



# Ungoverned Spaces and Rural Insecurity in North Central Nigeria, 2015-2022

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## Abstract

For close to two decades, North Central Nigeria has been embroiled in arrays of tension and insecurity. It has been a hotbed of herder-farmer conflicts, abduction, armed robbery, killings, and banditry among others. Road users are kidnapped, slaughtered, and burnt daily and most often; these destructive activities happen outside areas of security control. The study collected data through a rapid review of documents and observation. The data collected were analyzed using content analysis. The study appropriated the basic propositions emanating from the ungoverned spaces thesis and established that lack of security infrastructure in rural areas induces rural insecurity in North Central, Nigeria. It demonstrated that governance's failure to deploy technologies to oversee its territory is responsible for the insecurity experienced in the region. Accordingly, the study recommended the deployment of technologies for effective rural security surveillance and giving adequate training and retraining of security personnel on how to deploy the gadgets properly.

**Keywords:** *Ungoverned spaces, Rural insecurity, Banditry, Security gadgets, Nigeria*

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### **Background to the Study**

For quite some time now, North Central Nigeria has been embroiled in arrays of tension and insecurity. The region has been the hotbed of farmer-herder conflicts, raping, abduction, armed robbery, and destruction of lives and property. Road users are kidnapped, slaughtered, and burnt daily and most often, these destructive activities happen outside areas of police and security control (Ceccato & Ceccato, 2017). North Central, Nigeria is one of the six geopolitical zones with six states, including the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). These states are Kogi, Benue, Niger, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Plateau. These states were part of the Northern region that was created during the colonial era, with its capital in Kaduna. Geographically, the region serves as the link between the Northern and the Southern Nigeria. The region has been ravaged by insecurity although with different levels of intensity across states.

Meanwhile, rural insecurity is seen as a situation whereby a person, group of persons, or communities in rural areas are intentionally inflicted with death, robbed, raped, kidnapped, or injured. For short, it connotes kidnapping, banditry, killings, rapping, and robbery, among others, in the rural area (Okoli & Okpaleke, 2014). For instance, banditry is organized violent crime committed by criminals who engage in raiding, armed robbery, and kidnapping among others. Kidnapping involves the forceful capture, taking away, and illegal detention of a person(s) against their wishes for ransom-taking or rituals. It is perpetrated for economic, political, or religious ends. Unlike armed robbery, kidnapping has different stages from when a person is kidnapped to ransom payment and the time of release or eventual murder. (Inyang & Abraham, 2013). Most often, crimes are committed in ungoverned spaces because it provides an avenue to commit crimes and evade arrest.

Ungoverned spaces according to the US Department of Defence have to do with the State's inability or unwillingness to effectively oversee her territory in a way that guarantees for national security (Okoli & Lenshie, 2018). It is characterized by the failure of the state in that regard to embark on its primary function of providing security at all levels in the hinterland (Okoli & Lenshie, 2018). Ungoverned spaces are synonymous with unsafe zones outside formal state control that constitute a security threat. The US 9/11 Commission Report expresses that: it is a place with minimal government presence where terrorists leverage to commit crime, a place where law enforcement agents can rarely be found, a crooked terrain, a hiding place, where they could receive supplies, it is characterized with low population density with communities near enough to allow necessary contacts with the society.

Locally, defined, ungoverned spaces are areas inter-mixed by various forest territories, some of which are covered with water, rocks and caves, rangeland, etc. Besides being set aside from one another, they are also far set apart from the presence of central government. Olapeju & Peter (2021) explain that the hinterlands located in North Central Nigeria are marked by remotely dispersed rural villages, demarcated by rangelands that are prone to insecurity. Consequently, this paper examined the link between ungoverned spaces and rural insecurity in North Central Nigeria, 2015-2022. This is because of rising insecurity within the period under review.

