

Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa: A Study of Some Recent Trends

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Abstract

The lethality of insurgency and terrorism is sight destroying and heartbreaking. Yet, the resurgence of military coup d'etats in Africa is sowing more seeds for the growth of insurgency and terrorism recently, these together weakens state institutions in Africa and undermines their capacity to buy in to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The study examined the activities of some terrorist and Insurgence groups in Africa. It also analyzed the recent trends of insurgency and terrorism in Africa and to highlight the security challenges in fighting the threats. The study is anchored on the theoretical framework of grand – national strategy. Data was generated through documentary method via secondary sources, while qualitative descriptive method and content analysis was adopted as the tools of analyses. The study observed that leadership ineptitude and power struggle among political elites in Africa is to be held liable for these menaces. The study recommended for indigenous African counter-insurgency measures that reflects its motto: “African solutions to African problems”.

Keywords: *Insurgency, Terrorism, Africa, Strategies, Coup d'états, Challenges*

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Background to the Study

In recent times, the continent of Africa has found itself at the crossroads caused by the activities of terrorist and its counterpart insurgency; these has brought political disarticulations, mayhems, criminality, killings, fear, psychological disturbances and ineptitude leadership that has launched the region to insecurity, destructions and poverty. It is better time now to expose these menaces, join forces in searching for solutions to address the multifaceted challenges facing Africa in lieu of these threats. It is not only contradictory but also an abnormality for Africa. Terrorism and violent extremism continue to be the principal destabilization factors in the Continent of Africa in spite of various mechanisms put in place to tackle the scourge the phenomenon does not appear to be abating. The terrorist groups continued to carry out successful attacks causing deaths to hundreds of civilians and security personnel, maiming thousands more and causing the displacement of million others. (Lary 2020). This study had examined eight African conflict theaters, and observed that the terrorist trained adopted women and children as suicide bombers, these had made the rate of insurgency and terrorism not to be on the decline in all the conflict theatres identified. The lethality of insurgency and terrorist destruction is unimaginable and heartbreaking. Hitherto, the resurgence of military coup d'etats in Africa is sowing more seeds for the growth of insurgency and terrorism. The insurgence groups are primarily official and does not aim to overthrow established government but terrorist is different they create conditions that will make the constituted government, ungovernable, Together, the operations of both the terrorists and insurgence groups weaken state institutions and undermine the capacity of Africa to buy in to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). No single strategy can do it. So, it is a grand – national strategy approach that needs to be well articulated, and galvanized to address the remote and immediate contradictions in the fight against all forms of violent extremism. The study therefore will start with the definition of terms, enumeration of Nigeria politically motivated insurgent groups, the study examines some terrorist theatres from the African conflict theatres, that have made extreme violent activities. There was a highlight on the key differences between Insurgency and Terrorism. There was also an overview of some recent trends of insurgency and terrorism in Africa. Pattern of State Responses and challenges of fighting insurgency and terrorism in Africa was examined. The study also observed the strategies used against insurgency and terrorism in Africa, then the conclusion.

Insurgency

There is a galaxy of definitions of insurgency. In most cases, it is used freely as if it synonymous with terrorism (Osakwe & Ubong 2013; Akpuru-Aja, 2020, 2021). Yet, insurgency and terrorism is not exactly the same thing. The element of confusion, so to say, is that most insurgency cases employ terrorism as operational strategy. Having made this obvious point, insurgency retains it own characteristics which are distinct from terrorism per se. Debating insurgency depends on which side of a conflict. According to Tar (2019), from authority policy perspective, insurgency is domestically organized rebellion against established government. It does not matter if the protest or rebellion is a direct reaction against governance failure to engage fruitfully the aggrieved groups. The authority perspective of insurgency does not also seem to make a distinction, between violent and apparently “non-violent” forms rebellion. True, there are insurgency groups bent on either overthrowing

government or seeking to be politically independent. In the first case the Ambazonia group in Cameroon and FRELIMO in Mozambique are more politically motivated. The same is true of Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLC) in Ethiopia. A host of others are in the North African conflict theatre (Akpuru-Aja, 2020, 2021).

