

Terrorism and Violent Crime in Africa: A Comparative Analysis Between Nigeria and Kenya

Sunny Mene Piate

*Department of Political Science,
Akwa Ibom State University, Obio
Akpa Campus, Oruk Anam I. G.
Area*

Article DOI:

10.48028/iiprds/ssljprds.v11.i1.16

Keywords:

Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Niger Delta, Terrorism and Violent Crime.

Corresponding Author:

Sunny Mene Piate

Abstract

The study undertook a comparative analysis of terrorism and violent crime in Africa, concentrating on Nigeria and Kenya. The study was initiated because to the persistent occurrence of terrorism in Africa, despite several strategies used at local, continental, and global levels to eliminate it. Terrorism is a significant impediment to Africa's development, obstructing economic progress, social stability, and political security. The phenomena of terrorism and associated security challenges, such as banditry, kidnapping, and insurgency, need an examination of the nature of terrorism and its underlying causes in Africa. The study sought to examine the motives behind terrorist actions in Africa and their resultant negative impacts on the national and economic security of African nations. The key claim of the study was that policymakers must have a comprehensive grasp of the essential factors leading to terrorism to devise and implement effective prevention measures. The study used three theoretical frameworks to clarify the discourse: Frustration-Aggression Theory, Religious Fanaticism, and Relative Deprivation Theory. The importance of these concepts to the study is their clarification of how greed, grievance, corruption, inadequate governance, and psychological factors have combined to create a favourable climate for terrorism in Africa. The study's findings reveal that the persistence of terrorism in Africa arises from historical animosities, disputed legitimacy, resource conflicts, extremist ideologies, chronic intelligence failures, inadequate collaboration among the Multilateral Joint Task Force, insufficient natural solidarity among African states in fulfilling their counter-terrorism obligations, and porous borders. The report recommended that Africa's counter-terrorism strategy include a strategic political agenda for secularization, a comprehensive legal framework, proficient security forces, efficient border monitoring, and the sharing of intelligence and information.

Background to the Study

Those who fiercely oppose the status quo display a range of possible political acts, of which terrorism is one aspect (Pillar, 2001). Terrorism, in common parlance, is the use of violent means by an organized organisation to achieve a political objective or to influence the actions of a government to suit the group's agenda. As a political tactic, it entails using force or threats of force, usually against innocent civilian populations, to coerce a certain group to agree to certain social, economic, political, cultural, or religious demands. A terrorist act may be defined as a specific method of waging war, as well as a set of associated tactics and strategies. The fact that it is primarily a weapon aimed at humans is its defining feature. This kind of violence is intentionally carried out by subnational organisations against non-combatant targets, with the goal of influencing a larger audience than just the victim themselves. The illegal use of force or violence by a group of individuals linked to a foreign power or whose actions cross national borders in order to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian populace, or any segment thereof to advance political or social objectives is defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as terrorism (Blum, 2003). According to the 1999 African Union (AU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist Financing, a terrorist act is any behaviour that puts people's lives, freedoms, or physical integrity in jeopardy, or harms public or private property, natural resources, cultural heritage, or the following: (i) to intimidate, fear, compel, coerce, or induce any government, institution, or segment thereof to do or not do anything, accept or reject a particular stance, or act according to specific principles; (ii) to disrupt any public service or the provision of essential emergency services; or (iii) to incite general insurrection within a state. (b) Acknowledging, supporting, instigating, encouraging, attempting, threatening, conspiring, organizing, or obtaining any person with the purpose of carrying out any conduct described in paragraph (a)(i) and (ii), whether by promotion, sponsorship, or contribution.

Agwu (2013) said that the advent of terrorism, characterized by indiscriminate violence against civilians or non-combatants to garner notoriety for a cause, originated during the French Revolution, when the Jacobin Club instigated a reign of terror against the populace of France. The Jacobins' impact culminated in the emergence of Sergey Nechayev in 1869, who was the first individual to officially identify as a terrorist and, in that same year, established the Russian terrorist organisation termed "People's Retribution." The ascendance of the Jacobins during the French Revolution inspired a generation of fervent proponents of terror as a means of political involvement. The Middle East crisis seems to have intensified the contemporary phenomena of terrorism. The June 27, 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris, carrying 247 passengers and twelve crew members, culminated in Israel's Operation Thunderbolt, also known as the Entebbe Raid. Additionally, the October 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro involved four heavily armed Palestinian terrorists who seized the Italian cruise ship, which was transporting over 4,000 passengers and crew in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Egypt. Other heinous terrorist assaults that have occurred globally include the September 11, 2001 strikes in the United States, the Bali bombing in July 2002, the Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004, and the London bombings in July and August 2005 (Lackey, 1989; Clarke, 2004). Terrorism often occurs at three levels of explanatory frameworks. The political terrorism highlighted by the 1976 hijacking of a Paris-bound Air France flight from

Tel Aviv triggered Israel's retaliation known as Operation Thunderbolt. This kind of terrorism is conducive to discussions since it pursues apparent and tangible objectives. The second form of terrorism is millenarian terrorism, epitomized by the al-Qaeda movement, which aims to create a worldwide theocracy and whose proponents pursue martyrdom rather than worldly diplomacy. The third form of terrorism is insurgency or revolutionary terrorism, when rebels use it as an alternate method to achieve their revolutionary objectives in an asymmetrical confrontation with the state. They deploy terrorism to accomplish objectives such as fostering an environment of widespread insecurity and confusion inside the state, demoralising the opponent, and garnering notoriety. They contravene all established standards of involvement in armed conflict, especially by infringing against the protections afforded to the civilian population (Agwu, 2013; Egbe, 2022; Caleb, 2022).