### **Automated Security Gadgets and Rural Banditry**

Insecurity in the form of banditry has become dangerously profound in Nigeria. This is because of the inability of the government to take effective control over its territorial boundaries and forest using security personnel or modern automated security gadgets. / (Olaniyan & Yahaya, (2016) and Olapeju & Peter, 2021) argue that insecurity in Nigeria occurs in a large swathe of thick forest reserves that are ungoverned. Ungoverned spaces are defined by the US Department of Defence as the state's inability or unwillingness to effectively oversee her territory in a way that guarantees national security (Okoli & Lenshie, 2018). It is characterized by the failure of the State to guarantee its primary function of providing security at all levels in the hinterland (Okoli & Lenshie, 2018). Ungoverned spaces are synonymous with unsafe zones outside formal State control that constitute a security threat. The US 9/11 Commission Report expresses that. It is a place with minimal government presence where terrorists leverage to commit crimes, a place where law enforcement agents can rarely be found, a crooked terrain, and a hiding place, where they could receive supplies, it is characterized by low population density with communities near enough to allow necessary contacts with the society.

Insecurity in the era of globalization can best be managed with the deployment of security technologies. Security technologies are no doubt one of the most effective means in tackling insecurity in the world today. Technologically advanced countries have long keyed into the benefits derivable from the application of those gadgets for overseeing and ensuring the security of the lives and property of their citizens. Scholars have different views and opinions about the meaning of the concept. However, one outstanding point of agreement among these scholars is that its application in arresting security challenges is undeniable. Meanwhile, Keister (2014) observes that ungoverned spaces reflect a prevalent condition of feeble or absence of state authority in a defined geographical location. Put differently, ungoverned spaces connote governance failure to exert control or tame the tide of insecurity, areas of specific or general spot areas through its security architecture. Usually, ungoverned spaces, are chaotic and anarchic, a situation whereby the State's security apparatus becomes dangerously defective (Taylor, 2016). Insecurity comprised acts of organized criminality targeted at robbery, killing, and destruction, kidnapping, raping, and allied organized violence (Okoli & Okpaleke 2014). These incidents are capable of instilling fear in the minds of the people hence, the feeling of insecurity arises. In combating security challenges most developed countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, United States of America, have deployed modern automated security gadgets internally by federal, state, and local governments in a range of circumstances for diverse operations including security surveillance and fighter jets.

The US made use of security technologies such as drones to conduct effective surveillance and exploring activities in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, as well as for mounting targeted missiles. As early as 2007, it was visible that over seven hundred (700) drones were being deployed in Iraq territory (Peterson, 2009). Admissibly, if this approach can be deployed in rural areas of Nigeria, it will go a long way in curtailing rural insecurity. A major contribution of modern automated security gadgets is that they become more useful for aerial monitoring. That is they can travel at higher speeds compared to earth vehicles this is because

they are not restrained to traveling on the earth. Some European countries and the United States utilize drones/UAS, CCTV cameras, and GPS for some military purposes, but how such will operate in Nigeria is still a concern. Again, Chamberlain (2018) for instance, described how security technologies such as drones/UAS, satellites, and CCTV have been deployed by the United Kingdom in the fight against terrorism. For instance, the United Kingdom used drones/UAS to track Reyaad Khan, a British citizen, who was an Islamic State terrorist based in Syria, although initially, targeted missiles to the purported places of hiding yielded no result but later, it successful when finally, he was killed in his hideout with the aid of modern automated security gadgets (Guardian, 2015). This same feat can be deployed in Nigeria in the fight against insecurity within the context of the ungoverned spaces that criminals use as safe havens.

According to Okoli & Okpaleke, (2014), rural insecurity is a situation where the people are subjected to the threat of kidnapping, banditry, killings, and destruction of property, rapping, robbery among others. It is also concomitant with armed banditry, especially in the circumstances of a fragile state. This is admissible because these are all we now find in rural areas daily a situation where an individual or group of individuals feels endangered as a result of being raped, killed, kidnapped robbed, and/or slaughtered is a common occurrence in Nigeria today. The concept of “rural insecurity” is becoming more sophisticated that it has evolved from the simple act of criminality to a more mysterious intricacy over the years. Rural insecurity is seen as a situation in which a person, group of persons, or community in rural areas are intentionally inflicted with death, raped, kidnapped or injured engaging dangerous weapons such as AK-47, explosives and other small arms/light weapons to cause harm. Rural banditry in the era of globalization is beyond mere rural gangs or groups. The complexity and the capacity to compete with the authorities of weak and failing States is something not to underestimate. For instance, the attacks on government-owned structures by Boko Haram in the North East, and the killings and destruction by bandits in the North West and North Central is a vivid example. Most often, they leverage the ungoverned paces to carry out these attacks. The forested landscape, which has remained ungoverned where statehood is absent, has become a shelter for bandits who desperately seek an operational bridgehead in the area that makes it difficult and impossible for the Nigerian security forces to penetrate (Ojewale, 2023).

