

POWER SHIFT AND FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF POWER SHIFT

Ubana, Okah Okah
Institute of Public Policy and Administration
University of Calabar, Nigeria

Abstract

Power Shift in Nigeria over the years from one Region to another has dominated the Political, Social, and Economic discourse in our Country (Sanusi, 2010). This can be traced back to the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election in Nigeria when M.K.O. ABIOLA (a Southerner), won the Election but was annulled by Military President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (a Northerner). This can be said to be Regional and Ethnic differences even when it ought not to be so. The agitation grew, leading to the emergence of President Olusegun Obasanjo taking over office as President in May 1999, who led the Country to her next Republic. A comprehensive content analysis of the variables was done and was analyzed qualitatively. Findings revealed that Nigeria is practicing centralized federalism and not true federalism with respect to power shift/rotation. This paper however, examines the after effects of Power Shift in Nigeria. The paper concludes that power shift only leads to bringing to office incompetent people who do not have the charisma for Leadership. The paper submits that there are no changes in the Socio-economic indices of the Country. This paper suggests that if Power Shift is the consensus factor to solving Nigeria's political problems which the writer does not believe, then its operations should be an addendum/enshrined into the document binding the Country called the Constitution.

Keywords: *Power Shift, Federalism*

Corresponding Author: Ubana, Okah Okah

Background to the Study

The issue of power shift in Nigeria from one geo-political zone to another has become a great deal and debate to Nigerians (Sanus, 2010). Considering the fact that Nigeria possesses an array of great rational and people, immeasurable intellectual capacity. I sometimes become very disappointed on issues that ought not to be topical, becoming a national discourse but then I reckon that every human has the monopoly of knowledge to suggestions and opinions. One will, however, expect that some issues we drag for a long time, celebrating them as it were, will be totally discarded and thrown in the waste bin of no issues. From independence in 1960 to 1999, the rationale behind the domination of leadership particularly at the national level (Presidency/Head of State) by one geo-political zone either as military or civilian has been questioned. This development was fuelled further by the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election that was to put to office a southerner and was annulled by a northern military president. That development created the impression that the North did not want a shift of power to another zone (Kamar Bello, 2005).

This paper surveys those arguments for rational presidency in Nigeria and the rationale behind the agitation. The paper further assesses whether these arguments are justified or not with the conclusion of the implication of using wrong premises to reach conclusion and proffers recommendations.

Theoretical Framework

The pluralist theory was adopted in this paper to explain the cause of agitation and unrest among Nigerians on power shift/rotation. Robert, A. Dahl is a leading exponent of this political theory. The central tenet of this theory is that power and influence are distributed in a political process. (Rober Darl, 1915), with a view that politics and decision making are located mostly in the framework of government, but that many non-governmental groups use their resources to exert influence. The theory further explained that groups of individuals try to maximize their interests. Polsby (1960) however observed that, lines of conflict are multiple and shifting as power is a continuous bargaining process between competing groups. There may be inequalities but they tend to be distributed and evened out by the various forms and distributions of resources throughout a population.

The theory pointed to the fact that the existence of diverse and competing interests is the basis for a democratic equilibrium and is crucial for the obtaining of goals by individuals (Paul Hirst, 1989). However, the pluralist theory is a theory that centers on the idea of how power is distributed. The theory is most appropriate for this paper because both the south east and south-south states, due to their difficult experience of being deprived of power, have become dissatisfied with Nigeria federalism.

Conceptual Explication

Power Shift

The concept of "power shift" and "rotation" are by no means novel in the Nigerian political lexicon (Morgan Nkwoche, 2014). In the build-up to Nigeria's political independence, the signs of an eventual contest for control of political power in an

independent nation were evident amongst the constituent units. However, power shift is the movement of political power from one zone to the other with a much hospitable characterization that guarantees each zone equal and inevitable access to the presidency, irrespective of size, location or political pedigree (Robinson Akpan, 2014).

For Sanusi (2010), zoning/power shift is a can of worms, its potential contribution to national unity dubious and its negative consequences unpredictable and unmanageable. Also, Olisa Agbakoba in Calculia (2011), it is important to ask why the drafters of the constitution prescribed zoning or its constitutional name-federal character. The reason is quite simple, there are, broadly speaking, two types of federations: Homogenous federations, where citizens have a strong sense of national unity, and diverse or divided federations. In homogenous federations, unity is not a major issue and the social forces allow a strong central government. The second is the diverse or divided federation like Nigeria. Here, citizens identify with very distinct groups; sometimes members of a particular group may see their identity as incompatible with the national identity, thus creating tension around the issue of national unity. Nigeria is a perfect illustration of a diverse or divided federation.