Terrorism in Africa may trace its lineage back to extreme Sunni Salafists who want to restore Islam to its original, pure form; these extremists have their origins in al-Qaeda, a global Jihadist organisation. Terrorism is also seen as a means to an end—the liberation of Palestine—by isolating the West from the Middle East and ending its support for Israel. As a result, changing the balance of power on Earth is the driving force behind al-Qaeda's brutal assault on the West and its allies. We are faced with a paradoxical scenario here: The United States—the sower of the seed—is embroiled in a conflict with al-Qaeda. The United States' Cold War containment strategy against the Soviet Union outside of Eastern Europe dictated the overarching policy platform of U.S. intervention during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a proxy war undertaken by the United States. There is a strong correlation between al-Qaeda and the events surrounding its founding, including the United States' role in supporting the Soviet invasion and defeat in Afghanistan, the Afghan civil war that followed, and the establishment of the Taliban. The Islamists in Afghanistan had very little societal support to begin with, but they consolidated their influence with the aid of Pakistan and the CIA, which resulted in the Soviet Union's exit from the nation. Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Sahel (AQIS) are groups spread throughout Africa at the moment. According to Wapmuk (2022), AQIM and AQIS represent al-Qaeda in Africa, whereas AQAP is based in Yemen. For a long time, Africa has been afflicted by global terrorism.

The development issues of Africa, such as its porous borders, corrupt administrations, and impoverished, mostly Muslim populations, make the continent an unsafe place to live. The continent is ideal for terrorists because of these reasons. Researchers believe that several African states have all the makings of terrorist havens, including Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Kenya. The 1998 bombings of the Tanzanian and Nairobi embassies stand out among worldwide terrorist strikes on the African continent (Okaronye, 2013). More than 240 people were murdered and hundreds more were injured in these assaults. With the passage of Resolution 213 of 1992 at its 28th ordinary summit in Dakar, the African Union (AU) began to address the issue of terrorism on a continental level, calling on member states to work together more closely in the fight against extremism. During its 30th ordinary summit in Tunis, Tunisia in 1994, the OAU Assembly of heads of state adopted a Declaration on the code of conduct for Inter-African Relations, which firmly rejected fanaticism and the use of religion

to commit violent acts, including terrorist acts (AHG/Declaration 2(xxx) of 1994). The adoption of the OAU convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism in 1999 at the 35th ordinary session of the OAU Heads of State and Government in Algiers, Algeria, was the peak achievement of the continent's endeavours since the 1990s to tackle the issue of terrorism in a more organised and determined manner. The Convention is comprised of twenty-three articles in total. As previously stated, the Convention's Article 1(a) defines terrorist acts. The Convention's Article 2 states that the parties will review their domestic laws in relation to the Convention's definition of terrorist activities and establish criminal offences for such acts, with punishments proportional to the gravity of the offences. In addition, as stated in Article 4(i) and (2) of the Convention, the states who are party to it pledge not to do anything that may provide terrorists shelter, support or fund their activities, or even commit terrorist acts themselves. Article 6 of the Convention addresses the following situations regarding jurisdiction over terrorist acts as defined in the Convention: (a) when the act is committed in the territory of that state and the perpetrator is arrested there or outside, if this is punishable by that state's national law; (b) when the act is committed on board a vessel or ship flying the flag of that state or an aircraft registered under its laws at the time of the offence; (c) when the act is committed by a national or group of nationals of that state; (d) when the act is committed against a national of that state; (e) when the act is committed against a state or government facility abroad, including an embassy or diplomatic premises; (f) when the act is perpetrated by a person or entities outside of the country Article 3 has features that might undermine the convention's commendable provisions for measures to combat and prevent terrorism.

For instance, in line with the norms of international law, those who struggle for their independence or self-determination must not be subject to terrorist activities, as stated in Article 3(1) of the convention, notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 1. For example, there have been violent uprisings against foreign rule, colonialism, invasion, and occupation. With the abolition of apartheid in South Africa more than a decade ago and the fact that no African nation is now under colonial rule, the constitutionality of this provision in Article 3(1) is open to debate. Even in circumstances of self-determination, terrorism is never appropriate, as this indicates. For armed struggles against colonialism and national freedom, the 1949 Geneva Convention and its Protocol 1 lay forth the laws of Geneva. Even in these settings, terrorism may be hidden.

Terrorism is still a major issue on the African continent since many African nations do not have the necessary knowledge or resources to combat it effectively. This is due to the fact that a more fruitful and efficient strategy for the fight against terrorism in Africa would have been to: (a) ensure that its member states are prepared to respond swiftly and effectively in the event of an attack; (b) thwart the plots, networks, and operations of terrorists; (c) punish those who support terrorism; (d) deny terrorists funding, resources, and safe havens; and (e) create an unfriendly atmosphere in Africa. The problem is that Africa's approach to counterterrorism relies on outdated political, legal, and administrative frameworks rather than considering the sociopolitical and economic aspects of terrorism. In this second section, we consider how local communities may be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks in the context of widespread

poverty and ineffective leadership. Meanwhile, many African nations aren't united enough to do their part in the fight against terrorism. The terrorism problem in Africa is complex and severe for several reasons, including a lack of an appropriate patriotic climate, the presence of sympathetic elements within the populations of certain AU member states, and inadequate national institutions to enforce or implement the counter-terrorism framework of regional organisations. Weak leadership, long-standing animosities, exclusionary political practices, resource competition, legitimacy concerns, foreign influences, radical ideology, and other issues seem to be the origins of terrorism in Africa. The true offenders, however, are poverty, marginalisation, inequality, poor leadership, ethnic grudges, and so on. Many bloody conflicts have broken out throughout Africa because of these problems, killing millions of people and destroying assets and revenue worth billions of dollars for African countries. Terrorist activities may take several forms, including hijackings of aircraft, kidnappings, killings, bombs, and suicide attacks. Terrorist activities impose enormous psychological, social, political, and economic harm on the societies they target. How does armed robbery, banditry, abduction, insurgency, and other forms of terrorism in Africa work, and what are the root reasons of these threats to security? In this study, we compare and contrast two African countries—Kenya and Nigeria—to examine the causes, dynamics, and consequences of terrorist movements on national and economic security. The inquiry was prompted by the persistence of terrorist activities in Africa, despite several efforts to eliminate this risk on a local, continental, and worldwide level. The study's main argument is that governments can't put a halt to terrorist attacks until they identify their root causes.