Scholars and social commentators have raised theories or propositions to explain the emergence of insecurity in Nigeria. However, scholars are divided over factors that led to the emergence and the continued menace of rural insecurity in North Central Nigeria. The argument among scholars is that, security shares conceptual space of the people-centered approach to human development postulated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Central to the idea of insecurity, as espoused by the 1994 Human Development Report is first, freedom from fear intended to vindicate from violence, and freedom from want, which is intended to indicate freedom from poverty (Egwu, 2016). However, these propositions fail to interrogate how the lack of modern automated security gadgets in rural areas increases the rate of rural insecurity in North Central Nigeria.

In Africa, particularly in Nigeria, scholars view the deteriorating situation of insecurity as a governance failure. In his view, Ceccato & Ceccato (2017) hold that the trigger ranges between communal contestations over identity politics, power-sharing, resource control, chieftaincy struggle, etc. Ceccato & Ceccato (2017) did not explain how political marginalization, deprivation, and governance failure induce insecurity in Nigeria. Okoli, et al, (2016) observe that livelihood pursuits amidst instances of an ever-diminishing environmental space, characterized by resource inadequacy, population explosion, and resource contestation are factors that have occasioned rural security in the region. However, these scholars only informed us about the causes of insecurity in Nigeria but did not explain how it could be tackled decisively. They glossed over how the inability of the government to bring the hinterland, and/or rangeland and forest areas under control through security technology surveillance in Nigeria.

Scholars such as Kuna & Ibrahim (2016) identified factors that trigger rural banditry to include environmental and climate change, constant displacement of the human and livestock population, expansion in non-agricultural use of land, weak state capacity, and the provision of security, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs); rise of criminality and insecurity in rural areas; and weakening or collapse of informal conflict resolution mechanisms. However, Kuna & Ibrahim (2016) did not establish a connection between porous or ungoverned borders and rural banditry. Egwu (2016) attributed the underlying causes of rural banditry to a deteriorating state of human security, poverty, unemployment, the fallout of ethno-religious conflict, desperate desire for primitive accumulation of wealth, armed robbery and mental issues as well as the problem of small arms and light weapons (SALW) that have found their way into the hands of non-state actors. However, Egwu (2016) did not explain how consistent human population displacement could trigger rural banditry.

According to Momale (2016) the changing methods of animal husbandry, especially as it relates to pastoralism which involves movements of both people and livestock in search of feeds, water, and pleasant grazing regions, failures in the institutional capability of the State to tackle the problems of insecurity; joblessness and chronic problem of poverty are causes of rural banditry. Notwithstanding this excellent line of argument, Momale (2016) failed to attribute the reason for rural banditry to greed and psychological needs.

Ibrahim (2014) associated the phenomena of rural banditry with the failure of the State to provide security of lives and property as well as essential services to the general populace. Ibrahim (2014) did not see the collapse of informal conflict resolution mechanisms that could resolve social group conflicts leading to banditry as a factor responsible for rural banditry. Kuna & Salihu (2016) argued that rural banditry occurs due to the availability of motivated offenders whom cattle, goats, and sheep attract because of their high economic value, the availability of suitable targets that represent the unprotected citizens, and the absence of authority (state) to prevent the attack from taking place.

Nevertheless, Kusa & Salihu (2016) ignored how the chronic problem of poverty and unemployment could trigger rural banditry. Mohammed & Alimba (2016) posit that

uncontrolled or poorly governed rural environments and the availability of vulnerable populace citizens in rural areas and along the highways and roads are factors responsible for rural banditry. Nonetheless, Mohammed & Alimba (2016) did not look at the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as a driver of rural banditry. Hobsbawm (1969 in Mohammed & Alimba, 2016) enumerated two primary conditions essential for the existence of rural banditry including a rural or social situation established by a 'traditional peasantry' and a 'pre-industrial' geographical area.

