practice has made obsolete the idea of long life employment.

Statement of the Problem

Since the 2006 bank consolidation exercise in Nigeria, the operational modalities of the banking industry changed completely. This was seen in the reduction of banks from eighty nine (89) banks in 2004 to twenty one (21) in 2018 due to reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions. In the process, an estimated fifty five thousand (55,000) bankers were retrenched, retired or summarily dismissed from employment due to under-capitalization or insolvency, loss making and dwindling earnings on the part of the banks (National Bureau of Statistics NBS, 2018). The aftermath of these created a sense of uncertainty on the employees, which include the fear of unexpected sack, perceived powerlessness, and fear of early retirement and threat of dismissal/casualization, all of which could affect the employee's ability to meet up with set targets.

Despite the federal government's directive in 2016 to Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria to halt the wave of mass sack and forceful retirement of employees, the situation did not changed as the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revealed that in the first quarter of 2017, the number of executive staff reduced from 174 to 161 in the second quarter. From 20,483 senior staff in the first quarter, the number dropped to 19,826 in the second quarter. The drop was larger in the junior staff category where the number dropped to 33,783 in the second quarter from 36,202 in the first quarter. However, the Bureau pointed out that the number of contract

staff increased from 20,237 in the first quarter to 21,837 in the second quarter. The total figure of dismissed employees stood at 8,663 as of 2017 but rose to 16,773 in the third quarter of 2018.

It is against this background that this study was conducted to examine the effects of job insecurity on the employees' ability to meet up with set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada Abuja. The objectives of the study is to: determine the extent to which fear of unexpected sack affects the performance of employees in the selected Deposit Money Banks in Abuja; examine the degree to which perceived powerlessness affects the performance of employees in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja and to determine the extent to which fear of early retirement affects the employees' ability to meet up with set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja. The hypotheses are stated in null form and are in line with the objectives of the study.

Review of Related Literature

Concept of Job Insecurity

Job insecurity has been defined as a state when employees start perceiving been threatened and powerless to execute their duties (Owolabi, 2011). It refers to the anticipation of a stressful event in such a way that the nature and continued existence of one's job are perceived to be at risk, and can come in form of fear of demotion, possible sack, casualization and early retirement (Isaksson, 2014).

It is about not knowing what is necessary to keep one's job, even though the management might be aware that the employee's job is at risk for specific reasons and may or may not communicate it to the employee (Kinnunen, 2013). Job insecurity that stems from not knowing that one's job is at risk for specific reasons is likely to have originated from the kind of human resource management policy the organization operates.

Witte (2013), disagrees with Kinnunen's assertion that job insecurity is about not knowing what is necessary to keep one's job but rather views job insecurity as an employee perception that retaining his or her job is uncertain and that it may come to an end sooner than expected. The feeling of job insecurity in Nigeria has been largely experienced among bank staff due to reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions.

Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate as to whether or not employees will be less devoted or committed to the organization if they have a perceived fear as to losing their jobs. Some scholars Burke (2015), argue that it will lead to improved commitment to the job since employee(s) who nurses such fear would like to convince the management of his or her commitment to work and possibly avert any imminent sack but Grouchulski and Zhang (2013), on the other hand argues that employees will become less devoted to the job since they are no longer sure of retaining their jobs any longer.

Similarly, several factors like gender, old age, educational status and so on could contribute to job insecurity (Witte, 2013). It is revealed that people having low status are more threatened about loss of job and feel greater insecurity. It is often due to the fact that low status people have low education therefore they try to stick with the present job and fear of unemployment creates high level of job insecurity (Sverke, 2006).

Hellgren, Sverke and Isaksson (2016), distinguished between two different forms of job insecurity: a quantitative job insecurity, i.e. worrying about losing the job itself, and a qualitative job insecurity, i.e. worrying about losing important job features. While the quantitative job insecurity is related to the general, comprehensive (and most used) operationalization of the construct, the qualitative job insecurity refers to feelings of potential loss in the quality of organizational position, such as worsening of working conditions, lack of career opportunities, decreasing salary development (Sverke and Hellgren, 2014).

Concept of Employees performance

Employee's performance is measured in terms of productivity, job satisfaction, turnover and absenteeism (Gibson, 2009). Employee performance is about the timely, effective and efficient completion of mutually agreed tasks by the employee, as set out by the employer. Meyer and Allen (2016), in their study identified employee's commitment to work, employees' ability to meet up with the organization's set goals, employees' quality of service(s) rendered to customers, employees' job satisfaction and employees' innovation as ways of determining the performance of employees especially in service based organizations.

Furthermore, employees' performance deals with the knowledge of what activities and outputs are designed, observing whether they occur and providing feedback to help employees meet expectation (Nmadu, 2013). It is also refer to as a degree of

accomplishment of task(s) that make up an employee's job. This definition was in line with the definition given by business dictionary (2010), that performance is the accomplishment of a given task measured against pre-set standards of accuracy, completeness, cost and speed (Business Dictionary, 2010),

In addition, the outcome aspect of employee performance refers to the consequence or result of the individual's behaviour. The above described behaviours may result in outcomes such as numbers of engines assembled, pupils' reading proficiency, sales figures, or number of successful heart operations. In many situations, the behavioural and outcome aspects are related empirically, but they do not overlap completely.

Empirical Review

Kunle and Shittu (2014), assessed the impact of job insecurity on the ability of employees to meet set target in selected organizations in Bonny River state, Nigeria. Survey research design and quota sampling technique were adopted in this study. Fifty six (56) male and fifty three (53) female staff from three different organizations participated while data was collected from using a validated questionnaire form. The study employed the use of multiple regression and findings revealed that there is a positive significant relationship between job insecurity and the ability of employees to meet set target.

Reisel, Chia, Maloles and Salcum (2010), examined the effects of job insecurity on job satisfaction and the ability of employees to meet set target in selected brewery companies in Nigeria. Performance was measured with perceptual data. A total of 320 employees from five brewery companies in Nigeria participated in the research. The hypothesized model was tested by means of structural equation modeling using ANOVA. The findings show that job insecurity has no significant impact on employee satisfaction and employees performance.

Adewale (2015), examined the overall effect of perceived job insecurity taking into consideration, its effect on employees ability to meet set target in an organization. Making use of secondary data from the literature and relevant theories, it was discovered that there is no significant relationship between the effect of perceived job insecurity (i.e. perceived powerlessness about employees job) and employees ability to meet set target.

Theoretical Framework of the Study

Psychological Contract Theory of Job Insecurity and Employees Performance

The theory rely on the fact that job insecurity often represents a breach of the psychological contract that employees have with their employers, the researcher does not agree with this assertion because employees who are insecure with their job may not want to compromise standards but the researcher agrees that employees who are insecure with their job will reciprocate through thoughts and behaviors that negatively contribute to their performance because some employees performance could be altered.

The relevance of this theory for the importance of research conducted is very significant since it provides insights into how employees who are insecure, threatened or uncertain about their job are likely to reciprocate through thoughts and behaviors that negatively contribute to their performance. In the opinion of the researcher, this theory is of great importance for both Board of Directors and management staff of Deposit Money Banks on how employees are likely to reciprocate to the fear of unexpected sack through thoughts and behaviors that may negatively contribute to their performance. This study finds ground in the psychological contract theory of job insecurity and employees performance because it explains clearly how employees who are threatened or have the fear of either early retirement or unexpectedly sack reciprocate.

Methodology

The survey research design was adopted for this study, survey in the sense that information concerning job insecurity and the performance of employees was sought from respondents in the field and result obtained analyzed and discussed afterwards by the researcher. The target population of the staff is two hundred eighty six (286) as at March, 2018.

Table 1: Distribution of the Target Population of the Study by units/Departments

Departments/Units	Polaris Bank
Admin.	91
Marketing	101
Transaction	62
Security	32
Total	286

Source: Survey Data, 2018.

Since the population is two hundred eighty six (286), the researcher made use of Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table of sample size determination which indicates the actual sample size of any given population size. The table shows that a population of two hundred eighty six (286), would have a sample size of one hundred and fifty (150).

The study adopted the purposive sampling and simple random sampling techniques. The purposive sampling technique was used in selecting the Deposit Money Banks for the study and the reason is because the selected banks have the highest number of dismissed employees in the consolidation as well as post consolidation era. The relationship between job insecurity and the performance of employees in the selected Deposit Money Banks in Abuja was tested using Ordinary Least Squares (O.L.S) method of regression. It is one of the most popular and widely used methods for regression analysis. However, it is usually used to establish whether one variable is dependent on another or a combination of other variables and it was used to test the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.

Table 2: Reliability Test (Cronbach's Alpha)

Variables	Cronbach's Alpha	No. of Items
Fear of Unexpected Sack	0.86	5
Perceived Powerlessness	0.82	5
Fear of Early Retirement	0.81	5
Employees' Ability to Meet up with Set Targets	0.86	4

Source: Survey Data analyzed with SPSS version 23

The researcher continued with the research since the result of the Alpha is more than 0.7 as these will give a reliable and acceptable result. We therefore conclude that the measuring instrument of the variables is reliable. As part of the pilot test for the study, a preliminary draft of the questionnaire was given to two academic experts in the field of management and psychology to assess its content and construction. After that, the final questionnaire was given to twenty (20) selected employees of Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja to test the clarity and meaningfulness of the questions.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Test of Hypothesis

Hypothesis One

H₀₁: Fear of unexpected sack has no significant effect on the ability of employees to meet set targets in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja.

Table 3.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.890 ^a	.881	.880	.55482	2.269

a. Predictors: (Constant), FUES score, PPEJ score ,FER score, TDC score

b. Dependent Variable: AMST score

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2583.546	4	795.886	2910.350	.000 ^b
	Residual	70.493	229	.308		
	Total	2654.038	233			

a. Dependent Variable: AMST score

b. Predictors: (Constant), FUES score, PPEJ score ,FER score, TDC score

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.156	.102		1.529	.128
	FUES score	.048	.048	.066	1.015	.311
	PPEJ score	.862	.043	1.174	20.068	.000
	FER score	-.103	.059	-.138	-1.732	.085

a. Dependent Variable: AMST score

It is observed from the result shown above, that in general there is a significant relationship between fear of unexpected sack and the ability to meet set targets at (B = .156, t = 1.529, Sig = .128 $P < .05$). It was equally revealed that fear of unexpected sack has a positive relationship with employees effectiveness to work at (B = .048, t = 1.01, Sig = .311 $P < .05$). This implies that when employees have the fear of unexpected sack, their ability to meet set target will reduce.

Hypothesis Two

H₀₂: Perceived powerlessness has no significant effect on Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja.

Table 4.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.921 ^a	.913	.913	.52069	2.247

a. Predictors: (Constant), FUES score, PPEJ score ,FER score, TDC score

b. Dependent Variable: AMST score

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2579.761	4	794.940	3300.987	.000 ^b
	Residual	62.085	229	.271		
	Total	2641.846	233			

a. Dependent Variable: AMST score

b. Predictors: (Constant), FUES score, PPEJ score ,FER score, TDC score

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.081	.096		.850	.396
	FUES score	.038	.045	.051	.842	.401
	PPEJ score	.678	.040	.924	16.810	.000
	FER score	.087	.056	.118	1.566	.119

a. Dependent Variable: AMST score

It is observed from the result shown above, that in general there is a significant relationship between perceived powerlessness and the performance of employees at (B = .081, t = .850, Sig = .396 $P < .05$). It was equally revealed that fear of unexpected sack has a positive relationship with employees ability to meet set target at (B = .038, t = .842, Sig = .401 $P < .05$). This implies that when employees have the fear of unexpected sack, their ability to meet set target will reduce.

Hypothesis Three

H₀₃: Fear of early retirement has no significant effect on the ability to meet set target in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja.

Table 5.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.860 ^a	.849	.839	.56594	2.315

a. Predictors: (Constant), FUES score, PPEJ score ,FER score, TDC score

b. Dependent Variable: AMST score

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3479.116	4	869.779	2715.634	.000 ^b
	Residual	73.345	229	.320		
	Total	3552.462	233			

a. Dependent Variable: AMST score

b. Predictors: (Constant), Predictors: (Constant), FUES score, PPEJ score ,FER score, TDC score

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.027	.104		.260	.795
	FUES score	-.091	.048	-.126	-1.887	.060
	PPEJ score	.736	.044	1.017	16.803	.000
	FER score	.036	.060	.049	.597	.551

a. Dependent Variable: AMST score

It is observed from the result shown above, that in general there is a significant relationship between fear of early retirement and the ability to meet set target at (B = .27, t = .260, Sig = .795 $P < .05$).

Discussion of Findings

The result from the analysis carried out indicates that job insecurity (fear of unexpected sack, perceived powerlessness about employees' job, fear of early retirement and threat of dismissal/casualization) contributes positively to the

ability of employees to meet set target in Polaris Bank Plc, Gwagwalada, Abuja. This finding agrees with the findings of Kunle and Shittu (2014), who found a positive significant relationship between job insecurity and the ability of employees to meet set target but disagrees with the findings of Reisel, Chia, Maloles and Salcum (2010), who found a negative significant relationship between job insecurity and the ability of employees to meet set target. The study is also in agreement with the psychological contract theory of job insecurity and employee performance, which assumes that employees who are insecure, threatened or uncertain about their job are likely to reciprocate through thoughts and behaviors that negatively contribute to their performance.