Though not too violent, some insurgences arise from structural protests, against marginalization, exclusion and neglect. In Nigeria, politically motivated insurgent groups include:

- a) Movement for the Survival of Republic of Biafra (MASSOB) in the South East
- b) Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta people (MEND);
- c) Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSSOP) in Rivers State
- d) Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South East
- e) Bakassi People Movement (BPM) in Cross River State.
- f) Odua People Congress (OPC) in the South West
- g) Yoruba Nation Rally Group Advocacy in the South West and
- h) Southern Kaduna Peoples' Liberation Front in Kaduna State.

In Nigeria, since 2009 the Boko Haram insurgency seems to be more religiously inspired than political. It's deadly faction Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) has jihadism as an agenda too. In Africa, politico-religious insurgency groups abound in Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Eritrea.

Even non-extremely violent groups are classified subversive to constituted civil authorities. Insurgency logically represents both violent and non-violent rebellions or protests against constituted authority (Tar, 2019; Akpuru-Aja, 2021). To note is that insurgency is home grown rather than externally imposed and driven. While some are more negotiable, others are **not** due to extreme form of jihadism as an agenda. Most insurgencies do not get associated with suicide bombings. They do not also have the capacity to export and “sustain” linkages and operations beyond domestic boundaries, or even across geo-political zones in the country. Hardly placed as insurgency is military coup d'etat. The insurgence of coups in Africa represents the highest level of insurgency by military groups: direct seizure of power from constituted civil authority. The details are ahead.

Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is so complex in origin, operation and grand aim. As a phenomenon, it has, perhaps, no less than one hundred and fifty view points. Part of the difficulty is that virtually every act of extreme violence directed against either civil authority or ethnic conflict is labeled terrorism. This is regardless of the situation specific dimension; life span of operation and perpetrators. This is also regardless of whether such extreme form of violence comes from anti-government dissidents, or from bandits/organized crime syndicates or those carried out by governments themselves. The point to note is that, unlike in insurgency, both the non-state actors and governments are implicated in acts of terrorism (as the African experiences show). Excessive uses of kinetic forces and associated humanitarian crises

reproduce elements of terrorism on the society (Hoffman, 1998). Counter-insurgency or counter terrorism acts do not affect the insurgents or terrorists alone. The people are the worst victim; caught in between the forces of both actors. In all, terror reigns against the people and means of survival.

Noting that this discourse is more in the domain of policy and strategy rather than strictly an academic debating exercise, I have deliberately chosen to focus on the generally agreed kernel of terrorism. Terrorism is not just any act situation violence. Rather it is more about the Psychological impacts on the people who tend more to living in bondage of threat and fear of losing life, liberty and property (Horgan, 2015). The pervasiveness of threats and fears reflect Thomas Hobbesstate of nature, where “life is poor, solitary, nasty, brutish and short”. In the lawless state of nature, both the strong or the weak is a candidate of violent death. Diffidence (pervasive fear) reigns and pushes people to search for means of self defence or survival. In such a scenario, lawlessness becomes the fate of everyone in a civil society. From the foregoing, terrorism underscores the pursuit and use of power to create vicious circle of threat, fear or apprehension of losing life, liberty, property or authority in a highly uncertain and unpredictable violent circumstances (Chomsky, 2001). It is about occupation shock and awe against life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness (Solomon, 2015 & Kumbele, 2019). In line with the psychological impact assessment, Yoroms (2013) noted that terrorism is any act that is consciously and deliberately undertaken ... to intimidate, harass and instill fear via shock values on the society.

Government, people and terrorists themselves “live” in perpetual threat and fear. Depending on location and time, everyone is at risk of violent death or attack. For fear of the unknown, people work and walk in fear; sleep and wake up in fear; engage in occupation or travelling in fear. The “reign of fear” remains the defining index or kernel of terrorism (Akpuru-Aja, 2021, Onuoha, 2012).

From the African conflict theatres, the following have made extreme violent activities operational ways of life:

- a) AI-Shabaab in East Africa/Somalia/Eritrea
- b) AI-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM at the ungoverned space in the Shael region
- c) Book Haram sect in Nigeria ranked the third most deadly terrorist network
- d) Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the West Africa/Lake Chad region (getting for deadlier than Biko Haram since the death of Shekerau).
- e) Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and ISIS;
- f) Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG) Iran.
- g) AI-Shabaab in the Northern Mozambique
- h) AI-Qaeda global network.

