

Curbing Youth Unrest and Insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region: Challenges and the Way Forward

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Abstract

Records have shown that conflict arising from youth unrest involves the youths and young people hence this study is centred on curbing youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta region: Challenges and the way forward. The study made use of secondary and primary data. The study combined the elite theory and the frustration aggression theories as its theoretical framework in explaining why conflict and insecurity still persist in the Niger Delta region. Analysis was done qualitatively through content analysis. Findings from the study revealed that several socio-economic and political factors account for youth unrest and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. These factors include: marginalization and exclusion from the oil and gas sector, poor implementation of the federal governments amnesty programme in the Niger Delta, unemployment, poor governance at the state and local government levels etc. It is the position of this paper that massive investment in human capacity especially the youths will go a long way in curbing youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region.

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Background to the Study

Conflict especially youth unrest/uprising is a common feature of most developing states and Africa in particular hence, most states allocate huge public funds and resources in addressing conflict related issues at the expenses of national development and integration. While some states adopt nonviolent measures in managing and resolving conflict others rely on the use of military force. It is believed that the failure of the state to address key national issues and needs of citizens accounts for revolts and uprisings in most societies. While outlining the consequences of unresolved conflict Alao (2007), stated that for Africa, the implications of conflict caused by natural resources can be severe sometimes and underlining several issues including the collapse of state structures/institutions, massive human right abuses, the weakening of civil society, the disintegration of traditional institutions (Alao, 2007: p.2). Conflict scholars including Alao (2007), Achebe (1984) and Burton (1997) in their works reiterated that all the factors driving any conflict must be identified and addressed as quickly as possible to avoid its escalation which may be counterproductive for both the citizens and the state. Youth uprising or conflict at any level is detrimental to the citizens and the state hence, this study examines youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta region with a view to proffering solutions that will minimize all forms of violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta region.

Theoretical and Conceptual Elucidation

The study relied on the elite theory and the frustration-aggression theory in explaining the cause of youth unrest and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. Elites political theory was founded by an Italian economist and scholar called Vilfredo (1848-1923) who defined an elite as those with the highest level of excellence in a particular society. Vilfredo went further to develop the theory of the circulation of elites. On his part, Gactano (1941) added that in all societies there are two classes of people, the rulers and the ruled. According to him, the rulers are the elites while the ruled are the citizens (followers). In most societies, policies and actions of the state emanate from the elites who often dominate the political space hence, Arthur (1958) argued that political actions and policies are geared towards protecting the aspirations and desires of the ruling class (elites) in any society. This therefore implies that the failure of the state and the ruling elites to address issues affecting the citizens accounts for distrust and disenchantment which often degenerate into conflict, violence and insecurity as recorded in different parts of Nigeria. Proponents of the elite theory include: Vilfredo (1923), Gactano (1941) and Robert (1936). In the same vein, the frustration aggression theory was also applied in explaining the reasons for youth unrest, conflict and insecurity in Nigeria and the Niger Delta in particular. According to Dollard etal. (1939), when people find it difficult to achieve their goals and aspirations in any system or society, they are motivated to react negatively by engaging in aggressive conduct. Frustration-aggression theory scholars therefore maintain that aggression is propelled by factors which tends to deny individuals of their benefits and privileges and in most cases, it is traced to the failure of the state to perform its roles and responsibilities. Green (1941) and others reiterated that aggression is caused by frustration and that when people are prevented from attaining their goals or targets in any society, they become frustrated. This situation according to frustration-aggression scholars can transform into aggression when something triggers it. From this analogy, it is obvious that

aggressive behaviour by youths in the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general is aggravated to frustration and deprivation as reflected in the Kaiama declaration document, the Ogoni bill of rights etc. the position of conflict scholars is that deprivation, exclusion and frustration are indices to watch out for in order to prevent conflict in any society.