Furthermore, looking at the analysis in hypothesis one, it was revealed that fear of unexpected sack has a positive relationship with the ability of employees to meet set target at ($B = .048$, $t = 1.01$, $Sig = .311$ $P < .05$). The finding agrees with the finding of Salam and Wasim (2014), who found a positive relationship between fear of unexpected sack and the ability of employees to meet set target but disagrees with finding of Witte (2015), who found a negative relationship between fear of unexpected sack and the ability of employees to meet set target.

Also, looking at the analysis in hypothesis two, it was equally revealed that perceived powerlessness about employees job has a positive significant relationship with employees ability to meet set target at ($B = .678$, $t = 16.810$, $Sig = .000$ $P < .05$). The finding is in line with the finding of Chirumbolo (2015), who found a positive relationship between perceived powerlessness about employees' job and the ability of employees to meet set target but disagrees with finding of Adewale (2015), who found a negative relationship between perceived powerlessness about employees' job and the ability of employees to meet set target.

More so, looking at the analysis in hypothesis three, it was equally revealed that there is a significant relationship between fear of early retirement and the ability of employees to meet set target at ($B = .036$, $t = .597$, $Sig = .551$ $P < .05$).

Conclusion

When employees perceive to be sacked unexpectedly or become afraid of been retired forcefully or untimely or perceived to be powerless (that is to loss their position of value or become undervalued), their ability to meet set target reduces.

Recommendations

The study recommended the following based on the findings and in line with the objectives of the study:

1. The management of the bank should ensure that employees are not treated as mere 'use and dump slaves' but as dignified workforce with feelings and emotions.
2. The top management of the Deposit Money Banks should explore other areas of generating capital for the bank so as to avoid under-capitalization or insolvency and should also ensure to come up with realistic policies that will make employees perceive or feel valued and become more committed to work, increase their ability to meet the set targets, as well as become more effective to work and feel satisfy with the job. This on the other hand would lead to improvement in organizational performance as well.
3. The management of the bank should come up with a more practical SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity &Threat) analysis, in order to discover how to make good use of their strength when opportunity abounds in their internal as well as external business environment, and also discover how to manage their weaknesses in times of threat so as to reduce loss making and dwindling earnings which leads to employees dismissal from employment, forced retirement or retrenchment.

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Chapter - 5

Planning and Sustainable Food Security Decision Making Process: The Oyo State Situation

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Abstract

Lack or inadequate food security decision making process affects the sustainability of every food security plan, programme or policy in Nigeria. Therefore, it is imperative to assess the planning and food security decision making process in Oyo state, Nigeria. The study include to: 1. Assess the involvement of public in planning sustainable food security decision making process; 2. Evaluate the need for improvement in planning and food security decision making process in Oyo state; 3. Identify the various challenges facing planning and sustainable food security decision making process in Oyo state; and 4. Recommend means of improving the planning and decision making process on food security. The primary and secondary data were employed throughout and the study was anchored on prospect theory. Snowballing sampling technique that involves using personal contacts to build up a sample of the group to be studied was used due to covid-19 pandemic. Findings revealed that public was not involved in the food security decision making in Oyo state as confirmed by majority (71.43%) of the respondents; and there is the need for improvement in the food security decision making process in the state as submitted by 71.43% of the respondents. It was recommended that planning and food security decision making process should not be on intuition. In addition, the public should be allowed to participate in the food security decision process to avoid making wrong decisions or denying targeted people and to guarantee sustainability.

Keywords: *Planning, Food security, Decision making process, Sustainable, Oyo state*

Introduction

Decision making could be through incremental or comprehensive planning. The rationales behind the incremental planning are planning quickly with smaller steps/stages and continuous reviews by small number of planners that permits flexibility in adjusting the plan while still facilitating satisfactory choices. This form of planning is often called “on the spot planning” or “fire brigade approach”. At times, using the incremental planning, one ends up treating the symptom/s without treating the root cause/s (Oyediran, 2020). This could be attributed to the fact that a few key individuals' submission/s form/s the basis for decisions making (Sambamurthy, Zmud, and Byrd, 1994). On the other hand, comprehensive planning involves well-defined methods and criteria as its basis for making any decision (Newkirk and Lederer, 2006). These authors establish that researches had supported the contention that comprehensive planning should be adopted in a serious decision making because it could interpret a larger amount of information, and thus result in more accurate and successful planning.

Decisions are made at all levels of government. Decisions were made by the decision makers and professionals such as Town Planners are the decision makers' advisers. Decision making is so important and can have such significant effects on food security planning. The following are examples of some decisions about food security planning: 1. How many people are food in-secured? 2. Should government improve the existing food system or plan for a new one? 3. What type of food security planning process should be adopted (incremental or comprehensive planning)? 4. Should new technology be introduced? Eisenfuhr (2011) establishes that decision making is a process of making a choice from many alternatives (at least two) to achieve a desired goal/result. Three keywords that are very important in making a rational decision are in the definition. These include choice, process and rational decision. In sustainable food security decision making, one makes a wise choice that is economically friendly, socially desirable and environmentally friendly (Oyediran, 2014) from many alternatives. Food security planning and decision making requires a process (incremental or comprehensive) depending on the severity/urgency of the task/problem at hand. Incremental can include emergency provision of food to those that are in need. Lastly, rational decision that will cushion the effect of the problem on people or give a sustainable solution to the problem should be arrived at.

It is noteworthy to state that decision making process is required in incremental and comprehensive food security planning. The literature reviewed on planning and decision making process revealed that it can be either formal or informal. Incremental planning is more informal while comprehensive planning is more formal (Towler, 2010). That is, incremental planning relies on personal experiences and judgment (Sambamurthy et al., 1994) whereas comprehensive planning uses better-defined steps and multiple analyses (Towler, 2010). It was assumed that decision made through comprehensive planning is rational. This was attributed to the fact that a decision maker makes decisions under certainty: knows his alternatives; knows his outcomes; knows his decision criteria; and has the ability to make the optimum choice and then to implement it (Lunenborg, 2010).

According to Morgan (2009), food security planning and decision making process promotes equity, inclusivity, and flexibility within an ever changing system and is vitally important for promoting efficient and effective use of food resources to achieve positive health, socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental outcomes. Even though, the town planning profession has a role to assist in providing the basic needs of society, food is often left out of the responsibilities which seriously affects the food security planning and decision making process and outcomes. Despite variation in food security planning and decision making process, what holds them together are a set of stages common to almost every public-policy process. Identifying these stages within a given effort makes planning and evaluating food security planning and decision making process more rational and probably easier. Many times, even within the same effort to achieve the plan for food security in Nigeria, due to inadequate/lack of food security planning and decision making process, there are moments of impasse and frustration, followed by those of easy triumph. Planning for food security becomes a huddle without tangible planning and decision making process. Therefore, this study aims at assessing the planning and sustainable food security decision making process in Oyo state, Nigeria. The study include to:

1. Identify the highest qualification, profession and areas of specialisation of those in the offices where food security decisions were made in Oyo state
2. Assess the involvement of public in planning sustainable food security decision making process
3. Evaluate the need for improvement in planning and food security decision making process in Oyo state

4. Identify the various challenges facing planning and sustainable food security decision making process in Oyo state
5. Assess the reactions of people when wrong food security decisions were made or/and targeted people were denied; and 6. Recommend means of improving the planning and decision making process on food security in the state.

Methodology

Primary and secondary data from different sources were used. Snowballing sampling technique that involves using personal contacts to build up a sample of the group to be studied was used. This was employed due to covid-19 pandemic nationwide and worldwide. Contacts of samples were scouted for, and interview was conducted with them. These samples include eight (8) of the food security decision-makers in the Oyo State. These include people from Oyo State Ministry of Agriculture, Directors of Community Development Inspection and Directors of Agriculture of the LGAs in the state that are saddled with food security responsibilities; and a Non-Governmental Organisation that has its office in Oyo town (Justice, Development and Peace Movement, Catholic Dioceses). The food security decision makers interviewed were top-ranked officers. Extracts from the various discussions were made. No voice recording was made to make the information given highly confidential. Information were collected on the way the interviewees made food security decisions, influence food security decision-making around them, and how their food security decision making is being implemented. Secondary data collected from various documents like books, journals, websites which are relevant to the title of the study were also gathered. It is noteworthy that the research technique employed was a qualitative one and descriptive analysis was employed. Presentation of data was made using pie charts, bar chart and table.

Theoretical Underpinning, Conceptual Discuss and Literature Review

Theoretical underpinning of this study focuses on the prospect theory.

Prospect Theory

According to Fulfer and Maille (2018), prospect theory was originally propounded by Daniel Bernoulli in 1954 and moderated by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. Prospect theory is a decision making theory (Fulfer and Maille, 2018). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) submit that prospect theory relies on two

phases in the decision-making process. The authors express further that the first is an editing phase, which involves how individuals mentally organise and simplify information; and the second is the evaluation phase, in which individuals choose the prospect which has the greatest value. Vis (2011) identifies certain characteristics that distinguish prospect theory from other theories, such as expected utility theory on which rational choice (institutionalism) is based. These include:

1. It posits that individuals' risk tendency varies across contexts, with individuals being risk averse in the domain of gains; and
2. Risk accepting in the domain of losses.

This means that the propensity to take risks is thus not a stable personality trait, with some individuals being prone to take risks while others always stay away from them.

It is noteworthy that decisions are based on judgments and judgments are made especially under conditions of uncertainty, where it is difficult to foresee the consequences or outcomes of events with clarity. According to Fulfer and Maille (2018), decisions are made difficult when choices promote contradictory values and goals. Therefore, prospect theory directly addresses how these choices are framed and evaluated in the decision-making process. Camerer (2005, p. 129) submits that prospect theory is “a perceptual and psychophysical perspective to thinking about money, goods, and risk” In a nutshell;

1. Prospect theory is a theory of choice that accurately describes how people actually go about making their decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
2. The theory predicts that decision makers tend to be risk averse in a domain of gains (or when there is a favorable anticipation) (Rimamchaten and Musa, n. d)
3. The theory establishes that people aspire for uniqueness in relation to prospects being considered and will tend to shy away from the components shared by all (Rimamchaten and Musa, n. d); and
4. It is discovered from the theory that people lean more towards the outcomes obtained with certainty than those obtained by mere probabilities (Rimamchaten and Musa, n. d).

All about every planning process is decision making. It should be noted that a comprehensive food security planning and decision making process aims at growing collective and coordinated efforts that can ensure food access to every

citizen; communicate and educate citizens on food security planning; build sustainable food supply; create economic opportunities; and lead through networks. Therefore, prospect theory that deals with making decision by an individual, group or government, is relevant to this study. Furthermore, this study is conducted to guide actions within the framework of food security planning. The study links existing efforts, leverages new leadership, and makes everyone in Nigeria to participate in the food security planning and decision making process.

Conceptual Discuss

Food Security

According to Gyuse (2008) and Oyediran and Abubakar (2017), food security is the ability of individuals, households and communities to get appropriate and nutritious foods on a regular and reliable basis through socially acceptable means. The common definition given to food security by FAO/WHO (1992) and FAO (1996) refers to the condition in which all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. FAO (2008) and Simon (2012) identify and discuss the four components of food security as follows:

1. **Availability:** According to these authors, there should be physical, social and economic access to sufficient and nutritious food by all people and at all times. They express further that it is the amount of physically available food in a region or place. Food availability largely depends on the level of local production, imports, stock levels and net trade in food items
2. **Access:** FAO (2008) and Simon (2012) refer to this component as the economic, social and physical access to food by all people at all times. The authors argue that food must be locally accessible, affordable and an adequate amount of food is available at the regional, national or international level does not imply it is accessible at household level
3. **Utilisation:** According to FAO (2008) and Simon (2012), utilisation refers to the pattern by which the body makes use and benefits from the various food nutrients which is determined by the food quality, nutritional values, preparation method and storage as well as feeding pattern; and
4. **Stability:** This refers to the stability of all other components over time (FAO, 2008; Simon, 2012). That means, somebody who is adequately accessible to quality food today is still considered food insecure if he/she has periodic inadequate access to food which may cause his/her nutritional level to deteriorate.

Morgan (2009) argues that food security promotes equity, inclusivity, and flexibility within an ever changing system and very important for promoting efficient and effective use of food resources to achieve positive health, socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental outcomes. Therefore, food security is a driver of public health, community resiliency, local economic growth, and food system health which requires planning. A sustainable food security nation is a nation that can manage short-ranged and long-ranged planning process to balance economic growth, environmental protection and social harmony. Food security can be seen as a driver of public health, community resiliency, local economic growth, and food system health which may not be achievable without a comprehensive food security planning process (Oyediran and Abubakar, 2017). The study shall contribute to knowledge in the aspect of food security planning that is left out in the planning for food system (Morgan, 2009).

Literature Discuss

The Decision Making Approaches

There are numbers of theoretical approaches to decision-making. The major ones include rational approach, the incrementalist approach and the garbage can approach. Cairney (2012) sees a rational approach as the commonsense way in which a democracy should function. The author expresses that this approach may be viewed as a situation in which one should aim for a process that involves identify problems, clarify their aims and carefully weigh up solutions before making a choice. It can be said that rational decision making can be viewed as a process where we are seeking to make the best possible decision as far as possible by using scientific method to support that decision. Towler (2010) opines that with rational decision making approach, policy makers make decisions under certainty as they know their alternatives; they know their outcomes; they know their decision criteria; and they have the ability to make the optimum choice and then to implement it.