Theoretical Explication of the Discourse

Numerous theories may be used to comprehend terrorism, including Psycho-Sociological theories, Frustration-Aggression theory, Relative Deprivation theory, Human-Needs theory, Theory of Religious Fanaticism, and Rational Choice theory. Due to the comparative character of the research, it used three theories to elucidate the discourse: Frustration-Aggression Theory, Theory of Religious Fanaticism, and Relative Deprivation Theory. The Frustration-aggressiveness hypothesis, commonly referred to as the Frustration-Aggression-Displacement theory, is an aggressiveness theory introduced by John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Orval Mowrer, and Robert Sears in 1939. This hypothesis has emerged as a vital tool in elucidating violent conduct resulting from the failure to satisfy fundamental wants. The idea posits that violence arises from the obstruction or frustration of an individual's attempts to achieve a goal. Their first focus is on the disparity between perceived entitlements and actual provisions, specifically the "want-gap ratio" and the divergence between "anticipated and realized needs fulfilment." When expectations do not align with actual outcomes, individuals prefer to approach those they blame for hindering their aspirations.

The theory's central tenet is that aggressive behaviour is not merely an innate tendency, but rather the product of frustration. When people feel their rightful desires are being denied, either directly or indirectly, as a result of societal structures, they may resort to violent means to express their anger, which they may then direct towards those they hold accountable. When it comes to the causes of terrorism, Gurr (2006) places more faith in inequality than in poverty. The idea behind his assumption is that militants usually don't use poverty as an excuse for their

acts; instead, they say they're fighting for oppressed or marginalised communities. In contrast to Gurr's assertion, Gambo and Nankap (2022) argue that poverty and inequality, particularly in Nigeria, might in fact be driving forces of terrorism that reinforce each other. If you ask them, the phenomena of terrorism can be adequately explained by only one of these two things. The Boko Haram insurgency and the Niger Delta issue in Nigeria provide a superb illustration of this thesis. The youth of the Niger Delta decided to take matters into their own hands after patiently demanding a fair share of the oil wealth extracted from their land. They did this by damaging pipelines, abducting oil workers for ransom, and sowing a general atmosphere of insecurity, all in an effort to bring attention to their underdevelopment (Gambo and Nankap, 2022).

Regarding religious theory A kind of human fanaticism that could manifest itself in one's involvement and participation, including employment, role, and partisan affinities, is extremism, which, according to Caleb, is a derogatory term used to describe uncritical zeal or obsessive enthusiasm related to one's own or one's group's devotion to a religion. By exploring the function of the social group as the impetus for terrorist actions, the theory clarifies the social psychological aspects intrinsic to terrorist violence. This theory's central tenet is that, rather than disease or ideas at the individual level, group membership and identification are more influential in shaping terrorist action. A person's self-esteem may be boosted by joining a terrorist organisation, which offers both the training and the outlets for the emotions brought on by real grievances. According to David Rapport, who is one of the theory's proponents, religious fanaticism increases the likelihood of mass murder and random terrorist strikes because bombers often feel they are fighting a holy war, or doing God's or Allah's will. An excellent illustration of this is the Horn of Africa region's Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

Although Aristotle established a connection between poverty and war, Gurr (1970) explains in his book "Why Men Rebel" how a disparity between anticipated and actual welfare leads to group dissatisfaction, which is relevant to the Relative Deprivation hypothesis. Terrorism and political violence, in his view, stem from widespread dissatisfaction brought on by a feeling of relative lack. According to Gurr, the disparity between an individual's anticipated and actual wellbeing is the root cause of relative deprivation. The frustration-aggression theory, from which he derives his premise, states that violent action is always prompted by frustration. This theory's central tenet is that unequal distribution of wealth and resources will lead to violent uprising.. These theories are relevant to the research because they show how psychological variables, greed, injustice, corruption, and poor leadership have all contributed to an environment that is conducive to terrorism in Africa, namely in Kenya and Nigeria.

Terrorism, National-cum-Economic Security: Nigeria and Kenya Experience

According to Ibaba (2018), domestic terrorism did not emerge in Nigeria until the mid-1990s, despite the fact that the nation has seen several instances of violence between sub-national groups since its independence, the most notable of which was in 1970 during the civil war. Terrorism in Nigeria is complicated, according to him, and two incidents show this. The two most prominent ones are the Boko Haram insurgency and the Niger Delta oil insurgency. Protests over environmental damage, developmental neglect, and insufficient compensation

payments by oil firms started in the 1970s in the Niger Delta. These oil-related demonstrations had escalated into an insurgency by 2005. The war against terrorism relied heavily on the violent tactics used by the local militia organisations. An anti-Western jihadist group known as Boko Haram was founded by Muhammed Yusuf, who was formerly the head of a smaller Sunni Islamic group known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lid Da'awati Wal-Jihad. With the goal of creating an Islamic state in Nigeria as its central objective, it has been spreading violent extremism since 2009. The church rejects Western culture, education, and contemporary science, according to Ajayi (2012). The members of this group adhere rigidly to the teachings of Islam in its most basic form because they think that Western influences on Islamic culture are the source of Islam's flaws. Since their leader Yusuf's gruesome killing, churches, mosques, security institutions, and media organisations have all been the focus of violent attacks (2012). As a result, many have lost their lives, and the government seems to be unable to stop the insurrection.