The other vital feature is that African terrorist groups depend largely on external training, financing, sharing of technical intelligence and influx of small arms and light weapons (SALWS) (Tunde, 2012, Onuoha, 2012). Another feature is that terrorists adopt children and train them with arms to become terrorists, and use children as suicide bombers. It has been

reported in the Sahel and Lake Chad theatre. In some cases, terrorist groups in try hard to avoid fixed locations. They operate swiftly in decentralized locations. They Africa parade also very sophisticated weapons/equipments, and often take refuge in forests and vulnerable communities. On terrorism financing, terrorists locally use extortions, levies and kidnapping to argument external sources. Finally, unlike some insurgent groups, African terrorists tend more to dodge or avoid negotiation platforms. Examples include Al-shabaab, Boko Haram set, ISWAP and AQIM

Key Differences between Insurgency and Terrorism

As noted previously, common strategy of terror has lended more confusion to understanding insurgency and terrorism. So, aside shared strategy of terrors, the table below has some key differences between insurgency and terrorism.

Table 1.

	Insurgents	Terrorists
Targets	Primarily official (e.g.) military, police, governmental and non-governmental organizational personnel, economic assets and symbolic installations; selective	Primarily non-combatants; women and children, symbolic assets, military and paramilitary assets and personnel; indiscriminate attacks
Aim	Not to overthrow established authority but draw attention to unattended grievances in politics, economics, social and environmental areas	Rooted in ideological or religious beliefs and not easily prone to meeting demands; to make government ungovernable and irrelevant to citizens.
Operational Space	Hold Area defence territory; create liberated zones; location specific operation(s)	Rarely hold firm territories; more decentralized/ghost-like
Negotiation	Prone to negotiation with known representatives	Extremely hard to negotiate with.
Terror reign	Do not feature suicide bombing.	Feature suicide bombing
Publicity	Not keen on international publicity	Draws enormous strength from international publicity
Networking	More domesticated.	Global networking strategy
Law of Armed Conflict	Prone more to respecting laws of armed conflict	No respecter of laws of armed conflict
Organizational Structure	Less complex; factions	Complex structure, unit cells and leaders

Source: Alan Vick et al; Akpuru-Aja & Ibebunjo (2013)

Some Recent Trends of Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa

As noted in the introduction, the focus is limited to a few trends of insurgency and terrorism between March, 2021 and February, 2022. It appears too limited in time but not in dynamics. The period selected has updated activities over and above “our” presented cases in 2020 and 2021. Dating 43% spike in Islamist militant violence in Africa, there is yet to be any recent research report on the rates of increase or decline in lethality or deadly nature of attacks (ACSS, 2022).

There are six hostile conflict theatres:

- a) Somalia Theatre
- b) The ungoverned Sahel Theatre
- c) The Lake Chad Theatre
- d) North African Theatre
- e) Southern African Theatre
- f) Central African Religion Theatre

Somalia Theatre

Between 2021 and 2022, the apparent fragile political systems have been a source of strength to the al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab terrorism in the East African region. According to Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2022), the al-Shabaab has maintained frequent gun attacks and bomb explosions on the Somali security forces, government facilities and civilians. Even where the Prime Minister, Hussein Roble has emplaced agreed Electoral Implementation Team (FEIT) for parliamentary elections on February 25, 2022, Al-Shabaab does not seem to have any regards for political solution. Terrorism has become its way of life. On January 12, 2022 several people died in a suicide car bomb blast in a separate on a busy part of the capital. In the same period 4 people were killed and about 10 injured in a suicide attack at a Tea shop near military base (SONNA NEWS). Through its Andalus Radio, al-Shabaab terrorist network has been inspiring violent extremism in bordering areas of Kenya; Demonstrate Republic of Congo (DRC) and Northern Mozambique in Southern Africa. In all, the Somalia theatre is still endangered by the unrepentant activities of al-Shabaab. On February 9, 2022, four (4) were killed and several people injured in an explosion at the capital (Ajaazera, 2022)

The Sahel Theatre

The Sahel Theatre is bordered by the ungoverned space between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso principally. Like in the period of 2020 and 2021, operating terrorist networks in the Sahel theatre include.