This explains why Mburu (1999) argues that societal collapse is a permanent stimulant for rural banditry in a State. Mburu (1999) also opines that the motivation for present-day rural banditry is the pauperism of people living in an unpleasant physical environment. Sztompka (1993 cited in Mohammed & Alimba, 2016) asserts that rural banditry mainly occurs in periods of social conflict when accepted ways of life, rules, and laws are sabotaged, governing elites are not respected, and customs are jilted. For Sztompka (1993), rural banditry has a bearing on the internal dynamics of a state occasioned by social instability, poverty, politics, corruption, economic crisis, and environmental challenges that often precipitate rural banditry. Sztompka (1993) further posited that these internal dynamics directly undermine a state's security and stability, enabling a plurality of criminal activities across the State.

Scholars such as Olaniyan & Yahaya (2016), Suleiman (2017), and Mustapha (2019) have advanced different factors responsible for the preponderance of rural banditry in Nigeria, including the vulnerability of the Nigerian state, weak institutions of the state, particularly the security agency, accessibility of total ungoverned territories, weak leadership porous borders, corruption, chronic poverty, unemployment, and arms proliferation. Olaniyan & Yahaya (2016) asserted that the lack of sophisticated weapons and poor motivation of the State security forces promote rural banditry in Nigeria. Okoli & Ugwu (2019) posit that the existence and preponderance of an avalanche of 'ungoverned, 'under-governed' and 'ungovernable' spaces within a territorial area have provided a tremendous opportunity for rural criminality.

They also argued that a feasible but assailable rural economy based chiefly on animal husbandry, crop production, and informal mining, such as cattle, cash, and treasure, provides an avalanche of convenient crime targets. Okoli & Ugwu (2019) further argued that the crime environment is not only a motivating factor but also enticement for criminal pampering. For them, under this condition, crime deterrent takes flight, and all forms of marauding crime persist. Other scholars such as Blench & Dendo (2005) and Okoli & Atelhe (2014) averred that ethno-communal hostility complicated by the Faultiness of identity conflict encourages crime committal like banditry. Arguing from the perspective of criminological undercurrents of terror, McGregor (2014) and Olayoku (2014) see the predatory wanderers as offenders entirely driven by criminal intents. Accordingly, The Humanitarian (2018) stated that small-scale, illegal, and non-industrial mining in States like Sokoto and Zamfara has provided an abiding material inducement for criminals, including bandits who occasionally booty mining sites into stealing gold and cash.

According to Okoli & Lenshie (2018), poorly regulated livestock production has resulted in its attack by criminals, manifesting in increased rustling leading and banditry. However, Okoli & Lenshie (2018) did not explain how the crop destruction led to conflict between farming communities and nomadic herdsman Akanle & Omobowale (2015) argued that the goal of integration of the people of the ECOWAS member-nations in the ECOWAS Charter, which allows for the free movement of persons, goods and services, promotes banditry in the West African sub-region. However, Akanle & Omobowale (2015) did not link economic depression to banditry in the West African sub-region.

Mohammed & Abdullahi (2021) emphasized that rural banditry in Nigeria is economically driven by the desperate desire among unemployed youths to accumulate wealth and politically motivated by the quest to intimidate and kill a person or group of persons for the attainment of political positions. Thus, Mohammed & Abdullahi (2021) did not see the issue of identity politics and inter-group relations as drivers of rural banditry. Abdulrahman (2020) maintains that the weak capacity of the state, poverty, unemployment, and failure of leadership drive rural banditry in Nigeria. However, Abdulrahman (2020) did not look at the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, goods, and services as a contributory factor to explaining rural banditry in the West African region.

Notwithstanding this excellent argument, Osamba (1998) did not establish a connection between unemployment and banditry. Ademola (2021) enumerated poverty, conflict over depleted land resources between farmers and pastoralists, inequality, weak security forces, arms proliferation, the failure of local justice, and ethnic division as motivators of criminal activities such as rural banditry. Nonetheless, Ademola (2021) did not see the politics of cattle warlordism as an explanatory variable that promotes rural banditry. Suleiman (2019) argues that the effects of climate change, which result in decreasing amount of rainfall, scarcity of arable land and pasture, de-industrialization, abject poverty, porous borders, and collapse of State institutions as causes of the rise in criminality and banditry in North Central Nigeria. However, Suleiman (2019) ignored how the failure of local justice and ethnic division could drive crime like banditry

In his view, Omakoji (2019), insecurity emanates from the continued widening of the gap between the rich and poor occasioned by neoliberal reforms enforced on Nigeria beginning from the early 1980s by advanced capitalist societies through their imperialist institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and their allies when assets were privatized and commercialized only a few capitalists who could afford to buy bought them and became highly profit oriented. This enriched a few individuals and an impoverished mass majority however, Omakoji (2019) did not inform us about how political marginalization induces insecurity in Nigeria.