Conceptual Nature of Nigeria's Federalism

The concept of federalism defers a universally accepted definition. Wheare (1953), an exponent on contemporary federalism discuss, saw federalism as:

a constitutional arrangement which divides the lawmaking powers and functions between two levels of government in such a way that each within its respective spheres of jurisdiction and competence is independent and coordinate. This constitutional form is brought about by circumstances, where people are prepared to give up only certain limited powers and wish to retain other limited powers to be exercised by coordinated authorities. He observed that coordinate supremacy of all the levels of government with regard to their respective functions remains a cardinal principle of federalism.

This means that federalism has emerged as a particular kind of functional arrangement between states for living and working together nationally, while presenting a measure of separate identity (Wheare, 1953).

Kapur (1986) averred that federalism is a dual government where powers are divided and distributed by the constitution between a central government and regional or state government. Such powers are original and derived. The component units i.e. the regional or state governments are coordinate units must also be left with adequate economic resources to run their administrations and perform the functions assigned to them satisfactorily without being dependent on the peanuts that come from the national government.

Babawale (1998) defines a federal state as:

one in which there is an: explicit and constitutional demarcation of powers and functions among national and sub-national units, moreover, the powers and responsibilities are distributed in such a manner as to protect the existence of authority of both levels of polity each of which is independent within its own sphere... federalism refers to the doctrine which advocates and promotes the form of organization of a state in which power is dispersed or decentralized by contract as a means of safeguarding local identities and individual liberties

He further states that federalism describes not only the structure of a state; it also designates its political culture and political process. An important characteristics, which distinguishes federal system from non-federal systems, is non-centralization of power. For in a federal polity, there is division of power between the central and component units. It is pertinent to note that in Nigeria's federal experience, the reasoning propounded by Wheare (1953), Babawale (1958) and Kapur (1986) does not hold in practice. This is because the Federal Government has usurped virtually all the powers, which were formerly exercised by the state governments.

Corroborating this line of thought, Akindele and Bassey (2001) defines a federal state as a political entity or country where powers and indispensable decisions are exercised and made at two or multilateral levels of government in accordance with the strict mutually agreed constitutional provisions of the country concerned. Egbebullem (2011) argued that these positions formed the basis of the claim that federalism is anchored on considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action through conciliation even when the power to act unilaterally is available.

Wheare (1953) adopts United State of America as the model Federal State. Following his preferences for American style federalism, he choose to call other constitutions that do not make the component units autonomous as quasi-federal states. For example, Wheare's concept of federalism regarding the pre-1966 Nigerian constitution as quasi-federal because section 66 allowed the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency on any region and to take over the running of the government of that region for a specific period of time. Ekpo and Enamidem (2003) equally observed that protagonists of resource control began to push forward the argument that the country cannot be said to be a federation when the elements of federalism are lacking elements such as state police, control of natural resources by the federating unit. Although, Nigeria is supposed to be a federation, nothing in its structure and administration lends credence to this claim. Ekpo and Enamidem (2003) further assert that the manifestation semblance of a federation in Nigeria is merely the 36 states otherwise the country is to all intents and purposes a unitary state. The government at the centre is stronger than the states, with latter depending mostly on allocations from the former for survival

From Wheare's (1953), Kapu's (1986), Babalawe's (1988) and Akindele (1996) definitions and analysis, it could be concluded that in any true federalism, the regions or states have the constitutional right to control their resources without much interference from the

central government. They have also established that the basic principles of true federalism given by Nwabueze (1982) which include: separateness and independence of each government; mutual non-interference of inter-governmental immunities; equality between the region or state governments; ascertaining the number of regional or state governments which a Federal Government can meaningfully co-exists; mode for the division of powers and the supremacy of the constitution are glaringly lacking in Nigerian federalism.