Incrementalising is another approach to decision making; referred to as muddling through; and involves making small changes (increments) to the existing messy situation (Lunenburg, 2010). Lindblom (1959) considers the long time and high number of resources necessary for rational decision making approach and recommended the incrementalist approach which takes a more subtle view of the process of policymaking. According to Lindblom (1959), incrementalist approaches to policy making is a more efficient, sensible and democratic

approach. Cairney (2012) views incrementalist approach as more cognisant of the political challenges inherent in policymaking. In another expression, incrementalising does not require agreement on goals, an exhaustive search of all possible alternatives and their consequences, or selection of the optimal alternative. Instead, just small or incremental steps is all that is required or possible (Lunenburg, 2010).

According to Fioretti and Lomi (2008), the garbage can decision making model or approach is not a model of group or coalition formation, but a description of an intra-organisational ecology of heterogeneous populations of objects: participants, choice opportunities, solutions and problems. Garbage can be defined as container for garbage or trash. Therefore, this approach considered an organisation as a container where the members of these populations flow and interact to generate decisions. Fioretti and Lomi (2008) opine that garbage can-like decision situations are induced by the simultaneous presence of three factors. These factors include fluid participation, unclear decision technology and problematic preferences. Fioretti and Lomi (2008) refer to fluid participation as the well-established fact that the degree of attention typically dedicates to any problem that needs to be addressed. In addition, the authors establish that fluid participation captures the observation that organisational members tend to enter and exit decision situations according to processes that are not necessarily related to the structure or solution of the problems at hand. According to March (1994) and Olsen (2001), the unclear decision technology that is, the second factor, refers to the fact that causal relations underlying specific organisational decision problems in the form of well specified means-end chains are frequently ambiguous and are reconstructed only *ex-post*. The third factor is problematic preferences, a term that Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) describe as the general tendency of decision-makers to discover their preferences through action rather than acting on the basis of pre-defined and unchanging preferences. Fioretti and Lomi (2008) identify the agents in the garbage can model to include the participants (decision-makers), choice opportunities, solutions and problems which exist independently of one another, they might disappear as a consequence of decision-making, and their existence is also independent of time.

Sustainable Food Security Decision Making Process

Having discussed food security, it is necessary to know what planning process is. Here, planning could be seen as the process of thinking about how or what is/are

required achieving a desired goal which may involve designing and maintenance of a plan. Therefore, sustainable food security decision making process involves sequential steps in carrying out food security planning in a way that food insecurity is really dealt with but not the symptoms (March, 2010). The sustainable food security decision making process is engaged to create solutions for food insecurity in every part of the world. Each step of the sustainable food security decision making process aims at addresses the diverse underlying causes of food insecurity. Therefore, the sustainable food security decision making process encourages invitation of public to the table to plan their direction and activity on every stage/step in tackling food insecurity.

This process includes understanding of the nature of insecurity in a particular area, formulating policies towards solving this problem, managing the whole food system to provide an adequate system and involve broad interaction with many other disciplines (Alkafoury, 2012). Sustainable food security decision making process allows the policy makers and advisers to identify the risks of food insecurity at a local level, the challenges and opportunities to improve food security. The following are steps/stages in the sustainable food security decision making process as present in Figure 1

a. Problem identification: Policy makers and advisers can identify food insecurity problems and issues or interests common to all members of the community, region or state to begin the process of setting priorities. Kepner and Tregoe (2005) opine that providing a good definition of the problem affects the quality of planning for food security. According to Verschaffel (2011), the process of identifying problems requires surveillance of the internal and external environment such as geographic location, demographics, ecosystem, and history for issues that merit attention such as food insecurity. Ensuring public involvement requires the knowledge and skills necessary to set up and conduct or facilitate effective planning sessions. Public meetings are essential to the planning of food security with broad grassroots support. A food security plan is one that was designed based on a good understanding of the community conditions and identifies the problems preventing the community from achieving its long-range goal(s). The involvement of the public serves as a means to receive input on goals, objectives, and activities in order to determine ways to best prioritize them.

b. Formulation of goal and objectives: The goal of any food security plan is a basic description of the purpose or a reduction or resolution of the food

insecurity problem/s earlier identified. Formulating a goal for food security plan begins by describing the conditions that would exist in a “perfect food secured community, region or state” in a long-ranged manner (March, 2010). To achieve the ideal situation, the following questions should direct the selection of the food security planning goal: what would the food security plan look like? What are its characteristics? What are the available opportunities for achieving food availability, access, stability and utilisation? What resources are available for the members of the community? Formulation of goals and objectives for food security plans/policies provides a framework for formulating long-range community food security goals that point in the right direction. Meaning that one has succeeded in designing a plan that moves in the direction of that “perfect” place. Objectives are a list of possible strategies for addressing food insecurity problem and achieving food security planning goal. They help in selecting a strategy that represents the best method for implementing food security plans (Oyediran, 2020). It should be noted that objectives are specific, measurable accomplishments designed to address the stated problems. Therefore, following the set objectives must result in specific, measurable outcomes that benefit the community and directly contribute to the achievement of the stated food security planning goal.

c. Survey, data collection and analysis

Data on the impacts of food insecurity should be sourced through primary or/and secondary means. According to Turpin and Marais (2004) and Lunenburg (2010), sources of data collection for food security planning include: international, national and local government policies on food security/food insecurity; conduct a survey to assess food insecurity concerns in the area; map data on transport routes, fresh and fast food outlets, local food prices, community garden locations; local government-owned land for food growing; health statistics on emergency food relief demand in the area; local government data for population surveys results; identify food security plans/policies already in place in the area, for example, food coalitions and gardens; and map potential stakeholders both inside and outside government involved with issues relating to food security. In the same vein, World Bank (1997) suggests that the data collected and analyses should give answers to the following questions: 1. Who might be affected positively or negatively by food insecurity to be addressed? 2. Who are the 'voiceless' for whom special efforts of engagement may need to be made? 3. Who are the representatives of those likely to be affected? 4. Who is responsible for what is intended? 5. Who is likely to mobilise for or against what is intended? 6. Who can

make what is intended more effective through their participation or less effective by their non-participation or outright opposition? 7. Who can contribute by financial and technical resources? and 8. Whose behaviour has to change for the efforts to succeed? Data collected from the two sources (primary and secondary) should be analysed qualitatively and/or quantitatively.

d. Alternative plans generation

The next stage is to generate alternative plans to solve the problem. In developing these alternative solutions, the policy advisers should first specify the goal of the decision. Is the goal trying to reduce the rate of food insecurity, improve food quality, increase access to food, securing food stability or something else? Once the policy makers have determined/stated their goal/s, the decision advisers should search for alternative means of reaching them. The likelihood that each alternative will result in the achievement of various outcomes on food, and the extent to which those outcomes will contribute to the achievement of the goals and objectives being sought should be examined. According to Zopounidis (2011), the extent of the search for alternatives is limited by the importance of the decision, the cost and value of additional information needed to evaluate alternatives, and the number of people affected by the decision on food security. Narayanan (2005) and Ehrgott (2011) opine that the length and thoroughness of generating alternatives depends on the cost of evaluating additional alternatives.

e. Plans evaluation

An evaluation (process, impact or/and outcome evaluation) should be able to generate information that is credible and useful for decision-making and food security programme/s improvement. According to Grant (2011), in food security plan evaluation, three questions should be asked. These are: (1) Is the alternative feasible? (2) Is it a satisfactory alternative? (focus on the extent to which it addresses the food insecurity). (3) What impact will it have on people? (addresses the impact of an alternative on food security). Hastie (2010) submits that failure in this stage is one of the reasons for failure of the decision-making process to solve food insecurity problem/s. The best alternative should be the one that is feasible, satisfactory, and acceptable to the people (Gilboa, 2011). The basis of judgment should be how close the outcomes or consequences of the alternatives come to achieving food security.

f. Implementation of the preferred Plan

After choosing the best alternative, the food security policy makers are left with the challenge of implementing the plan/policy/programme. A sound decision may

become a failure if implemented poorly (Lunenborg, 2010). Food security policy makers need to make sure that the preferred alternative is clearly understood set up budgets and schedules for the actions they have decided to undertake. The policy makers now faces a "how much" and "how soon" decision on the preferred plan. It is noteworthy that the solution of most food insecurity problems requires the combined effort of government and public as the concerned people should understand what role they should play during each phase of the implementation process.

g. Monitoring

Monitoring in the food security planning process aims at determining whether the set food security objectives are met or not. It also makes sure that every activity is tailored towards achieving food security. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2011) identifies the various types of monitoring that are also applicable to food security plan monitoring. These include:

- i. **Results monitoring:** This tracks the effects and impacts of food security Plan on the public. In this regard, monitoring is merged with evaluation to determine if the food security plan, policy or programme tends towards its intended results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and whether there may be any unintended impact (positive or negative). For instance, a food security plan may be monitored to an extent that every community activity points at achieving the outputs that contribute to community resilience and ability to recover from food insecurity
- ii. **Process (activity) monitoring:** This type of monitoring according to IFRC (2011), tracks the use of inputs and resources, the progress of activities and the delivery of outputs. It monitors how activities are delivered in terms of the efficiency in time and resources. It is in many occasions conducted in conjunction with compliance monitoring. For example, a food security plan/project may be tracked so that targeted households are food secured as scheduled;
- iii. **Compliance monitoring:** It ensures compliance with food security plan/policy or programme and expected results. For example, a food security plan/policy or programme may be monitored to the extent that every individual/household lives to the expectation of the international food security standards.


Other types of monitoring identifies by IFRC (2011) are:

- iv. **Beneficiary monitoring:** This tracks beneficiary perceptions of any food security plan/policy or programme. It involves assessment of the beneficiaries' satisfaction or complaints with the food security plan/programme, including their participation, treatment, access to resources and their overall experience of change. For example, a food intervention programme assisting community members after a disaster (manmade or natural) may monitor how they feel about the selection of programme beneficiaries (equity or equality set in here)
- v. According to IFRC (2011), financial monitoring accounts for what is spent on activity within predefined categories of expenditure. The author expresses that it is often conducted in conjunction with compliance and process monitoring. For example, a food security plan may involve establishing small scale industries such as cassava processing industries may monitor the money awarded and ensure it is spent according to the budget and time frame for the plan/programme; and
- vi. IFRC (2011) establishes that organisational monitoring tracks the sustainability, institutional development and capacity building in the food security plan/project or programme. In most cases, it is combined with the monitoring processes of the larger implementing organisation. For example, a non-governmental organisation headquarters may use organisational monitoring to its food intervention in every state or nation.

h. Food security plan review

Review calls for evaluating the effectiveness of the implemented food security plan/programme. According to Lunenburg (2010), the failure of an implemented food security plan/programme to produce the desired results may be attributed to a number of causes such as incorrect definition of the problem, poor evaluation of alternatives, and/or improper implementation. The author expresses that the most common and serious error is inadequate definition of the problem as this will not produce the desired result. Reviewing of the plan/programme makes every food security decision making a continuous/never-ending process (Oyediran, 2020) as it precipitates a new decision cycle. Hicks (2005) suggests that many large problems are solved by attempting several alternatives in sequence, each providing a modest improvement. Food security plan/programme review is the part of the food decision-making process that assesses whether a new decision needs to be made.

Figure 1: The Outline of the Sustainable Food Security Decision Making Process Model




Source: Adapted from Limchfield Nathaniel (1969)

Findings and Discussion

Figure 2 reveals that the large number (64.29%) of the respondents had Master Degree as their highest qualification, one (7.14%) respondent had a PhD Certificate and none (0.00%) had primary and secondary school Certificates. This shows that respondents were literate and should understand how sustainable food security decision making process in Oyo state looks like. Findings also presents that none of these respondents studied Urban and Regional Planning (URP) in the schools but Agriculture, Law and Public Administration. It could be said that achieving sustainable food security decision making process may be doubtful. The reason is that URP is a futuristic profession that considers the past and present situations before making any future decision or policy.

Figure 2: Highest Qualification




Source: Field Returns, 2021

In addition, respondents were experienced in food security decision making and food policy implementation as 87.91% had spent more than 10 years in their various offices. According to them, they had witnessed a lot of policies on food formulated in their offices or/and brought to them by their superiors, government and NGOs. In addition, none of the sampled offices has an urban and regional planner working for them most especially in the aspect of food security decision making. This could be attributed to the fact that they were ignorant of the skills possessed by Planners in the area of food security decision making and/or plan implementation.

Furthermore, Figure 2 presents the involvement of the public in food security decision making. Large number (71.43%) of the respondents submitted that public were not given the opportunity to participate in food security decision making and that contributed to the reason of making wrong decisions or/and targeted people were denied or not reached. The 21.43% of the respondents that said public were involved stated that they only participated at the post decision making i.e they only benefitted from the food security policies. This means the policy makers were ignorance of the fact that when public participated in food security decision-making, sensitivity to people's value systems is better and helpful than the use of tools, intuition or guessing.


Figure 3: Involvement of Public in the Food Security Decision Making



Source: Field Returns, 2021

Figure 3 presents that 35.71% of the respondents signified that they felt bad or disappointed when wrong decisions were made or/and targeted people were denied and claimed to be handicapped in these situations. This could be attributed to their level of education. 57.15% did not see it as anything but normal practice. This could be attributed to the fact that long existence of wrongs could turn them to normal practices. Therefore, these people did not see it as a problem.