Conceptual Elucidation

Youth unrest and insecurity are clear signs of conflict hence, this aspect of the study will examine conflict, conflict analysis and conflict resolution methods and strategies. Adidu 2006 cited in Kalama (2012) defined conflict as the discord that arises when the goals, values or interest of different individuals or groups block or thwart each other's attempt to achieve their objective. In the same vein, Nelson and Quick (1997) also defined conflict as any situation in which incomplete goals, emotions, or behaviour lead to disagreement or opposition between two or more parties. Basically, conflict occurs as a result of disagreement or misunderstanding between groups, individuals, communities, regions and states hence, conflict can be personal, local, national or international depending on the variables and circumstances involved. On the other hand, conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict which in turn helps development, humanitarian and peace building organizations to gain a better understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context. It is instructive to add that conflict analysis can be carried out at various levels (e.g. local, state, regional, national and global etc.) and seeks to establish the linkages between these levels identifying the appropriate focus for the conflict analysis is crucial while the issues and dynamics at the national level may be different yet linking the level of conflict analysis with the level of intervention hence, it is also important to establish systematic linkages with other interrelated levels of conflict dynamics since all of these different levels impact on each other.

Youth Unrest and Insecurity in Nigeria

Available records show that most unrest and mass protests are mobilized and activated by young people (youths) ranging from 18-35 years. Examples of unrest and uprisings engineered by youths in Nigeria include: The Oodua People's Congress (OPC) which was led by Ganiyu Adams and DR Frederick Faseun, Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) led by Nnamdi Kanu who is currently detained by the Nigerian State, Boko Haram Insurgency led by Mohammed Yusuf etc. Whether these uprisings and unrest are justified remains a source of worry and debate among conflict scholars. However, these uprisings and unrest impacted negatively on the economy and citizens of Nigeria since several lives and properties were destroyed as a result of conflict and insurgency across the nation. The Boko Haram Insurgency for instance have remained protracted due to a number of factors ranging from lack of political will, corruption and criminal conspiracy and sabotage on the part of members of the armed forces and some civilian collaborators. This explains why the conflict in different parts of the country has remained unabated (endless). Alao (2007) argue that most devastating conflicts in Nigeria and Africa in the past and the present are connected to the struggle for power and control of mineral resources. Conflict scholars are therefore of the view that poorly managed conflict or uprising could experience escalation while properly managed conflict is likely to experience a steady decline (reduction). While referring to the Niger Delta

conflict Ibeanu (2008) stated thus; it appears that each advancement system created for the Niger Delta has incomprehensively under-developed the area (Ibeanu, 2008: p.4). It is therefore imperative for a thorough conflict analysis to be done before prescribing any conflict resolution methodology or framework.

Pre-Amnesty Niger Delta Region

While x-raying the activities of multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta Arugu (2013) in a paper titled “Oil Multinationals and Community Development: Reflections on SPDC and the Niger Delta”, published in the Niger Delta Research Digest (NDRD) Journal of the Centre for Niger Delta Studies, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, contended that multinational oil companies have contributed to the growth and development of less developing countries but that their unethical practices, designed for exploitation and profit maximization injure the economy and society of developing countries. The scholar listed the following as some of the negative activities of multinational oil companies: Environmental pollution, refusal to transfer technology/expertise, recapitalization through over invoicing, under invoicing, tax evasion and intrusion and inference in local politics.

With a table showing records of gas flaring among OPEC and non-OPEC countries, the author stated categorically that Nigeria ranks number one in the world when it comes to gas flaring which takes place daily in the Niger Delta region. Arugu (2013) maintained that oil spills and gas flaring resulting from the activities of the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) have devastated and affected communities in the Niger Delta and wondered why the communities are not adequately compensated whenever oil spills and pollution occur in the region. Citing Ibaba (2005) Arugu added “... the compensation rate for a mature Mahogany tree is N600.00, when such a tree can generate over N7, 000.00 when processed into wooden boards or planks. The same is true of the rates for Iroko, Ogbonom Camwood, etc. It is sad to note for instance that the rate for a mature “Ogbono” tree is just N340.00 when it can generate an average of N10, 00.00 a year for a period not less than 30 years. This also applies to the Star Apple (Udara) tree with a compensation rate of N100.00 for a mature tree, when it generates thousands of naira a year for a period not less than 20 years (Ibaba, 2005:29). The irony here is that these unrealistic and unjust compensation rates are fixed by the federal government of Nigeria through its Ministry of Environment, Solid Mineral Resources and Agriculture, yet the multinational oil companies uphold such rates because it promotes their business interest of maximizing profits.