Several causes have been proposed for the rise of al-Qaeda affiliate Boko Haram in Nigeria. One side of this argument maintains that economic issues like unemployment, poverty, and a lack of education, together with infrastructural decay, play a significant role in inspiring Boko Haram. All of Nigeria wishes for better times, but those in the north feel this longing more acutely than the rest, according to a speech given by former US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carlson at the Washington Centre for Strategic and International Studies. A lot of people in Nigeria are struggling, but up north, almost everyone is dealing with significantly worse problems. Many Americans, especially those living in the north, attribute their economic hardship on what they see as the government's hostility and incompetence. This view is supported by polls and news accounts. In 2012, the Nigerian Tribune

The late Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, who was the forum's convener in the North, is among others who have said things along these lines. Ciroma said that the sect's actions were related to concerns that affected the everyday lives of people, such the North's state governments' flagrant indifference to serious difficulties in healthcare, education, and agriculture (the Nation, 2012). A similar argument was advanced by Kashim Shettima, the now Vice President of Nigeria and a former governor of Borno State. Shettima said that Boko Haram was born out of the northern region of the country's and the state's inadequate access to healthcare, electricity, and clean water (The Guardian, 2012). Sanusi Lamido, who is both the current Emir of Kano and a former governor of the central bank, has also said that the growing violence is due to the regional disparity in the allocation of income, and that Boko Haram is to blame for this. This Day (2012) reports that Lamido asserts that the data demonstrate a fundamentally massive demographic imbalance, with the North's population being disproportionately huge.

An ex-president of the Kaduna-based Civil Rights Congress named Shehu Sani claims that the economic disparity between northern and southern Nigeria gave rise to the group. Northerners are now less well-off and more susceptible to the radicalisation of their political views as a result of this (This Day, 2012). A number of factors, including the country's infrastructure, economy, unemployment rate, and educational opportunities, would

contribute to mitigating or eradicating the effects of terrorism and the local al-Qaeda attack, according to the communiqué issued at the end of the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)-sponsored conference on the country's security challenges on September 9, 2011. According to Herskovits (2012), who wrote for the *New York Times*, the political climates in Nigeria are characterised by violence and anger because of the pervasive poverty and hopelessness. Those who argue that Boko Haram's growth in the North is rooted in economic issues fail to address a critical component of their argument: the elite's complicity in the region's extreme poverty. According to Agwu, poverty is seen as the standard in Northern society. Some Northern elites need to face consequences for the systemic, ongoing, and escalating poverty in the region, asserts Agwu (2013). This is due to their belief that material poverty serves religious and societal functions, as well as providing a degree of personal fulfilment. A school of thought known as "the political factor" contends that the socioeconomic school of thinking is reducing a complicated problem to a political one. They saw the North's embrace of Boko Haram as a response to many events, such as the PDP's rejection of its zoning deal and Goodluck Jonathan's assumption of the president.

The sickness and death of Yar'Adua stopped Jonathan from allowing the North to finish its second term. General Azazi, who was the country's national security adviser at the time, supported this viewpoint at the South-South economic forum in Asaba, Delta State. He said that the PDP's decision to derail its internal zoning arrangement was the real cause of the national security threat posed by Boko Haram (*The Guardian*, 2012). Some scholars have argued that the rise of Boko Haram can be explained by religious fanaticism, rather than a synthesis of the political factor school's conclusions and the socioeconomic factor school's premises. They argue that this does not diminish the sect members' fundamental motivation as individuals dedicated to spreading the prophet's teachings and Jihad, but rather shifts the paradigm. No one in either school of thought has ever explained how educated, well-off people like Anwar al-Awlaki or the US military officer Major Nidal Malik Hassan—who murdered 12 soldiers and wounded over 30 others in a terrorist attack at Fort Hood in November 2009—could fall for al-Qaeda's radical rhetoric (*New York Time*, 2009).

It seems that radicalisation, ideology, and brainwashing were the driving forces behind Boko Haram's ascent, rather than poverty. In spite of the fact that between 166 and 200 people were killed in the bombing in Kano, this sect has remained firm in its belief that the government is against Islam and that the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) is killing Muslims and anyone who helps them fight, even Muslims (*Daily Sun*, 2012). Because there is a segment of the Nigerian population that is tolerant of the cult, the Boko Haram scourge has endured for an extended period of time, thanks to the combined efforts of national and international actors. Given the foregoing, it should be easy to see the seriousness of the problem and the significance of the Sahel and much of tropical Africa as new arenas of conflict for al-Qaeda, represented by organisations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Because of its weak justice system, Nigeria is once again a target for terrorists looking for a safe haven. One example is the 2012 sentencing of Ali Sanda Umar Kodunga, a Boko Haram leader who brutally murdered hundreds of people; another is the 2011 life sentence handed down to Abdulmutallab, a Boko Haram member, for his involvement in the failed bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 over Detroit (*The Guardian*, 2012).

Some northern extremist groups celebrated Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attacks on the United States, demonstrating that some Nigerians openly support the extremist sect. The lack of political will, corrupt law enforcement officials, and the fact that some laws do exist are the real problems when it comes to fighting terrorism in Nigeria. Currently, terrorism is primarily responsible for the physical and/or structural violence that Nigerians in different regions of the nation, especially in the northeast (Udama, 2013), experience. There isn't a single northern town where people may go about their normal socioeconomic pursuits without fear of kidnapping, murder, or herdsman attacks. Borno, Yobe, Katsina, Zamfara, Niger, and Kano are among the states where reports of kidnappings and killings, especially involving children, often make headlines (Gambo and Nankap, 2022). Boko Haram kidnapped 276 female students from Government Girls Secondary School Chibok on the night of April 14th – 15th, 2014. Kankara, Katsina State, was the site of the abduction of almost 300 pupils (BBC News, 2020). According to The Guardian (2021), 27 students were among the 42 individuals kidnapped in Kagara, Niger State. Additionally, 317 schoolgirls from Zamfara were kidnapped (BBC News, 2021). Lastly, thirty students were kidnapped in Kaduna (BBC News, 2021). In Nigeria, each of these occurrences qualifies as a terrorist act. The Boko Haram sect's actions resulted in 3,118 deaths, 2,793 injuries, and 9,305 displaced persons in 88 coordinated attacks that occurred between 2009 and 2014.