### **Materials and Methods**

The materials for the work were drawn from secondary sources of data such as journal articles, government publications, official documents, books, book chapters, etc. As a qualitative study, the study depended on a documentary method of data collection. The

reason for this method is because of its advantages as follows:

1. It permits the researcher to access subjects that may be herculean to obtain through primary sources because they are connected either to the past or to events that lack geographical proximity.
2. The application of data generated from archives is so important because raw data are usually non-reactive. Put differently, those writing and saving the records are most often not aware of any future research aim or theorizing, or, for that matter, the results emanating from their works will be appropriated for research purposes at all. Be that as it may, record keeping is not most often completely non-reactive. Record keepers are unlikely to initiate and save records that are unpleasant to them, their friends, or their bosses; that reveal illegal or immoral actions; or that disclose indecent, greed, or other derogatory piece; or even in some cases, that have security implications. The documentary method provides the avenue to records that have been in existence long enough to guarantee analyses of political events or actions over a period.
3. Another advantage has to do with the fact that using a written account offers the researcher the opportunity to increase sample size beyond what can be obtained through either interviews, questionnaires or other forms of direct observation.
4. Lastly but most necessarily, documentary method of data collection usually saves the researcher reasonable time and resources, it is usually quicker to glance through printed government documents, reference materials, computerized data, and research institute reports than it is to accumulate data ourselves through the survey methods (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995) (as cited in Ugwueze, Onuoha & Nwangwu, 2016).

Because security studies are usually enmeshed in secrecy, getting firsthand information from security agents or other stakeholders within the security administration is often pretty hard because they are often unwilling and skeptical with evidence that could provide clear empirical conclusions if one would have to depend on their information. Meanwhile, a documentary method provides the research with a broad base of opportunities that other methodologies may not offer. In analysis, the study employed a qualitative descriptive method. This method offers the following advantages:

- i. The method is encompassing and multi-faceted
- ii. It is inherently descriptive.
- iii. It deals with the empirical world
- iv. It is essentially dialectical and interactive
- v. It does not aim to conduct a statistical test (and interpretation) of the hypothesis (Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006; Ugwueze, Onuoha & Nwagwu, 2016). Nonetheless, the qualitative descriptive method of data analysis entails rigorous thinking, enough evidence, and options based on step-by-step and logical analytic order. Where necessary, tables and figures were adopted for proper clarity of data interpretation.

### **Theoretical Application**

One of the assumptions of the ungoverned spaces thesis is that there is a lack of security infrastructure. Security technologies are computer-based gadgets that are programmed to perform security functions with or without human aid. Some are made to perform

surveillance functions some mooting and capturing while others are made to perform a combination of functions. These technologies because Nigeria is a peripheral capitalist State it depends on advanced capitalist and technologically advanced countries for supplies of its technology. Therefore, they are in short supply and are not available for deployment. Deployment of modern security technologies in the fight against insecurity implies the use of “sets of programmatic electronically based gadgets for communication, creation, circulation, storage and for the management of security information to avert any unpleasant impending danger.

### **Results and Discussion**

The nature of the porosity of Nigerian frontiers requires the deployment of security technologies to curtail insecurity ravaging the nation. Technology is effective for security purposes and that is why it cannot be waved aside in the 21<sup>st</sup> century when both criminality and development are deploying technology. No digital crime (crime carried out using sophisticated gadgets) can be handled without matching it with an up-to-date state-of-the-art security facility. We examined how the application of Security technologies in security management can impact the protection of lives and property in Nigeria using the combination of the following gadgets:

- i. Installation of CCTV Camera
- ii. Satellite technology
- iii. Drones/Unmanned aerial system

At this juncture, it is appropriate to demystify the contending explanations about the emergence of rural banditry in North Central, Nigeria. Firstly, contrary to the views held by many which implicated climates change, resource scarcity, and overpopulation among others as factors responsible for the emergence and rising rural insecurity in North Central, Nigeria, we, however, argue that the explanation remains insufficient as it failed to unravel the hidden cause of insecurity in the region. The rising rural banditry is located within the context of ungoverned spaces where criminals commit crimes and evade arrest without any technology to track them and bring them to book.