This explains why scholars and environmental rights groups have continued to call for environmental justice and reparation to oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta. Also commenting on the challenges encountered by the Nigeria Government in its demobilization, disarmament and re-integration (DDR) programme in the Niger Delta, Zibima and Felix (2013) in their article “The state in conflict management: The amnesty programme and the nature of stakeholder cooperation in Nigeria's Niger Delta”, published in the Journal of the Center for Niger Delta Studies volume 7, number 1, contended that the DDR exercise carried out by the Nigeria Government did not follow international standards in terms of content and methodology. They observed that the fact that amnesty programme

succeeded in drastically reducing the incidence of violence is a short-term gain arising from the greed of militant Generals under the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) flagship and of the State represented by the political class. They therefore predicted that the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta may collapse and hostilities may resume because addressing the social and institutional drivers of the conflict is far removed from the objective of the Nigerian State when it moved to implement the programme. They argued further that rather than address the social issues that led to the conflict, the entire programme was monetized with the militant leaders and combatants earning huge allowances and stipends before the usual nonviolent tests and training hence, the cooperation between the government and stakeholders seems sustained by narrow and selfish economic interests of political elites and Niger Delta combustions facilitated through formal state institutions and informal social relations. Both scholars observed that the fundamental objective of any disarmament demobilization and reintegration exercise is to discourage ex-combatants from engaging in activities that could re-militarize their psyche or put in jeopardy the existing peace. They argued further that the aim of a DDR Programme is to help ex-combatants and militants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income without compromising the security of the state and its institutions. Citing UNAMID, 2012, Nzeshi, 2012 and Ezigbo 2012, they stated categorically that the case in the Niger Delta is full of inconsistencies and contradictions which could scuttle the entire amnesty programme.

According to them, it is inappropriate and a threat to national security, the deliberate strategy of the Nigeria ruling class to co-opt ex-combatants into the economic mainstream while the fundamental issues instigating armed conflicts in the Niger Delta region remain unattended to. While substantiating this position they maintained that in Bayelsa State which arguably was the boiling pot of militant activities before DDR, a group of ex-combatants were awarded oil pipelines and facilities security contracts in the state through their security firm BAJEROS while in Delta state where hostilities were equally intense, the Oil Facilities Surveillance Limited (OFSL) also owned by a former militant was contracted to police oil facilities. Wondering why this form of patronage must continue even after the DDR, they argued further that the relationship between the federal government and ex-combatant leaders raise doubts about the potentialities for DDR sustaining peace in the region and Nigeria as a whole. In their paper, they cited The Wall Street Journal (2012) which revealed the value of the oil pipeline security contracts awarded to ex-combatants during the post-amnesty era by Nigeria's state oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Details of the contract according to The Wall Street Journal 2012, and Aluede, 2012 are listed below.

Table 1: Security/Surveillance Contracts awarded to top ex-militant Commanders in the Niger Delta Region

S/No	Name of Ex-Combatant Leaders	Amount Received and the Purpose
1	Gen. Ebikabowei Victor Ben (Boy loaf)	3.8 million US \$ (559.64 Million Naira) to secure oil facilities in Bayelsa State.
2	Gen. Ateke Tom	3.8 million US \$ (559.64 Million Naira) to secure oil facilities in River State.
3	Alhaji (Gen.) Mujahid Asari Dokubo	9 million US \$ (1.42) Billion Naira) River State to secure oil facilities in River State.
4	Gen. Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo)	22.9 million US \$ 3.614 Billion Naira) to secure oil facilities in Delta State

Source:

Wall Street Journal, 2012; Amaizi, 2012).

The above financial inducement given to top militant commanders by the Nigeria Government have constantly pitched the ex-combatants in fierce battles with oil facilities saboteurs (some of whom are former militant foot soldiers who feel short changed by their leaders) who have proved relentless in sabotaging critical oil installations (the Wall Street Journal, 2012; Amaizi, 2012).