According to Ndu (2003) cited by Ebegbulem (2011), there are two key reasons for the erosion of true federalism which characterized the Nigerian state in the first republic before the intervention of the military in 1966. One of the reasons he gave was the collapse of the First republic when the military intervened in January 1966. That intervention by the military marked the end of true federalism in Nigeria. He asserts that unfortunately, that visionary development of federalism specifically from 1954 to 1965 abruptly ended with the mutiny of January 15, 1966, which not only eliminated some of the founding fathers of federalism in Nigeria, but also killed the essence of federalism itself. The federal form which survived that military onslaught and on the basis of which the country precariously persisted as an entity has never regained its true essence.

Two interconnected developments accounted for that demise, Ndu (2003). First, the coup and the eventual threat to the unity of the country following secession and the civil war were traumatic events that called for centralized authority capable of pulling things back into one fold. Secondly, there was, and still has always been the professional practice of unified command with which soldiers are familiar. He sees the centralized federalism in Nigeria today as one of the disruptive heritage of military rule in Nigeria.

The second reason he advanced for wearing a way of true federalism was because most states in Nigeria are feeble, particularly in their extractive capability and, consequently can hardly perform as federating units. Ndu and other protagonist of true federalism have argued that states are feeble not because they lack the resources and manpower that would make them strong economically and administratively, but the fiscal and legislative relationships between them and the federal government render them feeble (Ndu, cited in Nwogwugwu et al, 2015).

Nwabueze (1982), cited in Ebegbulem (2011) further pointed out that the erosion of Federalism is due to lack of proper understanding of the concept among the leaders and the general public of the nature of federal relationship of the concept among the leaders and the general public of the nature of federal relationship as manifested between the federal and state governments. He noted that the autonomy of each tier of government in Nigeria is misconstrued to mean competition and confrontation with each trying to frustrate the other, Whereas, the conception underlying is that the federal and the state government are mutually complementary part of a governance mechanism.

Revenue allocation is another challenge to our federalism. The reason being that states totally depend on the federal government from the colonial masters, through unitary system of government given to use by the military also promoted this challenge and is responsible for the poor condition of the state, if states in Nigeria were independent, and came together to form a federation, they would have been stronger.

The Rationale behind Power Shift

Since independence in 1960, the northern part of the country has been known for their dominance in the leadership of Nigeria mostly at key positions in virtually all areas. This interest is buttressed by the fact that in the first republic, that is, 1960 - 1966, a Northerner, Sir Abubaka Tafawa Balewa was the Prime Minister (Kamar Bello, 2005). When the military took over in 1966, apart from about three months stay in office of General Aguyi Ironsi, a southerner, General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner assumed the mantle of leadership up to 1975 when another Northerner, General Murtala Mohammed took over up to 1976 when he was assassinated and his second in command in the person of General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southerner took over with his programmes up to 1979.

In the second republic, another Northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari became the president between 1979 - 1983, immediately after the end of that republic, the military took over power on December 31st in 1983, another Northerner, General Muhammadu Buhari became the Head of State up to 1985 when there emerge a palace coup. This resulted to the coming of General Ibrahim Babangida, a Northerner up to 1993 when there was a serious chaos caused by the annulment of the presidential election in that year that was poised to be won by a Southerner, Chief Moshood Abiola (Waidigbenro, 2015). In the same vein, the interim government put up by Babangida when he stepped aside in August, 1993, which was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, a Southerner was toppled by another Northerner, General Sani Abacha. Based on this development, the Northern region has not just been accused but proven as constantly monopolizing power in the Nigeria. That, the British colonialists who colonized the country assisted in the perpetuation of Northerners in power in order to continue their exploitation of the country. Ibrahim (2000), attested to this in the following words:

In Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy was maintained in power by the British during colonial rule through the indirect Rule System of National Administration. During the First Republic, the Northern people's congress, a party considered as an instrument of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy won both the Federal and Northern Regional elections. Since then, most succeeding regimes, civilian and military, have been monopolized by the Hausa-Fulani, and there have been serious concerns in the country about the perpetuation of Hausa-Fulani domination. Even among the Northerners, there are those who believed in this thesis. But if analyzed critically, it would be seen that the development of Northerners dominating the country's polity is not designed but accidental due to many factors but mainly distrust among the various ethnic groups in the country particularly the major ones, Yoruba and Ibo in the South. Each of them could not trust the other to assume the mantle of leadership instead they prefer the third; Hausa/Fulani under which they prefer to be deputy particularly the Ibo. Yahaya (1994), observed that the Hausa Muslims of the far-North appear to be the target of the frustration of all other Nigerians.