- a) Maccina Liberation Front
- b) The Islamist State of the Greater Sahara, and
- c) Ansaroul Islam

Escalated violent extremism in the Sahel theatre represents 70% annual increase unlike in the 2020 with recorded 43%. The Islamist militants have dominated the space by regular acts of terrorism. It has had the effect of disrupting a thriving regional trade hub and farming occupation. Since the mid 2021, the Sahel Jihadists have eyes on destabilizing all the more the fragile countries of Chad, Mali, Niger Republic and Burkina Faso. Part of the aim is to create expansion routes for the exports of Islamist Jihadism into Cote D'Ivoire, Benin Republic, and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) regions (ACSS, 2022). According to UNHCR, instability in the Sahel theatre has reproduced no less than two (2) million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Humanitarian crises have risen four times the record in 2020, particularly in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger.

Since 2015, Burkina Faso has been fighting the Islamist Jihadist attacks on a fragile society. The climax came on January 24, 2022. Alleging the inability of the civil government to check the excesses of the jihadists linked to al-Qaeda and ISWAP, a 41-year-old Lt. col. Paul-Henri Damiba staged a successful military coup d'etat. On January 31, 2022, France reported that

about 60 Islamist terrorists were killed ahead of the military coup on January 24, 2022 (AFP/ACSS, 2022).

In Mali, there exists an armed terrorist group such as AQIM, Ansar Dine and al-muurabitoun affiliate in Southern Mali. Since 2020 in Mali, jihadist groups have defied the configuration of foreign forces presence including about 15,000 U.N peace keeping personnel France (5,400 troops), and the E.U. Takuba (2020) drawn from Norway, Germany, Sweden and Denmark (ACSS, February 18, 2021). Their primary aim is to advise Malian troops and assist in combat. The decision to expel or order the French Ambassador to leave was a serious strain in diplomatic relation. In May 2021, Colonel AssimiGoita led the second coup in Mali against president Keita. As logic expects, the military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso are held as solution pathways to combating terrorism more effectively. Even against the ECOWAS engagements and imposed sanctions, the military junta in Mali seems stuck to its own defined 5-year transition to civil rule programme (ACSS, 2022).

On January 26, 2022, the military junta in Mali warned France to end interferences in its internal affairs. On the other development, the French Minister has accused Russian mercenaries of “despoiling” Mali through hundreds of Russian Wagner Personnel in the Sahel region. Like in Mali, pro-Russian sentiments have been growing in Burkina Faso. The military Junta went ahead to expel Danish special forces sent to help fight the jihadist insurgents.

The Lake Chad Basin Theatre

The Chad Basin includes Chad Republic, Nigeria particularly in the North East, Niger and Northern part of Cameroon. The most dominant and deadly terrorist networks in the theatre are:

- a) The Boko Haram Sect
- b) The Islamic State in West Africa.

Contrary to a reported decline of operational activities in 2021, deadly attacks by both the Boko Haram seem largely unchanged. Since mid 2021, weekly or monthly fatalities have exceeded the records of al-Shabaab in the Somalia theatre (ACSS, 2022).

According to a former Nigerian Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Burutai, the gallantry of the armed forces in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency/terrorism has had their members scattered across the North-South Divide. Governor of Borno state, Prof. U. Gana Zulumni has recently warned on the disastrous dimensions of the ISWAP expansion to other parts of the country. Nigeria remains the worst-case scenario in the Lake Chad Basin theatre. The epicenter of terrorist attacks has shifted from Borno state to Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto and Niger States.

Just between 2021 and early 2022, the reordered attacks by the terrorists include:

- a) Attacks on military bases/check points and patrol personnel; terrorist attacks getting too commonly violent in the South-East
- b) Attacks on NAF Aircrafts dating February 2021- July, 2021

- c) Attacks on three (3) the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA); the second attack repelled on February 10,22 by the NAF Jet fighters.
- d) Attacks on Burukai Institute for War and Research Studies, Biu, Borno State.
- e) Abductions of school children in the North East States
- f) Attacks on Police stations; Royal fathers' Palaces in the South East and South West.