Curbing Youth Unrest and insecurity in the Niger Delta Region: Challenges and the Way forward

Scholars and advocates of development in the Niger Delta believed that the federal government of Nigeria set up several agencies and structures to drive and implement the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta. Thus, they re-iterated that the federal government set up a technical committee on the Niger Delta and the presidential Amnesty committee on Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militants in the Niger Delta. It is important to note that the first committee was chaired by the then Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Godwin Abbe (rtd). Issues relating to poor leadership and the mismanagement of the N60 billion released to the committee prompted the Federal Government to dissolved the presidential committee in November 2009. By the 16th of December 2009, the federal government to drive the amnesty programme. This time several stake holders including militant leaders and their nominees were co-opted as members of some of the committees. At the end of the disarmament and demobilization phase, ex-militants were profiled and documented and deployed to a camp at Obubra in Cross River State for further trainings on peace building and nonviolence. In the words of Sofiri Joab (2017), an estimated total of twenty thousand, one hundred and ninety-two (20,192) ex-militants were to be admitted into the camp for intensive nonviolence transformational training and re-orientation programme that runs for a period of fourteen (14) days per batch of between one thousand (1000) and one thousand five hundred (1,500) ex-militants (Sofri: Joab, 2017; p. 131). Abazie (2014) noted that the federal government amnesty programme objectives and deliverables was expected to run in three phases as listed below:

1. A disarmament phase which was to last from 6th August 2009 and 4th October 2009 and to include the collection of biometric data and oath taking.
2. A demobilization and rehabilitation phase expected to last from 6 to 12 months and to include the provision of, among other things counselling and career guidance for the

- ex-combatants and participants.
3. A re-integration phase expected to last up to five years and to include the provision of, among other things, training and micro credit for the participants.

The amnesty programme objectives and expected deliverables is listed in the table below.

Table 2: Components of the federal governments amnesty programme

Disarmament	Demobilization	Reintegration
Duration: August 6- October 4, 2009	Rehabilitation duration:6-12 months	Duration: up to 5 years
Key activities ❖ Collection of arms and ammunitions, explosives etc.	Key activities ❖ Ex-militants report to camp ❖ Verification and documentation ❖ Transformational training. ❖ Peace building and conflict resolution ❖ Counselling ❖ Career guidance ❖ Wellness assessment ❖ Reintegration classification ❖ Education and vocational placement ❖ Graduation and demobilization	Key activities ❖ Knowledge and skills acquisition ❖ Financial empowerment ❖ Placement programmes ❖ Micro credit ❖ Education ❖ Reconciliation with local community ❖ Conflict resolution framework/mechanism ❖ Monitoring and evaluation ❖ Exit of amnesty
Key Enabler Disarmament camp Massive campaign.	Key Enabler Transformational training centres Rehabilitation camps.	Key Enabler Partnering government agencies, NGOs and private organizations, OGIS training and support framework.

Source: Adapted from Arugu and Okoye 2014 p.80.

The above analysis shows that the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region recorded some degree of success but also had challenges which if not addressed could lead to a resurgence of violence and insecurity in the oil-rich region. Bassey & Oshita, (2007) however blamed the conflict in the Niger Delta on the political economy of the Nigerian State which is structured to favour some regions against the minorities. Citing (Le Billion, 2001), they posited that the state centric nature of oil exploration concentrates oil wealth in the hand of the ruling elite, their foreign partners and the multinational oil companies (MNOCS) where they most probably maintain vested interests. Thus, they affirmed that state backed oil activities in the Niger Delta have impacted negatively on the psycho social and physical environment, causing stress, violence, and insecurity. While commenting on the consequences of oil exploration in the Niger Delta Bassey, and Oshita noted that communities in the Niger Delta, predominantly riverine communities have experienced consistent oil exploration for decades and have also suffered oil spillages, gas flaring, and other forms of ecological disasters at different times without adequate compensation and attention.