Table 1: Terrorist Attack in Nigeria

S/N	Date	Place of Incidence	Suspects	Victims
1.	19/10/1986	Dale Giwa's house; Ikeja, Lagos	IBB	Dele Giwa
2.	31/5/1995	Ilorin Stadium	Unknown	Figure unknown
3.	18/1/1996	Durbar Hotel, Kaduna	Individuals wanted for questioning slain; identify of victims not disclosed	Figure unknown
4.	20/1/1996	Aminu Kano Int'l Airport, Kano	Unknown	Figure unknown
5.	11/1/1996	Ikeja Cantonment, Lagos	Unknown	Figure unknown
6.	25/4/1996	Air Force Base, Ikeja, Lagos	Unknown	Figure unknown
7.	Murtala Muhammed Airport	Unknown		Chief Security Officer
8.	16/12/1996	Not available	Unknown	Col. Marwa's convoy
9.	18/12/1996	Not available	Unknown	Environmental Sanitation Task Force
10.	17/5/1997	Not available	Unknown	Nigeria Army bus hit
11.	22/4/1997	Evans square	Unknown	3 died, several people injured
12.	12/5/1997	Abuja Airport	Unknown	Colonel Oladipo Diya narrowly evades death
13.	27/1/2002	Ibadan	Unknown	Unidentified human casualty at federal works and housing ministry
14.	26/7/2009	Bauchi State	Dutsen Tanshi confrontation with security forces	The casualties include 39 civilians, 2 police officers, and 1 military.
15.	27/7/2009	Yobe State	The assault of the divisional headquarters in Potiskum began with the first strike in Yobe.	5 civilians dead, 3 policemen dead
16.	29/7/2009	Yobe State	Disagreement with Mamundo village security officers	33 BH dead
17.	29/7/2009	Borno State	Bravo, the conflict between BH and the joint security forces	Scores killed and operation base destroyed.
18.	7/1/2010	Borno State	Motorcyclists armed with BH weapons opened fire on a tea store in Gazangi-Tashan Gandu.	3 civilians dead
19.	2/4/2010	Bauchi State	Attack on prison at Maiduguri	1 prison warder killed
20.	15/5/2010	Warri, Delta State	Niger Delta Militants	Figures not available
21.	1/10/2010	Abuja	Boko Haram	Figure not available
22.	8/4/2011	Suleja, Niger State	Boko Haram	Figure not available
23.	26/4/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	Boko Haram	Figure not available
24.	1/1/2011	Abuja	Boko Haram	Army market, human victim not known
25.	28/1/2011	Bauchi State	Assassinated Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio, an ANPP candidate for governor	5 injured
26.	2/3/2011	Kaduna State	Marry a divisional police officer and attack his home	2 policemen killed
27.	7/4/2011	Borno State	An explosion of bomb	Many injured
28.	8/4/2011	Kaduna State	There were explosions at the Suleja headquarters of the independent elections commission.	11 civilians killed
29.	21/4/2011	Borno State	Two suspected bomb makers	2 BH dead

30.	25/4/2011	Kano State	Trifecta of Maiduguri bombings rock Tudu Palace Hotel and Kano Motor Park	Figure not available
31.	5/5/2011	Bauchi State	Bomb explosion in Damaturu	1 policeman injured
32.	5/5/2011	FCT Abuja	Attack on Bauchi State government house at Abuja	1 civilian dead, 1 policeman dead others injured.
33.	5/5/2011	Bauchi State	Sheikh Goni Tljam and Mallam Alhaji Abur, two eminent Islamic scholars, had their homes attacked.	2 islamic clerics dead
34.	9/5/2011	Bauchi State	Attack on Ibrahim Dudu Gobe	1 civilians killed
35.	13/5/2011	Bauchi State	Bomb explosion at Londo Chinki Maiduguri	2 civilians killed
36.	15/5/2011	Bauchi State	Bomb exposition at military barrack	3 policemen dead, 2 soldiers dead
37.	29/5/2011	Bauchi State	Take on Alhaji Abba Anas Graba El - Kanemi, the Shehu of Borno's brother.	14 soldiers dead
38.	31/5/2011	Borno State	Attack on police station in Maiduguri	1 civilian dead
39.	28/5/2011	Borno State	Shandawank Barracks's mammy market was a riot.	13 civilians dead, 40 injured.
40.	29/6/2011	Bauchi State	An explosion at Zuba of Kubwa in Abuja	8 civilians lose their legs.
41.	1/6/2011	Borno State	Violence breaks out at Maiduguri police station	5 policemen dead
42.	12/6/2011	Bauchi State	Attack on drinking joint at Damboa	4 civilians dead
43.	16/6/2011	Bauchi State	Bomb explosion at Damboa	4 civilians dead
44.	16/6/2011	FCT Abuja	Bomb explosion at the force headquarters	2 policemen dead
45.	16/5/2011	FCT Abuja	A huge detonation in Abuja, the site of the national police headquarters	Figure not available
46.	4/7/2011	Borno State	Bomb blast	4 civilians dead, 10 injured
47.	13/7/2011	Borno State	Bomb blast	5 civilians dead, 2 soldiers injured
48.	26/8/2011	FCT Abuja	Bomb blast at UN House Abuja	36 were killed, 11 from the United Nations, and many more wounded.
49.	17/10/2011	Borno State	BH storm police barracks	14 vehicles burnt
50.	8/12/2011	Kaduna State	Bomb blast	Several more wounded, and fifteen people killed.
51.	20/12/2011	Yobe State	Bomb blast	3 suspected BH injured
52.	25/12/2011	Niger State	Bomb blast at St. Theresa's Catholic Church	Several people injured.
53.	15/1/2012	Gombe	Deeper Life Bible Church in Gombe	8 worshippers dead, 18 injured.
54.	16/1/2012	Adamawa State	Shooting attendees at Christ Apostolic Church in Jimeta, BH	16 worshippers dead.
55.	21/1/2012	Kano State	Several bomb blast at police stations	200 people, including civilians and police officers, died
56.	27/1/2012	Kano State	Bomb blast	2 civilians dead
57.	20/9/2012	Plateau State	Attack on the State capital	9 civilians dead
58.	17/10/2012	Plateau State	Attack on security	1 soldier macheted, 3 BH killed.