Early February, 2022 the most affected Governors in the North East of Nigeria recounted their tragic losses. Governor of Borno State, Prof. Baba Gana Zulummi, reported a loss of 900,000 houses, 800 municipal building and 5,000 classrooms; 713 distribution energy lines and public water sources. For his part, Governor of Zamfara State Mataiwelle recounted human tragedies such as the reproduction of 25,000 orphans, 27,000 widows, loss of 3, 000 houses and 400 livestock. Kaduna State is not left out. According to Leadership Newspaper, February 1, 2022, in Kaduna State, 1, 192 persons were killed; 3,348 were kidnapped since 2021 across the state. In Niger State, the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) reported spent amount of \$2billion on security in two years. On January 14, 2022, the terrorists killed dozens and abducted scores of villagers for refusing to pay protection levy of N 25million. They stormed Dankade town in Danko Wasagu LG in Kebbi State (ACSS, 2020). For three years till 2022, the communities of this town had lived under the authorities of the terrorist operations in Akao (a small village bordering Zamfara State).

For the second time in Niger State in 2022, gunmen attacked the military camp in Allawa in Rafi L.G.A. They numbered about 200 by 10:00 pm. The Armed Forces fought gallantly, which left casualties on all sides, including unfortunate civilians. (Sun 2022). In a recent development in Niger State, gunmen numbering 300 rode on about 100motorcycles and invaded Mariga town in Mariga L.G.A. They rustled 300 cattle. According to an eye witness report, the gunmen went away with almost all the cattle in the town unchallenged.

On 20th January, 2022, ISWAP attacked Pemi ward, a few kilometers outside Chibok town. They looted food items and valuable belongings. It was the 97th time attack on Chibok and the surrounding villages. Since April 14, 2014 abduction of Chibok girls, about 100 of them are still in custody. Frequent attacks on Chbok area have less to do with the ineffectiveness of the Nigeria military and security forces. According to a native of Chibok, Government at all levels particularly the federal Government have surrendered their rights and privileges to the bandits/terrorists as the “bandits” operate parallel governments in villages and communities in Sokoto, Zamfara, Kastina and Niger States. They impose taxes and levies and kill people at will. According to Leadership (Agency Report, 2022), the “bandits” attacked Zamfara on February 4, and killed at least 30 people; abducted several others in Tsar, Bungudu and Bakara LGAs. It was on account of failing to pay N 40million levy. The cumulative attacks by the terrorists have left an estimated 35,000 people dead; 2.5 million suffering as IDPs; scores and refugees in fragile neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger Republic and Cameroon.

North African theatre

The North African Theatre includes mainly Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. Unlike in the periods of 2018, 2019, 2020, with over 340 cases of local insurgencies across the North

African States, they have declined in intensity. Virtually all the states of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia have shown more determination to engage lines of politico-religious insurgencies for political stability in the region. They are working against any resurgence of the Arab Spring with its destabilizing consequences. Though politically fragile, local insurgences in Libya have not gone too wild, except to be sources of refuge to a few terrorist cells and supply routes of SALWS to the Sahel and Lake Basin to be terrorists. Like in Mali, the presence of NATO, Russia and Turkey seems a relatively stabilizing mechanism for Libya. Very recently on February 13, 2022 the Libyan Armed Forces moved quickly to Tripoli: in support of the interim Prime Minister against Parliamentary opposition. The North African Theatre seems to be a much safer region of violent extremism

Central African Region Theatre

Central African Region Theatre includes active terrorist areas of Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo; Equatorial Guinea and Chad. In this sub-regional theatre, the highest fatality cases are in Democratic Republic of Congo. In Cameroon, Ambazonia insurgency seemed to have relaxed violent extremism for the greater part of 2021. Yet, the group has not given up. It was due to apparently political engagement of the main opposition party, Movement for the Rebirth of Cameroon (MRC) by President Paul Biya's 38 year leadership (1982-2022). Unrelenting in a separatist insurgency, the Ambazonia insurgent group threatened to disrupt the just concluded AFCON 2021 in Cameroon. For its part, government of Cameroon with other Africa States prevailed against the Ambazonia plot. Cameroon had no recorded tragedies associated with the Ambazonia group until AFCON ended successfully on February 6, 2022.

Ambazonia insurgency group has the most notorious of all commanders, known as GENERAL NO PITY. He declared himself Field Marshal of Liebalem. In early 2022, he made a revolutionary call to all Ambazonians at home and abroad to brace up for a real challenge until the two unevenly yoked republics in 1961 were granted independence. On February 1, Tuesday, 2022 Guinea Bissau witnessed updated military coup d'etat attempt (AFP Reporters). Since the attainment of political independence in 1974, Guinea Bissau has witnessed four coups. The February 1, 2022 coup was quickly aborted by President Uman Gomes Nabian. Yet, fear of the 5th coup is not over. The Armed Forces in Guinea Bissau still wield some substantial clout in the fragile country, which has been notorious in corruption, drug (cocaine) smuggling through its porous coastline routes. In 2019, nearly 2 tonnes of cocaine were seized (Punch, 2022).