They contended that the conflict over oil in Niger Delta climaxed in 1995, following the execution of nine Ogoni leaders, including the minority rights activist, Ken Sarowiwa. These extra-judicial killings were globally condemned, and led to Nigeria's suspension from the (Common Wealth) hence, the federal government under General Sani Abacha, determined to protect multinational oil companies MNOCs (Chevron, Shell, Mobil, Elf, Agip, etc.), deployed armed personnels to guard oil installations, to deter protesters. Ironically, there were more demonstrations, seizure of oil rigs, and abduction of staff of MNOCs, vandalization of oil pipelines, emergence of youth militia groups and the proliferation of militant camps across the Niger Delta region. They therefore concluded that the conflict in Niger Delta could be linked to be a denial of the ontological needs of the people, and complicated by the communal content, governance of the state and international linkages (Bassey, and Oshita, 2007: p. 246).

The above position clearly revealed that a combination of factors contributed to the crisis in the Niger Delta while the structure of the state further led to the escalation of the crisis. The international dimension and the role played by multinational oil companies no doubt also helped to aggravate the conflict with the active support of the Nigerian state. The views expressed by Bassey and Oshita, affirm the position of Gurr, (1994) who stated that when minority groups within a given society are excluded from political and economic sphere/transactions, frustration and aggression including rebellion against the state becomes necessary and fundamental. In his work "minorities at risk", Gurr posited that exclusion of minorities in the distribution of benefits and amenities accounts for the struggle for power and conflict across the world.

The submissions of Gurr (1994), Bassey, & Oshita, (2007) clearly indicate that the Niger Delta require new strategies for peace and peace building in order to curb youth unrest and insecurity in the oil-rich region. They posited that conflict necessitates peace building which seeks to secure peace through conflict prevention, resolution and management (World Bank, 2006; Ibeanu, 2006; Francis 2006; Best, 2007. According to Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006, Peace building is aimed at preventing and managing armed conflict and sustaining peace after large-scale organized violence.

In the words of Bassey (2002), peace building is also enhanced by knowledge of the motives for conflict and peculiarities of conflict systems. He reiterated that conflict prevention requires the identification and containment of possible conflict drivers before they trigger conflicts. Nevertheless, the following strategies will help to curb youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta region:

1. **Socio-political and Economic Reforms:** Data from the study clearly shows that some laws and policies in the country helps to encourage exclusion and marginalization of youths and citizens of the Niger Delta hence, there is urgent need for socio-political and economic reforms to create room for people-oriented policies and programmes at all levels. This explains why Achebe (1984) and Gur (1994), argued that lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the political decision-making process can lead to frustration and aggression which could degenerate into violence,

conflict and insecurity especially in third world countries. In the case of the Niger Delta and other minorities in Nigeria, socio-political and economic reforms when carried out transparently and faithfully will lead to the repealing and eradication of out-dated anti-development laws, policies and legislations in the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general.

2. **Skills Acquisition and Employment Creation:** Data from the study also affirm that oil exploration and gas flaring by multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta has destroyed and contaminated the land, streams and the ecosystem which has affected the livelihood and economy of the people prompting some of the youths to resort to vandalism, oil theft through the establishment of local artisanal refineries. In the short terms, provision of skill acquisition schemes/programmes and employment of youths especially in the rural areas will help to check and stop crime, violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta region.
3. The study also shows that the disbursement of funds for the DDR programme was characterised by corruption and neglect of the welfare of the amnesty trainees hence, the entire amnesty programme should be properly interrogated and re-evaluated to ensure justice for all the parties including community stakeholders who were ignored and side lined throughout the commencement of the programme.
4. **Aggressive Investment and Development:** Ibaba (2007) stated categorically that previous interventions in the Niger Delta did not yield the desired results because precious interventions by the federal government and oil companies failed to address the root causes and drivers of conflict. In his work “mopping the wet floor while overlooking the leaking roof: Rethinking peace building in the Niger Delta” he stated that previous state responses to the conflict in Niger Delta were merely based on military force. He advocated for massive investment and infrastructural development in the region. According to him, this will in turn address other socio-economic variables plaguing the region.
5. Apart from providing employment, there is need to also provide social security and safety nets for the less privileged youths, children and vulnerable groups in the Niger Delta. Ibaba (2012) posited that sociopathic personality occur due to parental irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity and the associated really pregnancy leading to early and unplanned family living by uneducated and unskilled teenage mothers and fathers; and large family size etc. According to him, sociopathic personality is the outcome of Antisocial personality disorder (APD) which refers to pervasive pattern for, and violation of, the rights of others. He reiterated that this category of youths (boys and girls) are deadly and dangerous. In his words persons with sociopathic personality are usually filled with pent up anger, given their feeling of alienation, deprivation and refection by the society. They lack social responsibility and love the attitude to take from society by whatever means, what they perceive to love been denied them. The social breakdown theory explains that such person's form or join social groups or mass movements to advance their private interest/agenda (Ibaba, 2017: p.90). Thus, to avert further insurgency and resurgence of violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta region, children and youths with sociopathic traits should be taken care of through policy initiatives and actions by the local government,