Figure 4: Reactions When Wrong Decisions Were Made/Targeted People Were Denied



Source: Field Returns, 2021

According to the respondents, politicians often made food security decisions intuitively without considering the structured description of problems. The respondents stated further that politicians make decisions to favour their own position, rather than aiming at making good decisions. Therefore, Table 1 shows that 71.43% of the respondents concluded that there is a need for improved decision-making in government as there is no stated demand for a more rational/scientific approach to solve food insecurity in Oyo state.

Table 1: The Need for an Improvement

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	10	71.43
No	4	28.57
Total	14	100

Source: Field Returns, 2021

Challenges facing Planning and Sustainable Food Security Decision Making Process in Oyo

The challenges facing planning and sustainable food security decision making process in Oyo state, Nigeria as revealed by findings, extracts from literature and researcher's observations include:

1. Some of the policy advisers (Planners) on food security lack the quality to design effective food plans. In other words, they are not successful planners because they lack the ability/education qualification to develop plans for a particular food situation. Such incapability/under-qualification creates hindrances such as wrong people enjoys the food security benefits and adoption of a wrong decision making process. In addition, many food security policies/plans end up treating the symptoms of food insecurity.
2. Lack of or inadequate commitment to planning and sustainable food security decision making process. This can be attributed to the fact that planning and sustainable food security decision making process requires much time, hard work and experts. In addition, the fear of failure considering the time and resources spent may contribute to lack of or inadequate commitments to planning and sustainable food security decision making process. As a result, food security policy advisers may choose to do little, adopt the incremental approach or nothing to help in the food security decision making process.
3. Lack, inadequate or unreliable data/information is another challenge to planning and sustainable food security making process. It was observed that lack, inadequate or unreliable data/information both in terms of quantity and quality was a great challenge. Even, if food security policy advisers were seasoned and experts in planning and sustainable food security planning but have data/information problem (quantitatively and qualitatively), their plans will definitely fail.
4. It was deduced from the various findings and literature that planning and sustainable food security decision making process is a failure if it did not consider the long-term effects of a food plan and laying more emphasis on short term effects. This may end up not planning for posterity.
5. The conventional model presented in Figure 2.1 requires much data, time and resources. These may discourage the adoption of a tangible food security decision making process and ends up in failure many times.
6. Another challenge is lack/inadequate public participation in the planning and sustainable food security decision making process. This may lead to

ineffectiveness or non-implementation of the food plans as a result of lack of public support most especially during the implementation stage.

Conclusion and Recommendations

It can be concluded that planning and sustainable food security decision making requires detailed plan of action for meeting the policy makers and public goals. Therefore, planning is a continuous process of making plans with the knowledge of the future, organising the activities needed to carryout food plans and monitoring the results of the food plans through public participation and comments. Policy makers' advisers (Town Planners) should communicate food security plan to the policy makers as why specific action is or should be taken. It is noteworthy that only food security planning process can effectively solve food insecurity problems and no amount of smart planning can predict all outcomes in a challenging area such as food security, or guarantee a hunger-free community. Despite this fact, food security planning process is facing some challenges in Nigeria.

Therefore, the following recommendations are made:

1. Planning and sustainable food security decisions should not be guided by intuition. It should be noted that the intuition aspect of decision making is a very unconscious process which is influenced by one's own experience.
2. Public participation in planning and sustainable food security decision making matters should be encouraged in Oyo state. This is supported by the submission of Oyediran and Ogundiran (2013) that once the public are involved from the inception to the completion of a project, policy or programme, it will be accepted, managed and even supervised by them. This shows the importance of public participation in planning and sustainable food security decision making processes.
3. The food security decision making process require much data, time and resources. Customised process that is not time and resources consuming is recommended for food security decision making process in Oyo state. Alternatively, smart methods of data collection that will fast the process is suggested.
4. Licensed and seasoned planners that major in food security should be employed in every food security decision making office in Oyo state and Nigeria at large. Planners are good food policy makers' advisers and this will reflect in the outcome of every food security decision the state is making.

5. All the identified challenges should be trashed, if an acceptable food security decision making process is to be guaranteed in the state
6. Every reaction to wrong food security decision making process should be means of correcting it but not to look at it as “as usual”.

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Chapter - 6

Impact of Corporate Social and Management Responsibilities to Community Development in Nigeria

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
Introduction

Several decade numbers of corporate, social and management responsibilities among some firms have been sources of conflicts between the government communities and people within the environment. Awuya, 2015, noted that the growing environment, ecological and management impact have destroyed global social responsibilities, 1992, at a conference on national and international lectures organized by institutes of environmental and management studies porthacourt, the frame work of the conference was to ensure effective and efficient social and management responsibilities within the immediate environment. The position of the study argued that social and management responsibilities are one of the fundamental pillars that promote the basic social welfare of the people in the environment.

Davison, 2016, argued that, in Nigeria particularly in oil producing states where number of multinational companies have dominated domestic firms have destroyed several environmental and promotes ecological damages to the immediate communities have triggered the government to established legal institution's that could ensure adequate social and

management responsibilities to the immediate environment. The justification of the study regarding the explanations of the researchers noted that, is not only multinational companies that have the responsibilities of managing and providing social responsibilities, needs assessment most be put in place on our domestic companies.

Fig. 1: Global Picture of (CSR) and how it could be Managed



Source: Empirical Reviewed, 2021

From the above chart it always been that in European countries due to effective policies and programs established by government towards the betterment of it people number of social responsibilities were given to immediate member of the environment. However, based on the empirical reviewed conducted 2021. The study noted that CSR and proper management of the responsibilities through planning and organization of the companies have greater positive impact to the member and at the same time improved quality and quantity of the country economy.


CSR in Africa is at backwardness due to foreign domination and poor policies, programs and management, the study noted that, corruption, inability for the government to integrate and effectively establishes policies that would ensure adequate responsibilities from all firms I respectives of who owners. The government, stakeholders, and community leaders need to integrate and bringout policies and programs that could not only be of benefit to the government and our leaders, but it would as well promote the lives of communities whose where affected from environment and ecological damages.

Statement of the Problems

Nigeria is one of the riches country in Africa and popular countries in the world with number of human and natural resources yet huge concern were not given to

CSR. However, the dynamic nature of global business activities that have transformed several socio-economic and management impacts, countries in the world begins to establish policies, rules and regulations that will enhance the effectiveness of CSR in order to ensure effective utilization of the basic needs. Increasingly Nigeria is a rich country with abundance of resources most concerned where not giving to CSR due to international intervention that dominated our domestic companies. Number of problems have hindered (CSR) in Nigeria such problems can be identify as follows, corruption, domination of multi-national companies, poor policies and programs, weak rules and regulation and ineffective implementation of policies establish by the government. Summary of the problem will be display in table


Fig. 2: Problems of CSR



Source: Empirical Reviewed, 2021

From the above table shows that number of problems have leads to ineffective provision of CSR in nigera, however, corruption has the huge rate that affected many system which translate into weak provision of basic social welfare to the immediate member of the community. Nigerian, has number of policies rules and regulations, but the problems are poor implementations of those policies and programs that is the fundamental problems Nigeria is facing. However, there is need for the government to ensure policies and programs that concern its members should be implemented so as to provide adequate dividend of democracy. Poor implementation of these policies shall manufacture the following: see figure 3 below

Fig. 3.



Source: Empirical Study 2021

From the above table shows that, ineffective implementation of all of these policies could resulted to the following problems, environmental damage among the member of the communities due to lack of social responsibility given to them such social responsibilities includes money to update. Example in Niger Delta were oil has destroyed a lot of farms they could not grow food which has translated into poverty and insecurity were we have militants and Niger Delta avengers which directly destroyed the country economic. Basically, increases the rate of crime and illiteracy among the people. There is need for the government to take note on this issues and to provide adequate transformation in respect of CSR in Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to examine the fundamental responsibility of the firms towards provision of corporate social and management responsibilities to their immediate communities. The specific objectives is to identify and examine the individual CSR in three companies in specific geo-graphical zones. Niger Delta, which is the oil company, North Central NNPC. And in North West Sokoto Cement company. Therefore, the study shall look at the recommendations in respect of the study problems.

Review of the Literature

Concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility/Management

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Is one of the fundamental concept that has been popularly practices in a business cycle. Farel, 2017, noted that corporate responsibility played a very vital role in the demonstrating basic responsibility to enhances the positive quality of lives on the people or member of the society., by addressing issues like, legal, ethnic, commercial and other expectations such expectations are, provision of scholarships, food, water supply, electricity and many more. Basu and Palzo, 2018, defined CSR as a process through which the managers within the power establish decision, planning and mutual relationships with the stakeholders in order to archived certain objectives. Stainer, 2018, noted that, CSR is a beautiful gesture that provide responsibility regarding to basic welfare of the society, individual and corporate behavior. From the above conceptual explanations from various views of scholars it is fundamental to justify the position of the study regarding the basic responsibility needed from organizations which shall serve not as gesture but as compulsory due companies needs to provide to people and stake holders regarding the environmental and ecological destruction of there community.

Concept of Management and how it could be Effective in Distribution of CSR


Management is one of the fundamental discipline that have provide for years effective and efficient controller and management of organization. No society, no organization, no industry and no firms that could developed without proper management, management for years serve as the heart of organization and therefore indicate as pillar of company survival. Management has the following five fundamental pillars of survival of any firms.

1. Planning
2. Organizing
3. Staffing
4. Leading
5. Controlling (Fayot,)
 - i. Planning meaning what need to be done in the future (in advance)
 - ii. Organizing to adequately ensure the combination of human and non human resources are in consideration
 - iii. Commanding or leading this is another vital concept on management what most be done and h=getting people to do it
 - iv. Coordinating creating basic structure that an organization could achieve it fundamental goals and accomplished its objectives

- v. Controlling carefully, checking the progress in view of the plans that has been establish

From the above conceptual framework of management it is fundamental to ensure that proper and effective managerial techniques to adequately enhances the effective utilization of CSR in any organizations. However, it si a failure is any organizations irrespective of what so ever, need to build up in the five pillars of management for survival. All of these are fundamental example given bellow in table format.

Fig. 4: Fives Pillars of Achieving CSR in and Organization



Sources: From Empirical Review 2021

Overview of Corporate Organizations

At an earlier point in history, societal expectations from business organizations did not go beyond efficient resource allocation and its maximization. But today, it has changed and modern business must think beyond profit maximization toward being at least socially responsible to its society. Today's heightened interest in the role of business in society has been promoted by increased sensitivity to the awareness of environmental and ethical issues. It means our society has become increasingly concerned that greater influence and progress by firms has not been accompanied by equal effort and desire in addressing important social issues including problems of poverty, drug abuse, crime, improper treatment of workers, faulty production output and environmental damage or pollution by the industries as it has overtime been reported in the media.

The position of the study is to make clear justification in regards to proper social responsibility that have for long enhances socio-economic and political achievement of member of the communities. However, the reaction of the observation was the ability for a firms to provide adequate social benefit in order to reduce the level of poverty, hunger, crime, and improve the quality of it members Columbus, Indiana, Gambia, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa and many more African countries have systematically used corporate funds to create a healthy community which, at the same time is a direct, though intangible investment in a healthy environment for his company. Miller specifically aimed at endowing his small industrial town with the 'quality of life' that would attract to it the managerial and technical people on whom a big high-technology business depends. Only if business and particularly Nigerian business learns that to do well it has to do good, can we hope to tackle the major challenges facing developing societies today. The economic realities ahead are such that 'social needs' can be financed increasingly only if their solution generates commensurate earning which precisely is what business is known for. We can actually say firms involved in Corporate Social Responsibility are actually not regretting because of the increase it has made on their sales leading to profit and how they have impacted the environment. The significance of corporate social responsibility as a vital tool for the societal progressiveness cannot be over emphasized.

Fig. 5: Perspectives on Social Responsibility





Fig. 6: Companies on four Selected Zones



From the above table study empirical noted that bin Niger Delta they are prone to disaster due to the fact that they were number of multi-national corporation that have been operating in the region however, the basis. However, the rate of social and management responsibility is not given much attention. While in north central and north esat respectively, the companies which were located in the areas as shows in and empirical study shows that, social responsibility is not adequately achieved.

Methodology

The study have utilized secondary information as one of the basis tools for data collection, however, books, journals, magazines, and newspapers were reviewed to understand, explain, predict and possible control the rate of social responsibilities in our firms

The population of the study comprises four geographical zones such as

1. South South (NIGER DELTA OIL COMPNIES)
2. North Central (NNPC COMPANY)
3. North West (CEMENTS COMPANY)
4. North East (beverage company)


Findings

From the finding of this study it has been noted that number of social responsibility were established in all of these four selected zones, examples, in the

areas of scholarships given by number of oil companies in Niger Delta such companies are shell, mobile total and many more have been studied and understood that series of corporate responsibilities were carried out to ensure adequate benefits to it immediate members. Similarly, in view of the above basic social welfare in regards to provision of shelter, food water and job opportunities were given to the immediate communities. Yet the member of the immediate communities are not grateful due to the fact that, they believed the multi-national companies are not doing the right think, this led to destructions of oil in the area. The root of this problem is corruption from the leaders who are responsible in handling the needs.