Southern Africa/Northern Mozambique

The Southern Africa remains one of the least affected of violent extremism associated with insurgency and terrorism. Yet, the Northern Mozambique remains a hotbed of insurgency and terrorism. The Islamist insurgency started in Cabo Delgado. It is otherwise known as Ansar al-sannah or Alhu-Sunna walJam'a (ASWJ). The root of insurgency had to do with a deep seated-sense of marginalization. Between 2019 and 2020, ASWJ was largely an insurgent group. However, in 2021 and 2022, it has shifted notoriously as a terrorist group in Northern Mozambique. Thus, it has been described as Al –Shabaab locally due to its deadly

operations similar to Al-shabaab in the Samalia theatre. The ASWJ is suspected to be sharing intelligence with Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and al-Qaeda cells in the Somalian theatre. A longstanding politically motivated insurgent group is the front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). It has a stronghold of one third (1/3) of Mozambique.

International/Regional Efforts

For sure, no state can fight insurgency and terrorism, which invariably are global scourge. International and regional efforts have not been lacking in support of Africa to fight insurgency and terrorism. The performance effectiveness is entirely different matters. These support efforts are summarized thus:

1. The U.N – E.U. Counter Terrorism Partnership in Africa
2. The U.N. – African Union (A.U) Peace-Dialogue Missions in Kenya –Somalia, Ethiopia – Tigra; the U.N – led Libya Political Dialogue Forum
3. The U.N. Humanitarian Mission Office in Sudan (Darfur)
4. The U.N Mission in Mali, with about 15, 000 personnel.
5. The A.U.- 15 Member ECOWAS Condemnations and sanctions on Military takeover of governments in the states of Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, dating 2021 – February, 2022.
6. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)/Rwanda Troop Support against Islamist jihadists in the Northern Mozambique
7. Foreign military powers, presence in Africa (the U.S, the E.U. Takuba; France, Germany, Norway, Sweden; Russia and Turkey.

As noted previously, despite reasonable foreign military presence in Africa, the spike of insurgency and terrorism is not gone, but still undergoing transformation or mutation like a virus.

Pattern of State Responses

Across Africa, no state is indifferent to fighting insurgency and terrorism principally. To the extent that socio-political and strategic milieu differs from state-to-state, response patterns are not exactly the same. Yet, one fact is certain. African states have combined reliance on kinetic forces with desperate efforts to open political solution talks, where insurgents seemed yielding to dialogue forum. Since 2021, this is largely true of Libya, Somalia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, South Sudan, DRC and Guinea Bissau. The situation in Nigeria is worrisome; wavering between negotiation or not with the insurgents, bandits, terrorists, and armed carrying herdsmen (Agekeme, 2018). Nigeria has been overstretched in both military engagements, defence budget and expenditures.

It's on note that between 2015-2022, Nigerian government has allocated about N5.081 trillion for defence, including the appropriation of N 4.669 billion to the Federal Ministry of Defence from 2016 till the present. Nigeria has also spent about \$1 billion for the pronouncement of military equipment. In 2021, Nigeria procured from the U.S. A. 29 SuperTurkano for fighting “insurgents” and principally the terrorists. The NAF has already recorded devastating results in the North East. Since, 2021, the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) have degraded the

capacity and endurance of the insurgents and terrorists, who have lost holding most of their territories in the North East. As a former COAS, Lt. General T. Buratai (rtd.) noted, the insurgents and terrorists are not longer safe in the North. They have started to expand across other geo-political regions. As Governor of Borno State, Prof Zulummni warned, it would be disastrous if the expansion of the ISWAP to the South is not effectively put under control as a matter of urgency. Let us highlight the efforts of the Nigerian State as a principal. Case for analysis in Africa.