The lack of modern automated security technologies induces rural insecurity in North Central Nigeria, such security technologies include CCTV cameras, this is useful for criminal investigation and include why, what, where, when, and who, which constitutes the major variable for investigation. The interrelated questions such as the person who participated in an act, the place it happened, the incident that happened, the time of the incident, why it happened, and how a crime was perpetrated help to establish and bring insecurity in check. It is known as the '5WH' (who, what, where, when, and why) inquiry model (Cook et al. 2016; Stelfox, 2009).

Secondly, contrary to the conventional belief that is premised on the emergence and rising insecurity on migration occasioned by the porosity of Nigerian borders, we contend that this unilateral perspective is erroneous and incapable of explaining the rising mayhem of armed banditry. As a result, we state clearly that the lack of security technologies such as satellite

technology satellite in rural areas to track the activities of bandits is responsible for the rising insecurity in the region. This helps to give early warning on impending danger. Although Nigeria has keyed into the benefits derivable from the installation of satellites and has since shot five satellite devices into outer space beginning in 2003 its impact has not been felt in arresting insecurity in the country.

Finally, from the feedback received, there seems to be a unanimous and unbiased recognition that the lack of drones in rural areas induces rural insecurity in North Central, Nigeria. This is because this technology has been used to peruse forest areas. For instance, it has been deployed in Indonesia to ransack a forest area to obtain the vastness of the forest area, human activities in and around the forest, and other relevant information. The UK deployed drones to trail Reyaad Khan, a British citizen, who was an Islamic State terrorist operating in Syria (Guardian, 2015). However, no success story has been written in Nigeria as a result of the backwardness in the deployment and application of technological gadgets hence, insecurity remains pervasive in Nigeria. Table 1 below indicates the breakdown of attacks by region in the decade 2008 to 2018.

**Table 1:** Breakdown of Herdsmen Attacks by Region from March 2008 - March 2018

Region	No. of Attacks	% of Attacks	No. of Deaths	% of Attacks	No. of Years	Average no. of attacks per year	Average No. of Deaths per Year
South East	33	5%	103	1%	10	3.3	10.3
South-South	77	11%	246	3%	10	7.7	24.6
South West	44	6%	84	1%	10	4.4	8.4
North Central	374	54%	4378	58%	10	37.4	437.8
North East	88	13%	1597	21%	10	8.8	159.7
North West	78	11%	1081	14%	10	7.8	108.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>694</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>7489</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>69.4</b>	<b>748.9</b>

**Source:** Centre for Democracy and Development, (2018).

The table above indicates the breakdown of the herdsmen attacks in a decade in Nigeria by region between March 2008 and March 2018. From the incidence, North Central recorded the highest number of attacks at 374 followed by North East, North West and South-South, South West and South East. Meanwhile, table 2- shows the regional map of herdsmen attacks in Nigeria.

**Table 2:** January 2018, Regional Data Map (Herdsmen attacks)

Region	Attacks	Deaths	Percentage
North Central	36	233	64%
North East	9	101	27.7%
North West	5	27	7.5%
South-South	3	5	1.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source:** Adopted from CDD, Abuja Conflict Mapping Database, (2018).

The above table shows the distribution of attacks and the number of herdsmen attacks in Nigeria by region. North Central has the highest number of attacks 36 and death casualties of 233 (64%) within the period followed by North East having 9 attacks and 101 deaths (27.7%). North West 5 attacks and 27 deaths (7.5%) South-South has 3 attacks with 5 deaths (1.5%) respectively.

### **Conclusion and Recommendation**

This study examined ungoverned spaces and rural insecurity in North Central Nigeria. It drew an explanation from the perspective of why and the context within which rural insecurity is escalating in North Central Nigeria. The perspective offered insight into the problem of how the lack of modern automated security technologies in rural areas is aggravating insecurity in North Central Nigeria, particularly banditry. The paper demonstrated that the emergence of armed banditry reflects the failure of the government to deploy up-to-date state-of-the-art security facilities or technologies to man the borders for effective security surveillance in rural areas. Arising from the forgoing findings, this study recommended the development of home-grown security technologies and deploying them in rural areas to forestall the activities of criminal elements in rural areas.

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