In north central NNPC is another domestic company located in kaduna has displayed number of social responsibilities ranging from provision of free scholarship to study abroad, provision of free medical services not only to it immediate member but to all sacksful Nigerians. Similarly, in North West the cement company of northern Nigeria also serve as one of the company that provide adequate social responsibility in ensuring adequate supply and security for the immediate community. Figure 7 and 8 indicates what, why and how those firms contributes in the provision of social responsibilities and challenges.

Fig. 7.



Source: Reviewed, 2021

Fig. 8: Challenges



Source: 2021, Empirical Review

From the above tables indicates that number of problems and challenges were confronted by the companies operating in Nigerian due to corruption, Niger Delta militant, poverty and poor governace which have hindered several social responsibilities in the country

Summary/Recommendations

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of the basic techniques firms uses to improve the standard of human development. However, there is need for the government to put more concern and to make sure adequate policies were implemented regarding CSR in Nigeria. Government also need to ensure that adequate security were given to those companies so that it will promotes effective goods and services in the country. Stakeholders have their own role to play community leaders and individual members also are victims in ensuring adequate look in the CSR.

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Weak Political Institutions as the Bane of African Developing Economies

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Abstract

A major criticism of the American economic historian W.W. Rostow in his model of “Stages of Economic Growth” is that the theory does not appear to be working for contemporary developing nations as they lack the institutional framework which existed in Europe. Nigeria certainly lacks strong political institutions as is easily observable from events which unfold in the country on daily basis. The study examined the effect of weak political institutions on African developing countries with a focus on Nigeria. Data was obtained from secondary materials including books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, the internet, etc. Content analysis was adopted in its methodology while the institutional theory (Amenta and Ramsey, 2009) was employed as the theoretical framework. Results showed that weak political institutions - legislature, political parties, the executive, etc. have not lived up to the demands of the Nigerian society. The study suggested that these institutions be strengthened if efforts to improve the society must begin to yield the desired results.

Keywords: *Political institutions, African developing economies, Desired results, Nigerian society, Stages of growth model.*

Introduction

Institutions may be perceived as rules, enforcement mechanisms and organisations (Nabli and Nugent (1999)). Such institutions may vary according to their organizational structures, i.e., the extent to which organizations and institutions overlap. North (1991) views institutions as consisting of formal rules, informal constraints – norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct- and their enforcement characteristic. According to the 2001 World Bank Development Report, institutions provide an important role in affecting people's standards of living and in helping protect their rights. They exert much influence on the macro-economic performance of countries as they affect transaction costs by decreasing uncertainty, directing economic activity to productive areas and by building trust and enhancing cooperation.

A major criticism of the stages of growth theory by Rostow is that the model cannot be effective in the contemporary developing nations since they lack the basic institutional framework which existed in Europe at the time. Obviously, the institutions in the emerging economies lack sufficient activity needed to support productive investments and solve the problem of low efficiency. In these societies, one discovers that legal principles discriminate among individuals, the properly rights are not valid for the majority of the population, the elites have unlimited economic and political power, only a few fortunate citizens can benefit from quality education, have access to credit and the opportunity to engage in production. In developing countries, bad institutions that do not function well have adverse effect on the performance of the economy. The inefficiency of the official institutions engaged in economic operations; increase the cost of doing business. Governments are unstable. In Africa and Latin America, the basic flaw in terms of economic growth and development is the nature of arrangements by political institutions which are often inconsistent with the interests of the citizens. The result is that bad public services are provided. There is uncertainty and manipulation in every sphere of public services rendered e.g. “the judicial system, corruption, bribery, tax evasion, ill-defined property rights and the existence of inefficient institutions as ill-conceived arrangements cause those countries to be risky and unattractive” (Luiz, 2009; Fosu, Bates and Hoeffler, 2006; Balamoune, 2005; Birdsall, 2007; Charnock, 2009).

Over the decades, there has been a recurrent and sustained argument that the Nigerian state, like its counterparts in Africa and other countries of the developing world, underperforms due to lack of state capacity to deal with the contemporary

realities of governance. The study conducted by Yagboyaju and Akinola (2009) on Nigerian State and the crisis of governance: A critical exposition, found that the state has failed in three major areas such as security of lives and property, promotion of the rule of law, and provision of visionary leadership. The paper concluded that the nature and characters of the political leadership explains the Nigerian state's incapacity for effective governance. In the views of Owoye and Bissessar (1992), "bad governance is a symptom of institutional and leadership failure, explicitly "manifested by its long list of dictatorial leaders, non free media and undemocratic elections". Obviously, all fingers in the above definition point at the weakness of the political institutions in Nigeria. It is a worrisome state that stimulates investigations. Against this background, this study seeks to assess the effect of weak political institutions on the Nigerian quest for development. Specifically, the paper will be focusing on:

- (a) The effect of the budgetary institution on Nigeria's quest for development.
- (b) The effect of civil service bureaucracy on Nigeria's development effort.

Research Questions

The study will address the following questions:

- a. What is the effect of the budgetary institution on the quest for development in Nigeria?
- b. How has civil service bureaucracy influenced Nigeria's quest for development?

Literature Review

Conceptual literature

Budgetary institution: Budgetary institutions refer to the set of rules, procedures, and practices used to prepare, approve, and implement budgets. This is to imply that budgetary institutions determine –(a) the size of total public expenditure, the fiscal deficit, and public borrowing (and implicitly the sustainability of public sector accounts,) and (b) the appropriation of resources by type of expenditure and by groups of beneficiaries. These institutions are important because they influence the rules of the game, either by imposing restrictions on the entire budgetary process, or by distributing the power, responsibilities, and information among the various actors, thus affecting the fiscal results. In his study, Raudia (2014), observes that "budgetary institutions encompass two different types of institutional arrangements: Fiscal rules and budget process rules".

Bureaucracy: This is an unavoidable concept both in common language and in organizational analysis. Generally speaking, bureaucracy is associated with very negative features of organization. It is a concept that was proposed by Max Weber in a context in which “he considers rationalization of society as inevitable” (Pollit, 2008). Godoi, Silva, and Cardoso (2017) observe that the negative features of organization with which bureaucracy is associated include – “delays in operation, action centred on opaque standards, executive requests for documentation, or even countless difficulties in meeting users or customers' requests”.

Civil service: Ipinlaiye (2001), perceives the term civil service as one “normally used when referring to the body of men and women employed in civil capacity and non-political career basis by the Federal and state governments primarily to render and faithfully give effect to their decisions and implementation, Abba and Anazodo (2006) in Anazodo (2012), argue that “civil service in Nigeria comprises workers in the various ministries or departments apart from those who hold political appointments”. The Nigerian Constitution (1999) section 318 sub section I posits that:

Civil service refers to service of the federation (stated) in a civil capacity, staff of the office of the president, (Governor), vice president, (Deputy Governor), a ministry or department of the federation (state), assigned with the responsibility for any business of the government of the federation(state), (FRN, 1999).

Institution: Institution refers to established ways of doing things. It refers to those rules and regulations which in their abstractness, focused on the practicality of them by maintaining social interaction and cubing human emotions and behavior. Institutions form choice sets. They influence behavior by shaping responsibilities, liberties and people's motivations. Institutions are created(laws) or emerge (norms) to serve specific purposes, while also protecting certain values. Institutions specify who gets access to which resources, and also influences how these resources are used.

The human society is characterized by more or less complex and overlapping networks of regular and social interactions and practices. Economic, political or cultural as the case may be, such repeated interactions require agreed and predictable rules. i.e. ways of doings. Such sets of rules constitute institutions. According to North (1990),

Economic activity- whether silent barter, the operation of stock markets, the conditions for opening a new business or obtaining credit – is shaped by the rules of the game' which forbid some forms of behavior and encourage others; the form which such rules take may either hinder or promote growth.

Institutions are neither static nor neutral, they distribute advantages and disadvantages in different ways, and they will always be winners and losers in the course of establishing or changing them. Emile Durkheim (1895/1938), observed that social science is 'the science of institutions, of their genesis and their functioning'.

Political Institutions: These are the organizations in a government that create, enforce, and apply laws. They often mediate conflict, make (governmental) policy on the economy and social systems, and otherwise, provide representation for the population. Political institutions include political party organizations, trade unions, and the (legal) courts. The term 'political institutions' may also refer to the recognized structure of rules and principles within which the above organizations operate, including such concepts as the right to vote, a responsible government, and accountability. In the views of Wittman (1995), political institutions arise exactly in order to mitigate potential 'political market failures', such as principal agent problems between voters and politicians or among political bodies. Again, competition for political office reduces political opportunism.

Empirical Review

Past and current works on the subject matter are hitherto presented in a tabular form as follows:

Table 1.

Names of Researcher(s)/ year, Title of study	Geographical and content scope covered	Data source(s) & Analytical tools	Findings / Conclusion / Recommendations
Fosu (2019), Institutions and African economic development.	Africa: Institutions and Development	Secondary materials (data) were employed, review of extant literature.	The paper concluded by flagging the potential risk of backtracking by African countries from achieving the democratic consolidation required to sustain the gains in growth and development.
Cheeseman (2018). Institutions and Democracy in Africa	Africa: Institutions and democracy.	Secondary materials like books, journals etc.	African political institutions, historically are seen as weak. Such institutions constitutions, legislatures and judiciary – all seen as being vulnerable to manipulation, leading to some claiming that the continent is “institution less”.
Nomor, Orjime and Miswenem (2018). Political participation and economic growth in Nigeria.	Nigeria: Political Participation and economic growth. 1999-2016.	The study used GDP per capita as proxy for economic growth while political participation was measured by political participation index Auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was used to estimate the model of the study.	The study found no long run relationship between political participation and economic growth in Nigeria. Thus, the study concludes that political participation has not favourably contributed to economic growth in Nigeria due largely to low participation of citizens in political activities in the country. The paper recommends increased participation of citizens in political activities in Nigeria so as to reap the full benefits of political participation.
Fosu (2017). Governance and development in Africa: A concise review.	Africa: Governance and Development.	Secondary sources were employed to obtain the data for the study.	The paper found amongst others that both economic governance and political governance have improved considerably sine the late 180 – or early 1990s.
Adegboye (2015). Political Institutions and Fiscal Management in Nigeria. Do state governments matter?	1970-2012 political institutions and Fiscal Management in Nigeria: Do state governments matter?	Data was processed using OLS and GMM estimation techniques.	The study found that fiscal dependence (state government dependence on oil resources) is the strongest institutional factor promoting fiscal procyclicality in Nigeria. The effect is more pronounced during the democratizera – fiscal deficits to income ration have responded more positively to state government dependence on the fiscal pool since 1999.

Theoretical Framework: Institutional Theory (Amenta and Ramsey, 2009)

Basically, all institutional theoretical claims are similar as they emanate from fact that something identified at a higher level is used to explain processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis (Clemens and Cook, Amenta, 2005). Political institutionalists typically situate their claims at the state or macro-political level and argue that process of formation of states, political systems, and political party systems strongly influence political processes and outcomes (Amenta, 2005).

Political and historical institutionalists are institutionalists who see institutions as formal or informal procedures, routine, norms, and conventions in the organizational structure of the polity or the political economy (Hall and Taylor, 1966). Institutional theories as applied to politics posit two distinct forms of institutional influences over policy and political action. Institutions can be constraining, superimposing conditions of possibility for mobilization, access, and influence. Institutions limit some forms of action and facilitate others.

Arguments about institutional constraint evoke an “architectural or maize-like” imagery, to the extent that institutions are hypothesized to proceed from powerful states; such architecture becomes a “concrete, massive, autonomous” fortress (Clemens and Cook, 1999: 445-461). Theories of “political mediation” (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky, 2005) and “Political opportunity” (Meyer and Minkoff; 2004) are, partially, institutional constraint arguments, to the extent that they posit that political institutions limit the conditions under which organized interests mobilize and attain collective goods from the state. This theory clearly explains the extent of influence an institution can have on various spheres of humanity, Hence, its adoption as the theoretical framework of this study.

Methodology

In this study, data was obtained from secondary materials. It is a descriptive study in which content analysis is adopted as the technique for analysis. The analysis is carried out in the following order –

Research Question One (1): What is the effect of weak budgetary institution on Nigeria's quest for development?

Budgetary institutions in Nigeria are generally perceived as inefficient, ineffective, weak and unable to create a meaningful contribution to the entire national growth process. There is quite a plethora of empirical support for the above stance. One such support is the study of “Budget and Political institutions and budgetary performance” in Nigeria by Adegboye and Iweriebor (2016). The empirical results from the study compare well with both regional and international positions and submits as follows:

The budgetary process in Nigeria is fraught with large-scale inefficiencies in terms of preparation and allocations. Moreover, budget institutions in Nigeria are shown to be weak in terms of maintaining accelerated processes or efficient resource use. The institutions do not provide the expected formidable guard against inefficiency of budget outcomes in Nigeria.

In a related development, the study by Edeme and Nkalu (2017) titled “Budgeting for development: Lessons from 2013 capital budget implementation in Nigeria, recorded the following –

Findings suggest that the level of capital budget implementation is insufficient to foster the desired development. This poor performance is attributable to inadequacy in the budget implementation plans, non

release or late release of budgeted funds and lack of budget performance monitoring.

Lacey (1989), in his observation, pointed out that, in most developing countries, there is always a disjoint between broad objectives of the plan and the interconnection in budget preparation. Empirical evince from Ghana and Nigeria reveal that national budgets possess the principal features of repetitive budgeting whose sources of financing is unpredictable. According to Omechinwa and Roe (1989), Nwagu (1992), “this unpredictability of resource flows creates uncertainty in resource allocation and capital budget implementation”.