Source: Okpata, F. O. and Nwali, T. B. (2013).

Kenya, in contrast to Nigeria, has a long history of being regarded as one of the most stable states in all of Africa. However, there has been a rise in terrorist attacks inside Kenya in recent

times. Kenya has, more than any other country in the area, been hit hard by terror attacks from local, regional, and foreign organisations since the August 8, 1998, assault on the United States embassy in Nairobi, which ushered in a new era of national security concerns. Once again, Kenya is home to several western-interested establishments, including the headquarters of important international humanitarian and development organisations like the UN. A lot of money has flowed into Kenya from the West because of its political climate, stability, and location in the area. Nairobi serves as the operational hub for many western countries and enterprises in Africa. This is mainly because of the city's advanced infrastructure, robust banking system, and generally stable economy. Kenya has been a popular tourist destination due to its pleasant tropical climate, beautiful landscapes and animals, and rich cultural heritage. This research suggests that Kenya is an important ally of the Western powers. The fierce hostility it faced from terrorist organisations like as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab might have been explained by this. Terrorist attacks in Kenya seem to be linked to the country's Muslim population and its political ties with the US and its allies, such Israel. As a result, acts of terror in Kenya might be seen as an indirect assault on both the US and Israel. While many Muslims throughout the globe loathe Israel for what they regard as its mistreatment of the Palestinian people, terrorist organisations see the United States as the strongest weapon against radical Islamization and the growth of the Islamic State. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Kenya's ethnic makeup, geographical location, political instability with its neighbours, Islamic fundamentalism, and a lack of strict law enforcement all contributed to the country's elevation to the status of a key ally in the worldwide fight against terrorism (Aranson, 2013). Following the fall of the Somalian government in 1991, the country descended into anarchy, where extremism and criminality thrived, with the Al-Shabaab Terrorist Organisation posing the greatest danger to civilians (Mogire and Agade, 2011). Due to its closeness to the Arabian Peninsula, Kenya has been an easy target for Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The current upsurge in attacks in Kenya is a retaliatory strategy aimed at compelling the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to pull its forces out of Somalia. According to Felix, Israel, and Billy (2022), Kenya is at risk of terrorist strikes because to its perceived affiliation with Western powers, instability in Somalia, frustrations among its own groups, and corruption within its security system. The terrorist attacks in Kenya have had far-reaching consequences, including loss of life on both the battlefield and in civilian and military personnel, emotional and psychological distress for affected families, widespread fear and panic among Kenyans and tourists, a decline in the country's tourism industry and economy, higher prices for consumers as a result of the government's increased spending on security measures, and higher costs for businesses as a result of the installation of expensive monitoring equipment and personnel (Klein, 2007).

Table 2: Terrorist Attack in Kenya

When	Where	What	Why	How	Who
28/1/1976	Nairobi	An attempt to shoot down a passenger airliner from EL. AL was unsuccessful.	Jihadism within Islam, resistance to Zionism, and US imperialism	Plotters arrested	The Palestinian Liberation Front and Baader Meinhef
31/12/1980	Norfolk Hotel	20 people killed, more than 100 injured	Lengthy prison terms for Kenyan officials who helped Israel free hostages in Kampala	Bombing	The Palestine Liberation Front (PELP) as a Popular Front
7/8/1998	US Embassy	Nearby structures levelled; 250 fatalities and 5,000 injuries	Attack on US interests	Truck Bomb	Al-Qaeda
28/11/2002	Israeli passenger aircraft, Mombase, and paradise hotel	An attack on an airliner almost missed, killing 13 and injuring 80.	Attack on Israel interests	2 missiles targeted the plane.	Al-Qaeda affiliated; 'the Army of Palestine'
Sept. 2011	Kiwaiyu Safari Village	A man is killed and a lady is abducted during an assault on a British couple.	Targeted foreigners for ransom	Guns	Armed Somali Men
Oct. 2011	Manda Island	Escaped from France to Somalia after being abducted	Targeted foreigners for ransom	Guns	Armed Gang
24/10/2011	Mwaurus Night Club Nairobi	14 people injured	Deployment of Kenyan forces in Somalia	Hand grenade	Al-Shabaab
27/10/2011	Mandera	Ministry of Education Officials attacked, 4 died	Deployment of Kenyan Forces in Somalia	Guns and explosives	Al-Shabaab
5/11/2011	Pentecostal Church Garissa	2 people killed			Al-Shabaab
21/9/2013	Westgate Mall Nairobi	67 people killed, 175 injured	AMISOM retaliation	Guns and grenades	Al-Shabaab
15-16/6/2014	Mpeketoni	At least 65 people in multiple attacks	Alleged execution of Muslim clerics	Explosives, machetes, guns	Al-Shabaab
22/10/2014	Mandera	Nairobi bound bus attack, 28 people killed	Religious Intolerance	Guns and explosives	Al-Shabaab
2/12/2014	Mandera	36 Quarry workers killed	Retaliation for Kenya Military in Somalia		Al-Shabaab
2/4/2015	Garissa University College	148 killed, 79 injured	Revenge attack against Kenya	Guns and explosives	Al-Shabaab
15-16/1/2019	Dusit D2 Hotel, Nairobi	21 killed and 28 injured	Retaliation against KDF in Somalia	Armed with firearms, suicide vests, and explosives, militants raid a hotel complex.	Al-Shabaab
16/2/2019	Primary School Wajir	3 Christian teachers killed	Religious Fundamentalism	Gun attacks	Al-Shabaab
15/4/2019	Mandera town	1 police officer killed & 2 Cuban doctors abducted	Scuttle government operations	Ambush with firearms	Al-Shabaab
15/6/2019	Wajir County	Eleven police officers slain, one wounded, and three reserve cops kidnapped	Undercut security operations	IED	Al-Shabaab
26/10/2019	Garissa County	Eleven officers from the General Service Unit (GSU) and four civilians were killed.	Hamper security operations in the region	IED	Al-Shabaab
6/12/2019	Wajir County	6 police officers and 4 civilians killed	Instill civilians fear	Gun attack on public transport bus	Al-Shabaab
5/1/2020	Manda Bay	3 Americans killed; 2 contractors injured	United States' Reaction to the Transfer of Its Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem	Indirect and small-arms fire	Al-Shabaab
7/1/2020	Saretho village in Garissa	4 children killed, 3 wounded	Target telecommunication infrastructure	Firearm attack/light bombs	Al-Shabaab