Furthermore, all of these labeled on Northern domination are to an extent unfounded. This is because in the 1959, 1979, 1983 and 1993 elections, the so-called Hausa/Fulani has never voted emblock. On this, Muazzam (1994) while reviewing the 1959, 1979, 1983 and 1993 elections demonstrated that the Hausa Fulani had been consistently involved in issue voting rather than sectional as follows:

In 1955, the Northern people's congress had to go into coalition with the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon to form a government, in the 1979 elections, Shehu Shagari's National Party of Nigeria's votes were higher in the areas defined as "minority" than in the traditional "Hausa Fulani" enclave. It was Kano that provided the test case on the legal interpretation of the 1993 elections. In June 1993 elections, the Hausa-Fulani from Kano, Jigawa, and Kaduna voted for Abiola of social democratic party. On the contrary, the Yoruba's of the South-West have never had such record in their voting pattern in the Nigerian project. For instance, the Yoruba's of South-West has never voted for any candidate or party outside the Yoruba enclave right from the time of emergence of Action group; an offshoot of Yoruba cultural group; Egbe based on Oduduwa in the early 1950s. But despite this fact, the voting pattern of the North had been wrongly manipulated for criticism.

This could be due to the strong propaganda instrument the south west has in her support. Vis-à-vis, the bigger opportunity came in 1993 with the annulment of presidential election, based on that development, various agitations came up from different angles of the western Nigeria of either a power shift in presidency, restructuring of the federation, power shift or even Sovereign National Conference. Based on this, different rational groups were mobilized for that course. In a related spirits, Olaitan (1998), submits that the crisis of June 12, 1993 presidential election had brought up questions as to the perpetual marginalization of some segments of the Nigerian polity in the political and power equation in Nigeria. Indeed, the annulment was perceived by not an insignificant number of the Nigerian polity as a conscious attempt at denying segment of the Nigerian polity, the control of Nigeria presidency. The scholar however submits that the solution to the perceived injustice lies in devising a framework for the working of the polity called Nigeria whereby all segments would have a sense of belonging by providing access to all important positions and offices in the country.

Furthermore, there is need to ensure balancing in filling political offices especially the presidency as the narrow head of all structures of leadership. Even the focus of the often publicized Sovereign National Conference is restructuring with its centre point of power shift specifically shift of the presidency from the North to the South. Amuwo and Herautt (1998), observed that the main drive towards institutional reforms in a federal system is the recognition that existing state institutions, particularly at the centre are inadequate to apprehend, comprehend and resolve immediate and new changes. Restructuring is meant to serve as a steering mechanism to properly give focus and locus to attempts at collective identity and distributive politics. The aim is to correct perceived structural defects and institutional deformities.

It is intended to lay an institutional foundation for a more just and an equitable sharing of the political space by multinational groups cohabiting in a federal polity. This type of agitation could not be more than the struggle by the elites for acquisition of power and wealth. Thus, the restructuring effort of Nigerian polity under General Abacha's regime through the National Conference of 1994 was informed essentially by factionalism of the elites as well as by the persistent demand by pro-democracy and human right groups and the call for a Sovereign National Conference. Those actions were not more than means of getting a share of the resources of the country through access to political power. There is no wonder then that even in the constitutional conference of 1994, there was no issue that received greater attention than the issue of power shift. The issue generated a very sharp division in the committee on power sharing of the conference with the southern members massively supporting it while their Northern counterparts largely opposing it.

However, a committee was formed that came up with the resolution and was attained through North/South rotation of presidency. However, the resolution was amended by the military led by Sani Abacha by making the shifting to be on the basis of six zones and six positions. The game plan was never concluded before the demise of general Abacha. General Abdusalami who succeeded the leadership did not continue with the issue rather adopted the 1979 constitution which has no provision on power shift and left the idea with the parties. Thus, the interest of a southern president in the name of power shift in presidency was finally achieved in 1999.