Studies have also exposed the fact that the manner in which new projects have been planned, appraised, approved and included in the budget are not in conformity with the laid down guidelines designed to facilitate the linkage between development plans and annual budget. The capital budget of a country is a veritable instrument in the provision of capital investment and it is often more directly related to development because it contributes to the capital stock needed to drive the growth process in the economy. This is hardly the case with Nigeria where Oke, (2013), Obadan (2010), assert that, “annual budgets over the years have not contributed significantly to the growth process”. This assertion is made more manifest as Ogujiuba and Ehigiamusoe (2014) noted that, “only 51% of the total budgeted funds for capital expenditures in the 2012 Federal Government Budget were utilized”.

Research Question Two (2): How has Civil Service Bureaucracy influenced Nigeria's Quest for development?

Bureaucrats play vital roles in the formulation, implementation, evaluation and review of government policies and programmes. However, the frequent incursion of politics into the domain of the public service in Nigeria has undermined these roles to an unimaginable extent. In his study titled “Bureaucratic politics and policy development: Issues and challenges, Agboola (2016), observe that, “public bureaucracy in Nigeria is expected to play a leading role in the socioeconomic transformation through innovation and social engineering”. In its analysis of data (secondary) obtained from official documents, books, reports and proceedings papers, the study came to the conclusion that, “public bureaucracy is a catalog of failed policies and development projects”. The paper believes that the inability of government bureaucracy to deliver the much needed services to the citizens and the resultant decline in the standard of living of the people may be held by the

same as a conclusive evidence of failed Nigerian state. Okotoni (2001), laments that, “the public bureaucracy in Nigeria is plagued with a number of problems that have hindered its effective role in the country. A major problem of the public sector is the politicization of jobs in the sector. Going further, Okotoni (2001), sums up the problems of the public service to include – “politicization of the offices of the permanent secretary and the head of service, corruption, nepotism, and introduction of the Federal character”.

In a recent study, titled, “Public bureaucracy and service delivery in Nigeria: The Neo-Weberian Explanation, Ajibade and Ibietan (2016), employed the tool of the Neo-Weberian model to highlight the deficits in public service delivery in Nigeria. It infers that for the Nigerian bureaucracy to achieve its mandate to qualitative service delivery to the populace, government should make use of professionals in the provision of public services as reinforced in the neo-Weberian model.

It is on record, that “the Nigerian public sector has undergone a process of restructuring in the last two decades” (Bureau of Public Service Reforms, 2007). This was in an attempt to improve service delivery by government agencies. Makinde (2005), and Abah (2010), believe the justification for the reforms has been to make it more responsive to the needs of the citizens by increasing the levels of accountability, promoting efficiency and effectiveness, introducing participative decision making and adopting pro-active steps and practices in the public sector. According to Njunwa (2007), “the introduction, adoption and implementation of public the adherence of formalized procedures to an emphasis on resources allocation and goal achievement for improved service delivery to the public. However, the reforms notwithstanding, public service delivery still remains unimpressive. For instance, the depressing state of public service delivery in Nigeria is noticeable in the collapse of public utilities and educational system. State hospitals which had earlier degenerated into consulting clinics have now become 'places to die' and the quality of services rendered by government agencies being the subject of continuous lamentation by citizens (Akume, 2015; Osawe, 2015).

Findings

This study revealed the following –

1. The budgetary process in Nigeria is fraught with large-scale inefficiencies in terms of preparation and allocations.

2. Budget institutions in Nigeria are shown to be weak in terms of maintain accelerate processes or efficient resource use.
3. The level of capital budget implementation is insufficient to foster the desired development.
4. The poor performance in the budget system is attributable to inadequacy in the budget implementation plans, non-release or late release of budgeted funds and lack of budget performance monitoring.
5. In Ghana and Nigeria as revealed by empirical evidence, national budgets possess the principal features of repetitive budgeting whose source of financing is unpredictable.
6. The manner in which new projects have been planned, appraised, approved and included in the budget are not in tandem with laid down guidelines designed to facilitate the linkage between development plans and annual budget.
7. In Nigeria, annual budgets over the years have not contributed significantly to h growth process.
8. The frequent incursion of politics into the domain of the public service in Nigeria has undermined the roles of the formulation, implementation, evaluation and review of government policies and programmes.
9. Public bureaucracy in Nigeria is plagued with a number of problems that have hindered its effective role in the country.
10. Problems of public service in Nigeria include – politicization of offices of the permanent secretary and head of service, corruption, nepotism, and the introduction of the federal character.
11. In an effort to improve public service delivery, the Nigerian government has introduced reforms. However, these reforms have not yielded the desired results.

Conclusion

Rostow's model of growth has been criticized on the grounds that the model cannot work in the contemporary developing countries as those nations lack the basic institutional framework which existed in Europe at the very earlier stage of their development process. Generally, African institutions are known to be weak and this has had adverse consequences for the development process of countries in the continent. Nigeria is no exception as her institutions are also known to be weak. This study examined the extent to which these institutions have influenced the development of the country. Data for the study was obtained from secondary

sources – books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, the internet, etc. Using content analysis as its analytic technique, two public institutions – the budgetary system and the civil service bureaucracy were examined. The paper found that both the budgetary system and the civil service were fraught with ineffectiveness and efficiency with the tendency of leading the nation to attain the status of a failed state. While the budgetary system has failed to enhance adequate planning and implementation, the civil service bureaucracy has led to a situation in which hospitals have tuned to mere consultancy centres, water and electricity supply are grossly inadequate, and the public service delivery is nothing to write home about. It is the conclusion of the paper that urgent reforms must be embarked upon to bring the Nigerian political institutions back on track if the country must avoid a total collapse in the nearest future. The paper goes on to suggest that the civil service and the budgetary system be reinjected with fresh blood to get it working again.

Suggestions

Based on the findings of this study, the following suggestions are made –

1. Reforms must not stop on paper. They have to be activated and implemented if the desired results must be received.
2. Annual budgets can only be effective and contribute in the growth process when the rules of the budgeting process are adhered to.
3. The challenges that have plagued public bureaucracy in Nigeria should be addressed seriously.
4. The politicization of the offices of permanent secretary and head of service must be stopped to give the civil service the professional look it deserves.
5. The federal character which has been counter productive should be scrapped.
6. Repetitive budgeting is a dangerous practice particularly in a situation of unpredictable sources of finance. It has to be stopped.
7. Frequent incursion of politicians into the budget process and civil service should be addressed seriously with a view to putting a permanent end to the practice.
8. It is necessary to beef up the level of capital budget implementation to foster the desired development.

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Chapter - 8

Foreign Aid, Debt Relief and Africa's Development: Problems and Prospects

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Abstract

In recent years, the Paris club granted a number of African countries, including Nigeria, debt relief. This elicited widespread celebration in the capital cities of affected countries, where it was portrayed as a veritable launchpad to Africa's development. This paper takes a critical look at the debt relief, with emphasis on its problems and prospects for Africa's development. It is argued that while debt relief does offer some prospects for development, there is little or no evidence to suggest that such an outcome is automatic. The conditions that precipitated the debt crisis in the first instance, including an inequitable international economic order and political conditions tied to aid, are still very present in the debt relief regime. Corruption of the foreign aid regime by both internal and external actors has been compounded by the recent global economic crisis, posing further constraints on the effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa. If debt relief must yield the desired result, it has to be accompanied by a sustainable campaign to fundamentally reform the world order to make it more equitable, together with a drive for good governance that is not only democratic, but also efficient and development-oriented in Africa.

Keywords: *Africa; Debt burden; development; International economic governance; Good governance; IMF; World Bank; SAPs*

Introduction

The debt burden has, for decades, remained a recurrent and discordant note in the discourse on the crisis and contradictions of Africa's development. This is, however, not entirely surprising given its magnitude and the consequences for Africa. The collective debt burden of the continent represents a massive betrayal of Africa's huge resource base, both human and material, and the failure of policy measures targeted at the management of those resources. To be sure, hopes and expectations were high in the decade of the 1960s, when most African countries attained political independence. Africa's new leaders believed that, given the abundance of human and natural endowment at their disposal, they were bound to make steady progress in the direction of sustainable democratic governance and development. But as it turned out, these hopes have been dashed by years of military dictatorship and external complicity.¹ Today, Africa groans under the weight of an excruciating debt burden. Available statistics indicate that between 1970 and 2002, Africa received a total of \$540 billion in loans and paid back \$550 billion \$10 billion more than the original loans over the same period. Yet, Africa owed \$293 billion at the end of 2002. This has been of profound impact on the continent. Not only do debt service payments consume a huge chunk of foreign exchange earnings, they also act to depress investment and lower the rate of economic growth, due to debt overhang effect, leading to extreme poverty.

As the crisis deepens, there has been a heightened African struggle for debt cancellation from creditors, particularly from the Paris Club. This elite consortium of Western creditor countries that have made loans or have guaranteed export credits to developing nations, so named because they meet in Paris to discuss borrowers' ability to repay debts, has no formal or institutional existence and no fixed membership. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury, and it has a close relationship with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).³ But it has great power over the future of many African economies. The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and IMF represents a major international plank in the struggle for debt relief. The HIPC initiative offers debt relief to countries with good governance and a demonstrated commitment to fight corruption and poverty and to invest in health and education for their societies. The initiative currently involves 38 countries out of which 32 are in Africa. In June 2005, the Group of Eight (G8) gathering of the world's most developed economies, resolved, through their finance ministers, to grant total debt relief to 18 countries that had reached 'completion point',

amounting to \$40 billion. Fourteen of these countries are in Africa. In the wake of the celebration that greeted this announcement, Nigeria in July 2005 was similarly awarded debt relief by her creditors amounting to \$18 billion. These developments have attracted attention on the continent and further abroad.

It is against the background of the foregoing developments that this paper is conceived. In it, discussion will seek to re-interrogate the linkages between debt relief or cancellation and the prospects for Africa's development. The position of the paper is predicated upon some pertinent questions: what are the prospects for African development through debt relief? And what are the problems with this approach? To what extent can debt relief alter the global trends and flows of capital in favour of Africa? This paper gives insights into these questions, drawing largely upon the Nigerian example. The central argument of the paper is that while debt relief or cancellation holds some prospects for African development, there is little or no evidence to suggest that it will automatically reverse Africa's increasing poverty and marginalisation in the prevailing world order. In this time of global financial crisis and economic recession, this is all the more true. If debt relief is to yield the desired result, it must be delivered in a context of a sustainable regime of good governance via popular empowerment, participation, accountability, and oversight. The ultimate way out of the current cycle of increasing debt, however, is for Africa to examine its own house.

Perspectives on Foreign Aid and Economic Development

The literature on development has over the years been characterized by sharp divisions among scholars as to the actual relationship between foreign aid and economic growth and development. Before delving into the debate, it is useful to conceptualise foreign aid. Foreign aid basically encompasses all forms of assistance that a country derives from other governments or multilateral agencies and financial institutions to fill noticeable gaps, especially in production, savings and investments. It takes diverse forms such as grants, loans, foreign direct investment (FDI), joint ventures and technical assistance. While grants are essentially gifts with neither interest charged nor any obligation to pay back, loans attract both. It is, for this reason, that classification of loans as aid has been vigorously questioned. The argument has, however, been made that loans may qualify as aid to the extent that they are 'soft' in terms of repayment and the rate of interest they attract. By contrast, however, loans cease to be aid if they are commercially motivated especially for the promotion of the donor's interests.⁴ Technical assistance connotes an offer of training facilities, equipment and

personnel by a donor country to a recipient country, to assist in skills training and institution building, as well as provision of professional support and advice on policy formulation, reform and implementation.⁵

The exact relationship between foreign aid and economic development continues to be controversial. For liberal scholars, the relationship between foreign aid and economic development is positive, but for more radical elements, the correlation between them is considered to be antithetical. For the former, foreign aid in whatever form engenders the process of economic growth and development in the recipient economy by filling the gaps between available and needed resources.⁶ More emphatically, in the liberal tradition, foreign aid is reputed for bridging the gaps in production, savings, investments, foreign exchange, technology and consumption, all of which have been identified as hampering development in developing countries.⁷ Borrowing, in particular, has been credited with allowing 'a country to invest and consume beyond the limit of current domestic production and, again finance capital formation via (a) mobilisation of domestic savings and (b) tapping savings from capital surplus economies'.⁸ The foregoing postulation is said to hold especially when the volume of the aid is high.