From the angle of non-kinetic approach, President Buhari has declared a solution path; a new approach to end insurgency in the North East within 18 months, perhaps, to begin with. As a result, emplaced are the following:

- a) inaugurated Presidential Committee on the Repatriation, Return and Resettlements of IDPs in the North East, Nigeria.
- b) Policy shifts from management of Insurgency situation to a permanent solution for effective and practicable restoration
- c) Committee to develop a 3-year plan by the end of March 2022, spreading across the Federal and State governments.
- d) Committee to collaborate with other key stakeholders, development partners and the organized private sector for resource mobilization.
- e) A Presidential charge to committees for more field visits, and regular engagement of governments, communities and other stakeholders.

From the new solution path approach, it inspires hope, if backed strongly and committedly by political will and political gut of enforcement.

Challenges of Fighting Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa

Time and space would not allow detailed presentation of the challenges of fighting insurgency and terrorism in Africa. The challenges are highlighted as follows:

- a. Unaddressed conflict's political root; governance failure to deliver public good, engage proactively aggrieved groups. Even copyists in Africa blamed political leaders for unconstitutional and undemocratic approach to governance (Bertochi, 2010).
- b. Insincerity of Africa leaders to profile and prosecute “enemies within” or local saboteurs in the realms of politics, business, religion, military, intelligence system, immigration and custom services. Without saboteurs within the country, counter-insurgency and counter terrorism would have been more effective and efficient in outcomes. No Africa state is free from acts of internal sabotage. It's hardly excusable in Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mali, Chad, DRC and Cameroon.
- c. “State terrorism by over reliance on kinetic force approach in counter –terrorism operations which used to reproduce occasional civilian casualties IDPs, refugees and vulnerable people to “gain” of the insurgents and terrorists Alli, 2013).
- d. Transformation of bandits to terrorists, who tend more to operate parallel government over the communities through extortion, levies, financing by kidnapping and cattle rustling. In Nigeria, deadly terrorists and their cell structures as expanding from the

- Northern to the Southern part of Nigeria.
- e. There are about, 1, 000 illegal routes where SALWs are brought between 12 midnight and 3.00pm; Arms are moved through cows; “freer” movement of mercenaries from Libya, Chad, and Niger Republic to Nigeria in the North East particularly seem to be Only 84 identified routes policed by Immigration and Customs (CASADE, 2015).
 - f. There are about 1, 000 forests with complex geographical terrains with community shields to the terrorists/insurgents in Nigeria.
 - g. Cases of security forces abandoning the defence of civilians to committing extra-judicial killings and activities as in Ethiopia, DRC, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria.
 - h. Greater infiltration of terrorist intelligence in government's armed and security than the opposite; resulting in periodic successful ambushes and attacks on military bases/institutions patrol force personnel across Africa. It raises the anxiety of less than adequately trained personnel in language or dialects of conflict flashpoint communities in Africa.
 - i. Foreign powers' fatigue in conflict flash points in Africa; withdrawals of the U.S. troops in Somalia; withdrawal proposals of France and the E.U. Takuba; in Mali and Burkina Faso; foreign powers rivalry in African conflicts as in Libya (the U.S., Turkey and Russia and in Mali (France, Russia, Germany Norway, Sweden)
 - j. Coordination without commitment by regional and neighbouring states in the Sahel, Lake Chad, Somalia and Southern Africa conflict theatres towards effective fighting and border security against the insurgents and terrorists as a continental scourge.

Resurgence of Coup d'etats in Africa

To compound the challenges of insurgency and terrorism in Africa is the resurgence of military coups in Africa. It has been a growing anxiety. By conceptualization, military coup is the highest stage of insurgency. It is clearly a direct overthrow of constitutionally and democratically elected civil authority. On October 25, 2021, the Army General Abdel Fattah sacked the Sudanese civil authority. The other was coup in Guinea. On September 5, 2021. Military leaders in Guinea overthrew the civilian government of President Alpha Conde. The coup was led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya. Mali coup hit the stage. On August 2020, the military ousted President Ibrahim B. Keita. It was followed by mass protests against Keita's government and weak governance. In May, 2021 Colonel Assimi Goita led the second coup in Mali in just a space of nine (9) months. Quite very recent were two coups, one successful, the other failed. On January 24, 2022, the military junta overthrew the civil government of Burkina Faso. Another coup was in early February, 2022 where suspected military personnel attempted to overthrow the civil government in Guinea Bissau. It was the fourth coup attempt. The most recent in February, 2022 was a failed coup in Democratic.