Evaluation

Not all scholars subscribe to the adoption of power shift in Nigeria. As some oppose the idea, others accept the idea on the other hand. Therefore, this paper intends to examine the implication of power shift in the Nigerian polity. Truly, there is no point submitting that power shift has the potential of doing more harm than good to the polity by further complicating the search for good governance, national integration and democracy. This is because the operators of the concept are those characters that have been participating in the Nigeria enterprise right from her inception as an independent state or even beyond. They have participated in the running and ruining of Nigeria enterprise. They comprise representatives from every interest group in Nigeria be it tribal, religious, social, professional etc. therefore, in that type of situation, little or nothing is expected from them other than their previous ruinous characters. No matter the name it is called, parliamentary, presidential, French indicative, rotational presidency, power shift, power sharing, democracy, military, democrat in uniform etc. there could be no improved changes in the lives of great number of the masses who are in majority. And this exactly is what is happening in Nigeria today despite power shift from the south to the North or vice versa. This situation has only increased looting public funds, corruption and increased poverty in the land, with power shift in Nigeria, the country is the 3rd most corrupt nation in the world, and over 70% of her population is below poverty line. The notion of power shift then becomes an ideology, an exercise in false consciousness meant to create a feeling of power dispersal in the face of power concentration. In any event, to talk about power shift in the increasingly exclusivity and monopolistic structure of the Nigerian political process is to raise hopes about a more pluralistic future (Agbaje, 1989).

Therefore, the notion of power shift cannot produce more than an oligarchic situation and existing power structure of inequalities if not worse under a situation of asymmetrical relationship in a deeply divided society such as Nigeria as well as have seen from 1999. This development could make the attainment of democratic situation not beyond “its normalist pretensions more tenuous if not impossible” (Ibid:122).

Agbaje has even predicted that the notion of power shift is not likely to work as we have seen since 1999. That the notion is not necessary and that it could injure the polity. This is because; Nigeria exhibits at least three characteristics which traditionally identified in the comparative literature as toxic to power sharing arrangements. One, is a network of deep social and territorial divisions, corresponding roughly with political loyalties, engaged in asymmetrical political relationships and with very little cross-cleavage allegiances. This structural network is under-written by political memory distilled from political experience informed more by the politics of domination than by the politics of group equality as well as by contemporary political culture, including attitudes that tend to concede rather than contest in the existing power equation (Ibid).

Unequivocally, the notion of power shift is unnecessary not only because it dictates have been taken care of by constitutional provisions of federalism and its twin sister in Nigeria: Federal character but because it could be taken care of by transparency in the implementation of democratic principles. Power shift could not work because given that in the best times, consociation government including an arrangement of power sharing is largely a holding operation with an inherent tendency to maintain the socio-economic status, to emphasize closed door negotiations, encourage governmental immobilize with the consequent growth of cynicism towards the political process and ultimately accentuates the oligarchical predilection of revisionist democratic theory and practice (Nnoli, 1996). Specifically, power shift can only lead to interest articulation in a particular zone despite when there is best qualified in that zone which will also lead to bringing to office incompetent people. However, this will go a long way to disorganize the government from the top down.

Conclusion/Recommendation

In view of the ongoing matter, this paper does not condemn in totality the concept of power shift, but it has only argued that it cannot solve the socio-economic problems of Nigeria. At least, if it attains nothing, it shows that the so-called Nigerian radicals and human right activists are nothing other than tribal cabals and sectional jingoists. In essence, the solution to Nigeria's socio-economic and political problems should be searched for in other areas and not in power shift. Like Jeja (2000), observed; the role of the post-colonial state in Nigeria has been drastically affected and conditioned essentially three major factors; its colonial origin, excessive factionalism amongst the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and regionally segmented elite and prolonged military authoritarian rule, and (democratic dictatorship). These defines the pattern and the character as well as the essence of its role in the capitalist development process in state civil society relations, in international relations, and in the dynamics of resources utilization and accumulation in the Nigerian political economy.

Unless these factors are addressed, no matter what methods adopted in the country, it would take the country nowhere as we have recently seen with power shift. Scholars and journalists alike as molders of the thinking and behavior of the people have not helped in that direction because they have been repeatedly reminding Nigerians about varying forms of identity, differences and conflicts in the polity and little or nothing about how to develop a Nigerian nation. Thus government to be “they” which has nothing to do with you or me, an alien institution whereby “people's business was to get as much from it as they could without getting into trouble” (Achebe, 160), in this type of situation, “the real tragic hero is the Nigerian State”. Nobody has any commitment to it and everybody is seeking for access, not to bake the cake, but to eat the cake” (Jega, op cit: 44). Another basic factor that needs-urgent attention is that: Nigeria has a patrimonial as well as a rentier character.