As Brautigam and Knack have argued, 'high levels of aid channeled to government with clear development agendas can be used to improve the quality of civil service, strengthen policy and planning capacity, and establish strong central institutions.'⁹ Devaranjan, Dollars and Holmgren also posit that 'aid can release the binding constraints of low revenue for governments committed to development',¹⁰ a situation capable of facilitating growth under good microeconomic policies, with prospects for generating 'new revenue for funding improvement in government qualities.'¹¹ These claims are widely supported by empirical evidence from the East Asian region, with reference especially to South Korea and Taiwan, and in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Botswana.¹² Despite the appeals of the pro-foreign aid argument, its intellectual foundations have not gone unchallenged. For its antagonists, foreign aid and especially borrowing is inimical to economic growth and development in the recipient country. This is more so when the conditions are not 'soft.' Accordingly, this perspective argues that foreign aid brings about distortions in the domestic political economy of recipients such as 'debt crisis, poverty, wider technological gap and disequilibrium in the foreign sector.'¹³ This is considered to be so because the only language understood by capitalism, the driving philosophy behind foreign aid, is exploitation of surplus value, often with

cruel effect. As Saliu puts it, 'capital has no human face and the only language it understands is that of exploitation'.¹⁴ The exploitation associated with foreign aid manifests in the conditions imposed by the majority of aid regimes. These include donor access to recipient national decision-making processes; direct transfer of resources from the recipient country to the donors' (through repatriation); imposition of dysfunctional economic policies upon recipients (e.g. structural adjustment policies, or SAPs); and high interest rates, among others. Brautigam and Knack posit that high levels of aid might also block governance improvement in at least two major ways.¹⁵ First, they assert that the way in which large amounts of aid are delivered can weaken institutions rather than build them.

They attribute this tendency to what they call 'high transaction costs' that accompany aid and 'the fragmentation that multiple donor project and agendas promote, [the] problem of "poaching" ...opportunities to learn, and [the] impact of aid on the budget process'.¹⁶ This position is supported by Bertin Martens, who argues that the existence of the multitude of aid organizations, serving as intermediaries between the donors and beneficiaries of aid, tends to increase transaction costs.¹⁷ Second, they argue that high South African Journal of International Affairs 89 levels of aid can create incentives that make it more difficult to overcome the obstructions to collective action required to build a more capable and responsive state and a more effective foreign aid system. Consequently, high levels of aid may lead to 'aid dependence', that is, the 'process by which continuous provision of aid appears not to be making significant contribution to the achievement of self sustaining development', or 'a state of mind, where aid recipients lose their capacity to think for themselves and thereby relinquish control'.¹⁸

Following this lead, Brautigam and Knack define aid dependency as 'a situation in which the government is unable to perform many of the core functions of governments, such as the maintenance of existing infrastructures or the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise'.¹⁹ While it cannot be directly measured, 'aid intensity', or net aid flows as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and aid as a percentage of government expenditure, is useful in determining the extent of aid dependence at a given point in time.

By these standards, most African countries can be said to be or have been at one time 'aid-dependent', with an average of about 50% aid as a percentage of

government expenditure in 1999, for instance. The impact of this is the gradual erosion of the autonomy of African states in the public policy decision processes.²⁰ All these have afflicted developing countries, especially those in Africa.²¹ For this reason, it can be argued that the conditions attached to Western aid to Africa are partly responsible for Africa's debt problems. More recently, foreign aid has been deeply implicated in the escalation of corruption in Africa, where both local and international actors have been indicted.²² As Moyo expressly captures the situation²³

The most obvious criticism of aid is its links to rampant corruption. Aid flows destined to help the average African end up supporting bloated bureaucracies in the form of the poor-country governments and donor-funded non-governmental organizations. In a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 2004, Jeffrey Winters, a professor at Northwestern University, argued that the World Bank had participated in the corruption of roughly \$100 billion of its loan funds intended for development. Reflecting the internal dimensions of the problem, Moyo continues:²⁴

As recently as 2002, the African Union, an organization of African nations, estimated that corruption was costing the continent \$150 billion a year, as international donors were apparently turning a blind eye to the simple fact that aid money was inadvertently fuelling graft. With few or no strings attached, it has been all too easy for the funds to be used for anything, save the developmental purpose for which they were intended.

While each of these perspectives has its merits, this paper aligns itself with the latter perspective that sees foreign aid as counterproductive in developing economies. This alignment is predicated upon the realities of African political economies, which have, so far, been adversely effected by the dominant foreign aid regime of the West, or Global North.

The African debt situation that Africa has been under the unbearable weight of a debt crisis is not disputed. By debt crisis, we mean a condition whereby a country has accumulated so much debt that it can no longer sustain the management of the debt, resulting in severe distortions and contradictions in the domestic political economy. This has been the African condition for decades, so much so that the struggle for debt cancellation for Africa has been in the forefront of the public discourse on the matter since the 1990s.²⁵

The origin of Africa's debt crisis can be traced to the colonial period where the foundations of the crisis were laid. Onimode has pointed out that African foreign trade exhibits five major defects, which were largely responsible for its debt crisis. These defects, a result of 'the extreme disarticulation and distortions of Africa's colonial economy and the late decolonisation of the region',²⁶ are:

1. High export dependence;
2. High concentration on a few commodities;
3. Low and declining terms of trade;
4. High instability of exports earning due to these factors; and
5. A chronic balance of payments crisis.²⁷

It was upon this weak economic base that most African countries attained political independence, mostly in the 1960s. The implication of this bad starting position was the inability of many new African economies to withstand the post-colonial shocks that were to come, including internal pressures for improved living conditions in Africa as promised under the anti-colonial ideologies of legitimation.²⁸ As the pressure heightened, several African countries were compelled by domestic politics to jump-start development programmes, relying largely on external funding for implementation. At the same time, to encourage economic growth, there had to be some significant level of investment in the economy. This can be achieved when there is an adequate investible surplus. In the absence of this surplus, alternative means of generating funds must be devised, most often through borrowing.²⁹ For these and related reasons, African countries began to seek and receive external funds to fill their savings and investments gaps. Borrowing may not necessarily be bad for an economy. In fact, it is even considered as one of the best alternatives to the creation of money during periods of recession.³⁰ What is negative about borrowing generally relates to the conditions attached to debt, and the cost of management of that debt. In the African experience, the burden of conditions and the cost of servicing extensive borrowing remain at the heart of the continent's debt crisis.³¹ Africa's external creditors have insisted on deregulation of the economy, devaluation of the local currency, and recently, political liberalisation, which, as has been demonstrated, actually undermined African economies.³² To make matters worse, poor economic management at the domestic front in the form of wasteful and unproductive expenditures, in addition to the mismanagement of the borrowed funds by inefficient public enterprises, were a major feature in Africa.³³ These forces have combined disastrously to lead Africa into a severe debt burden. At this juncture, it is important to illustrate with some statistics. Between 1970 and 1996, the long-

term debt of developing countries expanded about 30 times to the tune of \$1,726 billion, despite the sharp decline in net aggregate resource inflow in the 1980s. Short-term debt on the other hand increased by 216% from \$146.5 billion in 1980 to \$463 billion in 1997. The aggregate debt stock rose by 80.6% from \$1,365 billion in 1988 to \$2,465 billion in 1998. The external debt stock of sub-Saharan Africa also increased from \$164.9 billion in 1988 to \$215.7 billion in 2000.³⁴ by 2002, Africa's stock of external debt was put at an estimated \$333.3 billion.³⁵ the implications of this for Africa have been very harrowing. Among others, debt crisis has ensured an annual export of capital from the South to the North. This takes the form of debt servicing which inevitably puts great pressure on budgets, leading to rising fiscal deficits in the heavily indebted countries. The attendant overhang these generate depress the income, investment and living standards, as much as it seriously constrains the scope of macro-economic policy making, with damaging effects on economic and financial institutions.³⁶ The overarching implication is an unacceptable level of poverty and inequality, both of which symbolise the marginalisation of Africa in the international economic system.³⁷ While the foregoing represents the African picture, the Nigerian experience is particularly devastating. Endowed with large quantities of high grade oil, from which the country generated a total of nearly \$300 billion from oil exports between 1973 and 2000, one would have expected Nigeria to rank among the richest countries of the world.³⁸

Unfortunately, the reverse has so far been the case, as Nigeria is highly indebted with an egregious debt profile. As of 31 August 2001, Nigeria's debt stock, including penalty interests, amounted to \$28.42 billion, made up of obligations to: the Paris Club of Creditors at \$22.04 billion; non-Paris club bilateral creditors at \$111.6 billion; multilateral creditors at \$2.89 billion; and commercial creditors at \$3.37 billion.³⁹ Similarly, about 70% of Nigeria's 125 million people live in absolute poverty on a dollar a day or less. Whereas estimates have shown that Nigeria will require an annual GDP growth rate of 78% in order to halve the number of people suffering under poverty by 2015, the country currently grows at a rate of only 3%. Yet, the total contractual debt service obligations for Nigeria during the same period was \$3.7 billion per annum, and in recent past, Abuja had been paying about \$1.52 billion to creditors.⁴⁰ These excruciating conditions, repeated elsewhere, partly explain the gulf between the rich and poor countries of the world. Certainly, they have necessitated the resonant call for redress in the form of debt relief, forgiveness, cancellation or repudiation. How has the African debt crisis been managed over the years?

Management of African Debt Crisis

The question of how to successfully manage Africa's debt crisis has been a central theme in the discourse of international political economy. Debt sustainability connotes a country's ability to meet its external obligations in full, without future recourse to debt rescheduling, or relief or the accumulation of arrears over the medium or long term and without compromising economic growth.⁴¹ The major indicators for assessing sustainability have been identified as: the ratio of scheduled debt service to exports of goods and services; the external financing gap (after allowing for expected inflows in the form of grant receipts, loan disbursements and any commercial capital flows); and the ratio of the net present value (NPV) of the debt to exports.⁴² Over the years, most African countries have had debt sustainability problems. This explains why they have not been able to exit from the debt trap, necessitating the resort to debt rescheduling and relief measures. A number of initiatives have been taken, especially by the creditor nations and agencies in response to Africa's debt crisis. At the initial stage, they resorted to an adjustment mechanism as typified by the austerity measures and SAPs.

The basic features of the SAP regime include 'import and exchange liberalisation; getting prices right; privatisation and reduction of labor's share in national economy' as contained in the Baker Plan of September 1985.⁴³ The Brandy Plan, which followed in 1989, called for the reduction of current interest payments on the principal but also subject to World Bank, IMF conditions such as import liberalisation and privatisation.⁴⁴ Several other measures have been proposed to manage Africa's debt crisis. Some were designed to promote a regime of lower interest rates for poor countries undertaking adjustment programmes.⁴⁵ Some others emphasize the need for a high degree of concessionary rescheduling and a fundamental restructuring of the entire stock of the Paris Club debt.⁴⁶ Beyond these, however, African countries have also attempted to restructure their debt through a process of selling foreign debts at reduced prices in the secondary market.

They have also exploited opportunities for debt equity swaps whereby foreign debts are exchanged at reduced price in the secondary market for local equities or shares in the same enterprises, for purposes of environment, science and development.⁴⁷ The HIPC initiative was conceived in 1996 in response to Africa's deepening debt crisis. The HIPC initiatives in its original version, was to be anchored on six principles, such as: targeting overall debt sustainability and

providing a true exit from debt; track record of performance to address moral hazards; and building on existing mechanisms such as the London and Paris Clubs. Others include: ensuring a broad and equitable integrity of multilateral creditors; and pressuring the financing of concessional terms in order not to compound the problem it is trying to solve.⁴⁸ after years of experimentation with these measures, however, it is disappointing to note that Africa's debt burden, rather than diminishing, has assumed a frightening dimension. This may not be unrelated to the absence of any African country among those developing economies receiving debt relief under the original HIPC Scheme. This has been attributed to a variety of reasons including the stringent conditions of the HIPC Scheme and the slow response to prevailing realities.⁴⁹

For their disappointing level of performance, Onimode described these measures as a 'Non Solution to Debt Crisis' and proceeded to argue for collective debt repudiation.⁵⁰ The foregoing reality may have informed the revision of the original HIPC initiative to produce the Enhanced HIPC (HIPC II) in 1999. The HIPC II, which was a product of a comprehensive review of the original HIPC and extensive public consultations, essentially, seeks 'to provide deeper, broader and faster debt relief to eligible countries and to strengthen the links between debt relief, poverty reduction and social policies'.⁵¹ Such relief packages as approved by the African Development Bank (ADB), would be delivered to eligible countries through: annual debt service reduction; release of up to 80% of annual debt service obligations as they come due until the total debt relief is provided; interim financing, between the decision and completion points, of up to 40% of debt relief; and debt service to be provided, whenever possible, within a 15 year time horizon to assist countries in attaining the internationally agreed development goals for year 2015.⁵² Under the HIPC II, many African countries have obtained debt relief packages of various kinds and some are still being considered for debt relief. This suggests that the HIPC II marks a significant improvement over the original HIPC in terms of expected debt relief for Africa's development. Table 1 shows the differences between the two HIPC initiatives.