The few chronicles of resurgence of military coups should be awake up call for African leaders. African leaders are quick to blame the coupists for unconstitutional takeover of civil governments without blaming and condemning “themselves” for breaking their “oath” to use constitutional and democratic means of governance to advance the welfare, security and development of the people. Even the commander of the U.S. African command, General

Stephen Townsend attributed the resurgence of coups in Africa to corruption and lack of good governance (Punch, 2022).

Strategies Against Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa

In this presentation, attempt will be made to present proposed strategies under:

- a) Short term strategies
- b) Medium term strategies and
- c) Long term strategies.

Table 2.

S/No.	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
1	Grievances Ventilation Commission	Strengthening the Regional and AU Standby Force Capacity Building	African Continental Rapid Response Force
2	Victim Support/ Deradicalisation/ Resettlement and Social integration	Common Border Security and Defence Reform Trans-border fight against terrorism	Strengthening the AU and Global Counter Terrorism Measures
3	To build Pan-African anti-terrorist framework Military force, civilian support force and security force	Review of coordination frameworks between the AU – APSA and foreign support interventions	Establishment of Terrorism Financing Commission in every sub-region
4	Modalities on the roles of MDAs Joint Plan, coordination and synchronization of efforts within and between states	Research Centre for Continental Counter Insurgency and Counter terrorism strategies implications	Institutionalization of Non-Indifference Principle and Humanitarian Commission
5	Institutionalized mechanism for public enlightenment and public diplomacy to win hearts and minds of the local population	Updating of personnel Equipment, Training and logistics, plus welfare of personnel	Employing the umbrella of African Continental free Trade Agreement to address pervasions of democracy; prevalence of corruption and poor harnessing of potentially rich socio-economic and natural resources
6	Aerial bombing of Targeted Forest havens of insurgents and terrorists	Data Mining, using available information about a crime and crime scene to compose a psychological portrait of the unknown	
7	Infiltration of Intelligence and information gathering operations.	Cyber Security /Surveillance/Satellite Images Mechanisms	
8	Placing support operations of foreign powers on surveillance		
9	Using Border Control Policing to deny terrorism financing and easy access to SALWs		

Source: Apuru-Aja, 2020.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it has been established that insurgency and terrorism have taken roots in Africa. Out of all, the deadliest theatres are found a) the Sahel region, b) Lake Chad Basin

region and the Somalia region. When narrowed down, the worst affected country across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin is Nigeria. It has had the highest frequency of insurgency and terrorism as well as humanitarian crises. The other anxiety is the resurgence of military coups and military regimes in Africa. None of the tragic events is externally imposed. African leaders should be held wholly responsible. Both the politicians and the leaders are more interested in the deadly struggle for power rather than addressing the “sovereign” rights of the people to life, liberty property and sense of belonging. One dimension of external threat is the intervention of foreign powers, who seemed more committed to a) sales of arms and military services b) exploitation of natural resources rather than shared commitment to fighting insurgency and terrorism as a global scourge.

Though a number of security challenges and strategies have been identified, each conflict theatre has its uniqueness. The same is true of each of the states. Yet, the, strategies are all useful, as technical working policy fields for developing short term, medium term and long-term response patterns. While it is a necessity to sustain the kinetic force approach, African leaders should confront the root and immediate causes of insurgency, terrorism and coup and control Africa sliding into ruin. Starting from each conflict theatre, African states must rise and stand together in fighting these tragic setbacks to security and development. For self interest variables foreign powers can never fight to end insurgency, terrorism and coups in Africa. African sovereign states must shoulder the highest commitment on the conflict theatres. Engaging the assistance of foreign powers is a necessity, yet, such an engagement should be back by clarity of precondition by the African Union (AU). The other vital point was that more investment should be on public and intelligence personnel who are well trained and dedicated for contacts and interactions with the communities; to change their narratives; to gather advance security information; to present new hope for the vulnerable. Winning strategy against insurgency, terrorism and coup must be backed by political policy implementation that will apply a more intelligence approach of negotiation with the different groups that will yield positive results rather than over reliance on kinetic fire power. The conclusion of the matter is that as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have no universal model, Africa must passionately design and integrate implementation strategies based on its motto: “African solutions to African problems.

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