Patrimonial is the distinction between the public and the private domains has become blurred and power, which has become a major source of wealth, has become personalized. The major characteristics of a rentier state is that, it's main relationship with the society is mediated through its expenditures on the military and state security, development projects, consumption subsidies and construction (Ibrahim, 2000). Another major factor that should be looked at, is the non discrimination of “who is and who is not” from this state to be qualified for any political position. Then finally, Nigeria at 56, should still not be called “Nascent Democracy”, because if true federalism is practiced, and the eradication of corruption, Nigeria would not have been where she is today.

In conclusion, it seems that only a comprehensive democratic culture with all its intricacies that can take Nigeria closer to the emergence of stable, meaningful, purposeful and beneficial polity. If this is not attained, there would hardly be any need for an ideology such as power sharing or power shift. But if it is the rotational presidency that could bring the necessary platform for entrenching democratic culture in Nigeria with her pluralistic structure, it could be adopted and entrenched into the country's constitution. Such an arrangement should also state the modalities for its operation, either on two zone basis or on six zones as well as it would oscillate. This is necessary because the method adopted by the south west should not be repeated by other zones before power could shift them. This includes blackmail and even ethnic militia which is damaging. This is because the effects of the 1993 destructions of public utilities in the name of call for power shift is still within our hearts/minds till date.

References

- Achebe, C. (1960). *No longer at Ease*. London: Heinemann.
- Agbaje, A. (1989). The ideology of power sharing: An analysis of content, context and Intent. In Anniwo, Kunle (eds.) *Federalism and political Restructuring in Nigeria*: Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Akindele, R. A. & Bassey, A. E. (2001). Beyond conflict: managing African security in the 21st century". *The Nigeria forum*, Lagos: Nigerian institute of international affairs (NIJA).
- Amuwo, K. & Herault, G. (1998). Introduction to Amung Kunle (eds), *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*. IBADAN: spectrum books Ltd.
- Babawale, T. (1998). *Re-inventing Federalism in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Calculia (2011). Understanding constitutional zoning, power rotation.
- Ebegbulem, J. C. (2011). Federalism and the politics of resource control in Nigeria: A critical analysis of the Niger delta crisis. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 12.
- Ekpo, A. & Enamidem, U. (2003). *Issues in Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Future.
- Ibrahim, J. (2000). The transformation of ethno-regional identities in Nigeria. In Jeja, Attahiry (ed), *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. Kano: center for Research and Documentation and Nordiska: Afrikainstitutet.
- Jega, A. (ed) (2000). *Identity, Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. Kano: Centre for Research and Documentation and Nordiska: Afrikainstitutet.
- Kamar, B. (2005). *Presentation on Rotational Presidency and its aftermath in Nigeria*. Kano.
- Morgan, O. (2014). A Scientific Approach Power Rotation.
- Muazzam, I. & Ibrahim, J. (2000). Religious Identity in the Context of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria. In Jaga, Attahiru (ed.) *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. Kano: Centre for Research and Documentation and Bordiska: Africainstitutet.

- Nnoli, O. (1996). Ethnic and religious balancing in Nigerian Federalism. In Elaigwu, J. J. & Akindele, R. A. (eds), *Foundations of Nigeria Federalism*. Abuja: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations.
- Nwabueze, B. (1982). *Constitutional history of Nigeria*. Lagos: Longman.
- Nwogwugwu, N. Kupoluyi, A. K. (2015). Fiscal Federalism and resource control in Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of economics and finances*. Available online at: www.iosrjournals.org.
- Olaitan, A. (1998). Rotational presidency and State-building in Nigeria. In Awumo, Kule (eds), *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*. Ibadan: spectrum Books Ltd.
- Paul, H. (1989). *The pluralist theory of the state*.
- Robert, D. (1917). *Pluralism (political theory)*.
- Sanusi, L. S. (2010). *Power shift and rotation: Between emancipation and obfuscation*.
- Wheare, K. C. (1946). *Federal government*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Yahaya, D. (1994). *Key note address. Kano State constitutional conference workshop*. Kano: April.
- Zoning and Power Rotation Group Organization Abuja (2014).