Table 1: Enhancement to the HIPC initiative in 1999

Criterion	Original HIPC (%)	Enhanced HIPC (%)
NPV* debt/export	200-250	150
'Fiscal withdraw' NPV		
Debt/Revenue	280	250
Qualifying thresholds		
Export/GDP	40	30
Revenue/GDP	20	15
Base for assessment of debt relief	Completion point	Decision points
Net present value		

Source: Obadan, 2004a:194

Debt Relief and Africa's Development

How do we interpret the latest regime of debt relief for Africa, especially in terms of its likely implications for Africa's development? In official circles and beyond, the debt relief granted to some African countries has been widely celebrated. President Obasanjo of Nigeria, for example, describes debt relief for Nigeria as a dividend of democracy, noting that it would enable the country to have an additional \$1 billion to be invested in the human welfare budget for health, education, food security and infrastructural development.⁵³ Obviously, there is no controverting the fact that if properly governed, the new regime of debt relief does have some positive prospects for African development. To be sure, debt relief, be it partial or total, has the potential to halt negative movement of capital flight in Africa. As studies have shown, there is a positive correlation between external debt and capital flight, with negative consequences for economic growth and development.⁵⁴

For decades, African countries have had to commit a significant proportion of their annual budgets to debt servicing. Nigeria, for example, made annual debt service payments of \$1.5 billion between 1998 and 2000, an amount which constituted about 2030% of total exports. From projections, Abuja was expected to pay \$2 billion per annum (2001-2002) or a total of about \$43 billion for the rescheduling period.⁵⁵ Even after the very aggressive debt-relief campaigns in the 1990s, African countries still pay close to \$20 billion in debt repayments per annum, 'a stark reminder that aid is not free'.⁵⁶ With increased debt relief the hope is that there will now be more resources to be channeled towards development agendas.⁵⁷ Similarly, it is believed that debt relief would engender increased saving and investment in the domestic economy. This has the potential to engineer growth and reduce poverty, capable of leading to improved conditions of living. This is

especially so if the proceeds from debt relief are well managed in the overall interest of the national economies of African states. While this positive thinking has some merit, there is also the observation that the much-touted debt relief has been selective and discriminatory. For instance, under the various debt deals, different conditions apply to different countries with respect to qualification and classification. To make matters worse, these conditions were drawn up solely by the Paris Club and related agencies acting according to the interests of the West, and particularly the US.⁵⁸ Indeed, the assumed tremendous prospects of Africa's development under the new debt relief are too optimistic. For instance, virtually all the measures that have been devised by the World Bank and IMF for the management of Africa's external debt have been predicated upon such conditions as political and economic liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, and devaluation.⁵⁹

The HIPC (I and II) initiatives also focused on these conditions to the extent that only countries undergoing reforms in the political, economic, social and other spheres could take advantage of the scheme. Yet as with other such programs in history, these conditions, like the SAPs regime, are likely to produce several unintended consequences that may neutralise the intended benefits. A major challenge that emanates from the foregoing has to do with how to consolidate what ever gains the debt relief may engender. Debt relief cannot be assumed to automatically lead to development. It may even retard development if not properly handled. Reflecting on this, the Centre for Global Development (CGD) observes that while debt relief may not guarantee development, it is however 'an important step in the right direction'.⁶⁰ But debt relief must not be the only step. For instance, now that much of the hope of recovery has come to be associated with the debt relief, what becomes of local development frameworks, especially the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)? There are indications that debt relief, if not handled with caution, may detract from initiatives under NEPAD, thereby limiting its efficacy.⁶¹ Today, African leaders who claimed to have originated and owned the NEPAD framework would appear to have shown more confidence in the external component of the framework than in its domestic challenges.⁶² This tendency may have negative implications for Africa's and even global commitment to NEPAD.

Also of crucial importance is the management of the debt relief packages. Across Africa, many countries appear to be democratic, but only due to the conduct of multi-party elections, often with little or no choice. By implication, basic elements

of a democratic society such as constitutionalism, popular participation, empowerment, accountability and oversight are still widely derided.⁶³ This trend raises the question of whether African leaders whose countries have benefited from the debt relief package will give good account of such largesse. Proper governance and management of the debt relief would see more leaders willing to invest in the welfare of their electorates, benefiting health care, education, energy delivery, employment generation and general infrastructural development. But given the pervasive culture of corruption and opportunism among African leaders, it is questionable whether much can be accomplished in these critical sectors.

The foregoing put together therefore raises another question of whether what Africa actually needs is debt relief. As it is being made operational, the debt relief has been made to appear as if the western world is doing Africa a special favour. This ought not to be so. For, the deepening crisis and contradictions in Africa are largely attributable to decades of exploitation of Africa through the slave trade and colonialism. These were to be followed by years of marginalisation and continuing exploitation of African resources through the neo-colonial enterprise.⁶⁴ Perhaps the HIPC programmes should be seen as a meager part of meeting Western indebtedness to Africa, rather than aid? It is in this light that the conception of debt relief, or worse still, debt forgiveness, offends.⁶⁵ of much greater importance than debt relief to Africa is trade and entrepreneurial development. While debt relief offers a starting point, a greater challenge is how to relax the suffocating international trade regime which perpetually pushes Africa and many other developing regions into a very tight corner. Unless the right environment is provided for a truly liberal international trade, where there is no longer discrimination and double standards on barriers to trade, the high expectations that have attended the debt relief recently granted some African countries including Nigeria, will for years continue to be what they are - expectations. Unfortunately, the recent global economic meltdown seems to have added to Africa's woes.

As a result of the crisis, most African countries are suffering from depressed global demand for the natural resources that provide the lion's share of their income. For example, Nigeria, which relies heavily on rent from oil, has been a victim of the vagaries in global oil market and prices, thereby seeing declining revenue to finance its budget. Other likely implications of the crisis in Africa include the drying up of crucial direct investment from overseas, a drop in remittances sent

back home from African emigre's, and a flight of foreign money out of fragile local stock exchanges as overseas investors seek safer investments. To add to these, Africa can also expect a drop in direct aid from richer nations now preoccupied with their own economic troubles.⁶⁶ However, the global crisis may not be negative in every respect for Africa. Already, African leaders are striving to negotiate better deals in the international economic system by seeking a voice in the management of the crisis. Although only one African country, South Africa, was invited to the November 2008 emergency summit of the Group of 20 (G-20) in Washington, DC, a number of African leaders took part in another international conference on 'financing for development' in Doha, Qatar, two weeks later.⁶⁷ At the Doha conference, leaders called for the UN to organize a summit on the world financial systems. Africa's presence in Doha, according to African Union (AU) Commissioner Jean Ping, was 'evidence of Africa's interest in reforming global economic arrangements'.⁶⁸

The significance of Africa's presence, at least for Africa, is the fact that it broke at least one barrier. For, as Harsch puts it, 'up to then, most major talks about the world economy were open only to the rich industrialized Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US), with Russia joining on some issues to form the Group of Eight.'⁶⁹ Moreover, the increasing influence of emerging economies particularly in Asia, notably China and India, also offers some ray of hope. A recent report suggests a dramatic increase in Chinese foreign aid and related activity.⁷⁰ According to the research, which is largely based upon news reports of Chinese foreign economic activity, Chinese foreign assistance and government-supported economic projects in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia grew from less than \$1 billion in 2002 to \$27.5 billion in 2006 and \$25 billion in 2007, where Africa tops the list of beneficiaries: 'Aid and related investment to Africa showed the most significant increase.'⁷¹

The report, however, calls for caution, pointing to the possibility of overvaluation or undervaluation. The economic downturn following the financial crisis of late 2008 may also have a dampening effect on these trends. In light of these opportunities, there is need for developing and strengthening local frameworks for Africa's development. This is one area where the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) has made important contributions, defining national development programmes in a way that may help reduce aid dependency. Under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank, this process has included member nations in developing

strategies to address poverty over the past nine years. It is against this background that African initiatives such as the AU, NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanisms (APRM), whatever their shortcomings, should be commended. They point to the fact that African leaders have realized the need for local initiatives for speedy transformation in African affairs for the better. These instruments have, in varying degrees, mechanisms for promoting good governance.⁷² If they are well utilized, they may help to thwart any attempt by African leaders to squander the opportunities offered by debt relief. The increasing level of public consciousness exemplified by their activism in the process that attended the debt relief is also an indication that African civil society is gradually developing a voice. With increased awareness and sensitisation, this element in Africa may lead the way to resist government mismanagement of scarce resources. Yet, these are not enough assurances for Africa's development.

Beyond Debt Relief: Enhancing African Development

Now that a number of African countries enjoy some relief from years of suffocating debt burden, the most important challenge should be about the consolidation of the gains so far. In this regard, three things are very important. One is how to institute a sustainable debt strategy. The second relates to investment in Africa and between Africa and other parts of the world. The third has to do with how to institute a sustainable regime of good governance in Africa. We begin with the first challenge, which is that of instituting and consolidating a sustainable debt strategy for Africa. First and foremost, there is need for each African country to develop an adequately equipped Debt Management Office (DMO), with competent staff, up-to-date information technology and other performance enhancing requirements. The major task of the DMO should be to collect, store and analyse data regarding all transactions especially internal and external borrowing. From the experience of the past, some African countries became enmeshed in debt crisis not because they had borrowed so much, but because of poor documentation.

This was the case with Nigeria especially under successive military regimes. At one point, there was such confusion that public officers and agencies were supplying conflicting figures.⁷³ To avoid a repeat of this, there is therefore the need for the institutionalization of regulatory frameworks for African debt crisis. This can even be instituted at sub-regional and continental levels where DMOs can be established to strengthen national initiatives. African countries should endeavour

to sustain the current wave of economic reform, which further strengthens their case for development assistance. However, caution must be taken in doing this. It is important that temporary relief measures are put in place to absorb the short-run negative consequences that usually accompany such reforms. Africa is not yet in a position to totally remove subsidies on goods and services. Moreover, African countries would have to limit external borrowing, given the usually stringent conditions attached. To make up for investment, saving and consumption gaps that they may encounter, it would be better for them to intensify domestic production by mobilizing very effectively untapped national resources.

In Nigeria, for example, the agricultural sector, which was once the mainstay of the economy, is now a largely untapped resource due, in large part, to the discovery of Nigeria's oil reserves. While Nigeria's revenues during the economic boom were unprecedented nationally, there is danger in reliance on one sector to the exclusion of all others. There is need for diversification. If African countries must take fresh loans, they must be tied to productive ventures that are not only viable, but able, feasible and capable of generating quick returns to finance the debt.⁷⁴ another major challenge relates to measures that can be taken to boost trade and investment in Africa. As presently constituted, the global economy has left Africa almost a spectator in international trade. This fact has contributed in part to the continent's debt problem. If the debt relief currently granted is to be sustained, this trend must be reversed.

First, it is important that African countries step up their level of domestic production, both in terms of quantity and quality. Africa could start by investing more in entrepreneurial development. The place of human capital in promoting skills and development cannot be overemphasized. Africa requires a great deal of such entrepreneurship in trade to reposition itself in the global capital flows. Without it, the marginalization of Africa can hardly be halted, let alone eradicated. Each African country should therefore endeavour to institute entrepreneurial capacity building as a matter of deliberate national policy. At the same time, Africa must devise means of boosting intra-African trade by removing all roadblocks to free movement of goods and people. African goods must become competitive on the world market. As well, African countries should enhance their processing and refining capacity to attract more value for their products. The western world should meet this effort with fair trading rules that allow access to the developed world's markets for competitive products. In this regard, Africa must

intensify its struggle to see to the removal of trade barriers in the international system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular should be reformed because, as currently operated, its 'one country one vote' policy is deceptive. Some even argue that it is under the hegemonic control and influences of the West and particularly the US.⁷⁵ Efforts should therefore be geared towards its real and full democratisation in such a way that it will become responsive to the aspirations of its constituents, including Africa. It is within this framework that Africa can bargain for a more favourable pricing regime for its agricultural products. Until this is done, international trade may continue for some time to be biased against Africa. Above all, there is need to institute and strengthen a sustainable regime of good governance across the continent. By good governance we mean 'a system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development oriented',⁷⁶ the absence of which has always been the bane of Africa's development. This poses a number of challenges. Firstly, efforts must be made to identify and dismantle all structures that engender and nourish opportunism and corruption in both the public and private realms.⁷⁷ Secondly, the current wave of democracy must be sustained, which will require the institutionalization of an open political process, including multiple political parties, a free civil society, an informed citizenship, a free press, an independent judiciary and a democratic political culture. Thirdly, all institutional mechanisms related to the promotion of good governance in Africa should be strengthened to enforce their responsibilities. In this case, the AU, NEPAD and the APRM should be adequately repositioned through focused and dedicated leadership and popular participation of the people.⁷⁸

Conclusion

In this paper, we have critically engaged the question of Africa's debt crisis with specific emphasis on the current regime of debt relief granted to some African countries. From the preceding analysis, it has been made clear that debt relief does offer some prospects for Africa's development. At least, it represents an important 'burden-lifting' in the form of debt servicing and capital flight from Africa, which has hindered economic growth. With this development, room may have been created for boosting investment in human welfare on the continent, especially in the areas of health, education and infrastructural development. In spite of these prospects, debt relief also presents threats to Africa's development. For one, it is currently discriminatory and selective. The import of this is that only a few selected African countries have benefited from the scheme, leaving others suffering under their debt burdens. Also, conditions imposed in the past that worsened Africa's debt problem such as those contained in the SAPs - privatisation, deregulation,

economic reform - remain largely intact within debt relief policies. Yet, previous concessional measures proffered to Africa, which debt relief typifies, have not altered the underlying inequalities in the structure and composition of the prevailing world order. Indeed, many aspects of globalization have reinforced Africa's position on the lowest rung.⁷⁹ Beyond these constraints, the corruption within the foreign aid regime by both internal and external factors as well as the recent global economic crisis constitutes serious challenges to the effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa. In the short-run, Africa needs to devise means of promoting a sustainable debt management strategy and take full advantage of the opportunities of debt relief through prudent management of resources and effective co-ordination of all debt management related offices. Africa must also invest in entrepreneurial development to boost trade and investment not only in the continent, but also between it and the rest of the world. All these are possible where there is a system of governance that is democratic, efficient and development-oriented. It is on the strength of such internal cohesion, discipline and progressive commitment that debt relief can become meaningful in Africa.

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