Source : Felix *et al* (2021)

The attacks of September 11 in the United States demonstrated that no country is immune to the increasing frequency and intensity of terrorist activities and organisations throughout the globe. The current strategies for destroying terrorist organisations, including targeted killings, extrajudicial proceedings, and interventions, are very concerning since they have failed. Some anti-terrorism campaigns have been unsuccessful; for example, the Afghan Taliban's twenty-plus-year reign, Boko Haram's eradication in Nigeria, the Houthis' control of Yemen, and al-Shabaab's grip on Somalia (Jackson, 2017). As the frequency of their strikes increased, some African nations resumed negotiations with the organisation. The use of intelligence is more important in the fight against terrorism than fighting a standing army, according to Labaran Maku, a former Nigerian minister of information under Jonathan. This is in addition to the critical need of deploying physical soldiers. The comment implies that the federal government formally asked the cult to reveal their true intentions and make demands in order to start talks (The Guardian, 2012; The Punch, 2012). The federal government has said that the United States and its Western allies, including Britain, would never negotiate with terrorists because terrorists want to destroy the foundations of open society, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. The objectives of the Bi-National Commission and the counter-insurgency MOU are congruent with this. As a result of Jonathan's desire for a second term in office, the administration adopted a "choice cum" approach towards settling for discussion, which was more akin to playing politics than upholding the law regardless of who was involved. Anwaral Awlaki, a citizen of the United States, was ordered to be killed by the government as a form of punishment for his illegal terrorist actions. It is obvious that the United States is strongly against engaging in any kind of communication with terrorists, much alone negotiations.

There are a lot of inherent difficulties in fighting terrorism in Africa. Some of the greatest obstacles these African nations have in their fight against terrorism include persistent intelligence failure, an inadequate or nonexistent good intelligence network, and a lack of extensive collaborations among their intelligence agencies. The African continent has never had a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) that was able to accomplish its goals. At the height of the al-Qaeda and Boko Haram threats, Nigeria and Cameroon formed one coalition, while Somalia and Kenya formed the other in October 2011 to fight Al-Shabaab. In order to stop terrorists from getting in, there isn't enough information exchange between agencies or cross-border patrols and monitoring by MJOTFs. Corruption among security personnel in African countries puts most whistleblowers in risk. In nations like Nigeria, where whistleblowers are often betrayed, ordinary individuals are less likely to report terrorist actions to intelligence agencies. Intelligence collection is essential to counter-terrorism activities because only high-quality information can stop a terrorist attack in its tracks. Many African countries are known more for their inferior intelligence than their strong intellect. The porous borders of Africa further complicate efforts to combat terrorism throughout the continent. In Nigeria, for instance, the attack on Kano on January 20, 2012, resulted in the capture of more than 200 Boko Haram fighters. It came to light later that mercenaries from Chad had entered the country via Nigeria's weak borders, accounting for more than 80% of the attackers. More than a hundred people from various North African countries, including the Niger Republic, Chad, Mali, and others, were in the state's custody in February 2012, according to revelations made by Gabriel Suswan, the former governor of Benue State

(Punch, 2011). Fighting Somalian terrorist groups al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab presents a comparable challenge for Kenya. This is because; first, Africa is geographically close to the Arabian Peninsula; second, it is more heavily populated than its Asian and European neighbours; third, its borders are porous due to a lack of monitoring; and finally, and most importantly, the security agencies responsible for guarding Africa's borders do not have enough funding, personnel, or other resources to carry out their jobs effectively. Hence, border control is an essential part of the battle against terrorism on the continent. Border movements would keep conditions favourable to terrorist expansion going if it weren't for it (Otiso, 2009).

When it comes to African nations' national and economic security, terrorism is a major problem. A climate of fear is fostered by terrorist attacks, which deters investment from both domestic and foreign entities. Businesses are hesitant to operate in areas with a high crime rate. Spending will fall, fewer new employment will be created, and growth will be weaker overall. Transportation networks, energy facilities, and communication systems are all examples of crucial infrastructure that terrorists often aim their strikes against. Such destruction messes with the economy and slows down development efforts.

Kenya is one of many African nations that depends substantially on tourism. Significant economic losses occur as a result of terrorism-related fears that deter tourists. Governments are also compelled to devote significant resources to combating terrorism, which takes money away from vital development programs like as healthcare and education. Worryingly, terrorism has been connected with horrendous levels of bloodshed and damage. With the rise of suicide bombings as a tactic for combating terrorism, this group has added a new layer of danger to Africa's national security. Terrorist attacks in Africa have made the continent's nations very vulnerable on humanitarian and territorial fronts. It has exacerbated the refugee crisis, public insecurity, human rights violations, livelihood threats, displacement of populations, and human fatalities. The continent of Africa is no longer seen favourably as a location for investment, travel, tourism, and migration due to the negative connotations associated with terrorism. School buildings and campuses are common targets for terrorist organisations. Because of this, a vicious cycle of poverty is perpetuated and children are unable to get an education.