state government, federal government and other critical stakeholders.

6. **Enthronement of quality Leadership at all levels:** The study revealed that youth unrest and the conflict in the Niger Delta region was triggered and aggravated by the absence of basic social amenities which ought to have been provided by the local, state, federal government and the multinational oil companies. Thus, the enthronement of honest, patriotic and disciplined leadership at all levels will no doubt help to build peace and stability in the region. Achebe (1984) made this point clear when he stated that the problem of Nigeria and Africa is purely that of leadership failure.

Conclusion

The study examined youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta region with a view to interrogating the challenges and charting a way forward. In terms of structure, the study was arranged in the following order: Abstract, introduction, theoretical and conceptual elucidation, youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria, pre-amnesty Niger Delta region, curbing youth unrest and insecurity in the Niger Delta region: Challenges and the way forward, conclusion, recommendations and references. The study highlighted the dangers posed by youth unrest, key drivers of conflict in Niger Delta including proffering strategic options (way forward) aimed at curbing youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. It is important to note that the shortcomings in the federal government's amnesty policy are yet to be addressed hence, the study identified potential factors that may lead to the resurgence of violence and insecurity in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Thus, the study posits that addressing the fundamental factors responsible for youth unrest and conflict in the oil-rich region is very fundamental to the resolution of conflict and maintenance of peace and security in Niger Delta region and Nigeria in general. Curbing youth unrest and insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta region therefore requires collective action and commitment from all stakeholders including the federal government, state governments, community leaders, multinational oil companies, the agitators (ex-militants) Local governments, intellectuals from oil producing communities etc.

Recommendations

Any form of unrest in the Niger Delta will be detrimental to the national economy, stability and security hence, the recommendations listed below will go a long way in addressing the menace of youth unrest and insecurity in the Niger Delta and the nation as a whole:

1. There is need for synergy among oil producing states, local governments and intervention agencies like the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The current practice where development efforts are duplicated will not help the Niger Delta and the people especially those in the grass root.
2. The study clearly shows that youths and young people are the drivers and mobilizers of protest and conflict hence, there should be special development programmes set aside for the youths in order to engage them meaningfully and also channel their energies to the right direction.
3. Special attention should also be given to children of ex-combatants through

- government policy actions so that such children are not recycled back to the creeks as sea-pirates and agitators of tomorrow.
4. The present amnesty policy of the federal government should be reviewed and re-evaluated so that emphasis can shift from militant-centred to community and people centred policy. Thus, there is need for the federal government to focus its energy on developing oil producing communities rather than focusing on the welfare and needs of militant leaders and Generals as they are called.
 5. In order to ensure peace and sustainable development in the Niger Delta, the government at all levels must look beyond politics in its actions, programmes and policies. This is imperative and fundamental because oil producing states and communities are controlled by different political parties (APC, PDP, Labour Party etc.) whereas the central government is controlled by the Ahmed Bola Tinubu-led All Progressives Congress. Distributing development projects and benefits on the basis of equity, fairness and justice irrespective of political party affiliation is therefore very necessary and fundamental.

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