Conclusion

The research conducted a comparative investigation of terrorism and violent crime in Africa, focussing on Nigeria and Kenya. The research was prompted by the ongoing prevalence of terrorism in Africa, despite the many methods used at the local, continental, and global levels to eradicate it. This study concludes that the prevalence and persistence of terrorism in Africa stem from weak governance, historical animosities, exclusionary politics, contested legitimacy, resource conflicts, extremist ideologies, developmental challenges, insufficient political will, chronic intelligence failures, inadequate collaboration among the Multilateral Joint Task Force (MJTF), a lack of national solidarity to fulfil counter-terrorism obligations, and, crucially, porous borders. Africa's counter-terrorism strategy must incorporate a deliberate political agenda of secularization via citizenship education, a robust legal

framework, and efficient security forces aligned with human rights, thereby preventing unrest and instability that could be exploited by terrorists, alongside effective border surveillance and intelligence sharing.

References

- African Union Convention on the prevention and combating terrorism, 1999.
- Agwu, F. A. (2013). *Themes and perspectives on contemporary African's international relations*. Ibadan: University Press PLC.
- Agwu, F. A., Gabriel, A. A. & Ibi-Aglobu (2014). Boko Haram and terrorism in Northern Nigeria: A psychological analysis, *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, 17(1): 115 – 136. AHG/Declaration 2 (XXX) of 1999.
- Aranson, S. L. (2013). Kenya and the Global war on Terror: Neglecting history and Geopolitics in approaches to counter terrorism. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS*, Vol. 7.
- Article 3(1) of OAU Convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism, 1999.
- Article 4(1)(2) of OAU convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism, 1999.
- Blum, W. (2003). *Killing hope: US military and CIA interventions since world war II*, London: Zed Books Limited.
- Caleb, A. (2022). The concepts and operational frameworks of insurgency and counter insurgency In: Tar, U. A., Wapmuk, S., and Ubi, E. N. (Eds), *Terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria: The domestic and foreign policy dimensions*. Kaduna: Pyla-mark printing press.
- Caleb, A. (2022). The concepts and operational frameworks of insurgency and counter Insurgency. In: Tar, U. A., Wapmuk, S. and Ubi, E. N. (eds), *Terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions*. Kaduna: Pyla-mak Printing Press.
- Clarke, R. A. (2004). The new terrorist threat, *New York Time* of March 22, p. 29.
- Egbe, O. D. (2022). Understanding terrorism and counterterrorism: A didactic study. In: Tar, U. A., Wapmuk, S. and Ubi, E. N. (eds). *Terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions*. Kaduna: Pyla-mak Printing Press.
- Felix, S., Israel, N. N. & Billy, A. (2021). The experience of terrorism in Kenya: What are the Vulnerabilities and strength, *Algeria: African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism*, 11(1): 127.

- Felix, S., Israel, N. N. & Billy, A. (2021). The experience of terrorism in Kenya: What are the vulnerabilities and strength? *African Journal of Terrorism, Algeria: African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism*, 11(1), 127.
- Gambo, A. N. & Nankap, K. S. (2022). Theoretical perspectives on terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria". In Tar, U. A., Wapmark, S. and Ubi, E. N. (Eds), *Terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria: The domestic and foreign policy dimensions*. Kaduna: Pylamark Printing Press.
- Gurr, T. R. (2006). Economic factors." In Louise, R. (Ed). *The root of terrorism*, London: Routledge.
- Ibaba, S. I. (2018). *The challenge of domestic terrorism in Nigeria". In Ibaba and Ogban (Eds), Nigeria and the challenge of domestic terrorism*. Welberforce Island: Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University.
- Jackson, D. R. (2017). *United States foreign policy in the horn of Africa: From Colonialism to Terrorism*, Routledge.
- Klein, A. (2007). *The cost of terror: The economic consequences of global terrorism*, Konrad – Adenauer.
- Lackey, D. P. (1989). *The ethics of war and peace*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Mogire, E. & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter terrorism in Kenya, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473 – 491.
- Okoronye, I. (2013). *Terrorism in international law*, Okigwe: Whytem Publishers.
- Okpata, F. O. & Nwali, T. B. (2013). Security and the rule of law in Nigeria, *Review of Public Administration and Management*, 2(3).
- Otiso, K. M. (2009). Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery, *Kenyan Studies Review*, 1(1).
- Pillar, P. R. (2001). *Terrorism and United State Foreign policy*, Washington DC: Brooking Institution Press.
- Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949. *Resolution 213 of 1992*.
- Udama, R. A. (2013). Understanding Nigeria terrorism, its implication to national peace, security, unity and sustainable development: A discuss, *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 8(5): 100 – 115.

Wapmuk, S. (2022). Historicizing terrorism and the challenges to Nigerian Foreign Policy. In: Tar, U. A., Wapmuk, S. and Ubi, E. N. (eds). *Terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions*. Kaduna: Pyla-mak Printing Press.

National Dailies and News Sources

1. Nigerian Tribune, 11 April, 2012.
2. The Nation, 3rd April, 2012.
3. The Guardian, 21 April, 2012
4. This Day, 28 January, 2012.
5. Herskovits, J. (2012). "In Nigeria, Boko Haram is not the problem". *New York Time* reproduced in *Punch*, 5 January, 2012.
6. The Guardian, 28 April, 2012.
7. New York Time, 27 December, 2009.
8. Daily Sun, 23 January, 2012.
9. The Guardian, 17 February, 2012.
10. Daily Sun, 7 December, 2011.
11. BBC News, 14 December, 2020
12. BBC News, 26 February, 2021.
13. BBC News, 11 March, 2021.
14. Punch, 3 September, 2011.
15. The Guardian, 9 February, 2012.
16. The Punch, 27 January, 2012.